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ABSTRACT OF THESIS.
The Ghanaian te x t i le  sector, a fte r  decades of protection, is 
today operating in a free trade environment. This means that i t  is 
now having to compete with imports in terms of price and qua lity .
Thus, in th is  study, i t  is argued that e ff ic iency  of 
production and cost cutt ing measures-are important in aiding the 
te x t i le  sector in Ghana to become more competitive with imports. The 
e ff ic iency  and cost structure of the Ghanaian te x t i le  sector are 
therefore examined in an attempt to estimate the degree of technical 
ine ff ic iency  and the e ffec t of cost cutting measure on the price of 
individual te x t i le  f irm s ' output. Technical ine ff ic iency  is estimated 
using a stochastic f ro n t ie r  approach.
The main find ings are that f irm s ' technical ine ff ic iency  
declined to re la t iv e ly  low levels as they became more exposed to 
foreign competition. Also, the competitive position of Ghanaian 
te x t i le  f irm s, as fa r  as competition with imports is concerned, can 
be greatly  enhanced as a resu lt of the various cost cu tt ing  measures 
looked a t. This resulted in some firms achieving an export potentia l 
as a resu lt of the potentia l reduction in th e ir  price.
F in a lly ,  some po licy  options are explored. These include: 
change in tax po lic ie s ; change in fuel water and power charges; a 
devaluation of the exchange rate; and incentives fo r  cap ita l 
investment.
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1. INTRODUCTION.
The Ghanaian te x t i le  sector, a f te r  having been protected fo r 
decades in the p re - l ib e ra l isa t io n  period proceeding 1983, is today 
operating in a open market environment. This has meant that the 
sector is now open to competition from imports. Thus, efficency of 
production and cost cu tt ing  measures have become an important 
component in aiding Ghana's te x t i le  sector to compete in th is  
l ibe ra lised  economic climate.
This study is therefore concerned with the cost structure 
and e ff ic iency  of the Ghanaian te x t i le  sector. The Ghanaian te x t i le  
sector is reviewed, in Chapter (2), in order to put the te x t i le s  
sector in perspective. Chapter (3) looks at the competitiveness of 
Ghanaian cotton cu lt iva t io n  re la t ive  to world c u lt iv a t io n .  The study 
then goes on to examine the world tex iles  industry, in Chapter (4), 
in an attempt to shed some l ig h t  on the comparative advantage which 
developing countries might p o te n t ia l ly  enjoy in view of the fac t 
that th e ir  labour costs are re la t iv e ly  lower.
Chapter (5) reviews the h is tory  of te x t i le s  in Ghana, as 
well as summarising the state of the Ghanaian te x t i le s  sector as seen 
at the time the fieldwork was conducted.
Chapter (6) reviewed the l i te ra tu re  on the measurement of 
productive e ff ic icency , while Chapter (7) gives a b r ie f  account of
l
the questionnaires and the method of data co l lec t io n . Chapter (8) is 
involved with estimating technical ine ff ic iency  in s ix  te x t i le s  firms 
fo r  the period 1979-89, and Chapter (9) explores cost reducing 
measures to improve the competitiveness of te x t i le s .  Policy options 
are explored in Chapter (10), and a summary of the study is given in 
Chapter (11).
2
2. GHANA: ECONOMY.
2.1. Introduction.
Afte r a period of re la t ive  prosperity in the 1960vs, 
Ghana experienced a protracted economic decline in the following 
two decades characterised, in varying in tens ity , by persistent 
high in f la t io n ,  declin ing production and exports, f lou r ish ing  
i l le g a l  a c t iv i t ie s ,  and p o l i t ic a l  in s ta b i l i t y .  A gradual decline 
in per capita income increased the incidence of absolute poverty 
and was accompanied by a worsening of income d is tr ib u t io n , 
growing unemployment, and the emigration of sk i l le d  professionals. 
Discouraged by th is  deterio ra tion in the economy, aid donors 
gradually reduced th e ir  support, which fu r the r worsened the 
balance of payments s itua tion .
Although the economic deterioration was p a r t ly  caused by 
external fac tors , such as the two o i l  price shocks, the sharp rise 
in world in te rest rates, and a collapse of primary commodity prices 
in the early 1980's, the main cause was inadequate economic 
po lic ies . Beginning in 1983, a major reorien ta tion  of economic 
po lic ies took place with the adoption of the Economic Recovery 
Programme, (ERP), under the tutelage of the International Monetary 
Fund, (IMF), and the World Bank, (WB). The key reforms include 
import l ib e ra l is a t io n  and the abo lit ion  of import licensing; 
massive devaluation of the Cedi; the removal of price
3
controls; the elim ination of the budget d e f ic i t ;  and reduced 
public sector borrowing from the banking system.
I t  remains to be seen whether the gains achieved to date
w i l l  be consolidated. Cries of success would be premature. On the 
balance of payments f ro n t ,  Ghana w i l l  continue to be unhealthily 
re l ia n t  on aid. Prices of the two main exports - cocoa and gold 
which account fo r  70 per cent of foreign earnings - are forecast to 
remain re la t iv e ly  weak. Timber exports w i l l  be constrained too 
by environmental and conservation considerations. Aid 
dependence is heightened by the reluctance of foreign investors 
to commit new funds to Ghana, and a p a r t ic u la r ly  worrying aspect of 
th is  dependence is the increasing reliance on foreign technical 
assistance which is taking place.
F ina lly , industry, while having been weakened by prolonged 
disinvestment in the early 1980s, is , on the whole, having to face 
competition from imports while using old and run-down cap ita l stock.
This chapter is divided into seven sections. A fter the
introduction in Section (2 .1), Section (2.2) compares the re la t ive  
size of industry and agricu ltu re . Section (2.3) gives a b r ie f  review 
of the in d u s tr ia l isa t io n  push started by Nkrumah in the 1960s.
Section (2.4) is interested in what went wrong and the resu lting  
economic downturn of the 1970s and early 1980s. Section (2.5) gives 
an overview of the ERP of 1983. Section (2.6) looks at the ERP's
successes and fa i lu re s  under the fo llowing sub-sections: (2.6.1)
4
trade, (2.6.2) investment, (2.6.3) aid, (2.6.4) c re d it  and banking, 
(2.6.5) industry. The summary is in Section (2 .7).
2.2. Employment and Output in Industry and Agriculture: 1960-83.
Ghana was known as the Gold Coast u n t i l  her p o l i t ic a l  
independence from the B r i t ish  in 1957. The change of name was 
implemented p r im ari ly  to take account of the b e l ie f  tha t the Akan 
ethnic group, which made up about 45 percent of the to ta l 
population*, migrated to i ts  present location from the old Ghana 
Empire when i t  f e l l  in the 13th century. The change in name was also 
meant to serve as a mark of national id e n t i ty  and hence as an 
insp ira tion  to the then emergent l ibera tion  movement in A frica^.
The country is bordered by three former French colonies: on
the west by the Ivory Coast, on the northwest by Burkina Faso, and on 
the east by Togo. The southern part of the country is a 554 km of 
A tlan t ic  coastline facing the Gulf of Guinea.
Agricu lture  is by fa r  the largest sector of the economy. As 
can be seen from Table (2 .1), i t s  contribution to GDP at constant 
prices was 46.5 percent in 1970. By th early 1980s i t s  share was 
approximately 60 percent. The share of industry in GDP was 18.3 in 
1970, r is in g  to 21.0 percent in 1975, and fa l l in g  sharply to 11.4 
percent in 1980 and fu r the r to 6.2 percent in 1982. The share of the 
services sector f e l l  from 40.7 percent of GDP in 1965 to 27.6 percent 
in 1980 and then rose sharply to 36.4 percent in 1982. Huq (1989)
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indicates that the sharp r ise  of the service share in 1982 is due to 
the r ise  of the share of the wholesale and re ta i l  sub-sector during 
the 1980-82 period as a resu lt  of high prices during th is  period.
Table (2.2) shows the occupational d is t r ib u t io n  of the 
labour force. I t  can be seen from th is  that in 1960, agricu ltu re
engaged 61.5 percent of the to ta l  labour force, declin ing to 57.0
percent by 1970. While ag r icu ltu re 's  proportionate share of the 
labour force f e l l  in th is  period, both manufacturing and services 
recorded substantial employment growth rates. Huq (1989) points out 
that th is  trend is in l ine  with the universal performance of these 
three sectors in the course of economic development.
2.3. The Industrialisation Strategy.
In d u s tr ia l isa t io n  was an o f f ic ia l  po licy of the government 
as fa r  back as 1947 when a statutory body - the Industr ia l 
Development Corporation (IDC) - was established to ' fo s te r  industr ia l
growth' (Grayson 1971, p .73). Among i ts  objectives was 'securing the
investigation, formulation and carrying out of projects fo r 
developing industries in the Gold C o a s t .
The emphasis on ind u s tr ia l isa t io n  was also apparent in 
Nkrumah's development plans, issued shortly  a f te r  he became Prime 
Minister of the Gold Coast Colony in 1951 and a f te r  independence in 
1957:
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"Our f i r s t  Development Plan [1952-7] concentrated on 
communications, public works, education and general services. I t  
prepared the way fo r  our ind us tr ia l isa t ion  d r ive ."
"This was the keynote of our Second Development Plan [1959-64] 
which w i l l  provide fo r  the establishment of many fac to r ies , of 
varying size, to produce a range of hundreds of d if fe ren t 
products.1,4
Nkrumah emphasised the ro le of import-substitu ting domestic 
manufacturing industries in order to reduce foreign dependence fo r 
those goods. Thus, ind u s tr ia l isa t io n  was o r ig in a l ly  conceived:
"Prim arily  as a means of achieving economic independence and 
growth, rather than as a response to foreign exchange needs."5
According to the Economic Survey (1962) i t  was not u n t i l  
1962 that the country had i ts  f i r s t  serious balance of payments 
d e f ic i t ,  and reference was made to "helping the balance of payments 
s itua tion" as a primary reason fo r  encouraging domestic production.
To speed up the ind u s tr ia l isa t io n  process, Nkrumah 
introduced a package of incentives fo r  the manufacturing sector in 
the 1960s. For example, the Capital Investment Act was passed in 
1963. th is  act, as is pointed out in the Ghana Economic Review 
(1973-75), offered a wide range of f is c a l and other concessions to 
potentia l investors including: tax holidays of up to f iv e  years; 
accelerated depreciation rates fo r  build ing plant and machinery;
9
exemption from customs duties on machinery, raw materials, spare 
parts and fu e l;  deferment of company re g is tra t ion  fees and stamp duty 
fo r  up to f iv e  years on capita l invested in approved projects; 
guaranteed remittance of cap ita l and p ro f i ts  and employment tax 
cred it fo r  a period of up to ten years.
Apart from these incentives, industry was given protection. 
This involved the imposition of t a r i f f s ,  quotas and complete 
re s tr ic t io n s  on the importation of certain manufactured products. 
Steel (1972), fo r  example, points out that the import licensing 
system, which was established in 1961, became an important 
determinant of investment and production in manufacturing.
Thus, the main build-up of the industr ia l sector took place 
in the 1960's, under Nkrumah. But, as K i l l i c k  (1978) points out, 
e ff ic iency  was low and industr ia l output growth was poor. In fa c t ,  
Steel (1972) used the E ffective Rate of Protection (ERP), and Leith 
(1974) used the Domestic Resource Cost (DRC) to examine the 
e ff ic iency  of industries in Ghana.
Steel's work indicates that i f  t a r i f f s  and licensing had 
been removed in the period being studied ( i .e .  1967-68), only 15.4 
percent of the firms surveyed would have been competitive with 
imports at the o f f i c ia l  exchange rate, and devaluation by 50 percent 
would have raised that f igure  only up to 25.6 percent. Le ith 's  study 
shows that the ERP varied widely fo r  the firms surveyed in the period 
1968-70, and gives negative value added at world prices in a number
10
of instances.
The resu lts  of Steel and Leith cast doubts on the e ff ic iency 
of import-substitu ting in d u s tr ia l isa t io n  in Ghana as pursued up to 
1970. Steel concludes:
"These firms represent a waste of investment funds and a fa i lu re  
of import subs titu t ion , i f  they are continua lly  operated at the 
level and cost structure observed in 1967-8. As of that year, 
Ghana's in d u s tr ia l isa t io n  and import substitu tion  po lic ies  were 
extremely unsuccessful in establishing a structure and level of 
manufacturing output which could e f f ic ie n t ly  reduce foreign 
exchange requirements and stimulate growth of GNP."
Therefore, despite a r is in g  investment to GDP ra t io  between 
1958-65, as indicated by Brown (1972), the real per capita GDP, which 
grew stead ily  in the period 1960-63 and was above the African 
average, f e l l  sharply in the 1963-67 period and was by then below 
both i t s  1960 level and below the African average real per capita GDP 
as can be seen from Figure (2 .1).
Steel (1972) therefore concludes tha t:
"there is no evidence that the in d u s tr ia l isa t io n  programme was 
successful in stimulating a r ise  in income during the period 
under study, and i t  may have been pa rt ly  responsible fo r  the 
decline in real per capita income, to the extent that i t  
diverted resources away from other sectors."
That the economic decline of th is  early  period of 
independence was not more severe is explained by the following 
factors. F i r s t ly ,  the export prices of cocoa and timber were buoyant,
11
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while export volumes were increasing. Secondly, apart from the i l l -  
considered ind us tr ia l investments, Nkrumah spent more l ib e ra l ly  than 
the colonia l regime on health and education. Therefore, the physical 
indicators of welfare a l l  showed s ig n if ica n t improvement. And 
th i r d ly ,  as pointed out by Green (1987), s te r l in g  balances 
accumulated in the la te colonial period were s t i l l  there to be drawn 
from, while various other cap ita l inflows had not yet dried up.
2.4. The Downturn of the 1970s and Early 1980s.
Afte r only f i f te e n  years of independence, and before the 
exasperating factors that led to the economic collapse of the early 
1980s, key features of a counter-productive strategy were v is ib le  
( K i l l i c k ,  1978). During most of the 1970's and early  1980's Ghana 
suffered an economic malaise marked by shrinking output, high and 
accelerating in f la t io n ,  and growing external imbalances.
With a population growth of about 3 per cent a year in th is  
period (see population figures in Table (2 .3 )) ,  per capita income was 
substan tia lly  eroded. Figure (2.1a) plots real per capita GDP fo r  the 
period 1955 - 1988. Three trends are d iscern ib le : a f luc tua ting  but 
r is in g  trend from 1955 to 1974; a sharp declin ing trend from 1975 to 
an a l l  time low real per capita GDP in 1984; and then a mild recovery 
from 1985 to 1988. Thus as ODI (1988) points out, and as revealed by 
Figure (2.1a), i t  was in the 1970s that Ghana changed from being a 
middle-income to becoming a low income country - the only African
13
Real, Per Capita and Real Per Capita GDP, 
Population and Deflator. (1985 = 100)
Table 2.3.
QDP in Billion* 
of Cod I*
QDP Deflator 
1965=100
Real QDP (’B5«=pric**) 
Billion* of Cadi*
Population
Million*
Par Capita QDP Par Capita Real OOP 
’65 price* (’OOO*)
195S 0.6 0,36 174,1 5.83 106.3 29.9
1956 0.6 0.36 177.2 6.02 106.8 29.4
1957 0.7 0.37 1B1.6 6.20 108.7 29.3
1956 0.7 0,38 188.6 6.39 111.3 29.5
1959 0.8 0.38 210.1 6.58 123.3 31.9
1960 0.9 0.41 224.8 6.78 128.5 33.2
1961 0.9 0.41 238.6 6.85 141.6 34.8
1962 1.0 0.42 250.2 6.93 143.9 36.1
1963 1.1 0.44 258.8 7.01 157.1 36.9
1964 1.2 0.47 264.4 7.40 162.2 35.7
1965 1.5 0.54 268.0 7.74 193.8 34.6
1966 1.5 0.57 268.3 7.91 189.6 33.9
1967 1.5 0.58 260.2 8.08 185.6 32.2
1966 1.7 0.62 277.0 8.26 205.8 33.5
1969 2.0 0.68 293.2 8.44 237.0 34.7
1970 2.3 0.71 313.1 8.61 267.1 36.4
Source: IMF, IFS yearbook, various.
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Real, Per Capita and Real Per Capita GDP, 
Population and Deflator. (1985 = 100) 
Table 2.3 (cont)..
ODP in Billion* 
of Cadi*
QDP Daflator 
1885=100
Aaal QDP (*65 prtcaa) 
Billion* of Cadi*
Population
Million*
Par Capita QDP Par Capita Raal QDP 
’65 prica* fOOOs)
1871 2.5 0.75 330.5 8.86 282.2 37.3
1872 2.8 0.87 322.2 9.09 308.0 35.4
1873 3,5 0.94 371.4 9.39 372.7 39.6
1874 4.7 1.21 384.0 9.61 489.1 40.0
1875 5.3 1.58 334.6 9.87 537.0 33.9
1876 6.5 2.03 322,8 10.31 630.5 31.3
1877 11.2 3.39 330.1 10.41 1,075.9 31.7
1876 21.0 5.86 358.1 10.75 1,953.5 33.3
1878 28.2 8.14 346.7 11.09 2,542.8 31.3
1860 42.9 12.36 346.7 11.34 3.7B3.3 30.6
1861 72.6 21.29 340.6 11.55 6,285.7 29.5
1862 86.5 27.35 316.0 11.73 7,374.3 26.9
1883
I
184.0 57.83
I
318.0 11.92 15,436.0 26.7
1864 270.6 82.90 326.4 12.39 21,840.0 26.3
1865 343,0 j 100.00 343.0 12.72 26,965,0 27.0
1886 511.4 141.70 360.9 13.05 39,187.0 27.7
1887 746.0 197.30 378.2 13.39 55,713.0 28.2
1888 1,057.9 263.30 401.7 14.13 74,869.0 28.4
Source: IMF: IFS 1984,88, Jan. 91.
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country known to have made such a t ra n s it io n .
The performance of in f la t io n ,  fo r  the period 1968 to 1990, 
is i l lu s t ra te d  in Figure (2 .3). This can also be divided into three 
periods: a period of re la t iv e ly  low in f la t io n  in the 1968-1974 period 
( i . e  below 20 percent); a period of predominantly high in f la t io n  from 
1975 to 1983, with three years, 1977, 1981 and 1983 having over 110 
percent in f la t io n  and a peak of 123 percent in 1983; and a period of 
re la t iv e ly  moderate in f la t io n  from 1984 to 1990 with an average 
in f la t io n  value of approximately 23 percent. Thus we can see that the 
period 1975-83 was a period of extremely high in f la t io n .
By 1982, the country had incurred large external
payments arrears. Figure (2.8) shows Ghana's balance of payments 
s itua tion  in the period 1960 to 1989. The remarkable feature which 
can be seen from th is  f igu re  is that there was a BOP d e f ic i t  fo r  16
out of the 24 years in the period 1960 to 1983 with three years
having a d e f ic i t  of over $100m, (1974, 1976 and 1983), and one year, 
1981, having a d e f ic i t  of nearly $300m. In the period 1984 to 1989, 
th is  s itua tion  was d ra s t ic a l ly  reversed with an overa ll surplus being 
recorded fo r  every year except 1986, and a surplus of over $100m fo r  
each of the three years in the 1987-89 period. The conclusion to be 
drawn from th is  is that the BOP d e f ic i t  in the 1970s and early 1980s 
was s p ira l l in g  out o f con tro l.
Figure (2.9) gives a graphic p icture of government finances
in real terms fo r  the period 1965 to 1988. From th is ,  i t  can be seen
17
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Balance of Payments: Overall Balance. 
Figure 2.8.
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Source: IMF, IFS Yearbook, various.
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Real Government Finance: Deficit/Surplus 
at 1985 prices 
Figure 2.9.
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Source: IMF, IFS Yearbook, various.
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that a budget d e f ic i t  was incurred in the twenty one year period 
between 1965 and 1985. This showed an accelerating trend in the 1965 
to 1975 period with a high of over 350 m il l io n  cedis being reached in 
1975. A fa l l in g  trend is shown in the 1975 to 1988 period, with the 
budget being in s l ig h t  surplus in real terms fo r  each year in the 
1986-88 period. Thus a great deal of f is c a l imprudence was exhibited 
by the respective Ghanaian governments fo r  nearly three solid
decades.
As can be seen from Table (2 .4), domestic saving and
investment f e l l  away increasingly rap id ly  from an average of 10.9 
percent of GDP and 11.5 percent of GDP respective ly in the 1971-75
period, to 5.6 percent and 5.1 percent respective ly in the 1976-82
period. Domestic savings was as low as 0.9 percent of GDP in 1983.
Figure (2.11) shows the increase in ind us tr ia l output and 
employment from 1963 to peak in 1974. Then an exponential and rapid 
f a l l  can be seen in both employment and output from 1975 to 1988. The 
volume of cocoa exports, given in Figure (2 .5), showed a steady trend 
in the period 1960 to 1973, a fte r  which a sharply f a l l in g  trend can 
be seen fo r  the period 1974 to 1982, followed by a mild recovery in 
the 1983-88 period.
The above indicates that the productive base of the economy 
was rap id ly  eroded in th is  period. This was as a re su lt  of the 
emigration of sk i l le d  labour, lack of cap ita l formation, and a 
deterio ra tion  of in fras truc tu re .
21
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These i l l s  re flected a combination of exogenous factors 
and inappropriate economic po licy  signals. The la t te r  
discouraged production, exports, savings, and investment, while 
encouraging consumption, imports, and various corrupt practices, 
including a burgeoning underground economy.
One such po licy  signal was the maintenance of an over-valued
cedi. This was caused by a combination of high domestic in f la t io n  and
a fa i lu re  to devalue the nominal value of the cedi in terms of
foreign currencies. This made imported goods re la t iv e ly  cheaper than 
th e ir  domestic substitu tes. As can be seen from Figure (2 .2), the 
re la t ive  cost of imports, as measured by the ra t io  of the import 
price index to the GOP de f la to r ,  remained re la t iv e ly  high in the 
period 1967-74. But between 1974-80, despite an absolute r ise  in the 
un it  cost of imports estimated at 139 per cent, the re la t ive  cost 
of imports f e l l  by 450 per cent, and, by 1987, a 30 fo ld  decrease in 
th is  f igu re  had taken place, i . e . ,  3000 percent decrease.
The economic decline was fue lled by the po licy  favouring
rapid in d u s tr ia l isa t io n  by an in e f f ic ie n t  state enterprise 
sector to the neglect of an ag r icu ltu ra l sector that t ra d i t io n a l ly
had been the most important foreign exchange earner. Thus, as
mentioned in Section (2.3) above, inward-looking ind u s tr ia l isa t io n  
po licy  attached overwhelming importance to se lf- re liance  by 
establishing im port-substitu ting industries under h ighly protective 
trade and non-trade ba rr ie rs . These enjoyed protection under an
24
Relative Cost of Imports, (1980 = 100). 
Figure 2.2.
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increasingly re s t r ic t iv e  import-licensing system and high 
t a r i f f s .  Protection was ind iscrim inate ly extended to a l l  industries 
and ju s t i f ie d  on in fan t- indus try  grounds, irrespective of th e ir  
longer-term comparative advantage.
Despite, or even because of, these pro tec t ion is t 
po lic ie s , an overwhelming m ajority  of state enterprises suffered 
heavy losses, which were borne by the Government and u lt im ate ly  
financed by bank c re d it  (Toye 1989, p .54).
Ghana's f is c a l  position was fu r the r burdened by a policy 
in which the Government assumed the ro le  of employer of last 
resort. As Van Hear (1988, p .19) states, a large bureaucracy was 
b u i l t  up containing many nonproductive and ghost workers 
( f i c t i t io u s  names on the payro ll)  12,000 of whom were la id  o f f  in 
1987 and a fu r the r 5,000 in the f i r s t  ha lf of 1988.
As discussed by Ewusi (1988, p .7), the revenue base shrank 
as a re su lt  of the sharp decline in cocoa exports in the 1974-82 
period, and other trade flows on which the tax system heavily 
depended. Large budget d e f ic i ts  were financed through the banking 
system. This fue lled  domestic demand under conditions of 
declin ing domestic supply and led to growing balance of payments 
d e f ic i ts  and accelerating in f la t io n .  A vicious c i r c le  developed in 
which successive governments t r ie d  to cure macroeconomic 
imbalances with controls on d is tr ib u t io n  and prices without 
addressing the expansionary f is c a l and monetary po lic ie s . In f la t io n
26
was countered by price contro ls; balance of payments d e f ic i ts  
were countered by import contro ls; and scarc it ies  were countered by 
d is tr ib u t io n  controls. These in te rven tion is t po lic ies  suppressed 
market forces, causing much of the economy to go underground 
and contribu ting to the corruption and ine ff ic iency  of the 
administration.
A study in the World Development Report (WDR) (1983) ranking 
developing countries according to the nature and in tens ity  
of d is to rt ion s  preva il ing during 1970-80 found Ghana had the 
greatest d is to r t io n  amongst the sample countries. These d is to rt ion s , 
feeding on themselves, contributed to gross ine ff ic iency  through 
misallocation of resources, and destroyed incentives fo r  production 
and exports.
In the early 1980's, when Ghana's fundamentally weakened 
economy was confronted with sharply de te r io ra ting  external 
conditions and a persistent drought, the economic c r is is  f u l l y  
surfaced and the economy almost ground to a h a lt .  By 1983, the year 
in which the economic recovery programme was launched, the economy 
had been largely devastated. Signs of collapse were everywhere. 
The real wage had fa l le n  by 560 percent per cent of i t s  1974 level 
(see Figure (2 .11)). As can be seen from Table (2 .4), gross 
investment in the 1976-82 period amounted to 5.1 per cent of GDP 
- barely s u f f ic ie n t  to replace the depreciated cap ita l stock and 
providing no margin fo r  economic growth. The economy was starved of 
imported inputs and, as a re su lt ,  capacity u t i l is a t io n  in the
27
manufacturing sector was reduced to only 18 per cent by 1984, (as can 
be seen from Figure (4.5) in Chapter (4 )).
Signs were widespread that an in f la t io n a ry  psychology had 
become deeply entrenched. In f la t io n ,  which had been running fo r  
the previous decade at an average annual rate of over 50 per cent, 
surged to 123 per cent in 1983. The in f la t io n  rate re flected 
pa ra lle l market prices and not the contro lled prices to which 
v i r tu a l ly  a l l  of the economy was subject. Nominal in terest 
rates had been kept low - those on savings deposits, fo r  example, 
amounted to only about 11 per cent a year (Financial Times
1989). Holding money had become so unattractive that the money
balances, in p a r t icu la r  savings deposits, held with the banking 
system had declined sharply and the income ve lo c ity  of money
had nearly doubled from an average of about f iv e  in e a r l ie r  years to 
nine in 1983.
The external sector, too, was devastated. With the
exchange rate pegged at 2.75 cedis to a do lla r  since 1978, the real 
exchange rate had appreciated by 816 per cent by 1983 from a 
re la t iv e ly  undisturbed rate in 1981®. The currency appreciation, 
together with the pervasive re s tr ic t io n s  on Ghana's 
in ternationa l trade and payments, caused o f f i c ia l  exports to 
plummet. As shown in Pick (1987), by the beginning of 1983, the 
pa ra lle l market rate fo r  foreign exchange was about 40 times the 
o f f i c ia l  ra te . Grave d i f f i c u l t i e s  were being encountered in 
meeting payments fo r  essential imports and fo r  servicing the
28
external debt. As pointed out by Financial Times (1989), external 
payments arrears equivalent to about a f u l l  year's export earnings 
accumulated.
The public sector was in a precarious state. As pointed 
out by Loxely (1988, p .25), tax revenues had collapsed to about 5 per 
cent of GDP, dragging expenditures down and seriously eroding 
the Government's a b i l i t y  to function and to maintain the economic and 
social in fras truc tu re .
2 .5 .The Economic Recovery Programme.
Confronted with th is  s itua tion , the Government 
formulated the Economic Recovery Programme in 1983. I t  was 
designed from the beginning with a series of (p a r t ia l ly  overlapping) 
phases; s ta b i l is a t io n  was to give way to re h a b i l i ta t io n  of the 
economy, and th is  in turn was to lead to a phase of economic 
l ib e ra l is a t io n ^ .  Support was intended to come from many sources such 
as, the IMF, the WB, b i la te ra l  aid donors, and eventually, private 
foreign investors.
The s ta b i l is a t io n  e f fo r t  was aimed at the domestic economy 
and at improving the balance of payments. In p a rt icu la r ,  in f la t io n  
had to be contro lled and a measure of price l ib e ra l isa t io n  
introduced, so that the necessary adjustments in re la t ive  prices 
could be effected. As budgetary revenues continued to decline
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i n i t i a l l y ,  the f is c a l  adjustment was achieved through a compression 
in government expenditures to 8.6 per cent of GDP from 10.2 per 
cent the year before (Loxely 1988). Real wages were frozen, 
government operating and maintenance expenditures were 
restrained, and development outlays were sharply reduced. These 
actions which were thought to be necessary to s ta b i l is e  the economy, 
exacted a cost by depressing the level of economic a c t iv i ty  and 
postponing the re h a b i l i ta t io n  of the economy.
The centrepiece of external sector reform was depreciation 
of the exchange rate from 2.75 Cedis = $1 to 30 Cedis = $1 by the 
end of 1983. The exchange rate adjustment fa c i l i ta te d  the f i r s t  of a 
series of annual increases in the producer price of cocoa. 
Since much of the exchange rate adjustment merely made up fo r  
past in f la t io n ,  the depreciation did not appear to add 
markedly to the increase in the domestic price leve l. However, , 
as indicated by Financial Times (1989), prices of important 
ind ividual commodities, such as petroleum, increased sharply, and 
at the same time, many prices were decontrolled. Thus the pr inc ipa l 
of a f u l l  pass-through of exchange rate adjustments to local prices 
was established.
Ewusi (1987, p .20), amongst others, points out that i t  was 
not u n t i l  la te in 1984 that the economic outlook improved, as 
a re su lt  of the Government's perseverance with the 
s ta b i l is a t io n  po lic ies . A gricu ltu ra l production recovered 
sharply, s timulating exports and domestic food supplies. Food
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prices declined markedly. The la t te r  improvement contributed to a 
s ig n if ica n t deceleration of in f la t io n  because prices of food items 
account fo r  about ha lf of the consumer price index. This 
improvement in the in f la t io n  outlook occurred despite a sharp 
acceleration in the growth of the money supply, re f le c t in g  the 
financing needs of a recovering economy.
The exchange rate depreciation benefited both the external 
and government sectors. As stated by Financial Times (1989), the 
domestic terms of trade moved in favour of tradables fo r  the f i r s t  
time in more than a decade and an increased producer price 
stimulated production and o f f ic ia l  cocoa exports. The tax base 
improved as a resu lt  of the impact of the devaluation on 
trade-related taxes, which permitted an increase in government 
spending despite a fu r the r reduction in the f is c a l  d e f ic i t .  The 
sizable increase in external assistance permitted a large increase in
imports, while at the same time external payments arrears could be
reduced.
Signs that the s ta b i l isa t io n  strategy was succeeding 
permitted a change in emphasis in early 1985 toward the 
re h a b i l i ta t io n  of some of the more severely damaged parts of
the economy - in p a rt icu la r  in fras truc tu re , the key export
industries, and the public sector. With support from the World 
Bank and b i la te ra l  donors, in fras truc tu re  re h a b i l i ta t io n  
projects were undertaken in the transport, power, 
communications, and water supply sectors (Ewusi 1987, p .40).
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2.6. The ERP's Successes and Failures.
A b r ie f  review of the performance of selected economic 
indicators is given in what fo llows. For a more thorough account of 
economic performance under the ERP, see Green (1987), Loxely (1988), 
and Ewusi (1988). A gricu ltu ra l aspects are focused on by Seini et. 
a l.  (1987), and Smith (1987). Social and regional aspects are covered 
by Norton (1988).
The reforms have transformed the economy. As can be seen 
from Figure (2 .1), real gross domestic product has grown at 5 percent 
per annum since 1984, reversing a decade of f a l l in g  l iv in g  standards, 
cocoa exports, as shown in Figure (2 .5), are on an upward trend since 
1984, and in 1989 are put at 291,000 tonnes - almost double the 
190,000 tonnes exported in 1984®. the government's finances were 
also put be tter shape. In 1983, the tax share in GDP was only 
approximately 5 percent, but i t  rap id ly  increased to approximately 15 
percent (net of grants) in 1987 (Loxely, 1988, p. 25). Government 
expenditure grew less rap id ly  with the resu lt  that the budget d e f ic i t  
was eliminated by 1986 and a small surplus was generated, as can be 
seen from Figure (2 .9). Thus, as can be seen from Table (2 .4), a 
budget surplus of 0.1 percent of GDP was achieved in 1986 a f te r  an 
average d e f ic i t  of 7.5 per cent of GDP in 1976-82. In f la t io n ,  which 
is shown in Figure (2 .3 ), has been cut from 123 per cent in 1983 to 
30 per cent in 1990; foreign payments arrears of $232m in 1984 have
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been v i r tu a l ly  eliminated; and the balance of payments is in 
overall surplus to the tune of more than $100m a year (see Figure 
(2 .8 )) .  The share of gross fixed capita l formation in GNP rose from a 
mere 4 percent in 1983 to over 10 percent in 1987 (Loxely, 1988, 
p .22), and as can be seen from Table (2 .4), gross investment as a 
percentage of GDP rose from 3.8 percent in 1983 to 13.0 percent in 
1987. The share of exports in GNP also rose from 6 percent in 1983 to 
over 10 percent in 1987.
But, i t  would be a mistake to think that applying sensible 
po lic ies  with regards to public finance w i l l  be enough to guarantee 
Ghana's fu ture prosperity. A lo t  w i l l  depend on Ghana's terms of 
trade and the price of i t s  leading exported commodities, i .e .  cocoa 
and aluminium. I t  is also not advisable to look only to economic 
indicators such as real GDP, real per capita income, and in f la t io n  
fo r  signs that the economy is back to health. What is equally 
important is the state of the underlying features of the recovery 
such as degree of aid dependency, prospects of fu ture trade 
expansion, effects  on manufacturing output, a b i l i t y  to boost 
private sector investment and foreign cap ita l,  e ffec t on unemployment 
- which are inex tr icab ly  linked with Ghana's a b i l i t y  to make the 
t ra n s it io n  from aid-dependence to se lf-susta in ing growth, and th is ,  
in the f in a l  analysis, is the main c r i te r io n  by which to judge 
Ghana's economic recovery. A review, below, of these features 
paints a d i f fe re n t ,  more gloomy, p icture.
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2.6 .1. Trade and Commodity Prices.
Commodity prices are at th e ir  lowest level in real terms in 
at least f i f t y  years^. This has compounded the budgetary, debt 
servicing, and balance of payments d i f f i c u l t i e s  of developing 
countries. African countries have been badly affected: apart from
facing declin ing nonfuel commodity prices they also los t shares in 
th e ir  main commodity markets
Figure (2.4) shows Ghana's export structure. Cocoa's share 
alone accounts fo r  61 percent of to ta l revenues in 1985. Thus, the 
export base is extremely narrow. Figure (2.5) shows Ghana's cocoa 
export volumes indexed at 1980 = 100 and cocoa un it price at constant 
1980 prices and 1980 = 100 fo r  the period 1960 to 1988. This shows 
export volumes remaining re la t iv e ly  constant in the period 1960-74 
(except fo r  the two peaks in 1965 and 1973) and then a fa l l in g  trend 
in the period 1974-84, reaching an a l l  time low in 1984 fo r  the 
period shown. Unit value fluctuated along a horizontal trend fo r  the 
period 1960-79. I t  then exhibited a sharply f a l l in g  trend from 1979- 
82 to i ts  lowest point in the 1960-88 period, and then recovered 
sharply to i t s  highest point in 1987. Thus, Ghana's export revenues 
have been and remain dependent on world commodity prices.
Low cocoa prices are due to over supply and an ine las tic  
demand. During the commodity boom of the mid- to la te 1970s, 
t ra d i t io n a l as well as potentia l cocoa (and coffee) producers were 
stimulated to increase production by expanding crop areas and
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developing new and e f f ic ie n t  breeds. As trees began to mature and 
bear f r u i t  seven to nine years la te r ,  supply surpassed demand 
substan tia l ly , creating a g lu t* * .  When the market was awash with 
supply, demand stagnated, not because of lagging growth in cocoa 
importing countries, but because consumption was in e la s t ic .  This 
means that an increase in real income in these countries leads to a 
less than proportionate increase in th e ir  demand fo r  cocoa.
Empirical studies have revealed that income e la s t ic i t y  of 
demand fo r  cocoa is pos it ive  but less than one, thus conforming to 
'Engel's Law'*^. I t  has also been suggested that the demand fo r  cocoa 
tends to reach a saturation point beyond which the demand e la s t ic i t y  
becomes zero at higher income levels , while the long-run price 
e la s t ic i t y  of world demand fo r  cocoa has been estimated to be 0.4, 
suggesting, as Blomqvist (1973, p .11) indicates, that a reduction in 
un it price of cocoa leads to a less than proportionate increase in 
demand. In addition to th is  low income e la s t ic i t y ,  some countries 
released previously bu ilt -up  stocks. Others endeavoured to produce 
more in order to maintain th e ir  revenues as prices f e l l ,  which only 
depressed prices fu r the r.  This therefore h igh lights the importance of 
Ghana's drive to develop non-trad it iona l exports.
Earnings are also highly vulnerable to adverse c l im a t ic ^  
and terms of trade (TOT) influences. The terms of trade shows the 
re la tionsh ip  between the price paid by a producer fo r  the product he 
purchases and the price he receives fo r  his own product. The producer 
is in a be tter position i f  his se ll ing  price rises more (or fa l ls
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less) than the prices of the products he purchases. Thus, fo r  a 
country, the TOT are unfavourable i f  import prices r is e  in comparison 
with export prices. The TOT are generally calculated by d iv id ing the 
index of export prices by the index of import prices and then 
m ult ip ly ing the quotient by 100 to get percentages. Thus a figure 
above 100 indicates favourable TOT, and vice versa.
K i l l i c k  (1966, p .345), commenting on a study of Ghana's TOT 
fo r  the period 1950-62, observed:
" I t  is evident i f  we compare the la te r years with the 1954 base 
year, tha t Ghana has indeed suffered a de terio ra tion  in her 
terms of trade. In 1962 Ghana would have had to export 98 
percent more in order to buy the same volume of imports that she 
bought in 1954."
Data on the Developed, Ghanaian, and African LDCs' TOT, 
covering the period 1980-87, are shown in Figure (2 .6 ). This reveals 
that while the Developed TOT have risen s teadily  in the 1980-87 
period, the opposite has occurred fo r  African LDCs, and both Ghana's 
and African LDCs' TOT are lower than th e ir  1980 value fo r  every year 
in the 1980-87 period. Thus Ghana's TOT in 1987 was 17.6 percent 
below i ts  1980 value ind icating that Ghana had to export 17.6 percent 
more in 1987 in order to buy the same volume of imports that she 
bought in 1980. But, as can be seen from Figure (2.6a), i f  the longer 
time period of 1967-87 is looked at, Ghana's TOT is not seen to be 
declin ing, but rather to be f luc tu a t in g  unpredictably reaching a peak 
in 1977 which is 60 percent higher than i ts  1967 value, and then 
declin ing to a trough in 1982 which is approximately 30 percent below
37
Terms of Trade of Selected Country 
Groupings, 1980-1989, (1980=100). 
Figure 2.6.
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38
G
ha
na
’s 
Te
rm
s 
of 
Tr
ad
e:
 1
96
7-
19
87
. 
Fig
ur
e 
2.
6a
.
OOT"II
o
COo>T—
o
CM
10
00
05
o
CO
o>
toh-
05
Oh"
05
N.
COO)O ^
39
So
ur
ce
: 
W
or
ld 
Ta
bl
es
 
(1
98
8-
89
).
its 1967 value.
The gold outlook as stated by Financial Times (1989) - the 
current price weakness notwithstanding - is very b r ig h t.  Industry 
spokesmen predict tha t output of 12 tonnes a year w i l l  more than 
double by 1995 and even treb le  by the turn of the century. Gold's 
share of to ta l  exports is forecast to average more than 20 per cent 
over the next f iv e  years and th is  could well turn out to be an 
understatement.
According to Financial Times (1989), the greatest
momentum is expected to come from the non-trad it iona ls , 
accounting fo r  a mere 2 per cent of the to ta l ,  or $2m in 1988. By
1995, i t  is hoped that these exports w i l l  match gold's 20 per
cent stake.
For the res t, growth in timber volumes, a fte r  treb ling
since 1983 w i l l  decline sharply as a resu lt  o f environmental
considerations. As a re su lt ,  the share of timber in to ta l 
exports, which is curren tly  at 4.5 per cent, w i l l  f a l l  d ra s t ic a l ly  
(Financial Times 1989).
The obstacles are formidable. Given the absence of a viable
packaging industry, transport bottlenecks, a lack of export
marketing expertise and, above a l l ,  the fac t tha t so many other
countries, including many in A fr ica , are s im ila r ly  engaged in seeking 
to develop new export lines, i t  w i l l  be d i f f i c u l t  fo r  countries such
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as Ghana to f in d  exportable products in which i t  has a comparative 
advantage.
2.6.2. Investment.
Ghana's foreign investment track record is dismal. 
Private investment inflows since 1979 to ta l $90m - the bulk of 
which went into the buoyant gold sector. O f f ic ia l  forecasts are 
cautious, pointing to inflows averaging some $30m annually in 
the f i r s t  ha lf  of the 1990's. By 1995, as indicated by Africa 
Recovery (1990, p .23) the private sector share of to ta l  investment in 
expected to r ise  to 50 percent from 34 percent in 1990. With private 
sector investment languishing at a mere 4 to 5 per cent of GDP, new 
po lic ies to promote both foreign and domestic cap ita l spending are 
v i t a l .
I t  is f e l t ,  as indicated by Financial Times 1989, that 
greater autonomy is needed as fa r  as the Ghana Investment Centre 
(GIC) is concerned. This, l ike  so many so-called "one-stop 
investment shops" in A fr ica , is not the single channel that was 
intended as a l l  mining and energy projects are routed through 
separate agencies. I ts  approval procedures are cumbersome and 
lengthy because i t  lacks adequate qua lif ied  s ta f f  but also because of 
overlapping ju r is d ic t io n  with other government agencies. I t  is 
c r i t ic is e d  too fo r  preoccupation with controls rather than the 
promotion of new investment. Thus, A frica Recovery (1990, p .23) 
quotes the d irec to r of GIC thus:
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"despite new investment in mining, petroleum exploration and 
such non-trad it iona l exports as fresh pineapple, in te rest (from 
foreign investors) had been 'below expectations'".
The GIC answers c r i t ic is m  by stressing the 
im poss ib il i ty  of promoting foreign investment in the absence of a 
more responsive banking sector. They are not alone in believing 
that fa r  reaching f inanc ia l sector reform is a precondition fo r  
increased foreign cap ita l inflows.
There is also an image problem. Ghana's investment 
climate is not viewed with favour by the international 
investment community. For example, capricious and a rb itra ry  
actions by the government, such as the detention without t r i a l  fo r  
long periods of businessmen accused of trans fe r pr ic ing  and 
corruption, has deterred foreign investors (Financial Times 1989).
Administrative delays by the GIC hamper investment. 
Approvals can take as long as six to eight months to come 
through. There are technical and p o l i t ic a l  snags too, including the 
requirement tha t 100 per cent foreign ownership is  permitted only 
where a new venture w i l l  be a net foreign exchange earner. This 
means that potentia l foreign investor must f in d  an acceptable 
Ghanaian partner and - unless they are prepared to commit the entire 
cap ita l o f the new venture in foreign exchange - they must also 
f ind  domestic finance.
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2.6 .3. Aid Dependence.
Ghana's s truc tura l adjustment programme w i l l  stay on track 
only i f  donor assistance is maintained at current high 
levels, and underpinned by increased private sector investment 
and more rapid aid disbursement.
According to World Debt Tables (1991), the aid "p ipeline" in 
1989 was estimated at $1.4bn. This has since been supplemented at
the March Consultative Group meeting by pledges of a fu r the r $971m -
way above the forecast of new pledges of $800m. Just over ha lf of 
the aid pledged in 1990 is b i la te ra l  with Japan ($190m) heading 
the donor tab le , followed by B r ita in  with $61m and Canada with $55m 
(World Debt Tables 1991). On the m u lt i la te ra l side, the dominant 
donor is the World Bank's so ft loan window - the IDA - with 
$236m followed by the African Development Bank with $110m, and the EC 
with $45m (World Debt Tables 1991).
The cruc ia l ro le  of aid inflows is apparent from the 
balance of payments figures given in Figure (2.7) which show a
doubling in the trade gap from below $120m in 1987 to nearly $200m
by the mid 1989. When in v is ib le  and debt-service obligations are 
taken into account, the resource gap widens to $400m in 1987. 
Since private sector inflows are forecast at no more than $30m 
annually, donors w i l l  have to close the gap with inflows averaging 
$500m a year between now and 1995.
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Trade Balance (Exports - Imports). 
Figure 2.7.
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The prospect of inflows of th is  magnitude raises some 
worrisome issues. The f i r s t  is whether Ghana has the "absorptive 
capacity" to  u t i l i s e  such aid e f f ic ie n t ly .  On present form, the 
answer must be no given the scarc ity  of administrative and managerial 
ski 1 Is.
Figure (2.10) reveals alarming de ta ils  about Ghana's foreign 
debt. The to ta l  debt outstanding (EDT) rose s tead ily  from under $1.5 
b i l l io n  in 1982 to $3.2 b i l l io n  in 1987, and has remained at 
approximately tha t level since. The to ta l  debt service to exports 
ra t io  (TDS/XGS) increased from 15 percent in 1982 to a peak of 56 
percent in 1988 declin ing to 50 percent in 1989. The to ta l debt 
outstanding to export ra t io  (EDT/XGS) rose disconcertingly from 100 
percent in 1980 to 350 percent in 1989. The debt service f igure 
remained around the $100m-$150m per alum level from 1980 to 1985, 
with in te rest payments accounting fo r  approximately 50 percent of the 
to ta l .  I t  is only a f te r  1987 that th is  f igure  has risen to the $400m 
level with in te rest payments accounting fo r  less than 25 percent of 
the to ta l .  Thus a l l  th is  indicates that Ghana's foreign debt is a 
cause fo r  concern.
A p a r t ic u la r ly  worrying aspect of aid dependence, as 
mentioned by Financial Times (1989), is reliance on foreign technical 
assistance, estimated in 1989 at some $85m. Clearly, the essence of a 
successful aid programme is build ing se lf -su ff ic ie n cy  but there is 
l i t t l e  evidence that th is  is  being achieved. Thousands of Ghanaian 
professionals l ive  abroad and seem un like ly  to return home as long
45
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as present salary scales apply. This scarc ity  of professional and 
managerial s k i l l s  coincides with the next, more management­
intensive, phase of the recovery programme. As stated by Ewusi 
(1988), reform of the c i v i l  service, the restructu ring  and 
d ives titu re  of the 235 state-owned enterprises, root-and-branch 
reform of the f ina nc ia l sector, and the establishment of a capital 
market, are already constrained by the dearth of accounting and 
management s k i l l s ,  while bankers and businessmen believe the
Government should be doing much more to promote foreign private 
investment to f i l l  the inevitable void that w i l l  be le f t  by aid 
inflows once these s ta r t  to t a i l  o f f .
2.6.4. Banking and the Credit Squeeze.
As mentioned by Toye (1989, p .58), Ghana's banking sector, 
squeezed between a high ra t io  of non-performing loans and
t ig h t  government-imposed cred it ce il ings , is now a major constraint 
on economic expansion. Although the Government's c re d it  po lic ies  
make good sense given the impact of rapid monetary growth on 
in f la t io n  and the s l id ing  currency, in d u s tr ia l is ts  complain that
the severe l iq u id i t y  squeeze prevents them from undertaking the 
investment necessary to maintain growth.
During the decade of economic decline the banks suffered 
along with industry and commerce, build ing up high ra t ios  of non­
performing loans (Toye, 1989, p .58). Their accounting and management
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information systems are generally weak, operating costs are high 
re f le c t in g  both the lack of competition and the scarc ity  of 
expertise and professionalism, while some banks are highly exposed to 
foreign exchange r is k .  In th is  s itua tion , the two most pressing tasks 
to be tackled are the cleaning up of bank p o rt fo l io s  by co llec t ing  
arrears where possible and w rit ing  o f f  bad debt, while
restructuring and re cap ita l is ing  the system. But given the 
s k i l l s  constra int and the lack of an e ffec t ive  supervisory 
department at the central bank, f inanc ia l sector reform is going to 
be a lengthy process.
As indicated by Financial Times (1989), by the end of 1988 
the public sector's share of bank lending had fa l le n  to 43 per cent 
from more than 70 per cent in 1985, and with the Ghanaian budget now 
in surplus the Government hopes to make net repayments to the 
banking system of some C6bn to C8bn annually in 1989-91. The
combination of c re d it  ce il ings on the one hand and reduced lending to 
Government on the other has been instrumental in slowing the growth 
rate of bank lending from more than 50 per cent annually during the 
1982-87 period to only 12 per cent in 1989.
But, as mentioned by Financial Times (1989), the c red it 
squeeze has had two drawbacks : the bu ild  up of excess l iq u id i t y
in the banking system on one side and the clamp on bank lending to
viable priva te sector enterprises on the other. Bank 
p r o f i t a b i l i t y  is being undermined by the accumulation of excess 
reserves which cannot be translated into p ro f i ta b le  assets. As a
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re su lt ,  banks are refusing to accept fixed deposits and cutt ing 
th e ir  savings deposit rates despite the fac t tha t these are already 
more than 10 percentage points below the in f la t io n  ra te. Given the 
need fo r  increased savings in the economy and the severe 
l iq u id i t y  crunch in the industr ia l sector th is  is unfortunate but i f  
they were to charge posit ive  real in te rest rates as advocated by 
the World Bank, they would wipe out a wide range of borrowers.
I f  real in te rest rates are to become pos it ive , i t  w i l l  have 
to be the resu lt  of a s ig n if ica n t reduction in the in f la t io n  ra te, 
currently  estimated at between 25 and 30 per cent rather than 
higher nominal rates. Sadly, monetarist prescriptions not 
withstanding, the c red it  crunch has fa i le d  to reduce in f la t io n  to 
acceptable levels. The au thorit ies are faced with a "catch-22" 
s itua tion . I f  they tighten the squeeze - to slow in f la t io n  and 
s ta b il ise  the Cedi - they run the r is k  of aborting the s t i l l  
f ra g i le  economic recovery, especially in the ind us tr ia l sector.
On the surface the banks are operating with generous 
margins - savings deposit rates of 16 per cent and lending rates 
in excess of 20 per cent - but margins are under pressure from high 
operating costs and low lending ra t ios .
As mentioned by Toye (1989), there are two main areas where 
the banks w i l l  be called upon to play crucia l roles in the immediate 
future - the foreign exchange market and the development of a capital 
market. The need fo r  professionalism in the banking sector is
underscored by i t s  key ro le  in the foreign exchange market. This is 
p a r t ic u la r ly  so in the foreign exchange market where the auction 
system has been a great success, a lb e it  one curren tly  jeopardised 
by the 20 to 30 per cent gap between i ts  rates and those ru ling  in 
the licensed foreign exchange bureau.
A major tes t fo r  Ghana's Structural Adjustment Programme
w i l l  come in mid-1990 by which time i t  has pledged to eliminate 
the gap between these two "free" foreign currency markets. The 
re a l i ty  is that the freer of the two markets - the foreign
exchange bureau - signals the more re a l is t ic  exchange rate. So long 
as the au tho rit ies  are prepared to accept th is  market-determined 
re a l i ty ,  a l l  w i l l  be well. But should they seek to maintain a
" re a l is t ic "  ra te, in defiance of market forces, forc ing the bureau 
rate to appreciate rather than allowing the auction rate to 
depreciate fu r th e r ,  the l ik e ly  resu lt  would be the reemergence of 
a th ird  t i e r  - a black or pa ra lle l market, which was largely 
eliminated when the bureau opened last year.
The other looming challenge is ensuring that industr ia l 
recovery is not undermined by the l iq u id i t y  squeeze. Bank
restructuring and recap ita lisa t ion  w i l l  play the lead ro le here but 
i t  is also essential to develop a cap ita l market, including a 
stock exchange, to provide a longer-term funding, reducing dependence 
on term loans and overdraft finance.
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2.6.5. Industry.
Figure (2.11), shows output rea l, wages and employment fo r  
the period 1963-88 indexed at 1980=100. This shows tha t real wages in 
1988 was seven times less than the peak i t  reached in 1974. 
Industr ia l production in 1988 was nine times less than i ts  peak value 
in 1974. Employment on the other hand has remained f a i r l y  constant 
throughout the 1963-88 period. While i t  might be argued that the 
reluctance to allow real wages to f a l l  is responsible fo r  the fa i lu re  
of many countries to achieve economic growth, th is  contention is not 
borne out by the facts in the case of Ghana. Figure (2.11) shows that 
Ghana has allowed real wages and output to move up and down together 
while maintaining employment in the period 1963-88.
By fa r  the largest f a l l  in manufacturing output in the 
period 1977-83 among the three sectors, te x t i le s ,  wood, and non- 
ferrous metal, shown in Figure (2.12), occurred in the te x t i le s  
sector. This showed a drop of 560 percent in that period, and i t  also 
experienced the worst recovery in the 1983-88 period, recovering to a 
drop of 230 percent from i ts  1977 level.
Capacity u t i l is a t io n  in manufacturing, as shown in Figure 
(4.19) of Chapter (4), showed a fa l l in g  trend from 40 percent in 1978 
to below 20 percent in 1984. I t  then increased back to 40 percent by 
1988.
Figure (2.13) shows real manufacturing value added per
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Ghana’s Industrial Output, Employment, 
and Real Wages.
Figure 2.11.
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employee in Ghana, Benin, Nigeria, and Tanzania fo r  every f i f t h  year 
in the period 1970-85. A l l  four countries registered a f a l l  in value 
added during th is  period, but the largest f a l l ,  from $12,000 in 1970 
to $2,000 in 1985 (a f a l l  of 84%), is shown to have occurred in 
Ghana.
The collapse in manufacturing in the pre-ERP period ( i .e  
pre-1983) is mainly a tt r ibu tab le  to the foreign exchange scarcity 
which Ghana faced in the mid-1970s to early 1980s. This in turn 
forced the manufacturing industries to c u r ta i l  production because of 
shortages in imported inputs, equipment and spare parts.
With the introduction of the ERP, conditions in the 
manufacturing sector went from bad to worse. As Huq (1989) points 
out, industry now faced three problems - competition from imports, a 
rundown and obsolete cap ita l stock, and t ig h t  l iq u id i t y .  The exchange 
rate devaluation which took place under the ERP had the benefic ia l 
e ffec t of increases the price of imports re la t iv e  to domestic 
manufactures, but the removal of t a r i f f s  worked in an opposing 
d irec tion  by reducing the price of imports re la t iv e  to domestic 
manufactures. Thus the overall e ffec t of the l ib e ra l is a t io n  programme 
is undetermined, but some evidence of the degree of protection given 
to firms is shown by S tee l's  (1972) study using DRC to examine the 
e ff ic iency  of industries in 1967-68, in which he found only 15% of 
firms surveyed would have been competitive with imports at the 
o f f ic ia l  exchange rate. While Steel states that th is  f igu re  rises to 
25.6% with a 50 percent devaluation, the e ffe c t of the 300 percent
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devaluation which took place in the 1983-84 period (see Figure 9.14 
in Chapter 9) would therefore be expected to increase the percentage 
of competitive firms substan tia lly .
But competition from imports is p a r t ic u la r ly  d i f f i c u l t  to 
counter given industry 's  in a b i l i t y  to reequip because of l iq u id i ty  
problems and high operating costs a tt r ibu tab le  to the state of plant 
and machinery on the one hand and excess capacity on the other. As 
indicated by Financial Times (1989), t ig h t  l iq u id i t y  is a serious 
problem fo r  small to medium sized companies forced to borrow from the 
banks at in te res t rates of 25 percent or more. A second category of 
companies faces horrendous domestic currency repayment obligations 
fo llow ing the f a l l  in the cedi from C54 to the d o lla r  in 1985 the 
current level of C400.
Given the problem of t ig h t  l iq u id i t y ,  another major source 
of funds fo r  industry would have been from foreign cap ita l infusion, 
but as mentioned above, th is  w i l l  only take place when a s ig n if ica n t 
improvement in the investment climate has taken place, and th is  is 
expected to occur only a fte r  the economy moves on to a sounder
economic foo ting . In the meantime the en tire  manufacturing sector and 
a s ig n if ica n t proportion of manufacturing know-how and expertise,
b u i l t  over decades of experience and at great expense, is
disappearing15. L i t t l e  e f fo r t  has been made to id e n t i fy  industries 
that would benefit from an infusion of new physical and human
cap ita l.  This means that i f  and when Ghana's investment climate does 
become favourable, as is anticipated w i l l  be the case some time in
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the fu tu re , the investment in cap ita l and human resources w i l l  have 
to be that much greater.
2.7. Summary.
Ghana is today the World Bank's star pupil in A fr ica . And 
yet, tha t th is  is the case is not altogether surpris ing . That 
Ghana is perceived as such a success story is part a 
commentary on the continent-wide fa i lu re  of s truc tu ra l adjustment 
programmes in A fr ica , part a re f le c t io n  tha t in 1983, there was 
ju s t  no viable a lte rna tive  strategy available, and part the 
consequence of an economy which, having reached rock-bottom, had 
nowhere to go but up, when pump-primed with aid inflows of $530m 
annually. The pump-priming was - and remains - conditional on the 
successful implementation of a wide range of complex, and often 
p o l i t i c a l l y  unpopular, economic reforms rendered more d i f f i c u l t  
by fa l l in g  commodity prices.
Even though ERP has resulted in the s ta b i l is a t io n  of the 
economy, i t  has also led Ghana towards heavy aid-dependency; great 
reliance on world demand with respect to i t s  trade po licy; 
a d e re l ic t  manufacturing sector; and only a t r i c k le  of private 
investment inflow which is v i ta l  i f  she is to make the tra ns it ion  
from aid-dependence to se lf-susta in ing  growth.
Furthermore, fo r  the aid momentum to be maintained, the
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Government of Ghana must continue i ts  de licate high-wire balancing 
act, sa tis fy ing  both i ts  domestic and p o l i t ic a l  constituency 
whose l iv in g  standards are below th e ir  levels of 20 years ago, while 
meeting the exacting co n d it io n a li t ie s  of the donor community.
Thus, while in d u s tr ia l is ts  are not in favour of returning to 
the system of import licensing and blanket protection by import 
contro ls, there is a vociferous lobby fo r  increased industr ia l 
protection. Industry faces problems of t ig h t  l iq u id i ty ,  
competition from imports and a run-down, obsolete cap ita l stock. 
Manufacturers warn that the strategy of in d u s tr ia l- le d  expansion and 
the development of non-trad it iona l exports of manufactures and 
processed foods is being jeopardised by the ex is ting t a r i f f / t a x  
structure, thus seriously undermining the chances of survival of 
any sort of indus tr ia l sector in Ghana.
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Notes.
(1) For size of various ethnic groups, see CBS Population 
Census, 1960, as reported in the Central Bureau of 
Statistics, Statistical Year Book, 1965-66, p. 45.
(2) For more information on the history of Ghana see, for 
example, Agbodeka (1972); Buah (1980); Dickson (1969); Fage 
(1969) and Nkrumah (1957).
(3) Gold Coast Industrial Development Ordinance 1947,
Section 3(1) as quoted in Birmingham et al (1966), p. 287.
(4) Kwame Nkrumah, "Africa Must Unite", (New York, F. A. 
Praeger, 1963, p.111.
(5) w. F. Steel, "Import Substitution and Excess Capacity in 
Ghana", Oxford Economic Papers, New Series, Vol. 24, July 
1972, p.213.
(6) See World Bank, (1983) , Ghana: Policies and Program for 
Adjustment.
(7) World Bank, 1984, Ghana Policies and Program for 
Adjustment, Washington D.C. p.xvii, 73.
(8) U.N., International Financial Statistics, 1991.
(9) A detailed commodity by commodity discussion of past and 
future short-term fluctuations and trends is found in WB, 
Price Prospects for Major Primary Commodities, (1989?).
(10) WB, Market Prospects of Raw Materials, (1987), p. 29.
(11) for mean lags in the response of capacity to prices see 
Chu and Morrison (1986) p. 139-84.
(12) Manu (1973), p.5. According to Engel's law, given tastes 
or preferences, the proportion of income spent on food will 
diminish with an increase in income.
(13) Ibid., p. 5. as based on FAO, 'Agricultural Projections 
for 1970, Commodity Review, Special Supplement 1969, pp. 
11-38.
(14) For more details on the susceptability of agricultural 
commodities to the vagaries of weather see WB, Market 
Prospects of Raw Materials, (1987), p. 11.
59
(15) For a good account of industrial capabilities that have 
been aquired in African industrialisation, see Lall, s . ,  
(1990) Structural Problems of Industry in Sub-Saharan 
Africa.
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3. COTTON CULTIVATION.
3.1. In troduction .
The l ib e ra l is a t io n  po lic ies which began in the early  1980's 
have created a free market economy in Ghana. The te x t i le  industry, 
which fo r  decades suffered from low capacity u t i l is a t io n  due to 
foreign exchange constra ints, no longer faces such constraints and is 
free to import the quantity of raw materials i t  requires. At the same 
time cotton inputs from domestic production, which were not 
obtainable in any s ig n if ica n t quantity during the days of foreign 
exchange scarc ity , are now increasingly more available.
Texti le  m i l ls  are therefore faced with choosing between 
domestically produced cotton or importing. Their decision on which 
source of inputs to use depends largely on two fac to rs : price and
qua lity .
A fte r the introduction in Section (3 .1), cotton production 
in A frica is reviewed in Section (3 .2). Section (3.2.1) reviews the 
price and not price factors which a ffec t the performance of cotton 
c u lt iv a t io n . In Section (3 .3), the h is tory  of cotton c u lt iva t io n  in 
Ghana is investigated, and so are the methods i t  has adopted to t r y  
and make cotton production viable (Sections (3.3.1. and 3 .3 .2 .) ) .  
The cost, price, and qu a lity  of Ghanaian cotton are also researched,
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in Sections (3 .4 ), (3 .5), and (3.6) respective ly, in an attempt to 
examine the fu ture of th is  sector, and a demonstration of how price 
and non-price factors have been important in determining i ts  
competitiveness in domestic and international markets is made. The 
summary is in Section (3 .7).
3.2. African Production in Perspective.
As can be seen from Figure (3 .1), world cotton consumption 
(and production) has increased at an average of 1.2 m il l io n  bales per 
year in the period 1950 to 1990. Furthermore, figures released by the 
International Cotton Advisory Committee (1990) show forecasts of a 
r ise  in world f ib re  consumption of 2.5 percent per annum in the 
period 1990-92. This is based on IMF estimates of average economic 
growth in industr ia lised  countries of 3 percent during 1992-95.
While cotton is produced in 76 countries in the tro p ica l and 
temperate climate zones, the three largest producers' (China, US and 
USSR) share of world production stood at 60 percent in 1986 (WB, 
Operations Evaluation Study (1988) p . l ) .  A fr ica 's  share has been 
small and declin ing: 9% in 1974-76, 7% in 1990 (UNCTAD Commodity 
Yearbook 1991). Cotton production in A frica has increased by 1.3% per 
annum since 1961; s ig n i f ic a n t ly  less than in Asia (2.7%). A 
comparison between the production increase of Francophone A fr ica and 
Anglophone A fr ica  over the period 1960-1985 reveals an increase in 
output of 740 percent and 60 percent respective ly. Francophone 
production accounted fo r  15% of production in I960; by 1984 the
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World Cotton Consumption in Millions 
of Bales: 1950 - 1990.
Figure 3.1.
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proportion had risen to approximately 45% (WB Operations Evaluation 
Study (1988)).
3.2.1. Performance: Price, Non-Price Factors.
3 .2 .1 .1 . Price Factors.
Explanations of poor performance, p a r t ic u la r ly  in Anglophone 
A fr ica , are the subject of much debate. The inadequacy of producer 
price incentives due to high taxation of the ag r icu ltu ra l sector is 
one argument that has been put forward (World Bank 1981, 1984; Eicher 
1982).
Another reason which is frequently given is adverse 
macroeconomic po lic ies  which are said to have an even more prominent 
e ffec t on e ffec t ive  taxation rates in the a g r icu ltu ra l sector than do 
secto r-specific  po lic ie s . Krueger, Sch iff and Valdes (1988), fo r  
example, estimate the impact of secto r-specific  (d ire c t)  and
economywide ( in d ire c t)  po lic ies  on ag r icu ltu ra l incentives fo r
eighteen developing countries fo r  the period 1975-84.
The d ire c t e ffe c t is measured by the proportional difference 
between the producer price and the border price (adjusting fo r 
d is t r ib u t io n  , storage, transport, and other marketing costs). The 
ind irec t e ffe c t is s p l i t  in to two components. The f i r s t  is the impact 
of the unsustainable portion of the current account d e f ic i t  and of
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indus tr ia l protection po lic ies  on the real exchange rate and thus on 
the price of ag r icu ltu ra l commodities re la t ive  to nonagricultural 
tradables. The second is the impact of indus tr ia l protection po lic ies 
on the re la t iv e  price of ag r icu ltu ra l commodities to that of 
nonagricultural tradables.
They f ind  that the ind irec t e ffec t taxes agricu ltu re  by 27 
percent on average, and also that:
" . . . t h e  impact of the ind irec t, economywide interventions 
generally dominates the d irec t e ffe c t,  whether the d ire c t e ffec t 
is pos it ive  or negative."
This school of thought, therefore, stresses the need to get 
prices r ig h t .
3.2 .1 .2 . Non-Price Factors
Many have looked at non-price factors fo r  explanations of 
poor performance (Delgado and Mel lo r (1984); Lipton (1987); Ray 
(1988); Lele (1988); Lele (1989)). These include: (a) human capita l 
constra ints, (b) technological constraints, (c) in s t i tu t io n a l 
constraints, (d) p o l i t ic a l  constraints, and (e) environmental 
constraints.
(a) Human Capital Constraints
Delgado and Mellor, amongst others, point out that labour is
65
the "key l im it in g  resource to African a g r icu ltu ra l production. 
Furthermore, as indicated by World Bank (1981), there has been a 
large labour outflow from agricu ltu re , and urbanisation has occurred 
at the rate of 6.5 percent per annum over the 1960s and 1970s. 
Gbetibouo and Delgado (1984) h igh ligh t the fac t that labour shortage 
is becoming p a r t ic u la r ly  acute in West A fr ica , and is a s ig n if ica n t 
fac to r in the decline of food production.
(b) Technological Constraints
Mundlak (1988) puts ag r icu ltu ra l prices in the context of 
technological change and establishes that aggregate ag r icu ltu ra l 
supply does not respond much to price without technological change. 
He also implies tha t misallocation of ag r icu ltu ra l investment is most 
l ik e ly  to be due to in s u f f ic ie n t  attention by governments to key 
elements of technological change, such as research, and input 
de livery systems.
Another aspect of technological constraints is mentioned by 
Delgado and Mel lo r  (1984). They discuss the advantage of 
technological innovation that cuts per un it labour costs in view of 
the fa c t  tha t the opportunity costs of labour are constantly being 
pushed upward by factors outside the ag r icu ltu ra l sector.
Ranade, Jha, and Delgado (1988) indicate tha t the e ffec t of 
a reduction in the cost of production resu lt ing  from technological
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change in agricu ltu re  normally has a fa r  greater e ffe c t on incentives 
than a price change.
(c) In s t i tu t io n a l  Constraints
In s t i tu t io n a l factors which have a ro le  in ensuring the 
effectiveness of incentives in agricu ltu re , and p a r t ic u la r ly  in 
cotton c u lt iv a t io n  can be subdivided into two headings:
( i )  Those that bear d ire c t ly  on the p r o f i t a b i l i t y  of cotton 
through th e ir  e ffec t on price factors. These include prompt and 
s ta b i l i t y  of prices received by producers; t im ely de livery of 
inputs and th e ir  sale at predictable price leve ls; and the 
a b i l i t y  to secure credits  to purchase inputs. For example, Desai 
(1988), and Rosegrant and Siamwalla (1988) state tha t f e r t i l i z e r  
price and in te res t rate subsidies are much less important than 
po lic ies to assure adequate and timely supply, and in the form 
desired by farmers.
( i i )  Those that have enhanced technological know-how and support 
to the cotton industry. These include: research and extension; 
in fras tru c tu ra l complexity, especially the density of roads and 
buying posts in cotton-growing areas; and the qu a lity  of 
upstream a c t iv i t ie s  to ensure the r e l i a b i l i t y  of supply to 
ginneries. Thus, as argued by Olayide and Idachaba (1986), a 
major reason fo r  low supply e la s t ic i t y  in Sub-Saharan A frica is 
the poor state of ag r icu ltu ra l in fras truc tu re  and input
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d is tr ib u t io n  systems in A fr ica . I t  has also been argued that 
good price incentives themselves promote cap ita l formation, and 
in s t i tu t io n a l innovation (Hayami and Ruttan 1985; Mundlak 1988).
MAIDA (1990) reviews the development of cotton in several 
African countries and attempts to f ind  causes of re la t iv e  success and 
fa i lu re  of d i f fe re n t  cotton development schemes. I t  finds that a 
s ig n if ica n t d ifference between Francophone and Anglophone countries 
is :
"the ro le  played by in s t i tu t io n a l factors in a l le v ia t in g  
physical constraints and ensuring e ffec tive  price incentives. 
Anglophone countries are characterised by a low input/low y ie ld
technology whereas the francophone countries, ----- , feature a
high input/high y ie ld  technology."
I t  concludes tha t:
"while differences in macroeconomic and sectoral pric ing 
po lic ies  appear to have been c r i t i c a l ,  in s t i tu t io n a l  factors 
have been fundamental in explaining the sustained growth of 
cotton production in francophone countries."
(d) P o litica l Constraints
P o l i t ic a l  factors constraining the performance of the 
a g r icu ltu ra l sector are discussed by Bates (1981), Delgado and Mellor 
(1984) and MAIDA (1990) amongst others.
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MAIDA points out tha t since cotton is often grown in "poor" 
regions, the cotton industry has become an important instrument in 
governments' development and income d is tr ib u t io n  stra teg ies. Cotton 
development in Sahelian Francophone countries is often the 
cornerstone of a whole ru ra l development strategy. Anglophone 
countries, on the other hand have shown a greater tendency to allow 
p o l i t ic a l  and ethnic factors to dominate th e ir  cotton sectors.
An in te resting  point about the growth of parastatals is made 
by Delgado and Mellor who state that the rapid expansion of 
parastatal a c t iv i t y  in Sub-Saharan A frica in the 1960s and 1970s was 
largely achieved through ag r icu ltu ra l taxation.
(e) Environmental Constraints
Environmental constraints are also a reason fo r  the poor 
performance of cotton cu lt iv a t io n .  MAIDA (1990) gives some 
environmental and c lim atic  conditions which favour cotton 
c u lt iv a t io n .  These include re la t iv e ly  low a lt i tu d e s , good so il 
drainage, and non-windy conditions. Pests and diseases are a serious 
problem.
But, as stated in World Bank (1988), by fa r  the most serious 
and controversial problem concerns the environmental impact of cotton 
c u lt iv a t io n . The large increase in areas under cotton cu lt iva t io n ,  
especially in Francophone countries, has been associated with 
deforestation, erosion, and so i l  exhaustion. MAIDA points to evidence
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of declin ing so i l  f e r t i l i t y  in Tanzania due to continuous 
c u lt iv a t io n , and cotton's lack of responsiveness to f e r t i l i s e r s  
during research t r i a l s ,  as suggesting that environmental problems are 
more complex than previously recognised and thus require more 
attention than they are receiving at present.
3.3. Cotton Cultivation in Ghana.
Some of the conclusions which MAIDA draws from i ts  research 
seem to hold true in the case of Ghana's cotton sector. For example, 
the pre-1985 period, a period marked with adverse macroeconomic 
po licy, unattractive producer pric ing po lic ies  and in s t i tu t io n a l 
constra ints, is a period of unsuccessful attempts at cotton 
c u lt iv a t io n .  The post-1985 l ibe ra lised  period saw the p r iva t isa t ion  
of the cotton sector. Cotton companies were free to set the price 
they offered farmers fo r  seed cotton. At the same time macroeconomic 
po lic ies which advocated l ib e ra l is a t io n  freed up the constraints 
caused by f ixed exchange rates and foreign exchange scarc ity .
Today, according to Ghanaian Times (1991), cotton production 
accounts fo r  nearly 50 percent of the te x t i le  sector's cotton 
requirement and th is  f igu re  is set to r ise . This has not always been 
the case. In fac t the period between the e a r l ie s t  attempts at 
commercial cotton production ( in  the mid-nineteenth century) t i l l  the 
mid 1980's consisted mainly of fa i le d  ventures.
70
3.3.1 Early attempts.
In try in g  to give an ind ication of the many p i t f a l l s  which 
today's cotton cu lt iva to rs  face, an outline of the e a r l ie r  fa i lu res  
is ins truc t ive .
In 1909 the B r i t is h  Cotton Growing Association in conjunction 
with the Ghanaian (then the Gold Coast) Department of Agricu lture 
made an attempt to develop a cotton export industry. They d is tr ibu ted  
American and Egyptian hybrid seeds amongst farmers in the northern 
parts of the country. The y ie lds of seed cotton they obtained were 
so low (only 111 kgs. per hectare as against 1000 kgs. in 1991) that 
they re t ire d  from the f ie ld  in 1916.
Another fa i lu re  in production of cotton occurred when a 
cotton gin and b a il in g  press ins ta lled  in 1926 was reported to have 
ginned1 and baled only one bale of cotton because the supply of seed 
cotton had been so low.
The Government then focused i ts  a ttention on the factors 
which were l im it in g  y ie lds . A study was made by a foreign cotton 
growing company, and th e ir  report indicated tha t low y ie lds were 
mainly due to (1) boll-shedding, believed to be caused by a 
physiological fac to r bound up perhaps with poor s o i l ;  (2) pink 
bollworm; (3) cotton stainers; (4) blackarm disease and other pests. 
But despite the fac t that blackarm res is tant va r ie t ies  were planted 
in the period 1948 to 1951 y ie lds continued to be low. I t  was 
therefore realised that although disease and pest losses had been
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reduced the problem of bo ll shedding and poor so il  conditions needed 
to be solved i f  y ie lds were to be improved.
Various organisations and in s t i tu t io n s  such as the Crop 
Research In s t i tu te ,  State Farms Corporation (M in is try  of 
Agricu ltu re ), and the University of Ghana's Experimental Station were 
consequently set up to work on methods of improving y ie lds . The Crop 
Research In s t i tu te  has in fac t shown, from f ie ld  t r i a l s  i t  conducted 
in 1969 and 1970, tha t the use of 's c ie n t i f i c '  practices could obtain 
y ie lds of 2.8 tonnes of seed cotton per hectare.
With the emergence of a local te x t i le s  sector in the early 
s ix t ies  the need to produce cotton loca lly  took on even greater 
importance. Cotton consumption by Ghanaian spinning m il ls  is now 
14,000 tonnes. Up u n t i l  the mid-1980's, a vast m ajority  of th is  was 
being imported using scarce foreign exchange. The government's aim 
therefore sh ifted  from try in g  to cu lt iva te  cotton fo r  export to 
attempting to reduce the drain on foreign currency which cotton 
importation was causing. The Cotton Development Board (CDB), a 
government organisation, was set up in 1968 fo r  th is  purpose.
E ffo rts  by CDB to increase the production of cotton to a 
level which matched local demand met with l i t t l e  success. A study 
undertaken by the government in the I960's expected cotton demand in 
1970, 1975 and 1980 to be 12,000, 16,500 and 20,000 metric tonnes
respective ly2 . Local production in those years turned out in fac t to 
be 406, 2,200 and 2,400 tonnes respectively and there was worse to
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come as, by 1984, production had dropped to a mere 200 metric tonnes.
From the survey, conducted in 1991, the factors contributing 
to CDB's fa i lu re  were found to be numerous. These included:
(1) The fa c t tha t CDB was controlled by the government resulted in 
in s t i tu t io n a l ine ff ic iency . These ine ff ic ienc ies  resulted in:
(a) Inadequate timing in the purchase and d is tr ib u t io n  of 
f e r t i l i s e r s  and insecticides leading to poor so il 
f e r t i l i t y  and insect damage.
(b) Farm machinery such as trac tors  and accessories were 
badly maintained and in short supply,
(c) Transport equipment shortage, due in part to badly 
maintained stock, caused delays in the evacuation of seed 
cotton a f te r  picking. This meant that there was a 
discouraging delay in paying farmers.
(d) The q u a li ty  of ginning was not always good and varied 
from year to year as well as from gin to gin. This was 
because the technical know-how involved in maintaining 
and operating gins was not available.
(2) Price fac to rs , namely:
(a) The Cotton Development Board pursued an unprogressive
seed cotton p r ic ing  po licy - fa i l in g  to review seed 
cotton prices upwards despite the general trend of price
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hikes of other commodities in the 1970's and early 
1980's. Thus, farmers moved to competing crops, such as 
cocoa, which had more a tt ra c t ive  prices. In fa c t ,  Koli 
(1973, P .x iv ) , finds that unattractive price of seed 
cotton was a problem as fa r  back as the early  1920's.
(3) Macroeconomic factors. These are factors such as foreign exchange 
constraints which made i t  d i f f i c u l t  fo r  inputs l ik e  f e r t i l i s e r s  to be 
purchased.
3.3.2. Today's Privatised Sector.
The turning point in cotton production came with the setting 
up of the Ghana Cotton Company (GCC) in 1985. The Government owns 
30 percent of shares, and the remaining 70 percent are held by the 
major t e x t i le  f irm s. The company has been allowed to operate with 
l i t t l e  government interference, and i t s  aim from the s ta r t  was to be 
a p r o f i t  making operation. I t  went about achieving th is  aim by 
adopting a Francophone-style method of high input/high y ie ld  method 
of c u lt iv a t io n .
GCC has endeavoured to assure the a v a i la b i l i t y  of inputs, 
marketing and processing f a c i l i t i e s .  I t  made sure, in pa rt icu la r,  
that the small fam ily  farms that cu ltiva ted i t s  crop received a l l  
tha t was required to produce maximum y ie lds . Seeds were d is tr ibu ted  
and tra c to rs , f e r t i l i s e r s  and insecticides were made available on 
time. Transport vehicles were also supplied to evacuate the seed
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cotton at the end of the picking period (cotton is hand picked in 
Ghana). The prices payed to fanners were no longer a r b i t r a r i ly  set 
but were ca re fu l ly  calculated to maintain the incentive fo r  cotton 
farming. Government macroeconomic po licy , in terms of making foreign 
exchange more f re e ly  available, also favoured the drive fo r  increase 
in production.
As can be seen from Table (3.1) which looks at the 
performance of GCC in terms of y ie lds and areas cu lt iva ted  fo r  the 
period 1985-89, GCC has done extremely well. The figures fo r  1985 
re f le c t  the performance of the Cotton Development Board with only 
1,475 hectares cu lt iva ted  and a seed cotton y ie ld  o f 168 Kgs. per 
hectare. In GCC's f i r s t  season, in 1986, 7,625 hectares were
cultiva ted with a y ie ld  of 865 Kgs. per hectare; a remarkable 
increase. This performance was maintained in the period 1987 to 1989 
(see Figure (3.2) fo r  graphic representation of planted area and 
production).
Table (3.2) compares GCC's y ie lds of l i n t  cotton with other 
cotton producing countries fo r  the years 1986 and 1987. This shows 
that even though GCC's y ie lds of between 260 to 300 kgs. per hectare 
are not as high as those of countries such as Greece (707-848 
kgs./ha.)or Egypt (811-851 kgs./ha.), they are higher than y ie lds in
Uganda (20-20 kgs./ha) or Tanzania (123-131 kgs/ha). From the 1991
survey, i t  was learnt that GCC believes that i t  has achieved these 
re la t iv e ly  higher y ie lds as a resu lt of the price and non-price
factors which i t  has introduced to the cotton farmers. These include,
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fo r  example, the supply of adequate quantit ies of f e r t i l i s e r ,  under 
supervision, and on time.
With the l ib e ra l is a t io n  of cotton c u l t iv a t io n ,  other private 
cotton growing companies have emerged and have made a good 
contribution to to ta l  cotton output. In fa c t ,  the Ghanaian Times 
(1991) states that the to ta l  cotton production in Ghana as a whole 
rose from 360 tonnes cu lt iva ted over 1,700 hectares in 1985 to 5,000 
tonnes cu lt iva ted  over 12,000 hectares in 1990. Average national 
yie lds rose from 420 Kgs. of seed cotton per hectare to 1,000 Kgs. 
per hectare in the same period.
3.4. Structure of the Cost of Production.
The cost of growing cotton is shown in two formats. Table 
(3.3) gives a detailed account of cu lt iva t io n  costs incurred by GCC 
fo r  1000 hectares in 1991, and Table (3.4) shows costs incurred by
GCC and selected countries itemised by specific  types fo r  1991 as
w e l l .
As shown in Table (3 .4), GCC, with a f igu re  of 32.93
percent, has the lowest pre-harvesting cost as a percentage of to ta l 
cost fo r  the sample, even though i ts  chemicals f igu re  is the highest. 
This is because i t  has the smallest pre-harvesting labour and
equipment component in a l l  the sample. While Pakistan's labour 
component in the pre-harvesting cost is 9.3 percent, Greece's f igure
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Detail of cotton growing costs of Ghana Cotton 
Company 1991.
Table 3.3.
•  Insecticide: Spray 7 times per year. Each spraying requires 1 litre per hectare 
at 4000 cedis per litre. Therefore 1000 hectares requires 28 million cedis -{A)
•  Fertiliser: 2 bags of compound fertiliser at 6000 cedis per bag and 1 bag 
ammonia at 5000 cedis per bag. So 1000 Ha. requires 17 million cedis -(B)
•  Seed: 30 Kgs. per Ha. required. Therefore 1000 Ha. cost 1.5 mil. cedis -(C)
•  Ploughing: (refunded) at 8000 cedis per Ha.. So 1000 Ha. cost 8 mil. cedis 
-(C)
•  Yield: 700 Kgs. per Ha.. Farmers payed 70 cedis per Kg. Therefore 1000 
hectares cost 49 million cedis. -(D)
•  Ginning: 50 cedis ginning cost per Kg. of lint cotton. Yield of lint cotton 
approximately 282 Kgs. Therefore 1000 Ha. cost 14.1 million cedis. -(E)
•  Transport to and from gin: 20 cedis per Kg. of raw cotton. Therefore 1000 Ha. 
cost 14 million cedis. -(F)
•  Staff: 1 senior paid 30,000 cedis a month, 2 supervisors paid 20,000 cedis 
each and 17 workers paid 16,000 cedis each are reqired for 1000 Ha. 
Therefore yearly cost of employees is 3.9 million cedis. -(G)
•  Expatriate: one foreign cotton growing expert costs 6 million cedis as wages 
and 4.6 million cedis accomodation and transport, therfore total cost is 10.6 
million cedis. -(H)
•  Vehicles: car at 4 million cedis, 10 motorbikes at 4 million cedis, 5 tractors 
(second-hand) at 5 million cedis each. Therefore cost of vehicles is 33 million 
cedis. Therefore depretiation of 15 % means an annual cost of 4.95 million 
cedis. -(I)
•  Interest on operating capital: Insecticide and fertilisers given on 120 days 
credit; Therefore interest rate of 30 % on rest of operating capital is 25 
million cedis. -(J)
•  Total Direct Costs equal (A) +  (B) + (C) +  (D) +  (E) +  (F) + (G) +  (I) +  (J) =  
157.45 million cedis
•  Overhead Costs equal (H) =  10.6 million cedis.
•  Total Cost =  168.05 million cedis.
•  Sales: Yield of 282 Kgs. lint per Ha. at 750 cedis per Kg. Therfore total 
sales equal 212 million cedis (i.e. $.5m).
Source: 1991 Fieldtrip.
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Cotton growing costs for Ghana Cotton Comany and 
Selected Countries (% of total cost).
Table 3.4.
Egypt Pakistan Greece GCC
1. Direct costs 
A. Pre-harvesting
Labour 20.24 9.30 16.82 2.32
Power 10.25 7.79 7.95 --
Equipment -- -- 10.86 2.95
Seed 0.57 1.11 1.40 .89
Chemicals 14.69 20.90 6.57 26.7
Irrigation -- 5.59 1.68 --
Other 2.83 - -- -
Subtotal: 48.58 44.69 45.28 32.93
B. Harvesting
Labour 34.17 6.74 1.85 29.16
Power - -- 0.88 --
Other - -- 5.07 --
Subtotal: 34.17 6.74 7.80 29.16
C. Interest paid -- 5.36 7.89 14.88
II. Off-farm costs
Transport (gin) - 1.65 3.11 8.33
Ginning - 15.60 12.14 8.33
Other - -- - „
Subtotal: -- 17.25 15.55 16.66
III. Ttl dirct. cost 82.76 74.04 76.54 93.63
IV. Overhead costs
Administrative 17.23 1.98 1.03 6.30
Land cost 21.97 22.43 --
Other - 2.00 -- .07
Subtotal: 17.23 25.96 23.46 6.37
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: GCC data from 1991 fieldwork, other data 
from Industry and Development (1989/90).
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is 16.82 percent. But, Greece's chemical cost is 6.57 percent while 
Pakistan's is 20.9 percent. Egypt has both a high pre-harvest labour 
component, 20.24 percent, and a high chemical component, 14.69 
percent.
Greece has a low labour cost (1.85 %) as a percentage of 
to ta l cost fo r  harvesting. I t  would seem that Greece has mechanised 
capita l intensive harvesting since i t  has 5.07 percent of to ta l cost 
under the other category of harvesting, while the others in the 
sample have no figu re  fo r  th is ,  implying that th e i r  cotton is hand 
picked. Egypt's labour component is 34.17 while Pakistan's is 6.74. 
GCC's harvest labour cost as a percentage of to ta l  cost is 29.16 
percent. I t  seems that farmers are paid fo r  th e ir  pre-harvest and 
harvest e f fo r ts  only a fte r  harvest. Thus, while the pre-harvest 
labour f igu re  is low, the harvest f igure is re la t iv e ly  high.
Egypt has no ginning cost. No explanation can be given fo r
th is ,  and i t  seems, perhaps, that th is  is an erro r in the source
m ateria l.
Both Pakistan and Greece have low administrative costs as a 
percentage of to ta l  cost. These are 1.98 percent and 1.03 percent
respectively. GCC's f igu re  is higher at 6.3 percent while Egypt's
figu re  of 17.23 percent is higher s t i l l .
Thus, the s tr ik in g  features in th is  cost comparison are 
Pakistan's very low labour f igu re , Egypt's high labour and
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administrative f igu re , and GCC's high chemical f igu re .
Table (3.3) re f le c ts  the high input/high y ie ld  nature of 
GCC's approach. The optimum quantit ies of seeds, f e r t i l i s e r s  and 
insectic ides are used. The assumed y ie ld  of 700 kgs. per hectare is a
four year average. This has been done in order to reduce the effects
of yearly f luc tua tions  on the costing schedule.
Subtracting to ta l  cost from value of sales we get a pre-tax 
p ro f i t  f igu re  of 43.95 m il l io n  cedis per 1000 hectares. In do lla r 
terms th is  means 116,000 do lla rs  at 1991 rates of exchange (380 cedis 
to $1). Thus cotton cu lt iv a t io n  shows a return on sales of 20.7%. 
There are increasing returns to scale as well in that costs such as 
overheads, vehicles, and s ta f f  do not increase in the same proportion 
when the hectarage being cu lt iva ted is increased.
Costs itemised by spec if ic  types are shown in Table (3 .4). 
This is a comparison of differences in spec if ic  growing costs, 
expressed as a percentage of to ta l costs. A review of the data 
suggests the fo llow ing observations:
(a) For pre-harvesting, there is less emphasis on labour and 
power in the case of GCC than in the countries selected.
This can be explained by the fac t tha t farmers are paid
a fte r  harvesting.
(b) Cost of chemicals as a percentage of to ta l  cost in the
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case of GCC is very high at 26.77% as compared to 6.57 in
Greece, 14.69 in Egypt, or 16.65 in the United States,
even though a l l  of these countries achieve higher yields 
than GCC as can be seen from Table (3 .2).
(c) In terest charges by banks of over 30% resulted in GCC
having the highest in terest payments as a percentage of 
to ta l  cost in the countries selected.
(d) GCC has the highest to ta l d irec t cost percentage and
therefore the lowest overhead costs as a percentage of 
to ta l  cost fo r  the selected countries.
3.5. Lint Cotton Price.
A competitive price and adequate q u a li ty  are important 
elements which Ghanaian cotton must aim fo r  i f  i t  is to be 
competitive. They are important factors whether i t  is fo r  export or 
intended fo r  local consumption by the te x t i le  m i l ls .  This is because 
te x t i le  m il ls  in Ghana are no longer constrained by foreign exchange 
scarc ity . They are therefore free to import cotton i f  they are 
unhappy e ithe r about the price or qua lity  of Ghanaian cotton.
Figure (3.3) compares Ghana's l i n t  cotton price with C.I.F 
world prices. While the price of Ghanaian cotton, at $3.42/kg, was 
twice the world price of $1.52/kg in 1985, i t  f e l l  sharply the 
fo llowing year. In 1987 i t  f e l l  below the world price of $1.36 by 
reaching the $1.31 mark. In fac t i t  was lower than world price fo r
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Lint Cotton Price: Ghanaian vrs. World 
Price (US $).
Figure 3.3.
$/kg.
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Source: Ghana cotton price from 1991 
fieldwork. World price is C.I.F (nearby 
shipments), Int. Cot. Adv. Cmt. (1991).
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every year in the period 1987-90, and with p ro f i ts  in the region of 
20% (as indicated by Table (3 .3)) i t  is anticipated that the Ghanaian 
cotton price is able to absorb possible decreases in the world price 
of cotton as well as the added cost of f re ig h t  when production 
reaches exportable levels.
One advantage which Ghanaian cotton holds over imported
cotton with respect to domestic consumption is that transport charges
are fa r  smaller in the case of the former as compared to the la t te r .
This is due to the re la t iv e ly  shorter distances that domestically 
produced cotton has to trave l to reach the local te x t i le  m i l ls .
Another advantage is that domestic cotton is purchased on 
c red it  terms while imported cotton is paid fo r  upon placement of 
order and then requires a period of time fo r  shipment to be effected. 
Thus the purchase of domestic rather than imported cotton helps 
companies' cash flows and enables them to avoid the high cost of 
borrowing.
As we have seen above, Ghana has been price competitive in 
cotton production. But, as was discovered in fieldwork conducted in 
1991, there are serious problems with the q u a lity  of the l i n t  cotton. 
This is due to several factors and is discussed in the section below.
3.6. Quality of Ghanaian l in t .
Before we can understand the findings made during the 1991
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fieldwork on l i n t  cotton qu a li ty  i t  is important to know something 
about how cotton is harvested and ginned in Ghana, and how qua lity  is 
evaluated.
3.6 .1. Harvesting.
In spite of advances in mechanical harvesting, hand
harvesting, which s t i l l  accounts fo r  the largest percentage of 
harvested cotton in the world, is practised in Ghana. The harvesting 
of cotton demands care in order to obtain good value fo r  the l i n t .  
Cotton harvested improperly can be damaged by excessive moisture, 
trash and other contaminants which are d i f f i c u l t  to remove in ginning 
without damaging the spinning qu a li ty  of the f ib re .
Hand harvesting is done by two methods: picking and
"snapping". Picking is the removal of cotton seed from the burr with 
as l i t t l e  of the leaf or bo ll parts as possible. Pulling or 
"snapping" is the pu ll ing  of the entire  open bo ll from the plant. 
Picking is the practice used in Ghana since the local gins are not 
equipped to clean snapped cotton.
Another point to note is that storage of unginned cotton, 
( i .e .  cotton seed), in a humid atmosphere fo r  a long period of time 
before i t  is ginned causes the l i n t  to mould and should therefore be 
discouraged.
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3.6.2. C la ss ifica tio n  and Evaluation.
Cotton is classed according to staple ( i . e  f ib re )  length, 
fineness, grade and character. Amongst measures of staple length are, 
"2.5% span length", "50% span length" and "maximum f ib re  length". 
These are determined by using an instrument known as a Fibrograph. 
2.5% span lengths of less than 25 mm are considered short; so is a
50% span length of less than 18 mm. Longer staple cotton makes
stronger yarn and is used in making f in e r  count yarns i .e  thinner 
yarns. Short staple cotton is used fo r  less expensive items such as 
rugs, blankets and ropes.
Fineness is second only to length in determining the qua lity  
of a crop of cotton. The fineness of a varie ty  of cotton is dependent 
on the average external diameter of the f ib re s . Fibres of small
diameter re su lt  in a f ine  cotton, and f ib res  of large diameter in a
coarse cotton.
The "Micronaire" instrument measures flow rates of a i r  
through a sample. A low reading by th is  instrument (denoting a low 
a ir  flow) s ig n if ie s  tha t the sample being tested is of f in e  cotton; a 
high reading is obtained with a coarse sample. The reading is also 
affected by the maturity of the f ib res . A mature f ib re  has a th ick 
wall as a re su lt  of secondary thickening deposited on the inner side 
of the wall during bo ll r ipening, while an immature f ib re  is th in - 
walled and is usually the resu lt  of unfavourable growing conditions 
during the bo ll ripening period. Cotton containing many thin-walled
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f ib res  is d i f f i c u l t  to process. Micronaire values of 3.5 or above
should mean that th is  problem has been avoided.
Other important characte ris tics  are f ib re  strength and 
uniform ity of length. Fibre strength is measured in thousands of 
pounds per square inch by a "Pressley strength tes te r" and is based 
on the strength of a square inch of f ib re s .  Fibres with a
measurement below 65 are considered weak, while a reading above 95 is 
very strong.
The length of f ib res  in a given sample can vary 
considerably. A sample has a high uniform ity ra t io  i f  most of the 
f ib res , excluding the very long and the very short, have a small
length variance. When cotton with high un iform ity ra t io  is spun, the 
yarn w i l l  have a re la t iv e ly  even thickness throughout and w i l l  be 
less eas ily  broken.
3.6.3. Results of Tests on Quality.
Results of two tests conducted on Ghanaian cotton f ib re
q u a li ty  in 1987 and 1990 are given in Table (3.5) and Figure (3.4).
These were obtained from a te x t i le  m i l l  (referred to as Plant (B) in
1990 fie ldwork) during fie ldwork conducted in 1991. The data was
compiled fo r  the f irm  by a Swiss te x t i le s  laboratory.
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Comparison of Ghana Cotton Fibre Characteristics
for 1987 and 1990.
Table 3.5.
1990 1987
2.5 % Span Length 27.5 mm 33.0 mm
50 % Span Length 12.7 mm 22.0 mm
Max. Fibre Length 36.0 mm 38.0 mm
Pressley Ibs/sq inch 85,000 NO CHANGE
Micronaire 3.64 NO CHANGE
. ....
Trash Content 1.65% Not Available
Dust Content 0.07 % Not Available
Fibre Fragments 0.08 % Not Available
Nep Count 485 neps/gr. 315 neps/gr.
Source: 1991 fieldwork.
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Ghanaian Cotton Fibre Lengths: % of 
Total for 1987 and 1990 Samples. 
Figure 3.4.
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Table (3.5) gives data on 2.5% span length, 50% span length 
and maximum f ib re  length fo r  1987 and 1990. Although the maximum 
f ib re  length values do not vary greatly between the two years (38 mm 
and 36 mm fo r  1987 and 1990) the 2.5% and 50% span lengths show a 
drastic  decrease in f ib re  lengths fo r  those years. The 2.5% measure 
registered a decrease from 33 mm in 1987 to 27.5 mm in 1990 and the 
50% measure was 22 mm in 1987 but only 12.7 mm in 1990. The 
explanation offered by an o f f ic ia l  at Plant (B) is :
"In p rac tica l terms th is  means 50% of a l l  (1990) f ib res  are 
considered short f ib res  and influence the yarn qua lity  
negatively. No cotton buying f irm  w i l l  purchase th is  type of 
cotton anywhere in a developed country, as the spinning results  
are extremely poor. Short f ib res  are influencing yarn 
re g u la r i ty ,  tenacity  and e la s t ic i t y . "
This re la t iv e  shortness of the 1990 f ib re s  is well 
i l lu s t ra te d  in Figure (3 .4). This is a cumulative frequency diagram 
comparing Ghanaian cotton f ib re  lengths fo r  1987 with 1990 figures. 
I t  can be seen from th is  that even though there are s im ila r maximum 
and minimum f ib re  lengths fo r  1987 and 1990, the cumulative frequency 
curve fo r  1990 l ie s  below 1987's curve. This means tha t f ib res  in 
1990 are on average shorter than in 1987. For example, only 70 
percent of f ib re s  in the 1990 sample are at least 10 millimetres 
long, while 95 percent of f ib res  in the 1987 sample are at least 10 
m illimetres long.
Pressley and Micronaire readings of 85 thousand pounds per 
square inch and 3.64 respective ly fo r  the two years are considered
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good.
Trash content, i .e .  seed and sta lk p a rt ic le s , of 1.65% fo r  
1990 is considered high , while dust content of .07% and f ib re  
fragments, i .e .  destroyed f ib re  during ginning, of .08% are 
considered high but acceptable. No figures fo r  trash content dust 
content or f ib re  fragments are available fo r  1987. Neps, which are 
l i t t l e  knots formed e ithe r by irregu la r growth of cotton f ib res  or by 
the rubbing together of f ib res  especially in ginning, were more 
abundant in 1990 f ib res  than in 1987 f ib res . A nep count of 485 neps 
per gram was obtained fo r  1990 f ib res  as against 315 neps per gram 
fo r  1987 f ib re s .  A nep count of over 350 neps per gram is considered 
high.
Plant (B) o f f ic ia ls  comment on 1990 cotton thus:
"We f in d  tha t excessive contamination due to crushed o i l  
seeds takes place during ginning. During sampling, complete seed 
capsules as well as seed fragments are being isolated. Together 
with the trash content - cotton is hand- picked - the high o i l  
seed contamination as well as the low span lengths and high nep 
count point to serious deficiencies in ginning. This problem 
must be overcome before we can produce a standard yarn qua lity  
from local cotton."
GCC owns a l l  gins in Ghana. Upon informing GCC o f f ic ia ls  of 
the problems a local te x t i le  m i l l  was facing due to poor cotton 
ginning, the person in question disagreed. Further questioning 
revealed that GCC had no foreign technical assistance in operating 
th e ir  gins, and th is  gave the impression that local gin operators had 
l i t t l e  idea of the q u a li ty  standards they had to meet. The Plant (B)
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o f f ic ia l  also suspects that e ithe r parts in the ginning plant are 
worn and need replacement, or the machine is not being operated 
correc tly .
A l l  pr iva te  cotton producers re ly  on GCC fo r  ginning. A few 
have decided to purchase th e ir  own gins in order to reduce th is  
dependence. But, th is  does not necessarily mean that these producers 
w i l l  be able to run th e ir  gins co rrec tly  especially  i f  they intend to 
do so without outside technical assistance.
3.7. Summary.
I t  is clear from the above that both price and non-price 
factors have been instrumental in increasing the production and 
price-competitiveness of cotton, but that non-price fac tors , namely 
technical know-how in the ginning process, are required to improve 
i ts  q u a li ty .  This is an important find ing since th is  problem has 
serious implications on the future success of the sector.
One of the main reasons fo r  the recent success achieved by 
the cotton producers in se l l ing  th e ir  output to domestic m il ls  is
e ither because most of these m il ls  have not yet worked out the losses
they incur in buying in fe r io r  cotton, or because they are strapped 
fo r  cash and cannot pay fo r  cotton imports in advance, as is
curren tly  required by the government. When one or e ithe r of these
points is resolved, the demand fo r  local cotton w i l l  face competition
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from imports.
Also, as the quantity of cotton produced increases in the 
fu ture (Ghana could conveniently u t i l i s e  approximately 500,000 
hectares of land to produce 200,000 tonnes of cotton as mentioned in 
Ghanaian Times 1991), the exp o rta b i l i ty  of th is  commodity w i l l  depend 
to a large extent on i ts  qu a li ty  since price does not, fo r  now, 
appear to be a constra in t.
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Notes.
(1) Ginning is the process of separating the cotton lint 
from the seeds.
(2) Ghana Government, "Crop production goals and 
programmes", Agriculture Annexe II, Nathan Consortium for 
sector studies, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, 
Accra 1970, pp.203,213.
96
4. THE WORLD TEXTILE INDUSTRY.
4.1. Introduction
The biggest changes in the structure of the world te x t i le  
industry took place between 1965 and 1980. Great improvements in 
p roductiv ity  were achieved in spinning and weaving, and employment in 
te x t i le s  f e l l  sharply in North America, Western Europe and Japan. 
Faced with a declin ing te x t i le  industry in the early  1960's, the 
developed world opted fo r  n o n - ta r i f f  re s tr ic t io n s  on trade in 
te x t i le s  to protect them from cheap imports from developing 
countries. These are s t i l l  in place today in one form or another.
A fte r the introduction in Section (4 .1), the economic 
h is to ry of the world te x t i le  industry is reviewed in Section (4 .2). 
Section (4.3) looks at the modern te x t i le  industry. This contains a 
summary of the fo llow ing: world employment and output in Section 
(4 .3 .1 ); the LTA and MFA in Section (4 .3 .2 ); the e ffec ts  of MFA on 
developing countries in Section (4 .3 .3 ); the new technologies and 
th e ir  impact on labour p roductiv ity  and comparative advantage in 
Sections (4.3.4) and (4.3.5) respectively; technology d if fus ion  in 
Section (4 .3 .6 ). The summary is in Section (4 .4).
4.2. Economic History of World Textile Industry.
According to Ashton (1948, p .28), te x t i le s  have been one of 
the e a r l ie s t  offshoots of a peasant economy in a l l  parts o f the
97
world. He points out, fo r  example, that in B r i ta in ,  fo r  many 
generations, wool from sheep "provided the material fo r  an a c t iv i ty  
second only to ag ricu ltu re  in the number of people i t  employed and 
the volume of trade i t  supported." But i t  was not u n t i l  the wave of 
technical innovations swept B r i ta in  a fte r  1760 tha t the te x t i le  
industry began to grow at unprecedented rates.
As mentioned by C ipolla (1976), the two most o r ig ina l of the 
inventions that contributed to th is  growth were Kay's f ly in g  shuttle 
of 1733, which roughly doubled the weaver's output, and Lewis Paul's 
use of ro l le rs ,  in 1738, to draw out the rovings (see section below 
fo r  d e f in i t io n  of rovings) as part of a power-driven spinning 
machine. Thus as C ipolla (1976) states:
"The inventions did not in i t ia te  cotton 's  explosive 
expansion. B u t , . . . ,  once they had been made, the rate of 
expansion could r ise  to levels that would previously have been 
quite impossible. The hundred-fold growth in production between 
1760 and 1827 could not have been achieved by a hundred-fold 
increase in the labour force, but only by the rises in 
p roductiv ity  which the spinning machinery and eventually the 
power looms provided."
According to Knowles (1924, p .29), the introduction of iron 
products into te x t i le  machinery in the 1790s meant tha t steam powered 
engines could be used to power these machines. The wooden machinery, 
used previously, could not stand the s tra in  of the power produced by 
steam engines. Thus, according to Knowles (1942), as fa r  as te x t i le s  
were concerned, machinery was introduced to cope with the rapid 
expansion of B r i t is h  trade during the eighteenth century.
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Throughout the 19th century a succession of improvements in 
te x t i le  machinery s teadily  increased the volume of production, 
lowering prices of fin ished cloth and garments. The trend continued 
in the 20th century, with emphasis on f u l l y  automatic or nearly f u l l y  
automatic systems of machinery.
4.3 Modern Industry.
Both industr ia lised  and developing countries now have modern 
in s ta l la t io n s  capable of highly e f f ic ie n t  fab r ic  production. In 
addition to mechanical improvements in yarn and fa b r ic  manufacture, 
there have been rapid advances in development of new f ib re s , 
processes to improve te x t i le  characte ris t ics , and test ing  methods 
allowing greater q u a li ty  contro l.
4.3.1. Employment and Output.
As indicated by the International Labour Organisation 
(1991), the te x t i le  industry employed 5.3 m il l io n  workers in 
developing countries in 1985 or 16 percent of the industr ia l 
workforce. In the period 1967-1987 developed countries d ra s t ic a l ly  
reduced employment in the te x t i le  industry from 8.9 m il l io n  to 6.8 
m il l io n  workers, mainly by better integrating the design, spinning, 
weaving, and f in ish in g  stages of production and by establishing large 
manufacturing units and long production runs. In many countries, the 
Government provided f inanc ia l assistance fo r  res truc tu ring  and
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modernisation of the industry. As a re su lt ,  the value added per 
worker in 1985 in developed countries was $18,000, compared to $6,000 
in developing countries, as indicated by Industry and Development 
(1987, p .123).
Between 1970 and 1985, te x t i le  output increased by 2.4 
percent per annum in developing countries and 1.5 percent per annum 
in developed countries. As a re su lt ,  the developing countries' share 
in world output increased from 19.5 to 21.7 percent on the basis of a 
sample of 82 countries, (Industry and Development , 1987, p .123).
Textiles and cloth ing exports are therefore c le a r ly  of major 
importance to developing countries.
4.3 .2 . The LTA and the MFA.
The massive l ib e ra l is a t io n  of world trade since World War I I  
has provided a continuing impetus to change in te x t i le  industries of 
industr ia lised  countries. Pressures fo r  change in these countries 
have been imposed from many sides. Shephard (1981) finds that these 
include f ie rce  competition in foreign and domestic markets from low- 
wage countries, strong pressures from w ith in  the industry fo r 
s truc tu ra l reform and technical change and also competition fo r 
labour from other countries.
The prospect of decline has brought fo r th  a varie ty  of 
'su rv iva l responses' from the governments and industries of the 
industr ia lised  countries. Of these responses, government intervention
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aimed at stemming the t ide  of decline has been the most universal, 
and by fa r  the most important form of intervention has been provided 
by n o n - ta r i f f  re s tr ic t io n s  on trade, a h is to ry  of which can be found 
in Keesing and Wolf (1980).
Mathur (1989, p .217) points out that protectionism in the 
name of voluntary export res tra in ts  dates back to the 1937 Osaka 
"Gentlemen's Agreement" between the American and Japanese te x t i le  
trade associations. Cline (1990) h ighlights the fa c t tha t what 
followed was the beginning of a cycle that has plagued te x t i le  
protection ever since: namely the sp il lo ve r of imports from
controlled to uncontrolled areas. Thus, under s e l f - re s t ra in t ,  Japan's 
share o f US imports of cotton te x t i le s  f e l l  from 63 percent in 1958 
to 26 percent in 1960, while Hong Kong 's share rose from 14 percent 
to 28 percent. Imports also surged from many other countries. 
Moreover, as indicated by Keesing and Wolf (1980, p .14-15), US 
a g r icu ltu ra l po licy  aggravated import competition by forc ing domestic 
te x t i le  m il ls  to purchase cotton at an a r t i f i c i a l l y  high support 
price while foreign producers could buy exported US cotton at a lower 
price.
The General Agreement on T a r i f fs  and Trade (GATT) 
discussions, led by US negotiators, developed the concept of "market 
d isruption" in 1959-1960. This was defined as instances of sharp 
import increases associated with low import prices not a tt r ibu tab le  
to dumping or foreign subsidies. In November 1960 GATT adopted the 
Decision on the Avoidance of Market Disruption, which meant that
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re s tr ic t io n s  could be applied even i f  actual in ju ry  had not taken 
place. I t  also established the occurrence of a price d i f fe re n t ia l  
between imports and comparable domestic goods as a basis fo r  
determining the need fo r  re s t r ic t io n .
A waiver of GATT's rules on non-discrimination having been
obtained, the Short Term Arrangement (STA) was adopted in 1961, and 
th is  applied the concept of market d isruption, and i t  remained the 
cornerstone of te x t i le  and apparel protection therea fter in the Long 
Term Arrangement (LTA) and the M u lt i f ib re  Arrangement (MFA).
The LTA came into e ffec t fo r  f iv e  years in 1962, and was
largely meant to allow the industries of the importing 
( indus tr ia l ised ) countries a temporary 'breathing space' to adjust to 
increased imports from low wage countries. The 'breathing space' was 
seen as being too short, and the LTA was twice renewed before i t  was 
replaced in 1974 by an agreement that embraced a l l  the major te x t i le  
f ib re s ,  the MFA. The MFA was renewed fo r  yet four more years in 1978 
under s ig n if ic a n t ly  more re s t r ic t iv e  conditions, and then renewed 
twice more in 1981 and 1986.
Today, world trade in te x t i le s  and c lo th ing, continues to be 
regulated by the MFA. In 1986, the United States signed b i la te ra l  
agreements with i t s  three main Asian suppliers covering imports of 
te x t i le s  and c loth ing up to 1991. Hong Kong agreed to l im i t  the 
growth of i t s  exports by an average of 1 percent per annum in that
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period. Under s im ila r agreements, the growth of exports from the 
Republic of Korea was lim ited to 0.8 percent per annum, and those of 
Taiwan Province to 0.5 percent per annum. The EEC has been a l i t t l e  
more l ib e ra l than the United States in i ts  b i la te ra l  agreements. With 
the extension of the MFA in 1986, i t  has agreed to annual increases 
of 1 to 2 percent higher than in the previous b i la te ra l  agreements.
4.3 .3. Effects of MFA on Developing Countries.
Although the quota system re s t r ic ts  the expansion of 
exports, i t  guarantees the status quo. The ex is ting  suppliers are 
thus assured of a given share of the export market to which they can 
attach a market value. This market value, commonly referred to as the 
quota rent, is incorporated in the price of the exported te x t i le s  and 
cloth ing and becomes a guaranteed improvement to th e ir  terms of trade 
and export earnings. Trela and Whalley (1989, p .137) point out that 
i t  is therefore believed that th is  class of established exporters has 
a vested in te rest in maintaining the status quo and w i l l  favour the 
continued renegotiation of the MFA. Thus, Keesing and Wolf (1980, p. 
125) state that developing countries' gain from quota rents more than 
outweighs the loss they suffer as a resu lt  of the re s tr ic t io n s  on 
th e ir  market access. As a re su lt ,  i t  is not in th e ir  in te rest to seek 
to terminate the MFA because of the loss of th e ir  quota rents.
On the other hand, i t  is argued by GATT (1984, p .152), and 
Mark (1985, p .8) tha t the quota rents only p a r t ia l ly  compensate the
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earnings foregone from the unrealised expansion of sales. Moreover, 
the MFA imposes a r ig id i t y  on production and export structures in 
both exporting and importing structures. This, as pointed out by 
Mathur (1989, p .197), may re su lt  in the "established" exporters 
actua lly  losing market shares to new entrants into the market from 
unrestricted countries.
Various attempts have been made to estimate the magnitude of 
foregone exports and transferred rents from trade re s tr ic t io n s  in 
te x t i le s  and c loth ing. Most studies have found the decline in export 
opportunities and revenues from the MFA to be substantial fo r  
developing countries. According to an estimate by Trela and Whalley 
(1988), i f  these b i la te ra l  export res tra in ts  were eliminated, exports 
of te x t i le s  and cloth ing by developing countries would increase by 
about $5 b i l l i o n .  Ending t a r i f f s  on these items would add another $6 
b i l l i o n  in exports. By another estimate made by Laird and Yeats 
(1987), the removal of EC, Japanese, and U.S. barrie rs  to imports 
from developing countries could increase developing country exports 
of te x t i le s  and c loth ing by 125 percent. UNCTAD (1986) estimated that 
complete nondiscriminatory l ib e ra l is a t io n  ( invo lv ing both t a r i f f s  and 
the MFA quotas) could increase developing country exports of c loth ing 
by 135 percent and te x t i le s  by 78 percent. Another estimate by 
Kirmani et a l .  (1984) suggests tha t developing country exports to the 
major OECD countries could increase by 82 percent fo r  te x t i le s  and 93 
percent fo r  cloth ing i f  both trade re s tr ic t io n s  were removed.These 
estimates are of s ta t ic  e ffects only, and over time developing 
countries might reap fu r the r benefits from opportunities under
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l ib e ra l is a t io n  fo r  economies of scale, product d if fe re n t ia t io n ,  and 
specia lisation .
Cable (1989, p .148) points out tha t, the MFA, by re ly ing  on 
quantita tive  re s tr ic t io n s ,  has the e ffec t of fo rc ing the foreign 
suppliers to upgrade the added value content of th e ir  exports. I t  has 
therefore increased competition in the upper end of the market in
importing countries - precisely the part of the market where the
importing ( in d u s tr ia l)  countries have the greatest comparative 
advantages.
Cline (1990, p .128-130) shows that the MFA also has an 
ind irec t impact on the economic structure of both indus tr ia lised  and 
developing countries. For example, a d is torted price structure in the 
te x t i le  and cloth ing industries hampers the needed struc tura l 
adjustment which would have enabled a s h i f t  o f investment in
importing countries to other sectors. At the same time, exporting 
countries, in response to the MFA, have been forced to develop the 
export po tentia l of other industries, causing tension in the
increasing number of indus tr ia l sectors in indus tr ia lised  countries.
Developing country policymakers frequently argue that the 
more serious implications of the MFA are those which a ffec t 
ind iv idual country's growth and development. OECD (1985) argued that:
"the expansion of te x t i le  and cloth ing exports had become fo r 
the developing countries an increasingly important determinant 
of th e ir  economic development.1
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Their view was that they had seen the highly benefic ia l 
results  of both economic growth and social development from export- 
led growth in countries such as Japan, Hong-Kong, Korea, Singapore, 
and Taiwan. They argued tha t in order to s h i f t  to outward-oriented 
trade po lic ie s , developing countries needed not only continued, but 
expanded access to markets of the major indus tr ia l countries, and 
removing the MFA re s tr ic t io n s  played a major ro le  in th is .  Moreover, 
as Keesing and Wolf (1980) argue:
" i f  the MFA quotas did not ex is t the developing countries would 
have the opportunity to fo llow  much the same path to 
in d u s tr ia l isa t io n  that Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan 
have been taking and to supplant them as leading cloth ing 
exporters."
Further unfavourable consequences of the MFA re s tr ic t io n s  
fo llow  from th e ir  adverse impact on investment opportunities in 
developing countries. Thus, as Chaudhry and Hamid (1988) point out in 
discussing the e ffects  of the MFA on Pakistan's t e x t i le  industry, i t  
has:
"hampered modernisation of the sector, led to expansion of the 
low cost power-loom sector, and generally put Pakistan 
techn ica lly  behind in te x t i le s . "
However, Trela and Whalley (1990) argue that MFA 
re s tr ic t io n s  do not seem to have affected the overall growth 
performance of certa in developing countries. They c i te  the high 
growth rates of the Asian Big Three (Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan) 
through the 1970s and 1980s as an example. They also point out that a
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key fac to r behind th is  high growth rate has been a rapid expansion of 
exports, fue lled  to a large extent by the growth of exports of 
te x t i le s  and clo th ing.
4.3 .4 . Textiles Manufacturing and New Technologies.
Essentia lly , the processes involved in producing te x t i le s  
are designing, f ib re  preparation, spinning weaving or k n i t t in g ,  and 
f in ish in g ; making clothes involves designing and pattern making, 
cu tt ing , sewing and f in is h in g . These are summarised below, but a more 
detailed elaboration of the technical a c t iv i t ie s  in spinning is given 
in Hamby (1966), and Lord (1981) amongst others, and a detailed 
account of the weaving process can be found in Marks and Robinson 
(1976), Aitken (1964) and Lord and Mohamed (1976). A good account of 
the e ffects  of new technologies on these processes can be found in 
Toyne et a l.  (1984 ch.3), and Cline (1990).
Two important technological changes have taken place in the 
te x t i le  industry since 1945. The f i r s t  came as a re su lt  of the 
competition tha t occurred between man-made f ib res  and natural f ib res  
in the 1950s and 1960s. Thus, as FAST (1986), th is  resulted in an 
impressive ra t io n a lisa t io n  in spinning and weaving operations a fte r  
1950. The second wave of technological change in the te x t i le  
industry, which began in the 1970s, was driven to a large extent by 
the rapid advances in microelectronics.
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Designing.
Computer-aided design (CAD) techniques o f fe r  extensive 
opportunities in making te x t i le  designing a more e f f ic ie n t  process. 
Textile  manufacturers have t ra d i t io n a l ly  had to prepare several 
samples of c lo th fo r  th e ir  potentia l customers, which can be a time 
consuming task. With the CAD techniques, hundreds of examples can be 
presented to a customer on a computer screen, and only a few are then 
woven in to samples before a f in a l  choice is made. Moreover, the 
computer has a l l  the information ready fo r  se tt ing  the loom fo r  
production.
Fibre Preparation.
Fibre preparation before spinning involves blending, carding 
and drawing out of f ib res . These processes have undergone various 
degrees of mechanisation. Latest equipment is highly automated and 
can be operated with the use of computers.
Bales of f ib re  arr ive  at the te x t i le  m i l l ,  as shown in 
Figure (4 .1), from d if fe re n t  sources. Fibre from a selected number of 
bales are then blended to produce a clean, uniform qua lity  of 
material fo r  fu r the r processing. The purpose of the opening room 
machinery is to loosen up and break the f ib re  layers taken from the 
bales into smaller pieces and de liver th is  pre-opened stock to the 
cleaning machines fo r  fu r the r opening and cleaning. I f  the fib res are
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not properly selected and properly fed at th is  stage of processing, 
production e ff ic ie ncy  w i l l  be decreased and the product produced may 
not have the expected qua lity  characte ris t ics .
Toyne (1984) observed that computers are now widely in use 
fo r  selecting the best combination of bales fo r  a spec if ic  end-use 
product. The c r i te r io n  fo r  bale selection is based on how each f ib re  
qu a li ty  contributes to the manufacturing performance and product 
a tt r ib u te s . Bale pluckers and automatic feeds, as shown in Figure
(4.2), can be programmed to feed a specific  amount from bales at very 
high speeds while assuring homogeneous blending. These programmable 
machines, with th e ir  precision blending, minimise the w ith in-bale and 
between-bale varia tions to a degree which is unattainable in manual 
feeding. Automated equipment in the opening room tha t is completely 
contro lled by microprocessors can de liver a well-opened stock to the 
cards which are shown in Figure (4 .4). These remove any remaining 
d i r t  or excessively short or immature f ib re s , and arranges the 
remaining f ib res  in a roughly pa ra lle l disentangled form (called a 
s l iv e r )  that becomes the input fo r  drawing.
The development of new card cloth ing and the use of chute 
feeding, as shown in Figure (4 .3 ), and e lectronics have greatly 
contributed to carding speed increases in the las t decade. Meta ll ic  
card wire was an important technological invention. I t  allowed 
automation in carding, and i t  improved both production speed and 
te x t i le  q u a li ty  because i t  provided t ig h te r ,  closer settings which 
enabled a better in tegration of f ib res  and reduced weight varia tion .
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Figure 4.3. Chute Feeds 
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Figure 4.4. Carding
Figure 4.5. Rotor or Open-End Spinning
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The use of e lectron ic clutches, so lid  state c i r c u i t r y ,  
microprocessors, DC motors and minicomputers has provided greater 
control and higher carding e ff ic iency , and now that carding can be 
programmed d ire c t ly  from the control room, the need fo r  workers in 
the carding area has been v i r tu a l ly  eliminated.
Pre-spinning operations include combing, drawing and roving. 
The importance of combing depends on the qu a li ty  and fineness of the 
yarn demanded. Improvements in machine design, resu lt ing  in the 
elim ination of uncontrolled acceleration, weight reduction, balancing 
of swinging masses, and stronger rocker shafts have made higher 
speeds possible.
The drawing frame straightens and pa ra lle ls  the f ib res  in 
the s l iv e r ,  improves the uniform ity of the s l ive rs ,  blends the f ib res  
by feeding several s l ive rs  through the drawframe, and delivers a 
s l iv e r  of a spec if ic  weight. This is done by passing the s l iv e r  
between successive sets of ro l le rs ,  each of which moves more rap id ly  
than the preceding one. Modern high-speed draw frames are equipped 
with a n t i f r ic t io n  bearings to support the c o i le r ,  automatic stop 
motions at the break of the s l iv e r ,  automatic can chargers and larger 
cans, power-driven creels, and leve ll in g  devices.
The roving frame attenuates the drawing s l iv e r  into a roving 
so that i t  w i l l  be suitable fo r  the ring spinning frame. This is also 
done by means of employing increasingly fas t ro l le rs .  The s l iv e r  is 
simultaneously twisted s l ig h t ly  to strengthen i t .  The continued use
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and development of r ing  spinning encouraged e f fo r ts  to improve and 
automate roving frames. Frames with automatic do ffing  are now 
available.
Yarn Spinning
The purpose of spinning is to obtain a s t i l l  f in e r  yarn from 
the roving and to tw is t  previously pa ra lle l strands into a sp ira l so 
that they adhere together and make yarn strong enough to bear the 
stress placed on i t  in succeeding operations.
The spinning process takes one of two forms: ring-frame
spinning or open-ended spinning which is shown in Figure (4 .5). The 
ring frame spinning process which was f i r s t  introduced in the United 
States in 1830 is s t i l l  widely used today, though in a much improved 
form. For example, between 1950 and 1975 the speed of output doubled 
while the qu a li ty  of yarn and r e l i a b i l i t y  of operation also 
increased. Industry and Development (1987) states that as l im its  on 
the ring-frame spinning equipment were approached, open-ended 
spinning machines were developed which operate at four times the 
speed of ring-frames (p a r t ly  because they integrate three previously 
separate processes: roving, spinning and winding). Although fabrics 
woven from open-end spun yarns are reported to be in fe r io r  to those 
from ring-spun yarns, the open-end technique accounted fo r  more than 
15 percent of a l l  yarns produced in the US in the la te  1980's, 
compared to only 3 percent in 1975.
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Progress has recently been made in improving the ro to r 
system. Otemas (1989) states tha t a te x t i le  machine manufacturer 
claims to have produced a ro to r capable of spinning yarns in the f ine  
count range and which had outstanding e ff ic iency  and which could be 
"opening up new f ie ld s  of application fo r  ro to r yarns." UNIDO (1989) 
points out tha t je t  spinning, a re la t iv e ly  recent Japanese 
innovation, spins yarn even fas te r than open-end spinning and does i t  
f in e ly  enough fo r  high q u a li ty  sh ir t in g  and blouse materia ls.
Weaving
Weaving involves in te r lac ing  lengthwise yarns (warp) and 
crosswise f i l l i n g  yarns (weft) and is carried out on a loom. The 
simplest weaving is accomplished by ra is ing  a lternate warp yarns and 
inserting one length of weft (a pick) through the "tunnel" formed by 
raised and lowered ends and then reversing the pattern of raised and 
lowered warp yarns and inserting a second pick. The product of th is  
pattern is called a pla in weave.
The major innovation, in weaving, since the mid-1950s has 
been in the method of weft insertion . T ra d it io n a l ly ,  shuttles of 
approximately one foot were used on shuttle looms s im ila r  to those 
shown in Figure (4 .7). But the development of the shuttle less loom 
means tha t e ithe r small p ro jec t i les  or no p ro je c t i le s  at a l l  are 
used. Missiles (small p ro jec t i les  used to trave l across the loom from
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Figure 4.6. Rapier Weaving Looms (Shuttleless)
Figure 4.7. Shuttle Looms
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one end to the other), rapiers (two small p ro je c t i le s  which meet in 
the centre and one hands over the weft to the other to carry across, 
see Figure (4 .6)) , water-jets and a i r - je ts  were a l l  e f fo r ts  in th is  
d irec tion .
Shuttleless looms were estimated by Industry and Development 
(1989) to account fo r  around ha lf  the looms in use in Europe in the 
late 1980's. They have the advantage of requiring less power and 
space than conventional power looms, as well as being fas te r. The 
more recent use of multiphase weaving has allowed up to 600 picks 
(number of weft insertions) per minute, as against 180 on high-speed 
conventional looms, with weft insertion rates r is in g  from 400 metres 
per minute to 1840 metres. Further improvements of up to 170 metres 
per man hour have been achieved with the use of microelectronics to 
control the looms and to monitor the qua lity  of the cloth produced.
As a re su lt  of the high level of automation that has been 
achieved, weaving is more computerised than any other te x t i le  
process. Some of the la tes t machines use robotics, and the 
microprocessors in the machines can automatically adjust the winding 
speed according to the yarn requirements of the loom. The robots are 
capable of evaluating acceleration in order to reduce weft stress to 
a minimum. Other machines use systems which can adjust the weft feed 
while the machine is s t i l l  running. UNIDO (1989) state that in one 
te x t i le  m i l l  in the United States, computer control and automated 
materials handling devices allow production of about 1 m il l io n  metres 
of fab r ic  per week in 300 d i f fe re n t styles compared to 275,000 meters
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a week in 100 styles without the computer.
Finishing
Finishing involves some or a l l  of the fo llow ing processes: 
washing; bleaching; dyeing or p r in t in g ; and heat se tt ing . Washing, as 
shown in Figure (4 .9), is undertaken to clean the fab r ic  in 
preparation fo r  the other f in ish in g  processes. Bleaching is done in 
preparation fo r  dyeing or p r in t ing . Dyeing can be e ithe r of the 
fibre-dyeing type, the yarn-dyeing type (as shown in Figure (4 .8), or 
the fabric-dyeing type, while p r in t ing  is done e ithe r manually on 
f l a t  screens, or on a ro tary  p r in t ing  machine. Another method of 
p r in t ing  is called transfer p r in t ing  where the design is transferred 
from a paper-like material onto the fab r ic .
Figures (4.11 a,b), (4.12 a,b), and (4.13 a,b) show real wax 
p r in ts , im ita t ion  wax p r in ts  and machine woven kente cloth 
respectively, a l l  of which are manufactured by Ghanaian m i l ls .  These 
represents some of the fabrics which can be produced using some of 
the f in ish in g  processes discussed above, and a b r ie f  review of the 
actual processes involved is  given in Chapter (5).
Certain f in ish in g  processes involve heat se tt ing  the fab ric  
in order to l im i t  shrinkage, or to give the fa b r ic  a spec if ic  " fe e l" .  
This is done using Stenters as can be seen in Figure (4 .10 .).
Tex ti le  f in is h in g , has become more automated thanks largely
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Figure 4.8. Yarn Dyeing
Figure 4.9. Continuous Washing
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Figure 4.11b. Real Wax Print
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Figure 4.12a. Imitation Wax/Java Print
Figure 4.12b. Imitation Wax/Java Print
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Machine Woven Kente
Figure 4.13b. Machine Woven Kente
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to the incorporation of automatic control and computer systems which 
have allowed continuous processing and qua lity  improvements. Recent 
advances in colour physics combined with microelectronics have led to 
the use of computer based spectrophotometers. These can define shades 
numerically, allowing colours to be repeated accurately, and also 
scan a piece of c loth fo r  colour consistency. Computers are also 
being used to control continuous f in ish in g , while computer controlled 
lasers can be used to detect fa u lts  in c loth before i t  is f in ished, 
scanning an average of 270 metres per minute compared to the 50 
metres achieved with manual techniques. Further modifications are 
l ik e ly  as manufacturers seek to reduce the hot water needed fo r 
dyeing, thereby cutt ing energy costs.
4.3 .5. Impact of Technology on Labour Productivity and Comparative 
Advantage
I t  is often argued that developing countries have a 
comparative advantage in labour intensive spinning and weaving 
technology. I t  is true that wages in developing countries are 
s ig n if ic a n t ly  lower than in developed countries. For example, Figure 
(4.14) gives the 1985 hourly wages of sk i l le d  and unskilled workers 
in the te x t i le s  sector of f iv e  selected countries. From th is ,  i t  is 
found that s k i l le d  and unskilled wages are fa r  higher in the two 
developed countries (USA and Germany) than in the newly 
developed/developing countries (Ghana, India and Korea), with Ghana 
having the lowest wages of a l l .  But, as stated in Industry and
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Hourly Wages (US $) in Textiles Sector 
of Selected Countries, 1985. 
Figure 4.14.
$
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Source: Data for Ghana from 1990 
fieldwork. All other data from Interntnl 
Production Cost Comparison (1985).
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Development (1987), the outstanding p roductiv ity  increases achieved 
by the la tes t te x t i le  technology has o ffse t these higher wages in 
developed countries, and has made th e ir  industries highly 
competitive. For example, a shuttle less loom in 1982 was 3.5 times 
the cost of a f ly -s h u t t le  loom in 1950 (adjusting fo r  in f la t io n ) ,  but 
i t  was up to 4 times fas te r (UNIDO (1989)). Rotor spinning, as 
mentioned above and also by UNIDO (1989), can ra ise the speed of yarn 
output by up to 4 times.
In the opening rooms, automation of bale-opening, cleaning, 
picking, and mixing has reduced the need fo r  human labour to the bare 
minimum. According to UNIDO (1989) e ff ic iency  improvements at th is
stage are estimated to be at least 200 percent since the 1960s.
Thus, new technology has been ra is ing  p roduc tiv ity  while 
lowering labour content in the te x t i le  industry. This has transformed 
the industry into a cap ita l- in tens ive  operation in industr ia lised  
countries. Cline (1990, p .122) therefore states tha t enterprises 
adopting new technologies often enjoy an edge over th e ir  competitors. 
He fu r the r states tha t:
"The ind icator of re la t iv e  p roductiv ity  divided by re la t iv e  wage 
gives the surpris ing re su lt  that fo r  both te x t i le s  and apparel, 
the United States tends to be competitive with the developing
countries. Higher p roduc tiv ity  o ffsets higher US wages, even fo r
apparel..............the estimates here do suggest a much greater
a b i l i t y  of the te x t i le  and apparel industries in the United
States (and other indus tr ia l countries, especially  I ta ly )  to 
stand up to competition from the developing countries than would 
be expected from the progressive recourse to greater protection 
under the M ult i-F ibre Arrangement."
125
Unskilled labour has been replaced by a smaller number of 
jobs which require some knowledge and tra in ing  in the running of 
computer software. Many of the new technologies in spinning and 
weaving have centred on saving labour costs. ILO (1991) gives an 
example in Argentina were approximately 2,700 jobs were displaced by 
the introduction of open-end (ro to r)  spinning machines in 1987 and 
4,500 jobs were lost because of shuttle less looms. Two th irds  of the 
los t jobs were machine operators, mainly spinners and weavers.
One s ig n if ica n t impact of new technologies on comparative 
advantages in the te x t i le  industry is the decline of labour cost as 
the absolute c r i te r io n .  Curiskis (1989) compared the percentage 
change in manufacturing costs in Hong Kong and in the United States 
fo r  the period 1967-88 in spinning and weaving. Due to the increased 
c a p ita l- in te n s i ty  in the te x t i le  industry, the labour cost of 
spinning in making one standard un it of te x t i le  output in the United 
States has remained v i r tu a l ly  unchanged in money terms from 1967 to 
1988 (15.9 cents and 16.1 cents, respective ly). The re la t iv e  share of 
labour in to ta l  manufacturing cost, however, has fa l le n .
In Hong Kong the labour cost of spinning in 1988 was 60 
percent of the 1967 leve l, while m i l l  expenses (though s t i l l  lower 
than in the US) increased by almost seven times. Overall, the 
re la t ive  share of the labour cost dropped from 9 percent to only 2 
percent over the period.
Thus, Curisk is ' resu lts  show that the importance of un it
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labour costs in the overall cost of spinning and weaving, in the US
and Hong Kong, has decreased over the 1967-88 period.
4.3.6. Technology Diffusion.
The impact of these new technologies on the world's te x t i le s  
industries depends on th e ir  rate of d if fu s ion . But, the evidence 
available suggests that the d if fus ion  of microelectronics-based 
technologies has been f a i r l y  slow, being res tr ic ted  fo r  the most part 
to large firms in developed countries, though there are exceptions 
such as leading firms in Hong Kong, South Korea and Singapore. A 
survey by the Policy Studies In s t i tu te  (1985) of the industries in
Germany, France and the United Kingdom, fo r  example found that 
between 20 and 40 percent of te x t i le s  and cloth ing fac tories  used 
microelectronics, a lower proportion than fo r  any other manufacturing 
industry. This has meant that the technologies most commonly used in 
developed countries' te x t i le s  and cloth ing industries are well behind 
the 's ta te  of the a r t '  technologies, le t  alone the f ro n t ie r
microelectronics-based innovations. According to an estimate by
Hoffman and Rush (1980), average productiv ity  could be improved by as 
much as 33 percent i f  a l l  firms used the former, while even greater 
gains would be made with the la t te r .  In the fu tu re , the pace of
technological change in te x t i le  industries of the developed countries
may have to increase i f  the MFA is relaxed allowing increased
competition from developing countries.
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The introduction of 's ta te  of the a r t '  technologies, le t
alone f ro n t ie r  microelectronic-based technologies, in developing 
countries faces certa in barr ie rs . For example, local yarn supplies 
may not be of s u f f ic ie n t ly  high qua lity , or energy supplies 
s u f f ic ie n t ly  re l ia b le  to use automatic looms. The share of automated 
looms varies considerably amongst major developing countries. This 
ranges from 45 percent in B raz i l ,  78 percent in Egypt, and 81 percent
in Pakistan to 100 in Hong Kong.
4.4. Summary.
The developed world, faced with declines in th e ir  te x t i le
sector in the early  1960's, applied n o n - ta r i f f  re s tr ic t io n s  on trade 
in te x t i le s  to protect themselves from cheap imports from developing 
countries. These are s t i l l  in place today.
New technology has resulted in increased p rodu c tiv ity  and a
reduction in labour content in the te x t i le  industry. This has led 
Cline (1990) to state that enterprises adopting new technologies 
often enjoy an edge over th e ir  competitors in the sense that the
higher p roduc tiv ity  achieved with these new technologies often
offsets higher wages of countries such as the US, thus enabling them 
to be competitive with developing countries.
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5. THE GHANAIAN TEXTILE SECTOR.
5.1. Introduction.
This chapter looks at the h is to ry  and structure of the 
Ghanaian te x t i le  sector. A fte r the introduction in Section (5 .1), 
Section (5.2) looks at the t ra d it io n a l te x t i le  sector. Section (5.3)
looks at the modern te x t i le  sector. A plant by plant resumee of the
firms reviewed is given in Section (5 .4). The summary is in Section 
(5.5).
5.2. The Traditional Textile Sector.
According to African Textiles (1981, p .47), the e a r l ie s t 
materials used fo r  c loth ing in Ghana (then the Gold Coast) were 
animal skins and tree barks. Subsequently, the development of 
cotton c u lt iv a t io n ,  hand spinning and hand weaving made woven 
materials available. Then, as materials began to be dyed and printed, 
c loth designs (such as "Adinkra" and "Kente") which had a 
special sign if icance in Ghanaian culture, were developed.
Indigenous te x t i le  production has been centred in three 
areas: the Volta, Ashanti and Northern regions. Each t r ib e
has i ts  own d is t in c t iv e  fab r ic  which portrays the t r ib e 's
ideals and b e lie fs .  The "Kente" and "Adinkra" are woven in both the 
Ashanti and Volta regions but with varying designs, while the 
weaving of "Batakari" is customary in the North.
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Ewe t r ib e  of the Volta acquired th e ir  weaving s k i l l s  from the 
Yoruba of Nigeria, while the Northerners were influenced by the 
Arabs. Ashanti weaving orig inates from the Ivory Coast (African 
Textiles , (1981) p .47)
Hand weaving s t i l l  survives today. This is due mainly to 
the uniqueness of i t s  products. I t  is also due to the fac t 
that the components of the looms used are self-made and cheap and 
the weaving s ite  is mobile. But modern spinning technology has 
made hand spinning obsolete. This has meant tha t Kente weaving 
must depend on modern fac tory  yarn since th is  is cheaper and 
more robust. However, the hand-made Kente cloth is s t i l l  high-priced 
since labour cost accounts fo r  a large proportion of to ta l  cost of 
the product.
5.3. The Modern Textile Industry.
As mentioned by Anyomi (1985), the f i r s t  modern te x t i le  
factory was established in Ghana in 1962 and, by the la te 1960's, the 
m ajority of m il ls  had been set-up. Some firms began th e ir  
operations with te x t i le s  f in ish in g  only, but have subsequently 
integrated backwards in to weaving and spinning. Many firms have also
undergone expansion in terms of the number of spindles, looms and
dyeing or f in is h in g  f a c i l i t i e s  they operate. This is c la r i f ie d  by the 
fac t that 20.1 m il l io n  cedis was invested in t e x t i le  machinery 
importation in 1978 (Anyomi, 1985). Thus, in 1987, there were 20
spinning/weaving or f in ish in g  firm s, i .e  woven te x t i le s ,  employing
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8,583 persons in the establishments employing 30 or more persons (see 
Tables (5.1) and (5 .2 )) .
The main products produced in th is  sector are shown in
Figures (4.11a,b), Figures (4.12a,b), and Figures (4.13a,b) of 
Chapter (4). Figures (4.11a,b) show samples of Real Wax P rin ts . These 
are produced by p r in t ing  the designs on waxed c lo th . Figures 
(4.12a,b) show samples of Imitation/Java P rin ts . These involve 
p r in t ing  designs on unwaxed c lo th . Figures (4.13a,b) show machine- 
woven Kente fab r ics . These are produced by weaving designs using 
pre-dyed yarns. Thus, th is  process does not involve p r in t in g .
5.3.1. Size.
The size of a manufacturing firm  may be measured by the
number of workers employed, by cap ita l stock, by production or by 
value added. Table (5.3) gives the annual average output and 
employment in woven te x t i le s  fo r  the periods 1970-72 and 1973-75. 
From th is ,  an ind ication of the importance of te x t i le s  in the 
manufacturing and indus tr ia l sector in Ghana can be obtained. 
Textiles contributed 23-24 percent of medium and large-scale
manufacturing employment between 1970 and 1975. But, the
contribution of te x t i le s  to value added was s ig n if ic a n t ly  smaller - 
11 to 12 percent between 1970 and 1975.
The te x t i le  sector has been in decline since the mid 1970s. 
Figure. (5.1) gives cloth production in m il l ions  of metres fo r  the
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period 1976-80. I t  shows cloth production declined from a peak of 
over 100 m il l io n  meters per annum in 1976 to below 10 m il l io n  meters 
per annum in 1982 and 1983, and by 1988 th is  f igu re  had risen only to 
ju s t over 20 m i l l io n  meters per annum. Figure (5.2) gives real 
te x t i le  growth rates of four selected countries (Ghana, Nigeria, 
Turkey, and Korea) fo r  the period 1965-85. This shows a declin ing 
trend fo r  a l l  four countries in that period, with an a l l  positive 
growth rate in the 1965-70 period declin ing to give a negative growth 
rate of between 15 and 25 percent fo r  Ghana in the 1975 to 85 
period, a negative growth rate o f under 5 percent fo r  Turkey in the 
1975-80 period, and a negative growth rate of nearly 10 percent fo r  
Nigeria in the 1980-85 period. Thus, Ghana, amongst the four 
countries looked a t, showed the greatest decline in te x t i le  growth 
rate over the 1965 to 1985 period, even though a l l  growth rates are 
observed, in general, to have declined over that period.
In terms of employment, the te x t i le  sector, with 12,800 
employees out of a manufacturing to ta l of 157,100, is  one of the ten 
largest employers in Ghanaian manufacturing (CBS (1990)). Figure
(5.3) gives establishments and persons engaged by employment size 
class in spinning, weaving and f in ish in g , ( i .e .  woven te x t i le s ) ,  fo r
1987. This shows tha t the 5 percent of establishments which employ 
500 persons or more had 77 percent of a l l  persons engaged in woven 
te x t i le s .  Figure (5.4) gives the number of establishments and persons 
engaged in te x t i le s  in 1987. From th is ,  i t  can be seen that woven 
te x t i le s  was by fa r  the largest sub-sector in the te x t i le s  sector 
with 74 percent of to ta l  employment, and 73 percent of the to ta l
136
Te
xt
ile
 
Gr
ow
th
 
Ra
tes
 
19
65
-8
5 
for
 
Se
le
ct
ed
 
Co
un
tri
es
 
(c
on
. 
19
80
 
pr
ic
e)
137
So
ur
ce
: 
U
N
ID
O
, 
(1
98
7)
, 
In
du
st
ry
 
& 
D
ev
el
. 
G
lo
ba
l 
R
ep
or
t.
Es
ta
bl
ish
m
en
ts
 
and
 
Pe
rs
on
s 
En
ga
ge
d 
in 
Sp
in
ni
ng
 
W
ea
vin
g 
and
 
Fi
ni
sh
in
g,
 1
98
7.
Fig
ur
e 
5.
3.
CD CD CD CD t—
cd
in i-
□
CD CD 
CD CD
CMI Io o
CM CO
CDIo oo oo
+
ooi- cm in
vO
I'-r-.
"O
©
O)
CO
D)
C
H I
COco
CO
fc.
0)
CL
138
So
ur
ce
: 
CB
S,
 
In
du
st
ria
l 
St
at
ist
ics
 
(1
99
0)
.
Es
ta
bl
ish
m
en
ts
 
and
 
Pe
rs
on
s 
En
ga
ge
d 
in 
Sp
in
ni
ng
 
W
ea
vin
g 
and
 
Fi
ni
sh
in
g,
 1
98
7.
Fig
ur
e 
5.
3.
□
0 ) 0 5  0 ) 0 )
9  6
LO -r-
CVII Io o
CM CO
O)Io
LO
O ) O ) 
O ) CD
OO OO
CM
+
oo
LO
vOO''
"O
0)
O)
(0
O)c
LU
0)co
(0W.
0)
0 .
138
So
ur
ce
: 
CB
S,
 
In
du
st
ria
l 
St
at
ist
ics
 
(1
99
0)
.
number of establishments.
In terms of hourly wages of sk i l le d  and unskilled workers in 
1985, both stood at less than $0.25 per hour as shown in Figure 
(4.14) of Chapter (4). As mentioned in Chapter (4 ), th is  hourly wage 
is the lowest amongst the countries looked at.
5.3.2. Location.
The te x t i le s  sector in Ghana l ik e  most other 
manufacturing industries is heavily re l ia n t  on imported raw 
materials. Table (5.4) gives the percentage d is t r ib u t io n  of source of 
inputs fo r  selected medium and large scale industries. As can be seen 
from th is ,  foreign inputs in the te x t i le s  sector accounted fo r  73 
percent of to ta l  inputs in 1970. This declined to 65 percent in 19775 
and 1980, but was up again to 74 percent in 1984. I t  is therefore 
no coincidence that th is  has resulted in the concentration of 
th is  sector in the Accra-Tema area, with easy access to the port 
f a c i l i t i e s  of Tema. This region also has large, mature urban 
markets and a comparatively e f f ic ie n t  transportation and 
communication network. I t  is connected to the national e le c t r ic i t y  
g r id , and has f a i r l y  re l ia b le  pipe-borne water supplies.
Table (5.5) shows the persons engaged and number of 
establishments by selected regions in 1987. Out o f a to ta l  of 177 
te x t i le  establishments, 92 are located in the Accra-Tema (or Greater
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Accra) region. This re f le c ts  a figu re  of 52 percent of 
establishments being in th is  region. With regards to woven 
te x t i le s ,  54 out of 129 woven te x t i le  establishments, i.e  
42 percent, are in the Accra-Tema area. In terms o f employment, the 
Accra-Tema te x t i le  industry engaged 7,519 out of a te x t i le  
industry to ta l  of 12,825, re f le c t in g  an employment rate of 59 
percent of the te x t i le  industry to ta l .  Woven te x t i le s  accounted 
fo r  5,622 employees in th is  area. This means tha t 44 percent of the 
entire  employment of the te x t i le  industry in 1987 occurred in the 
woven te x t i le s  sector of the Accra-Tema area. Other small 
concentrations of te x t i le  establishments and employment are in the 
Eastern and Volta regions. The Volta region establishments take 
advantage of th e ir  proximity to the h yd roe lec tr ic ity  generating 
plant.
5.3.3. Ownership.
The industry is dominated by jo in t  s ta te -p r iva te  ventures 
followed by Private Limited Companies. Table (5.6) gives the type 
of ownership measured by the number of persons engaged in the 
te x t i le s  industry. This shows that the share of state-owned and 
jo in t  s ta te -p riva te  establishments as a percentage of the te x t i le  
industry to ta l  was 55 percent in 1987. Private Limited Companies and 
partnerships accounted fo r  another 30 percent.
Foreign control of f irm s, both adm in is tra tive ly  and 
techn ica lly , has been considerable. In a bid to r e s t r ic t  th is ,
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Foreign control o f f irm s, both adm in is tra tive ly  and 
techn ica lly , has been considerable. In a bid to r e s t r ic t  th is ,  
foreign ownership between 1970 and 1976 was not permitted by the 
government to exceed 49 percent of an establishment. A fte r 1976, th is  
f igure was reduced to 45 percent.
5.3.4. Capacity Utilisation.
The Central Bureau of S ta t is t ic s  has published figures 
fo r  capacity u t i l is a t io n  in te x t i le s  fo r  the large and 
medium-scale enterprises, and these are shown in Figure (5 .5). From 
th is ,  i t  can be seen that in 1978 the average capacity u t i l is a t io n  
was found to be as low as 40 percent. I t  declined fu r the r to 32 
percent in 1979, s t i l l  fu r the r to 20 percent in 1980 and 1981, and 
down again to 10 percent in 1982. This dramatic decline was 
subsequently reversed r is in g  to 24 percent in 1987 and 33 percent in 
1988.
This problem of low capacity u t i l is a t io n  is not peculiar to 
the te x t i le  industry. I t  has in fac t been a d i f f i c u l t y  fo r  
Ghana's manufacturing sector since the early 1960's. Actual 
manufacturing output in 1966 has been estimated at only 20 percent of 
the single s h i f t  capacity ins ta l led . Data on non-agricu ltural 
capacity u t i l is a t io n  between 1966 and 1968 show i t  to be at less
than 50 percent of the 1960 leve l* .
In l ig h t  of the above, a question that arises is : Why
were most of the te x t i le  firms established even at a time of 
low capacity u t i l is a t io n  in Ghanaian manufacturing. The answer lies
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mainly in the in d u s tr ia l is a t io n  strategies tha t were being adopted 
in successive development plans at tha t time (as discussed previously 
in Chapter (2 )) .  Nkrumah began the in d u s tr ia l is a t io n  drive by
demanding a " to ta l  break with p r im it ive  methods" through large- 
scale importation of foreign technology ( K i l l i c k ,  T., (1978) p .192)), 
Although at the time the raw materials base in Ghana was not 
developed, newly established firms were expected to integrate
backwards sooner or la te r .  Moreover, in fan t industry arguments
had large po licy  implications. In terest rates were lowered and 
rapid cap ita l depreciation rates were accepted. Capital goods 
importation was encouraged by the imposition o f protection
rates on consumer goods production (see Chapter (2) on the economy 
of Ghana).
5.4. Plant by Plant Resumee.
The best way, perhaps, to describe the te x t i le  industry 
as i t  appeared during fie ld -work is to o ffe r  a f irm  by f irm  account, 
a summary of which is given in Tables (5.7) and (5 .8). A more 
detailed description of the firms is given below. While th is  draws 
much from the work by Anyomi (1985) (especia lly  some figures fo r  the 
pre-1983 period), an e f fo r t  has been made to put forward the 
observed state of the industry as at when the survey was conducted in 
1990.
As can be seen in what fo llows, 12 f irm s, employing 20 
workers or more, were in existence in Ghana the 1979. Of these only
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.
8 firms were s t i l l  in operation by 1989. A l l  the closures took place 
a f te r  the l ib e ra l is a t io n  which began in 1983.
Plant A
Negotiations between the government o f Ghana and a 
foreign consortium, Adatig2, fo r  a ca lico p r in t ing  enterprise began 
in August 1960. The f in a l  agreement was signed in January 1966 
and production began in A p r i l  of that year. I n i t i a l  share 
holdings were 51 and 49 percent fo r  Ghana and Adatig respectively, 
but th is  was altered to 55 and 45 percent a f te r  1976. Although 
th is  plant began production as a r o l le r  p r in t ing  m i l l ,  producing the 
48 inch African or " Im ita t ion " wax p r in ts  fo r  which i t  is well
known, a wax p r in t ing  l ine  was introduced by 1969 which enabled i t  to
produce Real Wax or "Holland" Wax p r in ts .
Management control of th is  f irm  was in the hands of the 
foreign partners u n t i l  the PNDC government took over in December 
1981. Soon a f te r ,  the new government gave control of the f irm  to 
i ts  workers and they have, together with the government, managed the 
company since then.
Grey baft (woven unfinished c lo th ) ,  which is one of the raw
materia ls, is obtained from a local plant w ith imports as
supplements. The f irm  has been in the habit of purchasing only a 
small percentage of the spare parts required fo r  i t s  machinery. This 
has led to a reduction in the level of production and employment.
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The labour force which stood at 1,806 in 1977 has fa l le n  steadily  
since then to 1,328 in 1981, 1,090 in 1985, 1,080 in 1986 and 996 in
1988. This compares to an estimated f u l l  capacity labour force of
2,635. Average monthly earnings fo r  the years 1981, 1985, 1986 and 
1988 were 1,389, 6,916, 10,750 and 18,700 cedis respectively. 
This re f le c ts  earnings at constant 1981 prices of 1,640, 2,050
and 1,930 cedis fo r  1985, 1986 and 1988 respective ly.
Value added in production was 22.8 m il l io n  cedis in 1981, 
but the f irm  made an operating loss of over one m i l l io n  cedis. In 
the f iv e  years up to 1981 operations were p ro f i tab le  only in 1979
when a 14 m il l io n  cedis p r o f i t  was made. Pre-tax p ro f i ts  of
37 m il l io n  and 43 m il l io n  cedis were made in 1985 and 1986
respectively. This corresponds to 3 m il l io n  and 2.5 m il l io n  cedis at
constant 1979 prices. Capacity u t i l is a t io n  f e l l  from 58
percent in 1977 to a low of 17.3 percent in 1980. I t  has remained at 
the 20 percent level since then.
This f irm  is only involved in f in ish in g . I t  does not have 
any spinning or weaving capacity. Besides r o l le r  p r in t ing  machine, 
i t  has approximately one hundred wax p r in t ing  tables. Most of 
the f i rm 's  equipment was obtained from the Netherlands and dates 
from 1966-69.
Welfare f a c i l i t i e s  at th is  plant have been good. They 
include a factory c l in ic ,  canteen services, a f le e t  of buses
fo r  workers' transportation and many sporting f a c i l i t i e s .
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Plant B
This p r iva te ly  held company, located on the Accra-Tema 
motorway, is  a v e r t ic a l ly  integrated set-up consisting of spinning, 
weaving and f in is h in g  departments. The manufacturing license was 
issued on the 6th of August 1974, and the factory  was commissioned on 
the 1st of March 1980. While the spinning department has 
been operational since mid-1980, the weaving operations commenced 
in early 1982. The company is owned by B r i t is h  and Ghanaian 
concerns with shares in the ra t io  of 25/75 percent respective ly.
The technical management of the plant is in the hands 
of expatriate experts. In 1987, nine such expatriates were 
employed by th is  f irm . These included engineers from the 
Philippines, the Indian sub-continent, and Austria.
The s tr ik in g  feature of th is  plant is i ts  stock of 
f a i r l y  advanced equipment which includes the open end ro to r  spinning 
machines, card control equipment, and e lectron ic f a c i l i t i e s  fo r 
blending f ib re s .  A new tw is t ing  machine, purchased from Switzerland, 
was ins ta lled  in 1991 to add to the stock of ex is ting  tw is ters which 
date from 1981. There are 10,296 r ing spindles and 144 rotors 
fo r  open-end spinning; most of the equipment in the spinning 
department is automatic. Moreover, the en tire  spinning m i l l  is 
air-conditioned and the humidity level in the fac to ry  is controlled
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to provide optimum conditions fo r  the spinning process. The 
weaving department has 38 looms of the shuttle less va r ie ty  out of 144 
ins ta lled  looms. This department also has automatic warping and 
p irn  winding machinery as well as conventional s iz ing equipment and a 
reach-in mode of drawing-in.
The spinning and weaving equipment comes from Switzerland 
and Germany (West Germany), while the f in ish in g  equipment is 
Swiss and B r i t is h .  I t  was observed at the time th is  survey was 
conducted that th is  f i rm 's  machinery were well maintained with an 
abundance of spares. The premises were clean and well decorated 
and the lawns and garden surrounding the fac tory  were in good 
condition. Welfare f a c i l i t i e s  are good, and include a factory
c l in ic ,  a canteen and buses fo r  workers' transporta tion.
Rather than operating a p r in t ing  f a c i l i t y ,  th is  f irm  has
been set-up with yarn-dyeing and piece-dyeing ca p a b i l i t ie s .  The 
range of products include polyester/viscose, polyester/cotton and 
cotton yarn as well as machine woven Kente and Adinkra c loth which
are fa r  less labour intensive than th e ir  t ra d it io n a l counterparts. 
Materials suitable fo r  su it ing  are also produced.
The labour force in the spinning department was 423 in
1981. This is compared to an estimated f u l l  capacity of 467 
employees. Average monthly earnings per worker were 536 cedis - much 
lower than fo r  plant A. The to ta l number of persons engaged in 
1985, 1986, 1987 and 1988 was 505, 513, 596 and 837 respectively,
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with average monthly earnings per employee fo r  those years being
3,250, 7,580, 8,080 and 14,800 cedis respective ly. This
translates to 770, 1,440, 1,100 and 1,530 cedis at constant 1981 
prices fo r  the years 1985-1988.
In November 1987, plant F, a s is te r  company to th is  f irm
was amalgamated with i t .  The more modern looms from plant F were
moved into th is  p la n t 's  premises, and the two management
s ta f fs  were merged. This has added towels manufacturing to the l i s t  
of plant B's processes .
Plant C
This v e r t ic a l ly  integrated f irm , which is located in the 
Tema Industr ia l Area, was established in 1962. I t  has ginning,
spinning, weaving and f in ish in g  ca p ab il i t ies . 55 percent of the 
f i rm 's  shares are held by local partners who include Ghana Commercial 
Bank, A g r icu ltu ra l Development Bank and private 
businessmen.Investors from Hong-Kong, who hold the remaining 45
percent, manage the a f fa irs  of the company.
A va r ie ty  of products are manufactured. These include 
grey ba ft,  white, dyed and printed sh ir t in g  materia ls, dusters and 
bags fo r  holding r ic e ,  f lo u r  or sugar. A f i r e  in 1979 destroyed 
approximately h a lf  of the o r ig ina l set of 22,400 spindles. The 
remaining 11,632 spindles serve 1054 looms. The spinning equipment 
orig inated from the USA and Japan while the weaving equipment
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was obtained from China and dates period between 1960 and 1969.
The labour force in 1973 was 3,295 and o f these 53 were
Chinese c it izen s . The number of employees has fa l le n  s tead ily  since
then. I t  was down in 1981 to 2,415 of which 24 were
expatriates, and down s t i l l  fu r the r in 1986 to 1,632 of which 10 
were expatriates. These figures compare with an estimated f u l l  
capacity u t i l i s a t io n  labour force of 3700.
Average monthly earnings per worker have been s im ila r to 
those earned in plant B. In 1981 they were 523 cedis, while in 1985 
and 1986 they stood at 2,750 cedis and 7,666 cedis respective ly. 
This re f le c ts  figures of 653 cedis and 1,462 cedis at constant 
1981 prices fo r  1985 and 1986 respectively.
In the p ro tec t io n is t or pre-1983 period, th is  company did 
w e ll.  In 1972, fo r  example, i t  exported over 3.5 m il l io n  yards
of various cotton fabrics to the USA, the UK, Belgium, Germany and 
Nigeria. But raw material shortages meant that capacity u t i l is a t io n  
f e l l  s tead ily  from 84 percent in 1977 to 24 percent in 1981. Value 
added in 1981 was 12.7 m i l l io n  cedis, having decreased in real 
terms since 1979. The operating loss in 1981 was 6.1 m il l ion
cedis, with the only p ro f i tab le  years in the 1977-1981 period being
1977 and 1979. E ffo rts  were made to a l le v ia te  the raw
material shortage by sett ing up jo in t  venture cotton farms with the
National Investment Bank and the Agricu ltu ra l Development Bank. But 
these were not successful and raw material shortages
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persisted.
Raw material constraints eased in the post-1983 or
l ibe ra l ised  period. The company made pre-tax p ro f i ts  of 85.5 m i l l io n ,  
65.3 m i l l io n ,  71.8 m il l io n  and 225.8 m il l io n  fo r  the years 
1985, 86, 87 and 1988 respective ly. These re f le c t  p ro f i ts  of 20.3
m il l io n ,  12.4 m i l l io n ,  9.8 m il l io n  and 23.3 m i l l io n  at constant
1981 prices.
Welfare f a c i l i t i e s  are f a i r l y  extensive and include a
factory  c l in ic ,  canteen and a f le e t  of buses fo r  workers'
transporta tion. There are also a number of sporting f a c i l i t i e s .
Plant E
This fac to ry , which is situated on the Accra-Ho road,
was established in 1965 as a jo in t  venture between the Government of 
Ghana and the People's Republic of China. Following the coup of
1966, the construction work which was being undertaken by Chinese
technicians was abandoned. Work on the project was suspended u n t i l  
the formation of the ex is ting company in June 1967. Manufacturing 
commenced in March 1968 with a weaving section only,
producing grey c lo th , but backward in tegration was achieved in
December 1978 with the commissioning of a spinning m i l l .  The 
f irm  is now a jo in t  s ta te /p r iva te  enterprise with fore ign partners 
from the UK and Hong Kong holding a 45 percent share. The foreign 
partners administer the a f fa i rs  of the company.
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Capacity u t i l is a t io n  in th is  plant declined from 79
percent in 1971 to 23 percent in 1980 and 1981. Value added in 1981 
was 7.6 m il l io n  cedis while the only p ro f i tab le  year in the period 
1977-1981 was 1978. Pre-tax p ro f i ts  in 1985, 1986 and 1987 were 
49.9 m i l l io n ,  45.1 m il l io n  and 161.7 m il l io n  cedis respective ly. This 
shows pre-tax p ro f i ts  of 11.8 m i l l io n ,  8.6 m il l io n  and 22.1 m il l io n  
cedis fo r  1985, 1986 and 1987 at constant 1981 prices.
Two cotton farms were started in conjunction with 
local f ina nc ia l in s t i tu t io n s  in order to fo re s ta l l  problems of
cotton shortage. But, these have not been successful and the f irm
continues to re ly  on the Cotton Development Board or on imported
cotton.
The labour force declined from 2,343 in 1978 to 1,703 in 
1981. By 1985 and 1986, i t  had dropped even fu r the r to
approximately 1,450. This compares to a f u l l  capacity to ta l  of 3,060. 
Average monthly per employee earnings in 1981, 1985 and 1986 were 
700 cedis, 8,170 cedis and 7,583 cedis respective ly. These indicate 
earnings fo r  1985 and 1986 of 1,940 cedis and 1,446 cedis at constant 
1981 prices.
The spinning m i l l  is reasonably modern but basic and uses 
manual processes of feeding, doffing and cone winding as well as
conventional drawing. The 35,000 r ing spindles date from 1978. The 
weaving section operates automatic warping, conventional s iz ing,
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manual drawing-in and automatic p irn winding. Of 882 
magazine/battery shu ttle  looms, 660 date from 1968 and 222 were 
purchased in the 1970-74 period. There is no f in ish in g  
department. Equipment fo r  th is  f irm  was obtained from China,
Switzerland, Japan, the USA, Hong Kong, West Germany and the UK.
Welfare f a c i l i t i e s  are re la t iv e ly  good and include a
canteen, a c l in ic  and buses fo r  the transportation of workers. 
The f irm  also has some sporting f a c i l i t i e s .
Plant F
This f irm , established in the early s ix t ie s ,  was located in 
the indus tr ia l area of Accra. In November 1987, i t  moved i ts  premises 
to i ts  s is te r  company, plant B, and they have been under jo in t
management since.
The pr inc ipa l a c t iv i t y  of th is  f irm  is the manufacture
of towels. Raw materials have been imported, but some cotton is 
purchased lo ca lly .  Modernisation of the cap ita l stock continued up
to 1980, and the technical management is in the hands of
expatr ia tes.
The labour force was maintained at around 210 between 1985 
and 1987, while in 1988, employment stood at 174. Average monthly 
earnings per worker were 3,200 cedis, 7,500 cedis, 8,100 cedis and
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15,100 cedis fo r  the years 1985 to 1988 respective ly. These were 
765 cedis, 1,400 cedis, 1,100 cedis and 1,600 cedis in terms of 
1981 constant prices, and are s im ila r to earnings in p lant B.
This f irm  has in fac t been p ro f i tab le  over the whole 
period between 1977 and 1988. Pre-tax p ro f i ts  from 1985 to  1988 were 
put at 12.2 m i l l io n ,  19.1 m i l l io n ,  16.9 m il l io n  and 18.6 m il l ion  
cedis respective ly, and at 1981 prices they would be 2.9 m i l l io n ,  3.6 
m i l l io n ,  2.3 m i l l io n  and 1.9 m il l io n  cedis respective ly. Capacity 
u t i l is a t io n  has averaged at 40 percent in the 1985-88 period.
The weaving process includes automatic warping and p irn 
winding, conventional s iz ing and reaching-in drawing. The box 
loader shu ttle  looms used are from the 1973-74 period, and 
were purchased from Switzerland.
Plant G
This f irm  was established in 1968, and fo r  some time a fte r  
tha t i t  operated as a f in ish in g  plant only. I t  was involved in 
bleaching, dyeing and p r in t ing  of fab rics . The spinning and 
weaving departments were completed and operational by 1978, but lack 
of adequate e le c t r ic i t y  supplies delayed the commencement of 
production u n t i l  1980. The company is owned by Ghanaian and foreign 
partners in the ra t io  of 55 to 45 percent, and apart from 
the 5 percent share held by the fac to ry 's  workers, a l l  other 
shareholders are private ind iv idua ls. The f irm  is managed by the
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foreign partners.
The spinning department processes consist of manual 
opening and do ff ing , conventional drawing and automatic cone
winding, while the 12,240 r ing  spindles in operation date
from 1978. The weaving department has automatic warping, 
reaching-in drawing and 240 magazine battery looms which also date 
from 1978. The f in ish in g  department has 3 f l a t  bed screen 
p r in t in g  machines. The equipment in th is  plant come from China, 
Japan and Switzerland.
Employment in 1981 stood at 204. This increased to 248 by 
1985 and 381 by 1986, o f which 5 in each year were expatria te. By
1988 the workforce to ta l le d  418, compared to an estimated f u l l
capacity labour force of 1,105. Average monthly earnings per 
worker were 762 cedis in 1981, while in 1985 and 1986 these stood at 
2,916 cedis and 3,800. and by 1988, these had risen to 7,291 
cedis. But when compared at constant 1981 prices, these earnings 
were 689 cedis, 725 cedis and 754 cedis, fo r  the years 1985, 1986 and 
1988 respective ly.
Value added in 1980 was 11.3 m il l io n  cedis while p ro f i ts  
earned were 8.9 m i l l io n  cedis, while in 1981 these stood at 7.04 
m il l io n  and 4.7 m i l l io n  cedis respectively.
Plant H
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This p lant, which is located in the Akosombo Industr ia l 
Area, was commissioned in 1967. I t  is v e r t ic a l ly  integrated, with 
spinning weaving, p r in t in g  and dyeing ca p a b il i t ie s . The shareholding 
structure is 60 percent Ghanaian and 40 percent fore ign, with
the two foreign partners, Cha Chi Ming of Hong Kong and Trawaco
of Bermuda, holding 36 percent and 4 percent of shares respectively. 
The Ghanaian shareholders are private groups and indiv iduals 
while management control is in the hands of the foreign partners. 
The main products manufactured by th is  f irm  are real wax and
im ita tion African wax p r in ts .
The technical management of the plant is in the 
hands of expatriates. In spite of the d i f f i c u l t  export climate, 
the f irm  has continued to export some of i t s  products, 
although the trend is  declin ing. Recently, moreover, a 
considerable portion of i t s  exports have been in the form of 
processing foreign customers' raw materials on commission.
The labour force in 1978 was 2,506 as compared to an 
estimated f u l l  capacity labour force of 3,750. By 1981 i t  was down 
to 1,701, and by 1985 i t  stood at 1,324. Employment had fa l le n  even 
fu r the r to 1,093 in 1986 before r is in g  to 1,548. Monthly earnings 
per worker averaged 676 cedis, 6,417 cedis, 7,667 and 13,750 cedis 
in 1981, 1985, 1986 and 1988 respectively. At constant 1981 prices, 
earnings in 1985, 1986 and 1988 were 1,524 cedis, 1,462 cedis and 
1421 cedis respective ly.
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Value added in 1981 was 23.3 m il l io n  cedis, up in real 
terms from i t s  1980 value, but only one f i f t h  o f i t s  peak 1979 value 
in real terms. The f irm  was p ro f ita b le , except fo r  1980, in 
the 1977-1981 period. P ro f i ts  of 4.8 m i l l io n ,  133.3 m il l io n  and 
260.8 m il l io n  cedis were made in 1981, 1986 and 1987 respectively. 
The 1986 and 1987 values equate to 25.4 m il l io n  and 35.6 m il l io n  
cedis respective ly at constant 1981 prices.
The spinning department has manual opening and cleaning,
manual doffing and cone winding and conventional drawing equipment as 
well as 35,240 ring  spindles. The machinery in the weaving 
department includes automatic warping and p irn winding, conventional 
s iz ing and reaching-in drawing equipment as well as 1,064 looms, 
most of which are of the box loader type except fo r  120 which are of 
the smaller whole shuttle  change type. Half of the r ing  spindles and 
looms date from the 1970-74 period, while the other ha lf  is 
from the 1975-80 period. The f in ish in g  department has f l a t  bed 
screen p r in t in g , r o l le r  machine p r in t ing , real wax p r in t ing  and 
bleaching machinery. The equipment dates from the 1965 to 1969 period 
and was purchased from numerous sources including Japan, Holland, 
Switzerland and West Germany.
In common with the other larger p lants, welfare
f a c i l i t i e s  in th is  plant are good. These include a f le e t  of 
buses fo r  the transportation of i ts  workers, a canteen service 
and a factory  c l in ic .
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Plant J
This v e r t ic a l ly  integrated f irm  was commissioned as a
state enterprise in 1964. Actual production commenced in October
1964 under the control of a French management consulting
company, with i n i t i a l  equipment also being supplied by a French 
company (SCAM). I t  became a d iv is ion  of a public 
in s t i tu t io n ,  the Ghana Industr ia l Holding Corporation (GIHOC),
from January 1968 u n t i l  September 1969 a fte r  which foreign partners,
Winner and CO. of Hong Kong, were allowed to take a 40 percent stake
in the company. Local shareholders remained public 
in s t i tu t io n s ,  namely, GIHOC with i ts  40 percent share and the
Ghana National Trading Corporation with i t s  20 percent share.
Management control is in the hands of the foreign partner.
The f irm  produces i ts  own yarn and fabrics  fo r  f in a l
processing, but local grey baft is supplemented by imported yarn and 
fab r ic  whenever required. The main products are im ita t ion  African wax 
pr in ts  and dress p r in ts  some of which have been exported in the 
past, but there have been no exports since 1980.
The labour force has declined from a f u l l  capacity
level of 2,600 between 1973-75 to 1,275 in 1981. I t  f e l l  fu r the r
to 1,207 in 1985, and s t i l l  fu r the r to 1,185 by 1986. Technical 
control has been in the hands of expatriate engineers. In 1985 and 
1986, fo r  example, th is  f irm  employed 6 expatriate technicians.
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Average monthly earnings per worker in 1981, 1985 and 1986 
were 1,007 cedis, 5,833 cedis and 8,583 cedis respective ly. This 
means that at 1981 constant prices, earnings fo r  1985 and 1986 
increased to 1,386 cedis and 1,637 cedis respective ly.
Value added, having declined s tead ily  in the period 1978- 
1981, was 9.5 m il l io n  cedis in 1981. Even though p ro f i ts  were 
recorded in 1978 and 1979, a loss of 5.2 m il l io n  cedis was made in 
1981. But p ro f i ts  of 36.4 m i l l io n ,  47.4 m il l io n  and 63.2 m il l io n  
cedis were again produced in 1985, 1986 and 1987 respective ly. These 
re f le c t  p ro f i ts  of 8.6 m i l l io n ,  9.1 m il l io n  and 8.6 m il l io n  cedis 
respectively fo r  the above mentioned years.
The spinning process involves manual feeding and doffing , 
and automatic cone minding. While most of the 20,304 r ing  spindles 
date from the 1965-1969 period, 864 were purchased between 1975 
and 1980. The weaving process includes manual drawing-in, 
automatic warping and conventional sizing as well as 498 looms of 
the battery or whole shuttle  change type a l l  of which date from the 
1975-1980 period. The sources of equipment include France, Japan, 
Switzerland and Germany.
Like with the other lager firm s, the welfare f a c i l i t i e s  of 
th is  f irm  are good. These include a c l in ic ,  canteen, and buses.
Plants D, I ,  J, and L below make-up only a small proportion
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of to ta l  output of the sample firm s. At the time th is  survey
was conducted, plants D, I ,  and K were not in production, and
firm  L, while s t i l l  in production, produced an output of
in s ig n if ica n t value in comparison to other firms in the sample. But, 
even though raw data fo r  the econometric analysis on 
ine ff ic iency  estimation as well as the cost s e n s i t iv i t y  analysis 
undertaken in Chapter (9) was not obtained, i t  is s t i l l  of in te rest 
to provide a descrip tive resumee of these firms as given below.
Plant D
This private lim ited company was incorporated in January 
1975. The business started as a jo in t  venture between two Ghanaian 
businessmen but subsequently became a sole proprie torsh ip . At
the s ta r t  of operations, the company employed two expatriates 
to f i l l  the posts of production and m i l l  manager, but by the end of 
1979 they had both l e f t  and the company operated with no expatriate 
help.
Cotton yarn is the main product, and th is  is normally 
dyed before being sold to t ra d i t io n a l Kente weavers. The capacity 
output of 2.44 m il l io n  kilograms of yarn has never been 
attained, while the highest output reached was 1 m i l l io n  kilograms 
in 1978. A capacity u t i l i s a t io n  of 5 percent in 1981 was among 
lowest in the sample, with value added being 0.5 m i l l io n  cedis. The 
plant had been p ro f i ta b le  between 1977 and 1980 but made a loss of 
3.1 m il l io n  cedis in 1981.
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The labour force stood at 239 in 1981, compared to a 
to ta l  of 590 in 1979 and an estimated f u l l  capacity workforce of 
600. Monthly earnings per worker were 740 cedis in 1981. 
Operations which are confined to a spinning and dyeing process use 
manual methods of feeding and doffing and manual cone winding.
At the time th is  survey was conducted in June 1990, th is  
plant was at the point of closing down. Among the problems i t  had 
been facing was competition both from imports and from other firms 
in the industry. No data, apart from the above mentioned is available 
on th is  f i rm  and numerous e f fo r ts  to obtain additional figures 
were unsuccessful.
Plant I
L i t t l e  is known about th is  f irm  except that i t  had shut down 
sometime a f te r  the 1983 ERP. I ts  products were mainly towels and 
vests which i t  sold through i ts  own re ta i l  o u t le t,  and i t s  labour 
force, while i t  was s t i l l  in operation, is estimated at no more than 
100. The factory  had weaving and k n i t t in g  machines, and no spinning 
or f in is h in g  f a c i l i t y ,  and thus re lie d  on the importation of dyed 
(expensive) yarn. This method of operation proved unsustainable under 
l ibe ra l ised  market conditions.
Plant K
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This fam ily  run f irm  was established in 1960. I t
is  a partnership between Ghanaian ind iv iduals and expatriates 
of Indian descent. The main products of the f irm  are warp 
kn itted  and c irc u la r  kn itted  fab rics , sh ir t in g  materials and bed 
sheets.
The l ib e ra l is a t io n  of the Ghanaian economy has put th is  f irm  
in a lo t  of d i f f i c u l t y .  I t  employed an average of 170 workers 
per annum between 1986 and 1989. But in 1989, i t  began to face 
hardships and workers were obliged to work a 24 hour week rather 
than 40 hours per week, with a monthly income, subsequently, of 1,949 
cedis.
Output, which was valued at 8.3 m il l io n  cedis, 7.14
m il l io n  cedis and 10.1 m il l io n  cedis in 1986 to 1988 respective ly, 
had fa l le n  dramatically to 1.17 m il l io n  cedis by 1989. In terms of 
1981 constant prices, these re f le c t  f igures of 1.6 m i l l io n ,  0.9 
m il l io n ,  1.0 m il l io n  and 0.1 m il l io n  cedis fo r  1986, 1987, 1988
and 1989 respective ly. Likewise, capacity u t i l i s a t io n ,  which stood 
at 30 percent in 1985, f e l l  sharply in subsequent years reaching 10 
percent in 1989.
By 1990, the f irm  had wound-up i ts  operation; employees 
were being layed-o ff, and the management was interested in 
expanding i ts  trading business instead.
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Plant L
Although th is  fam ily  owned f irm  was established in 1969 
by a Ghanaian businessman, i t  has remained ra ther small with the
number of f u l l  time employees averaging around 25 between 1985 and
1990.
The products of th is  f irm  are e la s t ic  bands, tapes, wicks 
and laces. Output, which was a very small percentage of the sample 
to ta l ,  stood at 12.4 m il l io n  cedis in 1986. I t  grew s l ig h t ly  to 14.5 
in 1987, and was 33.5 in 1988. At constant 1981 prices, these 
figures re f le c t  outputs valued at 2.3 m il l io n ,  2.0 m i l l io n  and 3.5
m il l io n  cedis fo r  the years 1986 to 1988 respective ly.
With regards to monthly earnings perper employee, th is
stood at 6,513 cedis in 1986, and 10,000 cedis in 1988. These are 
comparable to ot ot other firms in the industry.
5.SSummary.
Most of the te x t i le  firms were established during a time 
of low capacity u t i l i s a t io n  in Ghanaian manufacturing, and the main 
reason fo r  th e ir  establishment was the in d u s tr ia l isa t io n  strategies 
adopted in successive development plans at that time. Nkrumah, fo r
example, began the in d u s tr ia l isa t io n  drive by demanding a " to ta l 
break with p r im it ive  methods" through large-scale importation of
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foreign technology ( K i l l i c k ,  T ., (1978) p .192)).
Ghana's adoption of l ibe ra l ised  trade po lic ies  has put an 
enormous pressure on the te x t i le s  industry, amongst others, to 
compete with imports a f te r  years of surviving behind p ro tec t io n is t  
ba rr ie rs .
Of the 12 te x t i le  firms (employing 20 workers or more) in 
Ghana the 1979, only 8 firms were s t i l l  in operation by 1989. A l l  the 
closures took place a f te r  the l ib e ra l is a t io n  which began in 1983. 
Average capacity u t i l i s a t io n  dropped from 40 percent in 1978 to 10 
percent in 1982. This dramatic decline was subsequently 
reversed r is in g  to 33 percent in 1988.
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Notes:
(1) These rates were 47 percent and 4 percent for consumer 
and capital goods respectively in 1966; Killick, T. p.203.
(2) Adatig is a consortium of foreign business interests 
comprising United Africa Company, and Calico Printers 
Association Ltd. of Lancashire.
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6. THE MEASUREMENT OF PRODUCTIVE EFFICIENCY.
6.1. Introduction.
Today’s interest in efficient frontier estimation stems from 
Farrell’s (1957) paper on the measurement of productive efficiency. 
He stated that:
’The problem of measuring the productive efficiency 
of an industry is important to both the economic 
theorist and the economic policy maker. If the 
theoretical arguments as to the relative efficiency 
of different economic systems are to be subjected to 
empirical testing, it is essential to be able to 
make some actual measurements of efficiency.
Equally, if economic planning is to concern itself 
with a particular industry, it is important to know 
how far a given industry can be expected to increase 
its output by simply increasing its efficiency, 
without absorbing further resources.’
Since Farrell’s article, several researchers have studied the 
possibilities of estimating the potential or frontier production 
function of a firm. This is defined as a production function giving 
the maximum possible output for a given set of inputs i.e. a direct, 
or primal, description of production technology. Thus, by 
definition, there cannot be any point above the frontier production 
function. Corresponding to the primal description of production 
technology are three value duals. The cost function gives the 
minimum level of cost at which it is possible to produce a given
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level of output, given input prices, while the profit function gives 
the maximum profit that can be attained, given output price and 
input prices. The revenue function describes the maximum revenue 
obtainable from certain inputs with given output prices and 
technology.
This interest in defining the production frontier had been 
inspired by a concern to know exactly the level of actual production 
in relation to the production frontier and from this how to reach 
this frontier by increasing the total productivity of the firm under 
consideration. Thus, the amounts by which a firm lies below its 
production and profit frontiers, and the amount by which it lies 
above its cost frontier, is regarded as measures of inefficiency.
Typically, empirical production functions are 'average’ rather 
than frontier functions, and are thus unable to provide information 
on efficiency. This is because they attribute differences from the 
estimated function to symmetric random disturbances. It was 
Farrell‘s pioneering contribution which developed a method that not 
only measured the production frontier but also abandoned the average 
productivity approach replacing it with a total productivity method.
This chapter highlights and compares four approaches that are 
currently being employed to measure and estimate productive 
efficiency. The designation of only four approaches is somewhat 
arbitrary, but is convenient for expository purposes. These 
approaches differ in many ways, but the two most significant
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differences occur in the method used to determine the shape and 
placement of the relevant frontier, and in the interpretation given 
to deviations from the frontier. Section (6,1) is the introduction. 
Section (6.2) explains the measurement of efficiency while Section 
(6.3) looks at the various approaches to production frontiers. In 
Sections (6.4 - 6.7), the four approaches to specification and
estimation are examined. Greater emphasis is put on Section (6.7), 
the stochastic frontier production approach, as it is the approach 
chosen for future research into productive efficiency of Ghanaian 
textile firms (see Chapter (8)). The summary is in Section (6.8).
6.2. Efficiency Measurement.
A production process can be inefficient in two ways. It can be 
technically inefficient, in the sense that it fails to produce 
maximum output from a given set of inputs. This means that technical 
inefficiency results in an overutilisation of all inputs in equal 
proportions. It can also be allocatively inefficient in the sense 
that the marginal revenue product of an input might not be equal to 
the marginal cost of that input. Therefore, allocative inefficiency 
results in utilisation of inputs in the wrong proportions, given 
input prices.
Figure (6.1) shows how Farrell measured technical and 
allocative efficiency. Consider a production activity which employs 
two inputs and assumption made for graphical simplicity
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Technical And Allocative Efficiency.
Figure 6.1.
X1/Y
X2/Y0
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only) to produce a single output y, so that the production frontier 
is y = f(x ,x ). Assume constant returns to scale, so that 1 = 
f { x  / y %x ^ / y ) t and therefore the frontier is characterised by the 
efficient unit isoquant YY’ .
* * *
We assume the firm uses (x ,x ) to produce output y . If we let
0 *  *
point P in Figure (6.1) be the point { x^ / y  , x  / y  ), (which by
definition cannot be below YY’), then the technical efficiency of
* *
the firm is OQ/OP.It measures the proportion of (x ,x ) which is
♦
actually necessary to produce y . Thus 1-0Q/0P, the technical
* *
inefficiency of the firm, measures the proportion by which fJf1>x23
could be reduced (holding the input ratio x / x  constant) without
reducing output. It also measures the possible reduction in cost
*
(holding the input ration constant) of producing y .
Let us assume that AA’ represents the ratio of input prices, so
that the cost minimisation point is Q ’. We define the allocative 
efficiency of the firm as OR/OQ, since the cost at R is the same as 
the cost at Q ’. Allocative inefficiency is correspondingly defined 
as 1-0R/0Q, and it measures the possible reduction in cost from 
using the correct input proportions.
The total efficiency of the firm is defined as OR/OP. The total 
inefficiency, 1-0R/0P, measures the possible reduction in cost from 
moving from P (the observed point) to Q ’ (the cost minimising 
point). The total efficiency can be shown to be equal to the product 
of technical and allocative efficiency, and total inefficiency can
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be shown to be approximately equal to the sum of technical and 
allocative inefficiency.
Even if we relax the assumption of constant returns to scale, 
we can still think in terms of Figure (6.1), where the units of
measurement on the axis become simply, xa and x^. Therefore, if the
*  *  *  *  *
firm uses (x 1 >x 2  ^ to produce y , point P is simply (x ,x ). The
measures of technical, allocative, and total efficiency are, as 
before, OQ/OP, OR/OQ, and OR/OP, respectively. This is suggested by 
Kopp (1981) amongst others.
Another potential problem, as pointed out by Forsund and 
Hjalmarsson (1974), is that unless technology is homothetic (a 
production function is said to be homothetic if f(x) can be written 
as Mg(x) where h is monotonic and g is homogenous of degree 1), the 
breakdown between technical and allocative inefficiency requires 
some assumption about what the firm’s expected output was.
6.3. Approaches to Production Frontiers.
There is a fundamental difference between statistical and 
non-statistical approaches to production frontiers. A statistical 
approach depends on assumptions about the stochastic properties of 
the data, while a non-statistical approach does not.
Among non-statistical approaches, there is a further
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distinction between those that are parametric and those that are 
non-parametric. Basically, parametric approaches assume a particular 
functional form(e.g., Cobb-Douglas, CES, translog) for the 
production or cost function, while non-parametric approaches do not.
6.4. The Pure Programming Approach.
6.4.1. Data Envelopment Analysis.
This is a non-statistical, non-parametric efficiency 
measurement technique known as "data envelopment analysis" (DEA). It 
was originally developed by Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes(1978) (see 
also Banker 1984, Banker, Charnes and Cooper 1984) as a new 
technique in operations research for measuring and comparing the 
relative efficiency of a set of decision-making units (DMUs).
The DEA approach utilises a sequence of linear programmes to 
construct a transformation frontier and to compute primal and dual 
efficiency relative to the frontier. It applies the basic concept of 
Pareto Optimality by stipulating that a given DMU is not relatively 
efficient, if it can be shown that some other DMU or, combination of 
DMUs can produce more of some outputs without producing less of any 
other and without utilising more of any input. This technique has 
been found very useful in measuring efficiency for various public 
sector DMUs and/or quasi-market or non-market agencies e.g., 
schools, recruitment and training programmes in defense industries,
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hospitals, extension services and family planning programmes, where 
price data are mostly unavailable and there are multiple goals 
pursued. Sengupta (1988) provides a good overview of the current 
status of the DEA approach emphasising mainly its applied economic 
and econometric aspects.
6.4.2. Consistency Approach Through Data Adjustment.
Two major questions arise when the efficiency hypothesis 
characterised by a production frontier or, an efficient production 
set is set up. One is: how can we estimate the production frontier 
when the observed data have the property that they contain points 
not satisfying the efficiency hypothesis? A second question concerns 
the consistency of the data. A literature has developed (e.g., 
Afriat (1972), Hanoch and Rothschild (1972), Diewert and Parkan
(1983), Varian (1984)), on non-parametric tests of certain 
hypothesis i.e., one can test the consistency of the data with
hypothesis such as (i) the existence of a production function; (ii)
constant returns to scale; (iii) homotheticity; or (iv) cost
minimisation, without assuming a functional form for the production 
or cost function.
These tests involve checking for the satisfaction of certain 
inequalities, often by the solution of some linear program. Varian
(1984), for example, gives a condition which is necessary and 
sufficient for the existence of a production function which
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'rationalises’ the data in the sense that the data could be 
generated by cost-minimising behaviour given that production 
function. Given that the condition holds, Varian goes on to derive 
the tightest possible inner and outer bounds for any (set of) 
production functions which rationalise the data. His inner bound is 
essentially identical to the (set of) production functions 
constructed by the DEA approach in the sense that their efficient 
subsets coincide.
Banker and Maindiratta (1988) extend Varian’s work to the case 
in which the data do not satisfy Varian’s rationalisability 
condition; that is, the data could not (all) have arisen from 
cost-minimising behaviour. Hence, they introduce the concept of 
subset rationalisation, in which they construct inner and outer 
bounds for all possible (set of) production functions that 
rationalise the rationalisable subset of observations. The inner 
bound is essentially the same as Varian’s, while the outer bound is 
the same as Varian’s except that it is computed only from the 
rationalisable subset of observations. By using this subset 
rationalisation criterion they have developed technical, allocative 
and aggregate efficiency measures, which are consistent with 
Farrell’s approach.
Another way to interpret the data consistency problem is in 
terms of the existence of suitable Lagrange multipliers, which is 
the approach of Diewert and Parkan. For a good resumee of this 
approach, see Sengupta (1988).
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Perhaps the most advantageous characteristic of the pure 
programming approach is that the (set of) production functions it 
constructs are the smallest well-behaved set containing all the 
data. Such a set is piecewise linear, and the construction process 
achieves considerable flexibility because the breaks among the 
pieces are determined endogenously so as to fit the data as closely 
as possible, (see for example, Banker and Maindiratta (1986), and 
Charnes, Cooper, Seiford, and Stutz (1982,1983)).
But, the major problem with the pure programming approach lies 
in the fact that the sample data are enveloped by a deterministic 
frontier. Consequently the entire deviation of an observation from 
the frontier is attributed to inefficiency. Since the frontier is 
non-stochastic, no accommodation is made for environmental 
heterogeneity, random external shocks, noise in the data, 
measurement error, omitted variables etc.. All sorts of influences, 
favourable and unfavourable, beyond the control of the firm are 
combined together with inefficiency and called inefficiency. 
Furthermore, since the approach is non-stochastic, there is no way 
of making probability statements about the shape and placement of 
the frontier, or about the computed inefficiencies relative to the 
f rontier.
6.5. The Modified Programming Approach.
This approach also uses a sequence of linear or quadratic
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programming techniques to construct a transformation frontier and to 
compute primal and dual efficiency relative to the frontier. The 
only difference between the modified and pure programming approaches 
is that the frontier constructed by the modified programming
approach is parametric. The modified programming approach was first 
suggested by Farrell (1957), and has been refined and extended by 
Ainger and Chu (1968), Forsund and Jansen (1977), and Forsund and 
Hjalmarsson (1979a,b) among others.
The modified programming approach has two drawbacks that limit 
its appeal. The first is that the approach, like the pure
programming approach, is entirely deterministic, with no allowance 
made for noise, measurement error, etc.. Since the computed
frontier is supported by a subset of the data, its shape and
placement are highly sensitive to outliers. It is this deficiency 
that led to the development of probabilistic production frontiers by 
Timmer (1971), in which he eliminated a certain percentage of the 
total observations. Such a selection procedure, however, is not 
based on statistical theory, making hypothesis testing impossible. 
Thus the neglect of the statistical error is a serious disadvantage 
of this method.
The second drawback of the modified programming approach is its 
inability to deal easily with multiple outputs. A remedy draws on a 
proposal of Kopp and Diewert (1982) and Zieschang (1983) to compute 
primal and dual efficiency relative to the dual cost frontier.
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6.6. The Deterministic Statistical Frontier Approach.
This approach, in contrast to the two programming approaches, 
uses statistical techniques to estimate a transformation frontier 
and to estimate primal and dual efficiency relative to the estimated 
frontier. The technique was first proposed by Afriat (1972) and has 
been extended by Richmond (1974) and Green (1980a,b), among others. 
A one-sided (non-positive) disturbance is explicitly assumed, of 
some particular form (e.g., truncated normal, exponential or gamma). 
As in both programming approaches, the data are enveloped by a 
deterministic frontier. As in the modified programming approach, the 
deterministic frontier is parametric. In contrast to both 
programming approaches, the deterministic frontier is estimated 
rather than computed.
Schmidt (1976) showed that the Ainger-Chu linear programming 
"estimator" is the maximum likelihood estimator (MLE) if the errors 
are exponential, while their quadratic programming "estimator" is 
the MLE if the errors are half-normal. However, since the regularity 
conditions for the consistency and asymptotic normality of MLEs are 
violated by this specification, (namely, that the range of the 
random variable should not depend on the parameters), estimation of 
frontiers is not completely straightforward since the properties of 
the MLEs are, in general, uncertain. This range problem which was 
pointed out by Schmidt (1976), was partially solved by Green 
(1980a), who found sufficient conditions on the distribution of the 
error term such that maximum likelihood is consistent and
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asymptotically efficient. A gamma distribution for the error term 
satisfies these conditions, for example.
Since a deterministic statistical primal or dual frontier and 
their related efficiencies are estimated by statistical techniques, 
a large sample size is required. Furthermore, it is a disadvantage 
to have to specify a distribution for technical efficiency if a 
production frontier is estimated, or for allocative efficiency if a 
cost frontier is estimated. Ideally the specification would be based 
on a knowledge of the forces, economic or otherwise, that generate 
that inefficiency. However such information is rarely available.
There being no a priori arguments for a particular 
distribution, choice is typically based on analytical manageability. 
Unfortunately, estimates of the parameters of the exogenous 
variables and of the magnitude of efficiency are not invariant with 
respect to the specification of a distribution for the efficiency 
term. Specification tests to evaluate half-normal and truncated 
normal distributions have been developed by Lee (1983a) for 
stochastic frontier models. These can be applied to deterministic 
frontier models as well. The advantage of a statistical approach is 
the possibility of statistical inference based on the results, 
although such inference is conditional on the specified distribution 
being the true distribution.
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6.7. The Stochatic Frontier Approach.
Like the deterministic statistical frontier approach, the 
stochastic frontier approach uses statistical techniques to estimate 
a transformation frontier and to estimate efficiency relative to the 
estimated frontier. In contrast to the deterministic statistical 
frontier approach, but in accordance with the typical nonfrontier 
approach to the estimation of economic relationships, this allows 
the frontier to be stochastic.
6.7.1. Technical Efficiency Only.
The technique was first proposed by Ainger, Lovell, and Schmidt 
(1977), and Meeusen and van den Broek (1977). Their approach takes 
into account statistical error and uses a production model with a 
composed error. This filters out the statistical error and 
calculates a less biased efficiency measure. Composed error 
distributions which have been employed in the literature include: 
the half-normal and exponential distributions proposed by Ainger et 
al. (1977) (among others), the truncated normal proposed by
Stevenson (1980), and the two- parameter Gamma distribution proposed 
by Greene (1990). Tests of the appropriateness of these
distributions can be made using Lagrange multiplier techniques
proposed by Lee (1983) and Schmidt and Lin (1984).
To illustrate the basic econometric approach to estimating 
technical efficiency using a stochastic frontier, consider a
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Cobb-Douglas production function:
where Y is output, X i s  the level of input j (j= l,2...,k), c is a 
random disturbance, and aQ and a . a r e  parameters to be estimated. 
The disturbance is assumed to be of the form
e = v - u.
2Here v ~ 0,£r ),is the stochastic (symmetric disturbance term)
V
representing random exogenous shocks, such as machine breakdown,
2
weather variation, etc., and u ~ N (0,cr ) for u^O, is a one-sided
u
disturbance term which represents technical inefficiency differing 
across firms. The production frontier is derived by setting u = 0, 
thereby giving the maximum possible output, given the inputs. A 
nonzero value of u shows that potential output could be (u.100 per 
cent) higher than the actual output. The production frontier is 
stochastic since the random (exogenous) shocks, v, can affect 
output.
To discuss the implications of the presence of technical 
inefficiency which is often viewed as unobserved firm-specific 
effects, we write (1) in logarithmic form where subscript f indexes
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firm (f =1,..,F). Equation (1) is rewritten as:
If the two errors are assumed independent of each other and of 
the inputs, and specific distributional assumptions are made (e.g. 
normal and half-normal, respectively), then the likelihood function 
can be defined and estimation of the parameters can be carried out 
using MLE techniques. This will generally require a numerical 
maximisation of the likelihood function. Computational issues are 
discussed by Waldman (1982), Greene (1982), Lee (1983b) and Huang
(1984). The basic approach is as follows:
We can specify the density function of e as follows:
1 - F * ( e , A , cr- 1 )
where:
2 2 2
cr cr + cr
u V
cr
A
u
cr
v
f  = standard normal density function,
F standard normal distribution function.
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The likelihood function can be written as follows:
inL(y/|3,A,cr2) = N I n — + N Incr- l
T^T
i = a
(3 )
Estimates of this model can be obtained using corrected
ordinary least squares (COLS) or by maximising the likelihood
function (MLE) directly with respect to (3, A and cr. Olson Schmidt 
and Waldman (1980) used a Monte Carlo approach to examine the 
relative advantages of these two estimation techniques. MLE tended 
to outperform COLS in sample sizes larger than 400, wheras COLS 
tended to outperform MLE in sample sizes of less than 400. i.e MLE 
estimates are asymptotically more efficient. They also find the COLS 
estimator performs virtually as well as the MLE, for the
normal/half-normal case. Note that the range problem that plagues 
the MLE technique in the deterministic statistical frontier approach 
does not appear in the stochastic frontier approach because of the 
presence of u.
Having estimated the model, one obtains a fitted value for (v -
f
uf). In earlier studies that applied this new approach (stochastic 
method), the disadvantage seemed to be the impossibility of 
individualising the inefficiency measure, i.e., we need an estimate 
of u alone. A start on solving this problem was provided by Materov
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(1981). A real breakthrough was only achieved with the publication 
of the article by Jondrow, Lovell, Materov and Schmidt (1982). They 
propose to individualise technical efficiency via a conditional 
distribution of the efficiency deviation given the total error for 
each firm. They give an explicit formula for E(u/e) for the 
normal/half-normal case as follows:
E ( u / c ) = <r‘
c A
1_F(^
cA
cr (4)
Where:
O'
A =  —cr (5)
2 , 2  2 .O' = (O' + O' )
U  v
( 6 )
2 2 O' O'
2  u v
O ' . =
From equations (5) and (6) we get the following
2O' =
2 2 A o'
1+A
(7)
( 8 )
2
O' =
1+A
(9)
2
Minimising equation (3) yields estimates of o' , and A. These can be
188
substituted into eqs. (8) and (9) in order to work out a value for
2 2 <r# using equation (7). We can then substitute <r , A, and cr into
eq.(4) to estimate the firm and year specific technical
inefficiency, (u) for the textile firms.
The drawback to these estimates of (u) is that they are not 
consistent; the variance of the conditional distribution remains no 
matter how large the sample. A second disadvantage of the Jondrow 
et. al. (1982) measure is that it only estimates technical 
efficiency. Thus, there is a serious limitation in the information 
it provides on production efficiency since allocative inefficiency 
is not measured.
6.7.2. Technical and Allocative Efficiency.
Although we have so far discussed efficiency in terms of 
production frontiers, it can also be discussed in terms of cost 
frontiers (see below for profit function). Just as output should lie 
below the production frontier, so should cost lie below the cost 
frontier.
It is also possible to estimate a system of equations 
consisting of production or cost frontier together with auxiliary 
equations for whichever problem the firm is attempting to solve 
(i.e. output maximisation or cost minimisation). The reason for 
doing this is so as to increase the efficiency of the parameter
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estimates, by exploiting the cross equation restrictions that 
implicitly appear because the production/cost function parameters 
appear in the auxiliary equations.
Allocative inefficiency has been introduced in the literature 
by estimating cost systems. Estimating cost systems that impose as 
few assumptions as possible, particularly ones that minimise 
arbitrary assumptions about the distribution of disturbances, 
functional forms, and independence of the level of inefficiency with 
the regressors, has proven to be a difficult task. Using Farrell 
definitions for technical and allocative inefficiency, cost systems 
that allow for cost inefficiency can be written as:
I nC = I n C i y ,p ) + I nT + I nA + v , (10)f  J f  f  f  r
s = s (y ,p ) + e for:j=l,..,M-l, f=l,..,N. , „,f j  j J € f j  °  ( 1 1 )
where is the observed cost, C(.) is the deterministic minimum 
cost frontier, y^ is a vector of outputs, pf is a vector of input 
prices, i-s a nonnegative term reflecting the increase in cost
due to technical inefficiency, I n A is a nonnegative term reflecting 
the increase in cost due to allocative inefficiency, v represents 
statistical noise, s is the observed share of the jth input, s^(.) 
is the efficient share of the jth input, e is the disturbance on 
the jth input share equation (a mixture of allocative inefficiency
190
and noise), M is the number of inputs and N is the number of 
observations.
The characteristics of this system are as follows. Firstly, the 
disturbances representing technical and allocative inefficiency in 
the cost equation increase observed cost, whereas statistical noise 
can either increase or decrease observed cost. Secondly, allocative 
inefficiency and noise may increase or decrease a given input’s cost 
share in the input share equations. Technical inefficiency does not 
appear in the input share equations when considered from a cost 
perspective, since output is exogenously determined in this 
framework. Lastly, the allocative inefficiency disturbance in the 
cost equation is related to the allocative inefficiency disturbances 
in the input share equations.
A key problem, when employing such systems, is how to model the 
relationship between the two sided disturbances on the input share 
equations (which are composed in part of allocative inefficiency, 
i.e., over- or underemployment of a given input) with the 
nonnegative allocative inefficiency disturbance in the cost 
equation. This problem, which is sometimes referred to as the 
’Greene problem’, was first discussed by Greene (19S0), and then by 
Nadiri and Schankerman (1981).
The ’Greene problem’ can be overcome in three ways: 1) by
looking for the analytic relationship between the allocative 
inefficiency disturbances, e and InA^ (as in Schmidt and Lovell
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(1979) or Kumbhakar (1989)); 2) by modelling the relationship using 
an approximation function, and impose, a p r i o r i ,  all the structure 
that is known (e.g., Shmidt (1984)); 3) by ignoring the relationship 
among the disturbances in the cost and input share equations (e.g., 
Greene (1980) treats these disturbances as independent.).
6.7.2.1. Analytic Solutions.
This approach is generally to be preferred, since it derives 
the exact analytic representation of the relationship. However, an 
analytic relationship can only be found when fairly restrictive 
functional forms are imposed. The Cobb-Douglas functional form is a 
closed form representation of both the cost and production 
functions, and thus an analytic representation of the relationship 
among allocative inefficiency disturbances in equations (10) and
(11) is possible. Schmidt and Lovell (1979, 1980) were the first to 
develop this systems approach.
Thus, assuming Cobb-Douglas technology , and following Schmidt and 
Lovell, we consider the system:
k
( 12 )
,j = 2 ....  k. (13)
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y is log of output, x ’s are log of inputs, P ’ s are log of prices, f 
indexes firms , j indexes inputs and £ represents the amount by 
which the jth first-order condition for cost minimisation fails to
hold. Schmidt and Lovell estimate this system under fairly strong
2
assumptions. The v^’s are iid N { 0,<r ); the u^’s are iid half-normal;
and the vectors (£   £ ) are iid W(u,S). Also v is
2f  kf  r  f
independent of and £ ^  , and uf is either independent of £ or
else uncorrelated with £ but correlated with |£ | in a particular
j f  j f 1 y
way. This leads to a complex MLE procedure, and then to 
straightforward measures of technical and allocative inefficiency.
(12) is a stochastic production frontier, while (13) is the set of 
first order conditions for cost minimisation. The errors in (13) 
represent allocative inefficiency. From (12) and (13) we can derive 
the cost function:
k a ,
l n C =  K + i y + y ' _ i p  - - (v - u ) + (E - Jnr) (14)
f  r - ' f L r j f r f f  f
J = 1
where:
[ k a rr a  ^ ,
ti j 
j * i  -1
k
r = ^ a) is returns to scale, 
J = i
k a p k _ -
E = V  - £ + in a + V a e f 
r L r f i L rf  = 2 L f  = 2
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1
The cost of technical inefficiency is — Uf, while the cost of 
allocative inefficiency is (E - Jnr).The Green problem is 'solved* 
in that the disturbances in the factor demand equations are 
functionally mapped into the allocative inefficiency term in the 
cost equation i l nA ~ E - Inr). Technical inefficiency is simply a 
function of the returns to scale and the one-sided disturbance in 
the production frontier { I n T = p).
Kopp (1981) identified a deficiency in Ainger et. al. and 
Meeusen and van den Broeck’s (1977) notion of technical inefficiency 
which encompasses the inefficiency of total factor employment. He 
pointed out that these aggregative measures are incapable of 
identifying inefficiency of individual input inefficiency. Thus, 
recognising the importance of disaggregating total factor 
efficiency, he suggested a measure of single-factor technical 
efficiency and decomposition of total cost of inefficiency into cost 
of technical and allocative inefficiency. This decomposition was 
further extended by Kopp and Diewert (1982) and Zieschang (1983). 
They assumed the parameters to be known or capable of being 
estimated in some way.
Kumbhakar (1988a,b) extends the idea of technical inefficiency 
to a factor-specific technical and allocative inefficiency, assuming 
the production technology to be Cobb-Douglas. Estimation of such 
models is carried out using special distributional assumptions for 
input-specific technical inefficiency - inefficiency attributed to 
each of the endogenous inputs used by a firm. This is a nonradial
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approach and differs from Farrell’s radial definitions of technical 
efficiency by explicitly allowing some inputs to be used more 
efficiently than others.
His model is based on the approach used by Lau and Yotopoulos 
(1971), Levy (1981), Schmidt (1988), in which a non-unitary factor 
of proportionality in the first-order conditions is used. One 
advantage of this approach as pointed out by Schmidt and Lin (1984) 
is that the existence of allocative inefficiency can be tested 
without making the first order conditions deterministic. In other 
words allocative inefficiency can be separated from random errors in 
the first-order conditions. This, however, is not possible in the 
Schmidt and Lovell model. Separation of random errors in 
optimisation and allocative inefficiency is important because the 
former comes from e.g., measurement errors, uncertainty in. input 
prices, and quality of inputs, etc. which are not under the control 
of the firm, whereas the latter comes from, e.g., managerial errors 
out of ignorance, etc. which are under the control of the firm. Thus 
lumping the effect of exogenous factors like uncertainty together 
with measurement errors and allocative inefficiency into one single 
error term and calling it ‘allocative’ inefficiency is questionable.
Following Kumbhakar (1988a,) in which he considers the 
generalised production function (GPF) developed by Zellner and 
Revankar (1969), we have:
where y is output, are inputs, and are the parameters to be
estimated, v is the general statistical noise and u(£ 0) is a one
sided random variable that represents the differences in technical
efficiency of the firms. The assumption is made of cost
minimisation. Allocative inefficiency is modelled as:
MP,
= k
MPX
f = 2,...,k (16)
where factor of proportionality k f are firm and input specific, zf
are random errors in cost minimisation, MPV are marginal products
X
f
of Xf, and W are input prices. Thus exact cost minimisation (except 
for the random error) is a special case when k = 1 (f = 2 , . - . . ,  k) 
and non-unitary k represents allocative inefficiency in the input 
pair (l,f). Specification (16) goes beyond Lau and Yotopoulos 
(1971), Levy (1981), and Lovell and Sickles (1983) since it 
separates allocative inefficiency from random errors.
Solving X from equations (15) and (16) yields the following input 
demand functions:
l n X  -  a + Y f  r L J = i
—  -  6 
r r j I nk + - l n F ( Y )  j r
+ 1
J=i
f  >cc
_ J I n
fw 1
_j
k
+ Y
f \fa
_i _ 5
r
wV. f J
Lj=2 r f j
- (v - u) 
r
(17)
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where:
a = I n a  -  Ina 
f f
+ ) k Jna , 
o L j j|j = i J
k
r
f  = 1
1 if f=j 
0 otherwise ,
5fj= \ f= 1, 2, . . . k
The input demand function in (17) shows that the presence of 
technical inefficiency increases input demand by - percent. But the
r
impact of allocative inefficiency on input demand is indeterminate. 
The percentage change in the demand for input f is:
k
I
j  = 2
fQL  ^
r
V )
Ink^ - I n k f < 0 depending on k and (j = 2  k)
However, whatever the effect is, it varies across inputs.
Kumbhakar then investigates the impact of inefficiency on the 
cost of production. Following Schmidt and Lovell (1979,1980) he 
derives the cost function when there is both technical and 
allocative inefficiency:
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( K  -v KI n a + Y a + -  l n F ( Y ) + - V a InWO L j j r  r L  j  J
j = l  ;  J = 1
a z - -  (v-u) + E 
, J J r
(18)
where:
The stochastic cost frontier is given by putting u = I n k ,  -  0 in
(18).Thus the presence of technical inefficiency increases r
percent. E = 0 if k, = 1 (j - 2,...,k) which is the case where firms
operate on the least cost expansion path. Non-negative value of E 
can be viewed as the percentage increase in cost due to allocative 
inefficiency.
Though otherwise inflexible, the major advantage of this 
approach is that we can derive analytically the expression for both 
technical and allocative inefficiency and increase in cost 
associated with each of these. Once the relevant parameters are 
estimated, each of these components can be estimated separately, the 
only problem is that the effect of random error in cost-minimisation 
(z^) cannot be disentangled from the cost of allocative 
inefficiency.
j
j
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The main difficulties with Kumbhakar’s (1988a,b) model are (a) 
the proposed methodology cannot be extended to a more flexible 
functional form and (b) estimation involves computation of n-variate 
cumulative normal-density functions when there are n variable 
inputs. With the flexible functional form proposed by Kumbhakar
(1989) in which he uses a symmetric generalised McFadden (SGM) cost 
function, (which is a slight extension of Diewert and Wales (1987)), 
he is unable to specify allocative inefficiency. Thus more 
flexibility in the functional form specified is achieved at the 
expense of being able to formulate technical but not allocative 
inefficiency.
Since the cost equation is not needed to identify all the 
parameters for the Kumbhakar’s (1989) functional form and one 
equation must be dropped from the system in any case, the cost 
equation is dropped and only input demand equation is estimated. 
Thus there is no problem in relating inefficiency in the input share 
equations to the cost equation.
6.7.2.2. Approximate Solutions.
Schmidt (1984) proposes modeling the relationship between 
allocative inefficiency in the cost and input share equations for a 
system such as equations (10) and (11) as follows:
/
I n  A-  = e Fe , (19)f f f
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where e = (e , e , e )' and F is an M x M positive
f  f  l  r  2 f  m ^
semidefinite matrix. This specification ensures that I n  A  ^ -  0 when
e = 0 and that in A and \e I are positively correlated for all j. f  r 1 r j 1 r  J J
Schmidt also suggests that:
F = > (20)
where ~ N(0,£), D is the product of the positive eigenvalues of 
and J] is the generalised inverse of J] (the covariance of the 
input share equation disturbances). Given these assumptions, I n  A 
is distributed as a chi-squared random variable and is positively 
correlated with the variances of the disturbances on the input share 
equations.
This model has not yet been used to obtain empirical estimates, 
since the resulting likelihood function would be fairly formidable 
to maximise.
Melfi (1984) simplifies Schmidt’s specification to obtain a 
more conformable maximum likelihood procedure. Most of the 
complexity of the above model comes from the assumptions required to 
ensure that I n  A is fixed given e Melfi reduces this complexity 
by first demonstrating how the likelihood function for the system 
can be derived given the relation of the disturbances in the input 
share equations to the allocative inefficiency term in the cost
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equation by noting:
f i l n  T + I n  A + v ) = g i l n  T + v |e ) h i e  ) , 
f f f f f ' f  r
where f , g  and h are the density functions for i l n T  + I nA + v ),
r f f
i l n T  + v ), and e . Since the allocative inefficiency term here,f f f
I nA , is a function of e , then I nA is fixed given e . Thus
f  r  f  & f
distributional assumptions need only be made for JnTf, v , and ef, 
which are assumed to follow half-normal, normal, and multivariate
normal distributions respectively. For manageability, Melfi modeled 
F = I and assumed no cross equation correlation among the input 
share equations, so that InA is the sum of the squared errors on 
all the share equations.
A disadvantage of this specification is that the estimates of
allocative inefficiency are forced towards zero. The input share
residuals are less than one in absolute value and so the sum of the 
squares will almost necessarily be small. One way of overcoming this 
problem is to set F = cl, where c is a scalar to be estimated. The 
sum of squared errors from the input share equations can be scaled 
up (or down) by c in order to model the effects of allocative 
inefficiency more flexibly.
Several extensions are made to Melfi’s approach by Bauer (1985) 
in order to develop a more flexible estimation technique. Firstly, F 
is modeled as a positive semidefinite diagonal matrix whose elements
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are treated as parameters to be estimated. Secondly, e is modeled 
as ~ N(a,£), allowing to have a nonzero mean (Schmidt and 
Lovell (1979) section 4, modeled the factor demand equations in this 
way). This enables a firm to persistently (and still temporarily) 
over- or underemploy a given input relative to its cost-minimising 
employment.
There are problems remaining despite these modifications. 
Firstly, even when dealing with a small number of outputs and
inputs, there is a large number of parameters to estimate. Also,
some of these parameters, such as the off-diagonal elements of F and 
£, would be very difficult to estimate in practice without imposing 
additional structure. Bauer, for example, restricted both. F and £ to 
be diagonal matrices. Secondly, solving the Green problem by 
flexibly modeling the relationship between the allocative
inefficiency disturbances does not necessarily lead to better
estimates of the cost frontier. Ignoring these relationships, as is 
discussed in the section below, may yield better estimates than 
modeling them imperfectly.
6.7.2.3. Qualitative Solutions.
It is possible to develop estimation techniques that ignore the 
link between the allocative inefficiency disturbances across the 
equations in the system. This approach was first put forward by 
Greene (1980) in a full frontier framework in which he constructed a
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translog cost system using a Gamma distribution for the cost 
inefficiency disturbance. The disturbances on the input share
equations were assumed to follow a multivariate normal distribution
1
with mean zero. While recognising the relationships among these 
disturbances, he treated them as statistically independent of the 
inefficiency term in the cost equation when deriving the likelihood 
function.
It must be realised that this approach is not fully efficient 
statistically in that the information about the relationship among 
the allocative inefficiency disturbances is being ignored. However, 
this does not necessarily yield worse results than an approach which 
models the relationship incorrectly.
6.7.3. Other System Approaches.
Frontier estimation techniques have also been developed for 
relationships other than production and cost functions. The 
application of cost or production frontier techniques is simple only 
when a single equation is considered. When estimating other systems, 
such as a profit function, output supply equations, and input demand 
equations, problems similar to those faced with the cost system 
estimation techniques (i.e. in integrating the error structures) 
arise.
Kumbhakar (19S7a), paralleling the Schmidt and Lovell approach
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for cost systems, extended the use of frontier production models to 
firms under the behavioural goal of profit maximisation for the 
single product firm. A system with composed error terms is 
constructed using a Cobb-Douglas production function and the first 
order conditions for profit maximisation, and it is estimated using 
maximum likelihood estimation.
This framework is extended by Kumbhakar (1987b) to 
multi-product firms facing constant elasticity of transformation 
(CET) output (introduced by Powell and Gruen (1968)) and 
Cobb-Douglas input functions. He constructs the likelihood function 
for the system composed of the production function with a composed 
error term made up of technical inefficiency and noise, and the 
first-order conditions for profit maximisation containing allocative 
inefficiency.
A drawback to the analytic approach in the stochastic frontier 
profit system, as in the cost function approach, is the relatively 
inflexible functional forms required in order to obtain closed-form 
solutions.
r
6.7.4. Avoiding Disturbance Term Assumptions.
6.7.4.1. Panel Data.
Panel data, by which we mean data on a cross-section of firms
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each observed for a number of time periods, has recently been made 
use of to avoid difficulties faced with stochastic frontier models, 
especially with disturbance term assumptions. This is shown in 
Schmidt and Sickles (1984).
With panel data, the crucial question is whether the firm’s 
efficiency level changes over time. At one extreme., the error term 
reflecting inefficiency can be taken to be independent over time (as 
well as over firms), in which case the panel nature of the data is 
irrelevant. At the other extreme, we can assume that firm 
inefficiency is constant over time, in which case the panel data 
literature is highly relevant. It is this assumption of unchanging 
inefficiency over time, while not being a particularly attractive 
assumption, which allows us to remedy certain serious problems of 
frontiers models. Three such problems discussed at below, and the 
sense in which they can be remedied model is:
y = oc + x 13+ v -  u
f t  o f t  f t  f US:  0, f ( 2 1 )
f = 1, . . . ,N,...,T.
This is a Cobb-Douglas production function, with noisetv^) and with 
technical inefficiency (uft_) that is constant over time. By defining 
5 -  a - u , we have:f  O f
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a panel data model with a firm effect (5f) but no time effect. We
assume x uncorrelated with v .
f t  f t
One problem with stochastic frontier models is the strength of 
the distributional assumptions on which they rely. The estimation of 
the model and the separation of technical inefficiency from 
statistical noise require specific assumptions about the 
distribution of technical inefficiency (e.g.,half-normal) and 
statistical noise (e.g., normal). It is not clear how robust one’s 
results are to departures from these assumptions. But with panel 
data, such assumptions are unnecessary. We can still impose such 
distributional assumptions, presumably to gain efficiency; Pitt and 
Lee (1981) do so, for example. Since the model can be estimated with 
or without making distributional assumptions, then following Hausman 
(1978) or Ruud (1984) we can test these assumptions.
A second problem with frontiers models is that inefficiency and 
input levels (or whatever variables are exogenous) are assumed to be 
independent. This may be unreasonable, since if a firm can foresee 
its level of technical inefficiency, this should affect its input 
choices. With panel data, no such assumption is necessary. In 
particular, the fixed effects (‘within’) estimator does not make or 
require any assumption of independence between the effects and the 
explanatory variables, we can still make such an assumption, in
which case more efficient estimation is possible; and therefore the 
assumption is again testable.
Finally, a serious problem with stochastic frontier models
(though not with deterministic frontier models) is that the
technical inefficiency of a particular firm can be estimated but not
consistently. We can consistently estimate the (whole) error term
for a given observation, but it contains statistical noise as well
as technical inefficiency. The variance of the distribution of
technical inefficiency, conditional on the whole error term, does
not disappear when the sample size increases (see Jondrow et. al.
1982 for a discussion of this point). With panel data we can
estimate technical inefficiency better because we get to observe it
T times instead of once. At the simplest level, the fixed effects
(<5^in (22) can be decomposed into overall intercept (aQ) and
inefficiency (u ) by defining a = max <5 and u = a - 6 . This should J r J & o r r o f
work well provided that N is large enough for the normalisation of
aQ to be accurate, and that T is large enough for estimation of the
5fto have been precise. Intuitively, we are just averaging away the
noise (v ) in the residuals [v  -  u ). 
f r r
r
6.7.4.2. Panel Data With Time Varying Inefficiency.
If one finds the panel data assumption of time-invariant 
technical inefficiency untenable, inefficiency could be modeled as 
being statistically independent over time. However, panel data then
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ceases to have any qualitative advantage over time series or 
cross-sectional data.
Cornwell, Schmidt, and Sickles (1990) develop an approach that 
attempts to combine the qualitative advantages of panel data without 
imposing the assumption of time invariancy. This is done by 
specifying some structure on the variation of inefficiency over 
time. Thus, the intercept as well as the slope coefficients are 
allowed to vary over firms and time, allowing the levels of 
efficiency to vary over time by firm.They generalise Schmidt and 
Sickles (1984) by replacing the firm effects, 8 , by:
6 =  </> + <n t + <£> t*
ft r fl f 2 f 3
(23)
If we let:
w =
ft
l,t,t‘
f [^f l ’
$  =  <p ,(p
f 2 f 3
the model can be written
y = x fi + w ^ + v
ft ft ft f ft
(24)
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Time varying firm productivity and efficiency levels and rates 
of productivity growth can be derived from the residuals based on 
the 'within', GLS, Hausman-Taylor, or MLE, depending on the number 
of assumptions one is willing to make about the independence and the 
distribution of the firm effects. In Schmidt and Sickles (1984), 
using the model specified in equation (21), the residuals 
are an estimate of i v -u ) „ and the firm effect (for a given firm)
f t  f
is estimated by averaging its residuals over time. Specifically, the 
estimate of Sis:
This estimate is consistent as T 4  cc, The analogous procedure for
the Cornwell et al. (1990) model is to estimate ^ by regressing the 
> ~
residuals (y - x B) for firm f on w ; that is, on a constant, 
f t  f t  f t
time and time squared. The fitted values from this regression 
provide an estimate of S in equation (23) that is consistent (forft
all f and t) as T 4 to, Furthermore, the frontier intercept a and
the firm specific level of inefficiency for firm f are estimated in
i
Schmidt and Sickles (1984) respectively as:
a = max(a ) and u = a -  a . o j  j  f  o f
The analogous procedure in Cornwell et al. is to estimate the
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frontier intercept at time t and the firm specific level of 
technical inefficiency of firm f at time t as follows:
5 - max (5 ) and u = 5 - 5  .
j  Jt  f t  t  f t
The disadvantage of the Cornwell et al. model is that it does 
not capture allocative inefficiency. This is because it has a single 
equation framework in which only the production function is used.
Kumbhakar (1990) presents a model that accommodates both types 
of inefficiency using a cost minimising framework. He begins with an 
equation similar to equation (21), but proposes the following 
formulation for u :
ft
u = x (t)u , t=l,2,...,T.ft r . . .
where
-l
T ( t ) = 1 + exp(bt + ct )
where b and c are coefficients to be estimated. The resulting system 
must be estimated using MLE.
A criticism of both the Cornwell et al. model and the Kumbhakar
(1990) model is that inefficiency has been forced to change over
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time in a specified way (in this case quadratically) and this may 
not model, adequately, the relationship between inefficiency and 
time.
6.8. Summary.
The biggest advantage of the stochastic frontier approach is 
that, unlike all three other approaches, it introduces a disturbance 
term representing noise, measurement error, and exogenous shocks 
beyond the control of the production unit. None of the other 
approaches makes any accommodation for such phenomena, which affect 
every economic relationship. This in turn permits a decomposition of 
the deviation of an observation from the deterministic part of a 
frontier into two components, inefficiency and noise. Without such 
an accommodation statistical noise is bound to be counted as 
inefficiency.
While the Jondrow et. al. (1982) measure, using the stochastic
frontier approach, does give estimates of firm and year specific
technical inefficiency, these are not consistent. Also, only
v
technical inefficiency can be measured using this method.
Both technical and allocative efficency can be estimated by 
estimating a system of equations consisting of production or cost 
frontier together with auxiliary equations. This is done so as to 
increase the efficiency of the parameter estimates by exploiting the
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cross equation restrictions that implicitly appear because the 
production/cost function parameters appear in the auxiliary 
equations. A problem that can appear when employing certain versions 
of this system is called the ‘Greene problem*. The problem faced is 
how to model the relationship between the two sided disturbances on 
the input share equations with the nonnegative allocative 
inefficiency disturbance in the production/cost equation.
This problem can be overcome in three ways: (1) by looking for
the analytic relationship between the allocative inefficiency 
disturbances; (2) by modelling the relationship using an 
approximation function, and impose, a p r i o r i ,  all the structure that 
is known; (3) by ignoring the relationship among the disturbances in 
the cost and input share equations.
Finally, panel data has recently been made use of to avoid 
difficulties faced with stochastic frontier models, especially with 
disturbance term assumptions. But if the firm’s efficiency level is 
beleived to change over time, then the usual panel data literature 
becomes irrelevant. However, Kumbhakar (1990) has developed a model 
that accomodates both technical and allocative inefficiency with 
time varying inefficiency. A major criticism of his approach is that 
he specifies the way in which inefficiency is expected to change 
over time, but his specification may not adequately model the change 
in inefficiency over time.
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7. DATA COLLECTION.
7.1. The Questionnaire.
Two fie ldwork t r ip s  were made, one in 1990, and the other in 
1991/92. A to ta l  of three sets of questionnaires were implemented, 
and these are discussed in what fo llows. Questionnaire forms are 
given in Appendix (1).
7.2. F irst Field Trip
During the f i r s t  t r i p  of April-June 1990, interviews took 
place with s ix  te x t i le  firms in order to complete the Textiles 
Questionnaires given in the Appendix.
I t  was decided from the outset to make every attempt to 
administer the questionnaires personally. This necessitated several 
v is i t s  as a lo t  of the required data was h is to r ic a l ( i . e .  beginning 
with 1979), and thus some time was necessary fo r  th e ir  re tr ie va l from 
archives. I t  was also f e l t  that th is  method of data co llec t ion  was a 
more re l ia b le  method than sending questionnaires, fo r  completion, by 
post as i t  was f e l t  that the la t te r  method would lead to poor 
completion rates and inaccurate returns from firm s.
The Textiles Questionnaire is divided into three sections: 
Section (1) is concerned with general de ta i ls  about the f irm
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concerned. This section formed the basis of the p lant-by-p lant 
discussion given in Chapter (5 ). Section (2) is concerned with data 
on wages, output, and value of assets fo r  the period 1979-89. This 
provided the data fo r  the technical e ff ic ie ncy  estimation made in 
Chapter (8). Section (3) is concerned with e le c t r i c i t y  consumption, 
in terms o f un its  consumed ( in  KWh) and maximum demand ( in  KVA), of 
firms in 1989. This formed the basis of the discussion o f e le c t r ic i t y  
cost comparisons made in Chapter (9).
Firms were encouraged to provide the relevant data on asset 
values in the form of photocopies of the relevant pages from the
audited accounts, i f  they preferred. I f  they were re luctan t to do so,
or i f  completion of Sections (2) and (3) were incomplete, v is i t s  were 
made to other sources of data such as the Central Bureau of 
S ta t is t ic s ,  the M in is try  of Industries, the Internal Revenue 
Services, Customs and Excise, the Price and Incomes Board, and the 
Ghana E le c t r ic i ty  Corporation, in an e f fo r t  to complete the
questionnaire, or crosscheck, wherever possible, the accuracy of the 
data co llected. This approach helped to elim inate some 
inconsistencies.
7.2 .1. Capital, Labour, and Output Data for Technical Efficiency
Estimation.
Capital measurements are concerned with the unobservable 
use-up of cap ita l re flected in the shorter remaining working l i f e .  On 
ex-post basis, annual cap ita l inputs on summation over the l i fe t im e
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of the asset must equal the o r ig ina l in s ta l la t io n  price of the asset 
while, on an ex-ante basis, po tentia l cap ita l services must re f le c t  
the potentia l income flows to be derived from the asset. Therefore, 
with an appropriate discount ra te , the present value of cap ita l must 
equal the discounted value of the expected to ta l  fu ture  y ie lds .
In th is  study, the concern is with ex-post measures of
cap ita l.  Two common measures of cap ita l are the net book value and
the replacement value. The net book value is  the o r ig ina l cost of 
purchases plus (or minus) the value of additions (or disposals) made 
thereon, minus the amount of depreciation presumed w rit ten  o f f .  The 
replacement cost is frequently estimated at the insured value of 
assets. Another way of obtaining th is  information is to enquire 
d ire c t ly  from the firms as to how much they would expect to get fo r 
the equipment i f  i t  is offered fo r  sale in a perfect cap ita l goods 
market, or to enquire from second hand machinery dealers, who have 
experience in re se ll in g  machinery, as to the expected value of 
cap ita l,  and likewise, build ings can be professionally valued.
Net book value of assets are used as the basis of the
measure of cap ita l.  Capital is c lass if ied  into bu ild ing , plant and 
machinery, fu rn itu re  and equipment, and motor vehicles, with
depreciation being provided on a s tra igh t l ine  basis at rates 
calculated to w rite  o f f  the cost o f each fixed asset over i ts  
estimated useful l i f e .  The rates in use are as fo llows: Buildings 5%, 
plant and machinery 12%, fu rn itu re  and equipment 7.5%, and motor 
vehicles 25%.
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Net book values of assets, as they stand, may be a poor 
guide to the current values of assets. F i r s t ly ,  o f f i c i a l ,  lega lly - 
determined depreciation allowances may be greater than the actual 
physical de terio ra tion  of the cap ita l stock. Secondly, and more 
importantly, the rapid r ise  in in f la t io n  means tha t current additions 
and disposals are given greater weight in the valuation process not 
because they are worth more in real terms, but because th e ir  price 
has risen in nominal terms due to in f la t io n .  I t  was decided to 
revalue each type of fixed asset (be i t  bu ild ing, machinery, e tc .)  in 
a way that takes th is  fac t in to  account. This has been done by f i r s t  
adjusting the i n i t i a l  value of each type of asset fo r  in f la t io n ,  then 
depreciating i t  fo r  the necessary number of years, and f in a l l y  adding 
(or subtracting) the value of additions (or disposals). I t  is then 
possible to compare these estimates with the revaluation of assets 
which some firms have recently undertaken. From th is ,  i t  is found 
that the in f la t ion -ad jus ted  book value estimates corresponded f a i r l y  
well to such revaluations as had been made. These are given in Table 
(8.1) of Chapter (8).
The measure of labour input added together the yearly 
salaries and bonuses of a l l  categories of labour, namely s k i l le d ,  
sem i-skilled, and unskilled. This is given in Table (8.2) of Chapter 
(8). The measure of output took the form of annual pre-tax sales of 
each f irm . This is  given in Table (8.3) of the same chapter. ,
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7.3. Second F ie ld tr ip .
During the second f ie ld  t r i p  of December-February 1991/92, 
interviews were obtained with several representatives of the Ghana 
Cotton Company (GCC), whence the Ghana Cotton Company Questionnaire 
(GCCQ) (shown in Appendix), which formed the basis of the information 
required fo r  Chapter (3) on cotton, was completed. The Cost Structure 
Questionnaire (also in Appendix) was completed by Plant B, and th is  
provided the data required fo r  the Total Manufacturing Costs section 
of Chapter (9).
7.3.1. The Ghana Cotton Company Questionnaire.
The GCC questionnaire (and interviews) was p r im ari ly  aimed 
at obtaining data on the performance of the cotton cu lt iva t io n  
sector, and i ts  cost s tructure. Data, on the q u a l i ty  of Ghanaian 
cotton was obtained from Plant B. These results  are given in the 
chapter on cotton c u lt iv a t io n .
The GCCQ is divided into three sections: Section (1) deals 
with general information about the f irm . Section (2) looks at the 
performance of GCC in the period 1985-1989. This requires data such 
as the area cu lt iva ted  in each year, the volume of .seed and l i n t  
cotton produced, and the price of l i n t  cotton in each year. Section 
(3) is concerned with GCC's cost structure in 1991. This requires 
data on (a) cost and application of insectic ides, (b) cost and
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application of f e r t i l i s e r s ,  (c) cost of seed required, (d) cost of 
ploughing, (e) the y ie ld  fo r  tha t year, ( f )  ginning costs fo r  that 
year, (g) transport costs, (h) wages of employees, ( i )  cost of 
vehicles, ( j )  c re d it  f a c i l i t i e s  and cost of cap ita l.
7.3 .2 . Cost Structure Questionnaire.
The Cost Structure Questionnaire was conducted to co llec t 
data on manufacturing cost comparisons in spinning and weaving, which 
meant that data on both yarn manufacturing costs per kilogramme and 
fab r ic  manufacturing costs per meter were required. This data, 
obtained only from plant B, formed the basis of yarn and fab ric
manufacturing cost comparison made in Chapter (9).
The data required in Section (1) of the questionnaire 
concerned yarn manufacturing costs. These included the blend and
count of yarns; overheads per Kg; the cost of cotton, polyester, and
viscose; and the cost of waste per Kg. Section (2) collected data on 
the type/width of fa b r ic ;  the labour cost per yard; power cost per 
yard; supplies, depreciation and in terest charges per yard; yarn cost 
per yard; raw material cost; and waste.
Very useful data on the cost structure of several f i rm 's  
products was obtained from the Price and Incomes Board. Data was 
provided on the fo llow ing: description of product; un it  of measure 
(usually 12 yards or 10.968 meters); period of inqu iry . Cost per un it 
was obtained under the fo llow ing sub-sections: imported raw
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materia ls; imported packing materia ls; duty on imported materials; 
other local cost on raw materials; local raw materia ls; d irec t 
labour; fue l cost; power cost; water cost; spares and replacement 
cost; administration cost; other overheads; de live ry  expenses; p ro f i t  
margin; se l l in g  expenses; excise duty; sales tax; and ex-factory 
price. This data formed the basis of the cost s e n s i t iv i ty  analysis 
made in Chapter (9).
F in a lly ,  the various tax rates were collected during the 
v is i t s  to Customs and Excise, and the Internal Revenue Service.
7.4. Summary.
This chapter looked at the two f ie ld t r ip s  conducted in 1990 
and 1991/1992 during which a to ta l  of three questionnaires, the 
Textiles Questionnaire, the Ghana Cotton Company Questionnaire, and 
the Cost Structure Questionnaire, were implemented. These 
questionnaires are b r ie f ly  reviewed above, and so is the method of 
data co llec t ion .
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8. ESTIMATING TECHNICAL INEFFICIENCY FOR THE PERIOD 1979-89.
8.1. Introduction.
As mentioned previosly in Chapter (6), a production process 
can be inefficient in two ways. It can be technically inefficient, 
in the sense that it fails to produce maximum output from a given 
set of inputs. It can also be allocatively inefficient in the 
sense that the marginal revenue product of an input might not be 
equal to the marginal cost of that input. Therefore, allocative 
inefficiency results in utilisation of inputs in the wrong 
proportions, given input prices.
As also discussed in Chapter (6), the greatest advantage 
thestochastic frontier approach has over the pure, and modified 
programming approaches, as well as the deterministic statistical 
frontier approach is that, unlike these three other approaches, it 
introduces a disturbance term representing noise, measurement 
error, and exogenous shocks beyond the control of the production 
unit. This in turn permits a decomposition of the deviation of an 
observation from the deterministic part of a frontier into 
inefficiency and noise.
It was intended to estimate the allocative as well as the 
technical inefficiency component in Ghanaian manufacturing, but 
the data required, namely cost of capital, labour and output, to
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specify the cost functions required were unobtainable at the time 
the fieldwork was conducted. Thus, only technical inefficiency is 
estimated here using Jondrow et. al.’s (1982) measure. This is 
based on the stochastic frontier approach, and estimates of firm 
and year specific technical inefficiency can be obtained. It must 
be pointed out, as has already been done in Chapter (6), that 
these estimates are not consistent.
Thus, in this chapter, the empirical model used to estimate 
technical inefficiency in six Ghanaian textile mills is discussed, 
and the results of technical inefficiency estimation for the 
period 1979-89, are presented.
8.2. Empirical Model.
The model that was estimated follows the stochastic 
Cobb-Douglas frontier production function approach discussed in 
Section (6.7.1) of Chapter (6). The data on inputs and output used 
wascollected from the 1990 fieldtrip, as discussed in Chapter (7). 
The model is specified as in equation (2) of Chapter (6), and even 
though the data being analaysed covers several firms and for 
several years we find that a particular firm’s inefficiency varies 
over time. Thus the data is treated as cross section data, and the 
subscript (i) indexes firms over time. The model used is as 
follows:
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I n Y = I n  a + a l nX + a InX + (v - u ),
1 0 11 li 2i 2i i i
i=l,2...,N.
where JnY is the log of output, is the log of capital,
is the log of labour, aQ , ct^ ^ , and a are the parameters to 
estimated, V ~ N(0,cr ) is the stochastic error which is assumed to
V
2
be normally distributed, U ~ N(0,tr ) for u^O, is a one sided
u
disturbance term, assumed to have a half-normal distribution, 
which represents technical inefficiency differing across firms or 
time. V and U are also assumed to be independent of each other. 
The data for capital, labour, and output are given in Tables 
(8.1), (8.2), and (8.3) respectively.
Given the error term assumptions made above, the 
log-likelihood function can be defined, as in equation (3) of 
Chapter (6), thus:
<12
I nL (y/p.A.o-2) = N I n —  + N Jncr"1
•T
n  r  *
+ £ In 1-F (e,, A,cr 1) 
i = i * -  1
where F = standard normal distribution function,
2 , 2 , 2 ,  tr = (cr + o' ) ,
u  V
2 o'2 i = 1
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Capital of Firms in Ghanaian Textile Sector,
Million Cedis, 1979-1989.
Table 8.1.
Firm B Firm C Firm E Firm G Firm H Firm J
1979 * * 27.1 23.5 12.7 * * 38.8
1980 55.5 24.4 20.5 11.0 * * 33.8
1981 59.5 22.1 17.8 9.5 ** 28.7
1962 64.0 19.1 15.3 9.2 24.1 24.4
1983 627.7 180.8 144.0 86.7 228.0 230.3
1984 877.0 248.9 178.1 119.1 311.8 313.7
1985 993.7 261.8 187.5 121.5 329.6 328.2
1986 1272.4 340.6 253.3 161.0 452.0 422.9
1987 2141.0 572.3 491.7 272.4 759.6 707.9
1988 2413.6 622.7 621.1 308.2 878.8 812.9
1989 2714.9 692.0 720.7 331.5 1018.4 977.1
Source: Data 1990/91 Questionnaire.
** means not available.
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Labour of Firms in Ghanaian Textile Sector,
Million Cedis, 1979-1989.
Table 8.2.
Firm B Firm C Firm E Firm G Firm H Firm J
1979 * * 13.4 8.0 1.0 * * 7.6
1980 .9 13.6 8.3 1.0 * * 5.4
1981 3.5 18.4 13.8 1.2 * * 7.6
1982 5.5 19.6 11.6 1.4 7.5 7.3
1983 5.8 25.4 9.6 1.4 5.2 6.9
1984 12.2 36.1 15.7 2.0 10.3 9.4
1985 16.0 72.9 39.5 7.0 102.3 36.0
1986 43.0 127.0 77.3 7.5 101.3 48.5
1987 63.0 141.8 136.0 12.9 140.0 77.6
1988 109.8 295.3 165.9 20.3 256.2 126.3
1989 145.7 297.9 427.3 28.9 298.8 171.0
Source: Data from 1990/91 Questionnaire.
** means not available.
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Output of Firms in Ghanaian Textile Sector,
Million Cedis, 1979-1989.
Table 8.3.
Firm B Firm C Firm E Firm G Firm H Firm J
1979 * * 65.7 43.0 18.3 ** 58.8
1980 18.9 42.9 18.3 9.8 * * 29.7
1981 40.4 57.4 36.3 10.6 ** 26.7
1982 24.0 50.3 14.6 11.6 52.6 35.5
1983 43.0 109.0 31.6 7.6 48.6 40.2
1984 131.1 294.4 152.3 48.0 192.0 145.9
1985 183.3 412.7 358.3 87.9 387.2 287.4
1986 470.3 756.0 405.8 153.7 786.9 470.0
1987 827.2 1262.1 966.1 266.7 1360.0 877.0
1988 1424.7 3499.2 1232.2 506.3 2590.0 1220.0
1989 1956.3 3851.3 2284.0 630.6 3929.0 1838.0
Source: Data from 1990/91 Questionnaire.
** means not available.
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This model was estimated by maximising the likelihood 
function with respect to (3, A, and o\ or conversely, by minimising 
the negative of the likelihood function. Thus the actual function 
which was minimised, using Limdep (1989) computer software, is 
thus:
Ini (y//3, A, cr2) = lno'-in(l-F((y-/3 -  (3 x ~ [3 x )/cr))
o ' 1 l  1 2 2
+ (y - £o - 0 A  - 02x / / C 2 . 2),
where y = I n Y,
x = ln X ,1 i
x = lnX ,
2 2
8.3. Results of Estimation.
Several combinations of starting points were attempted, and 
one such combination which led to a global minimum in the 
minimisation process was as follows: 0q= 0, |3 = 0, (3^= 0, <r -  1, 
and A = 1. The result of this minimisation are given in Table
(8.4). The R value , using Ordinary Least Squares regression,
was found to be .927 indicating that 92.7 percent of the 
variability in y is explained by xi and x . The parameters of (3^, 
(3^, and cr were found to be significant at the 5% level, while 
those of A and (3 were insignificant at the 5% level. The fact 
that at least cr, which contains the variance of technical 
inefficiency, was significant, encouraged further use of this 
model for estimating firm and year specific technical
inefficiency. The fact that A was found to be insignificant was 
disappointing, and perhaps the significance of the inefficiency
estimates is slightly reduced by this fact.
The estimates shown in Table (8.4) were substituted into
2
equations (8) and (9) of Chapter (6) in order to work out crw 
using equation (7) of Chapter (6). cr , A, and o' were then 
substituted into equation (4) of Chapter (6) and estimates of firm 
and year specific technical inefficiency, for firms B, C, E, G, H, 
and J for the period 1979-89, were thus obtained. These are given 
in Table (8.5).
From Table (8.5), it can be seen that the average value of 
inefficiency for all firms in 1980 (excluding firm H) stood at 
13.8 percent, with the lowest and highest values for that year 
being 5.2 percent and 25.5 percent respectively. Average
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Result of Maximising Likelihood Function. 
Table (8.4).
Variable Coefficient Estimate
x1 (log capital) B1 .4089
(.0573)
x2 (log labour) B2 .6910
(.0508)
Constant BO .0160
(.7797)
Lambda 1.8933
(1.3813)
Sigma .6675
(.1474)
Note: Figures in parentheses are standard errors 
of estimates.
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Technical Inefficiency (u) of Firms In Ghanaian 
Textile Industry (in %).
Table 8.5.
Firm B Firm C FlrmE Firm G Firm H Firm J
1979 - 9.8 9.8 3.6 - 8.1
1980 6.2 16.4 25.5 7.1 -- 13.7
1981 8.1 14.0 17.4 6.7 - 19.2
1982 23.6 16.2 32.8 6.6 7.1 12.0
1983 31.8 23.7 33.1 30.6 18.8 27.1
1984 21.9 11.1 10.3 5.8 6.9 9.2
1985 19.9 13.9 7.8 8.2 21.6 13.3
1986 16.7 11.9 14.7 4.9 10.7 10.3
1987 15.0 8.8 11.2 5.1 9.2 9.2
1988 13.0 4.7 11.0 3.7 7.3 10.0
1989 11.8 4.5 12.6 4.0 5.3 8.4
Note: No values available for B (1979) and 
H (1979-81).
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inefficiency rose sharply to 27.5 percent in 1983 with the lowest 
and highest values being 18.8 percent and 33.1 percent
respectively. By 1989, this figure had fallen to 7.7 percent with 
the lowest and highest values for that year standing at 4.0
percent and 12.6 percent respectively. These results are discussed 
further in Chapter (9) which is on the cost structure of the
textile industry.
8.4. Summary.
In this chapter, the stochastic Cobb-Douglass frontier
production function approach, discussed in Section (6.7.1) of
Chapter (6), is used to estimate technical inefficiency in six
Ghanaian textile mills for period 1979-89.
The results of this estimation show that technical
inefficiency was on an upward trend in the 1979-1983 period, and
was subsequently on a declining trend in the 1984-89 period. This 
finding forms part of the cost structure analysis undertaken in 
Chapter (9) .
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9. COSTS IN GHANAIAN TEXTILE INDUSTRY.
9.1. Introduction.
This chapter focuses on the costs faced by the te x t i le s  
sector. Reasons why firms need to cut costs are discussed, and the 
main areas where cost reductions are possible are highlighted, be 
they exogenous areas ( i . e .  beyond the f i rm 's  contro l but w ith in  
Government's contro l) or endogenous areas ( i . e .  d i re c t ly  under the 
f irm 's  con tro l) .
A fte r the introduction in Section (9 .1), a summary of the 
costs faced by te x t i le s  firms is given in Section (9 .2). Section 
(9.3) looks at why firms need to cut costs, while Section (9.4) 
discusses to ta l  yarn and fa b r ic  manufacturing cost. The endogenous 
costs are given in Section (9 .5), while the exogenous costs are given 
in Section (9 .6). Section (9.7) discusses s e n s i t iv i ty  analysis of 
costs. The summary is in Section (9.8).
9.2. Costs Faced By Textile Firms.
Figure (9.1) i l lu s t ra te s  the main components of to ta l  cost 
in the Ghanaian te x t i le  sector. These can be c la ss if ie d  into two 
groups: "endogenous costs" and "exogenous costs". Endogenous costs,
i . e . ,  costs which firms can contro l, include:
Cost of labour ( i . e  post-tax wages).
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Cost reductions due to improved labour p roduc tiv ity .
Raw material cost.
Cost reductions from e f f ic ie n t  use of raw materia ls.
Cost reductions occurring from e f f ic ie n t  use of fu e l,
e le c t r ic i t y ,  and water.
Cost reductions with improved technical and a lloca tive
e ff ic ie ncy .
Exogenous costs, i .e .  costs not d i re c t ly  under the firms 
con tro l, include:
Cost due to high price o f, and tax on, e le c t r ic i t y ,  fuel and
water.
D irect taxes: income tax, and company tax.
Ind irec t taxes: sales tax, raw material tax.
Cost changes as a resu lt  of exchange rate changes.
9.3. Why Firms Need to  Cut Costs.
The question as to why firms need to cut costs can be 
answered with reference to two periods: pre- and post­
l ib e ra l is a t io n  periods. In the p re - l ib e ra l isa t io n  period before 
1983, "rent seeking" costs and cost due to "d ire c t ly  unproductive" 
a c t iv i t ie s  were incurred as a re su lt  of protectionism (see Tullock 
1967, Krueger 1974, and Bhagwati 1980 fo r  a review of costs due to 
protectionism). There were d i f f i c u l t ie s  in acquiring imported 
inputs due to the import licensing system. The import licensing 
system placed a great s tra in  on the smaller establishments making i t
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d i f f i c u l t  fo r  them to obtain inputs. Problems with maintenance of 
machinery, due to shortages of spare parts, led to high down times. 
Strikes by workers also played a part in high down time. The 
granting of import licenses on the basis of capacity in existence 
and the need to exp lo it  scale economies led to the establishment 
of large plants, and th is  over-supply of capacity in turn 
contributed to i t s  underu ti l isa t ion .
But th is  s itua tion  did not improve p o s t- l ib e ra l is a t io n .  
What many had seen as the major constraints to improving the 
level of capacity u t i l is a t io n ,  namely foreign exchange constraints 
and the f ix in g  of output prices, had a l l  been removed by the end of 
1986, but s t i l l  in 1988, the level of capacity u t i l is a t io n  in 
te x t i le s  was 10 percent lower than in 1978 (see Figure (5.5) on 
capacity u t i l is a t io n  in Chapter (5 )).  This suggests tha t the low 
capacity u t i l is a t io n  levels were not e n t ire ly  due to constraints 
from outside the industry, but tha t the problem was pa rt ly  from 
w ith in . Many years of protection had made firms complacent about 
con tro ll ing  costs. The shelter from competition had, with few 
exceptions, allowed i l l-m a in ta ined or inadequate cap ita l to stay in 
production and not much e f fo r t  was put into improving the 
e ff ic iency  of labour. This meant tha t firms operated with re la t iv e ly  
low p roduc tiv ity  of fac to rs . As discussed in Section (2.3) of Chapter 
(2), Steel (1972), using Domestic Resource Cost to examine the 
e ff ic ie ncy  of industries, found that only 15 percent of firms 
surveyed in 1967-68 would have been competitive with imports at the 
o f f ic ia l  exchange ra te , and devaluation by 50 percent would have
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raised that f igu re  only up to 25.6 percent.
As discussed in Section (2.6.5) of Chapter (2 ), industry 
began to face d i f f i c u l t i e s  with the introduction of the ERP in 1983. 
These were mainly due to competition from imports, a rundown and 
obsolete cap ita l stock, and t ig h t  l iq u id i ty .  The 300 percent exchange 
rate devaluation in the 1983-1984 period, as shown in Figure (9.14), 
had the e ffe c t of converging the nominal and PPP rates, and meant 
tha t domestic goods became re la t iv e ly  more competitive as compared to 
imported goods. But, the removal of t a r i f f s  and quotas worked in an 
opposing d irec t ion  to the devaluation, leading to a reduction in the 
price of imported goods as compared to domestic manufactures. Thus, 
the overa ll e f fe c t of the market l ib e ra l is a t io n  programme 
(devaluation, removal of t a r i f f s  and quotas, e tc .)  is undetermined. 
What has already been mentioned above is that Steel (1972) found a 
high degree of ine ff ic iency  amongst the firms he surveyed. Also some 
evidence of the adverse e ffec t of the i n i t i a l  stages of 
l ib e ra l is a t io n  can be seen from Chapter (5), where 8 of the 12 
te x t i le  firms in existence in 1979 were s t i l l  in operation in 1989. 
A l l  the closures took place a fte r  the 1983 l ib e ra l is a t io n  programme. 
Thus even though a devaluation and removal of t a r i f f s  work in
opposite d irections in terms of the e ffec t they have on
competitiveness with imports, i t  is f e l t  that the removal of t a r i f f s  
had the greater e ffe c t .
In view of the fac t that at the time of the survey, only one
firm  had modern machinery, and no firms had made provisions fo r  the
required reinvestment in p lant, machinery and tra in in g , and that
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neither the government nor foreign investors have been w i l l in g  to 
commit funds to th is  process, the long-term prospect fo r  survival of 
the Ghanaian te x t i le  industry is in question. Thus production cost 
cutt ing is  essentia l, and the ro le  of both firms and the government 
in achieving th is  is discussed in th is  chapter.
9.4. Total Manufacturing Costs.
Prior to considering the endogenous and exogenous costs in 
d e ta i l ,  a comparison of plant B's manufacturing costs with those of 
other selected countries is made. This would give an ind ication of 
i t s  competitiveness and of the gap which i t  has to close i f  i t  is to 
stand up to the competition i t  now faces from imports.
9.4 .1 . Yarn Manufacturing Costs.
Idea lly , the cost structure fo r  products of several firms 
would be needed to give a clear picture of industry costs, but th is  
was not obtainable. Nevertheless, the costs of the best equipped and 
arguably the best maintained f irm , Plant B, was obtained during 1990 
fie ldwork. As seen e a r l ie r  in Chapter (5), Plant B has ins ta lled  
open-end ro to r spinning, and uses shuttle less looms (both modern 
cap ita l intensive techniques). This, generally, is comparable with 
Curisk is ' (1989) cap ita l intensive techniques in the USA discussed in 
that chapter, and is commensurable to the 20 to 40 percent of firms 
in the te x t i le s  industries of Germany, France, and the United
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Kingdom, found by the Policy Studies In s t i tu te  (1985) to be using 
microelectronics. I t  is therefore f e l t  that a comparison of plant 
B's costs with those of countries such as the USA, Germany, is apt 
since, the d isp a r ity  in cap ita l in te ns ity  between these three samples 
is not as large as might be expected, and so differences in costs 
would, by and large, be a tt r ibu tab le  to management e f f ic ie n cy , labour 
p roduc tiv ity  and other overheads, rather than to ine ff ic iency  due to 
technological d isp a r ity .
Figure (9.2) gives the to ta l  cost of yarn manufacture in 
do lla rs  per Kilogramme, in 1985, fo r  Plant B in Ghana, and other 
selected countries, i .e .  USA, Germany, India, Korea. The highest 
yarn manufacture cost was Plant B, at 3.2, and the lowest was India, 
at 1.9. This means that Plant B's cost was 68 percent higher than 
Ind ia 's  average cost in 1985. I t  is true that th is  is  probably not a 
l ike  with l ike  comparison because f i r s t l y ,  the qu a lity  of Plant B's 
yarn would be expected to be higher than the average Indian yarn. 
This is because Plant B is a modern well maintained p lant, while 
"over ha lf  the spinning and weaving equipment in India is estimated 
to be over 20 years old and much of i t  over 40 years" (Technical 
Change, 1987). Secondly, the yarn counts (thicknesses) that are being 
compared are not known. Also, a review of count and q u a l i ty  premiums 
by Cotton Outlook (1992) reveals tha t, fo r  the two commonest counts, 
20s and 30s, the price spread is from $2 per Kg. to  $3 per Kg. fo r  
20s count, and from $2.3 per Kg. to $4 per Kg. fo r  30s count. Thus 
fo r  the evidence from Figure (9.2) to be conclusive, the yarn counts 
and q u a lit ies  being compared would be required. Nevertheless, i t  is
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Total Cost of Yarn in S elected  Countries  
and for Plant B in Ghana, 1985. 
Figure 9.2.
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possible to conclude tha t Plant B (and by inference, other plants in 
Ghana) is expected to have s ig n if ic a n t ly  higher yarn manufacturing 
costs a l l  things being equal.
When yarn manufacturing costs, in do lla rs  per Kilogramme, 
are s p l i t  in to  overheads, cotton cost, and waste, as in Figure (9 .3), 
Plant B's overheads, at 1.1 are found to be roughly twice the size of 
Korea's, at 0.6. Plant B also has the highest cotton cost, at 1.9, 
while India has the lowest, at 1.2. The cost of waste varies from .2 
fo r  Plant B to about .1 fo r  the res t.
Thus, i f  Plant B is to achieve a reduction in yarn
manufacturing costs, i t  w i l l  have to improve i ts  raw material ( i .e  
cotton) sourcing, as well as cut down i ts  overheads.
9.4 .2 . Fabric Manufacturing Costs.
Figure (9.4) is a stack Figure comparing fab r ic
manufacturing cost fo r  Plant B in 1989 with the fa b r ic  manufacturing 
cost in USA, Germany, India, and Korea, fo r  1985. Although th is  is 
not s t r i c t l y  a l ike  with l ike  comparison, as f i r s t l y ,  costs are not 
being compared fo r  the same year, and secondly, the q u a l i ty  of the 
d if fe re n t fa b r ic  being compared is unknown, an ind ica tion of where 
Plant B's cost is in comparison to developed (USA, Germany), newly 
developed (Korea), and developing (India) countries can s t i l l  be 
obtained.
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Cost of Yarn in Selected Countries 
and for Plant B in Ghana, 1985. 
Figure 9.3.
Dollars/Kg
1.5
0.5
I
zzn
M J m J
Plant B USA Germany India Korea
Overheads  Cotton Waste
Source:Data for Plant B from 1990 
Questionnaire, other data from 
Production Cost Comparison (1986).
240
Total C ost of Fabric in P lant B (1989)  
and Se lec ted  C ountries  (1985).  
Figure 9.4.
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Plant B's cost, at approximately 1 $/yard, is s im ila r to 
those of USA and Germany. India and Korea's costs are approximately 
0.75 $/yard; 25 percent less. From Figure (9 .5 ), which is a 
sided-by-side bar chart of costs, shows that Plant B has a higher 
waste cost than the other countries. Labour cost, at 0.1 $/yd, while 
being lower than that of USA (0.27 $/yd.) and Germany (0.21 $/yd), is 
higher than fo r  India (0.04 $/yd) and Korea (0.05 $/yd).
E le c t r ic i ty  cost per yard fo r  Plant B are the highest 
amongst the f iv e  samples. Yarn manufacturing costs and raw material 
costs vary considerably. India and Korea have the lowest yarn 
manufacturing cost at approximately 0.13 $/yd. while Plant B, USA, 
and Germany have yarn manufacturing costs of ranging from 0.16-0.17 
$/kg. Raw material cost is lowest fo r  India (0.22 $/yd), followed by 
USA (A (A (0.25 $/yd), and Korea and Plant B (both at 0.28 $/yd).
Thus, i f  Plant B is to reduce i ts  fa b r ic  manufacturing cost, 
i t  w i l l  have to f i r s t l y ,  improve i ts  raw material sourcing. Secondly, 
i t  w i l l  have to cut down on the amount of wastage that occurs, and 
th i r d ly  (and importantly) i t  w i l l  have to f ind  a way to increase 
labour p roduc tiv ity  and thus reduce labour costs to Indian and Korean 
levels. I t  w i l l  also have to consume e le c t r ic i t y  more e f f ic ie n t ly ,  
and perhaps press fo r  a review of e le c t r ic i t y  supply charges.
The a b i l i t y  of Plant B and the other plants in the Ghanaian 
te x t i le  sector to reduce th e ir  costs and increase th e ir
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Cost of Fabric in Plant B (1989) 
and Selected Countries (1985). 
Figure 9.5.
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competitiveness w i l l  depend c ru c ia l ly  on th e ir  capacity to adapt to 
the new libe ra l ised  climate. This in turn w i l l  depend to some extent 
on th e ir  adeptness at improving th e ir  productive e ff ic ie ncy  ( i .e  
technical and a lloca tive  e f f ic ie n cy ) .  An attempt to estimate th is  is 
made below by estimating the change in th e ir  technical e ff ic iency  
over the pre- and post- trade l ib e ra l is a t io n  period.
9.5. Endogenous Costs.
The endogenous costs of the firms are now considered. These 
include: labour cost; raw material cost; e ff ic ie ncy  of raw material
use; e ff ic ie ncy  of fu e l,  power, and water use; and technical and
a lloca tive  e ff ic iency .
9.5.1. Labour: Price and Productiv ity .
As shown in Figures (9.4) and (9.5) above, Plant B's labour 
cost per yard is higher than in India or Korea. But, as shown in
Figure (4.14) of Chapter (4), hourly wages ( i . e  labour price) in
Ghanaian te x t i le s  are much lower than in the USA and Germany, and
they are at least ha lf the rates in India and Korea. Thus, the
re la t iv e ly  high labour costs per yard exhibited by p lant B means that 
plant B's labour p roduc tiv ity  is lower than Ind ia 's  and Korea's 
p roduc tiv ity . This also implies tha t the labour p roduc tiv ity  of the
other te x t i le  m il ls  surveyed is also lower than the p roduc tiv ity  in
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India and Korea since, as can be seen from Figure (9.10), Plant B has 
one of the lowest labour to output ra t ios  (implying that plant B's 
labour p roduc tiv ity  is one of the highest amongst the Ghanaian 
te x t i le  f irm s).
9.5 .2 . Raw Material Cost/Quality and Efficiency of Use.
Raw materials used by some of the te x t i le  firms include 
cotton, dyestuffs, polyester, and viscose. The discussion 
concentrates on cotton as i t  is the main raw materia l.
Figure (9.3) shows that Plant B's cotton cost in 1985 was 
the highest amongst the USA, Germany, India, and Korea. But, as 
indicated in Figure (3.3) of Chapter (3), the Ghanaian l i n t  cotton 
price did f a l l  sharply from a level of nearly twice the world price 
in 1985, to a level which was marginally lower than world price in 
1987. This price d i f fe re n t ia l  was also maintained during the 1987- 
1990 period. Thus i t  would i n i t i a l l y  appear that local m il ls  are able 
to purchase cotton at a marginally lower price than the world cotton 
price. But, as also pointed out in Section (3.6) of Chapter (3) th is  
is not e n t i re ly  to the benefit of local m il ls  due to the 
de terio ra ting  q u a li ty  of the Ghanaian cotton. This has been 
a ttr ibu ted  to the poor ginning process which caused f ib re  damage.
In terms of e f f ic ie n t  use of raw materials, an ind ication of 
th is  can be seen from the level of raw material waste in
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manufacturing. Figures (9.3) and (9 .4), show that Plant B had the 
highest cost of waste in both the spinning and weaving processes as 
compared to a l l  the other countries examined.
9.5 .3 . Efficiency of Fuel, Power, and Hater Use.
Fuel and water are required mainly in the f in ish in g  
process. The steam required in the dyeing process is generated by 
bo ilers which burn fu e l.  Water is required fo r  washing, bleaching and 
dying.
Figure (9.5) shows tha t e le c t r ic i t y  cost per yard was 
highest fo r  plant B in 1989 as compared to the other countries' costs
fo r  1985. But in Table (9 .1), e le c t r ic i t y  price fo r  the f iv e  firms
shown averaged $0.04/kWh in 1992. This is comparable with USA price 
of $ .049/kWh, and Ind ia 's  1985 price of $0.04/kWh, as can be seen 
from Table (9.2) which gives l ig h t  fue l o i l  prices ( i .e  fue l with a 
density of between 0.8-0.9 m t/k l,  and a c a lo r i f ic  value of between 
10100-10350 kca l/kg .) and e le c t r ic i t y  prices fo r  selected cases. I t  
must be stressed, before making any inferences from these data, that
th is  is not an e n t i re ly  comparable comparison. This is because
compared costs are not fo r  s im ila r years, and also because Figure 
(9 .5), on cost of fa b r ic ,  does not indicate whether the same qua lity , 
or width of fabrics are being compared. Nevertheless there are 
indications that Plant B is not as e f f ic ie n t  with e le c t r ic i t y  use as 
India or the USA. I f  th is  is the case, then plant B has cost cutt ing
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Electricity Prices for Textile Firms (1992). 
Table 9.1.
Firm C Firm E Firm G Firm H Firm J
(a) Units (kWh) 10,506,000 10,848,000 1,961,000 15,439,100 1,866,000
(b) 1992 Cedls/Unlt 14.00 14.00 14.00 14.00 14.00
(c) Max. Demand: KVA 2500 3200 824 3000 1530
(d) 1992 Cadls/KVA 1,300.00 1,300.00 1,300.00 1,300.00 1,300.00
(a) MD,Ced/yr:d*12*c 39 ,000,000 49 ,920,000 12,854,4000 46 ,800,000 23 ,868,000
(f) MD,Ced/kWh:e/a 3.71 4.60 6.56 3.03 12.79
(g) Tot. Price: b+f 17.71 18.60 20.56 17.03 26.79
(h) Tot. In $ 0.043 0.0448 0.050 0.041 0.065
Source: 1991/92 fieldwork.
Note: All units and max. demand figures are for 
1989, except Firm H which Is for 1988.
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potentia l i f  e le c t r ic i t y  is used more e f f ic ie n t ly .
No figures on the cost of water or fue l per yard of fab r ic  
are ava ilable, therefore an inference on the e ff ic ie n cy  of th e ir  use 
cannot be made at th is  stage.
9.5.4. Summary of Results of Technical Inefficiency Estimation.
The resu lts  of the technical ine ff ic iency  estimation made in 
Chapter (6) are summarised in Figure (9 .6). This shows two d is t in c t  
patterns: a steeply r is in g  trend in technical ine ff ic iency  in the
pre-ERP ( i . e  pre-1983) period of 1979-83, and a generally fa l l in g
trend in technical ine ff ic iency  in the post-ERP period of 1984-89.
Technical ine ff ic iency , on the whole, peaked in 1983 with
three f irm s ' (B, E, and G) ine ff ic iency  estimated at over 30 percent
fo r  that year. This means that these firms could have increased th e ir  
outputs by over t h i r t y  percent given the same quantity of cap ita l and 
labour employed. But the foreign exchange scarc ity , which became 
acute in 1983, meant that firms faced shortages of imported foreign 
inputs, equipment and spare parts, and thus had reduced outputs, but, 
at the same time, they did not seem to reduce th e ir  labour force.
Even i f  they had been able or w i l l in g  to do th is ,  they would s t i l l
have been le f t  with id le  plant and machinery whose value was
deterio ra ting  with time, even i f  they were not in operation.
With the introduction of the ERP in 1983, the removal of the
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foreign exchange bottleneck mixed with the e ffec t of competition from 
foreign imports meant that firms now had to compete, but they also 
had some of the conditions, such as foreign exchange a v a i la b i l i t y ,  
they required to be competitive. This is re flec ted  by the aggregate 
ine ff ic iency  value shown in Figure (9 .7). This shows tha t the stacked 
values of ine ff ic iency  (excluding f irm  H's values) in 1989 was nearly 
ha lf i t s  1980 value, and also nearly four times less the than 1983 
peak value.
Figures (9 .8), (9 .9), and (9.10) give the cap ita l labour
ra t io s ,  the cap ita l output ra t io s ,  and the labour output ra t ios  fo r  
the 1979-89 period, with the exception of the values fo r  f irm  B ( fo r  
1979) and f irm  H ( fo r  1979-81).
Table (8.5) of Chapter (8) shows the ine ff ic iency  estimate 
fo r  f irm  B standing at 6.2 percent in 1980, r is in g  to a peak of 31.8 
percent in 1983, and then fa l l in g  s teadily  to 11.8 percent by 1989. 
As can be seen from Figure (9 .6 ), th is  f irm , although being amongst 
the most e f f ic ie n t  firms in terms of technical e ff ic ie n cy  in the 
1980-81 period, was the second most in e f f ic ie n t  f i rm  in 1983. I t  can 
also be seen from th is  that i t s  post-83 recovery has been the 
slowest. This is re flected in th is  f irm  having the highest average 
ine ff ic iency  value in the 1984-89 period, as can be calculated from 
Table (8,5) of Chapter (8). An explanation fo r  th is  firms slower 
recovery can be seen in Figures (9 .8), (9.9) and (9.10). While i ts  
cap ita l- labour ra t io s  and cap ita l output ra t io s  have been the 
largest, especially  in the 1984-89 period, i t s  labour-output ra tios
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Capital Labour Ratios in Ghanaian
Textile Firms: 1979-89.
Figure 9.8.
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Capital Output Ratios in Ghanaian
Textile Firms: 1979-89.
Figure 9.9.
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Labour Output Ratios in Ghanaian
Textile Firms: 1979-89.
Figure 9.10.
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have been some of the lowest in the sample fo r  tha t period. This 
means tha t with the shortage o f foreign exchange in 1982-83, th is  
f irm  had to reduce i t s  output, but i t  s t i l l  had, as mentioned in 
Chapter (5), the most modern, and thus expensive, cap ita l stock. This 
is re flected by the larger cap ita l-output ra t io s .  On the other hand, 
th is  f irm  has managed to keep i t s  labour-output ra t ios  low in 
re la t ion  to the other f irm s, and seems to have layed-off workers when 
i ts  production decreased, and controlled wage increases when output 
picked up.
The best performing f irm , in terms of improvement in 
technical e f f ic ie n cy  in the period 1983-89, was f irm  G. I ts  
ine ff ic iency  value dropped from 30.6 percent in 1983 to only 4.0 
percent in 1984; a d ifference of 26.6 percent.
I t  can be concluded that with an estimated average
ine ff ic iency  value fo r  the six largest Ghanaian te x t i le  m il ls  in 1989 
standing at 7.7 percent ( i . e .  the average of the six ine ff ic iency  
values), and the lowest value being 4.0 percent ( fo r  f irm  G), 
technical e f f ic ie ncy  has responded favourably to the competitive 
free-trade market i t  now finds i t s e l f  in. Some firms such as, B, E, 
and J, with ine ff ic iency  levels of 11.8 percent, 12.6 percent, and 
8.4 percent, s t i l l  have some way to go in reducing th e ir  ine ff ic iency  
values to a sub-five percent leve l, th is  being roughly the technical 
ine ff ic iency  level attained by firms C, G, and H.
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9.6. Exogenous Costs.
.Exogenous costs, as mentioned above, are costs imposed on 
firms e ither by monopolistic inputs suppliers, or by governments. 
These include: fu e l ,  power and water prices; d ire c t taxes (income tax 
paid by employees, and company tax which companies pay on p ro f i ts ) ;  
ind irec t taxes (such as sales tax, raw materials tax) and other taxes 
which a ffec t f i rm 's  costs in d ire c t ly ,  such as taxes on fu e l,  power 
and water consumption. Another form of cost reduction can be achieved 
as a resu lt  of exchange rate devaluation. This produces a decrease in 
cost re la t iv e  to world prices as demonstrated in Section (9.6.3) 
below.
9.6 .1 . E lec tric ity , Fuel, and Water, Price/Tax.
Indus tr ia l e le c t r ic i t y  rates in Ghana are worked out by 
adding a "maximum demand" (MD) ra ting  to the units or k i low att hours 
(kWh) consumed. These units are recorded by a meter. The MD ra ting , 
is measured in KVAs, and re f le c ts  the power requirement of a m i l l  at 
maximum production capacity. So, even i f  only one un it  of e le c t r ic i t y  
is consumed, the f u l l  MD charge is incurred fo r  the month. This is 
therefore punishing firms when they reduce th e ir  e le c t r ic i t y  
consumption. Table (9.1) works out the e ffec t ive  cost per un it of 
e le c t r ic i t y  fo r  firms C, E, G, H, and J. This is done by spreading 
the annual charge on maximum demand onto the number of units 
consumed. Thus, f irm  H, which seems to have a high un it  consumption 
re la t ive  to i t s  MD ra ting , has a re la t iv e ly  low e ffec t ive  un it charge
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of $0,041 ( i . e  low to ta l  charge per u n i t ) ,  while, f irm  J has a higher 
e ffec t ive  un it  charge of $0,065 because i t  consumed a re la t iv e ly  
small amount of units in re la t ion  to i ts  MD ra t ing .
Table (9.2) compares l ig h t  fue l ( i . e .  fue l o f 0.85mt/kl. and 
net c a lo r i f ic  value of 10350 kca l/kg .) and e le c t r ic i t y  prices in 
seven countries. In terms of fue l prices per thousand l i t r e s ,  I ta ly  
and Portugal, with prices of $761 and $646 respective ly, have two of 
the highest prices in Europe. This is pa rt ly  because I ta ly  levies a 
64.5 percent tax on l ig h t  fue l fo r  indus tr ia l use, while Portugal's 
tax is 56.3 percent. On the other hand, India ($191), Canada ($216), 
Germany ($270) and the USA ($184) a l l  have fue l prices below the $300 
mark. This is mainly because the taxes levied on l ig h t  fuel fo r  
indus tr ia l use are low, or because no taxes are levied at a l l .  For 
example, India applies a 4 percent tax, Germany applies a 15.4 
percent tax, while Canada, and the USA levy no tax at a l l .  Ghana's 
fue l price of $395, while not being as high as I t a ly 's  and Portugal's 
price, is nevertheless more than twice Ind ia 's  and the USA's price. 
This large d i f fe re n t ia l  is mainly a ttr ibu tab le  to the tax levied by 
the government.
Table (9.2) also shows that the price of e le c t r ic i t y  per 
K ilowatt Hour in I ta ly  ($0,097), Portugal ($0,128), and Germany 
($0,088) is re la t iv e ly  high as compared to the price in India 
($0.04), Canada ($0,038) and the USA ($0,049). One of the reasons fo r 
these large differences is the taxes levied on e le c t r ic i t y  in these 
countries. Tax in I ta ly ,  Portugal and Germany is 14.2 percent, 7.4
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Light Fuel Oil Price, and Electricity Prices 
for Industry in Selected Cases (1991) 
Table 9.2.
Light Fuel in 
US$/1000 litres
Electricity in 
US$/kWh.
Italy 761 0.097
Portugal 646 0.128
India 191 (1990) 0.040 (1985)
Canada 216 0.038
Germany 270 0.088
USA 184 0.049
Ghana 395 0.063 (Firm J)
Source: Ghana 1991 fieldwork, other* IEA (1992).
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percent, and 7.6 percent respective ly, while tax in the USA is 
between 2-6 percent depending on the State. Firm J 's  price of $0,063 
is 58 percent higher than Ind ia 's  price, but the other te x t i le  firms 
in Ghana experience e le c t r ic i t y  prices of $0.04-$0.05/kWh (see Table 
7.1). The reasons fo r  th is  difference has been discussed above.
Water rates in Ghana are shown in Table (9 .3 ). These are on 
a m u lt i- t ie re d  progressive basis and thus penalise the bulk use of 
water. United Kingdom rates, obtained from Thames Water (1992), are 
fixed at $2.78 per thousand gallons, while the top rate in Ghana is 
$3.33/1000 gallons. Thus, water rates in Ghana are re la t iv e ly  high, 
and the progressive nature of the t a r i f f  means that the obvious 
economies of scale involved in the purchase of large volumes of water 
is not passed on to the consumer.
9.6 .2 . Taxes.
This section looks at the rates and possible d isincentive 
e ffects  and added costs which d ire c t taxes (on employee incomes, and 
company p ro f i ts )  and ind irec t taxes (on sales, and raw materials) 
place on Ghanaian te x t i le s .
9 .6 .2 .1 . Direct and Indirect Tax Incidence.
Studies on the re d is tr ib u t iv e  effects of taxes in developing
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Price of Water in Ghanaian Industry (1992).
Table 9.3.
Cecils per 1000 Gals, 
per Month
$ per 1000 Gals, 
per Month
0-3,000 gals. 300.00 .73
3,000-10,000 gals. 732.00 1.76
10,000-25,000 gals. 1,040.00 2.51
25,000-50,000 gals. 1,200.00 2.89
50,000-100,000 gals. 1,250.00 3.01
over 100,000 gals. 1,380.00 3.33
Source: (1991/92) fieldwork.
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countries calculate annual tax incidence on the basis of assumptions 
on the s h if t in g  of the d if fe re n t  taxes onto consumers, producers, and 
other groups (see, fo r  example, Musgrave et a l .  (1951); G illespie 
(1980); Pechman and Okner (1974); Musgrave, Caves, and Leonard 
(1974); Browning (1978)). The f iv e  main kinds of taxes usually 
considered are income, corporate, sales and inputs, property, and 
social security  taxes. Each tax has side effects  on sources (cap ita l 
income, labour income, or transfers) or uses (savings and expenditure 
patterns by households) or both that re f le c t  how the tax is assumed 
to be s p a t ia l ly  or f u l l y  borne. In the l i te ra tu re ,  the terms 
"s h i f t in g  assumptions", and "incidence assumptions" re fe r to the 
methods adopted to a llocate tax burdens.
S h a l l iz i  and Squire (1988) state that taxation, in addition 
to re d is tr ib u t in g  resources from the private sector to the public 
sector, changes the structure of incentives. For example, taxes on 
company p ro f i ts  generate revenue but, by reducing the return to 
investment, they discourage capita l accumulation and hence growth. 
S ha ll iz i  and Squire also point out that since, fo r  administrative 
reasons, tax bases in Sub-Saharan A fr ica are re la t iv e ly  small, there 
is a strong presumption that rates of taxation, and hence the 
economic cost of taxation, are high.
In the case of a tax on the production of a commodity, we 
can d istingu ish between the e ffec t on the p ro f i ts  of the producer, on 
the incomes of those who supply factors or intermediate products, and 
on the consumers of the product. To the extent tha t the price of the
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product r ises , we say that the tax has been sh ifted  forward onto 
consumers, since th e i r  real income is ,  other things equal, reduced. 
I f  producers p r o f i t  margins are cut as a resu lt of taxes in order to 
re s is t  increasing the price of th e ir  products, then we could say that 
the tax is sh ifted  backwards onto producers.
The incidence of taxation can be described using the pa rt ia l 
equilibrium approach of Atkinson and S t ig l i t z  (1987). Even though
th is  approach has i ts  l im ita t io n s , i t  is useful in pointing out the
possible e ffects  of taxation on producer costs. The p a rt ia l 
equilibrium approach is i l lu s t ra te d  in Figure (9.11). I f  the
assumption is made that a te x t i le  f irm  produces fabrics using 
machines which i t  cannot use fo r  any other purpose, and i t  also uses 
labour (L) that is in pe rfec t ly  e las tic  supply at a wage (w), and i f  
F(L) is the production function (where F '> 0 ,F "<0 ),  then in 
competitive equilibrium pF'= w, where (p) is the price of output. 
This generates the supply curve in Figure (9.11). A demand curve of 
the usual shape is also shown.
I f  a tax is imposed on the consumption of fabrics  ( i . e  a
sales tax ) , the new equilibrium w i l l  be at PI. The a f te r  price tax is 
above the old equilibrium price PI, but not by the f u l l  amount of the 
tax, i .e .  the distance P to price a fte r  tax is less than PI to price 
a fte r  tax. This means that some of the tax on consumption is borne by 
the producer, i .e .  the tax is p a r t ia l ly  sh ifted backwards.
Shah and Whalley (1991) point out that when considered as a
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Tax Incidence: Partial Equilibrium. 
Figure 9.11
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Source: Atkinson and Stiglitz (1987).
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group, ind irec t taxes are almost un iversa lly  assumed to be shifted 
forward to consumers of taxed commodities. With few exceptions (Radhu 
(1965)), backward s h i f t in g  and incomplete forward s h if t in g  have not 
received much a tten tion . Thus, f u l l  forward s h i f t in g  of sales taxes 
at the manufacturer level is generally assumed even though we can see 
from our p a r t ia l  equilibrium analysis that there can be p a r t ia l
backward s h i f t in g  of taxes onto producers, and in an open economy
with foreign competition producers ty p ic a l ly  cut in to th e ir  p r o f i t  
margins to reduce the e ffe c t of taxes on th e ir  product price. This, 
fo r  example, is demonstrated by Jeetun's (1978) study of Pakistan 
which finds only 35 percent forward s h if t in g  from increases in the 
sales tax at the manufacturer leve l. A common assumption when looking 
at the incidence of company tax, as stated by Shah and Whalley
(1991), is tha t 50 percent of the tax is borne by the owners of the
cap ita l,  and 50 percent is sh ifted forward to consumers. Personal 
income taxes are assumed to f a l l  on the ind iv iduals who pay them.
9.6.2.2 . Taxes in Textiles Sector
Figure (9.12) shows the marginal rates of personal income
tax fo r  Ghana and Kenya. The two cases d i f fe r  with respect to the
standard exemption rate and the degree of progress iv ity . The standard 
exemption level in Ghana is much lower than in Kenya. Thus, in Ghana, 
taxation fo r  single persons begins when th e ir  income exceeds 70 
percent of GDP per capita, while in Kenya, the corresponding f igure
is almost twice GDP per capita. Also, as pointed out by S ha ll iz i  and
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Rates of Personal Income Tax in 
Ghana and Kenya (Marginal Tax Rates). 
Figure 9.12.
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Squire (1988), since e ffec t ive  co llec t ion  is usually confined to 
large scale manufacturing, a low exemption (as in Ghana) implies 
taxation of numerous, low-paid employees.
In terms of p rogress iv ity , i t  is noted from Figure (9.12) 
that marginal tax rates in Kenya are lower than those in Ghana fo r  
a l l  incomes up to 60 times GDP per capita. According to S h a ll iz i  and 
Squire, th is  suggests that the e ffec t of taxation on incentives to 
work and save are much more severe in Ghana than in Kenya. They f ind  
that the in terests of improved administration and economic e ff ic iency  
are better served, and a reasonable degree of equity is preserved by 
a tax structure corresponding to that of Kenya, with a combination of 
high exemption and slowly increasing marginal rates, rather than that 
of Ghana.
From the above i t  can thus be concluded tha t i f  taxes on 
employees' incomes are reduced then firms can benefit from a certain 
proportion of th is  reduction by saving on labour wages, and employees 
w i l l  benefit by an increase in take home pay (without necessarily 
having th e ir  post-tax wages a lte red). This can be demonstrated using 
Figure (9.11) where a reduction in income tax reduces the wage paid 
to workers (by moving the price a fte r  tax point down towards P) and 
increases the take home pay of workers (by moving PI up towards P). 
This means that the w indfa ll gain in income due to a reduction in 
income tax rates can benefit both employer and employee. As at 1991, 
a typ ica l worker earning 17,600 cedis per month paid 1,600 cedis 
income tax, i .e .  approximately 9 percent of his or her income
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(Figures from 1991 Questionnaire).
Company tax rates in Ghana, as obtained from 1991/92 
Questionnaire, are fixed at 35 percent of chargeable income. Sales 
tax on f in ished goods fo r  each year in the period 1985 to 1990, also 
obtained from 1991/92 Questionnaire, was 10%, 10%, 20%, 25%, 22.5%,
22.5% respective ly, and excise duty fo r  each year in the same period
was 15%, 15%, fo r  the f i r s t  2 years and was removed completely from
1987 onwards. Tax on raw materials varies depending on the type of
import ( i . e .  whether f ib re ,  or dyestuffs) in 1985 i t  was in the
region of 30 percent, declin ing to 15 percent by 1988, and 10 percent 
by 1990. A reduction in any or a l l  of these rates means a reduction
in f i rm 's  costs, i .e .  a reduction in these rates means a w indfa ll
gain to the f irm  and a loss of revenue to the Treasury.
9.6.3 Exchange Rate Devaluation and Fiscal/Monetary Contraction.
Exchange rate devaluation can have a favourable e ffec t on
f irm 's  competitiveness i f  i t  is introduced with the r ig h t
fiscal/monetary contraction po licy .
In considering the effects of a devaluation, we fo llow  the 
approach of the Meade-Salter-Swan model as stated in World Bank Study 
(1990). We assume a small open economy which is a price taker in 
in ternationa l product markets. I f  the domestic re la t iv e  price of 
exportables to importables (Px/Pm) is f ixed , they can be regarded as
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a composite commodity - tradables. The domestic price of tradables 
(Pt ) w i l l  be determined by the world price and the exchange rate, and 
since, by d e f in i t io n  nontradables are not traded in world markets, 
th e ir  price (Pn) is determined sole ly by domestic supply and demand.
The World Bank Study points out that the analy tica l 
framework must incorporate both expenditure-switching po lic ies  ( i .e  
depreciating the exchange ra te) and expenditure reducing po lic ies 
( i .e .  fiscal/monetary contraction as shown by the budget balance 
performance ind ica to r) . Depreciation of the real exchange ra te, 
Pn/Pt> induces a s h i f t  or switch in production from nontradables to 
tradables. This switching po licy therefore a ffects  the product 
markets by changing the re la t ive  price regime in favour of tradables. 
This is i l lu s t ra te d  in Figure (9.13) which shows the production 
p o s s ib i l i t ie s  of nontradables and the composite tradables as the 
curve N*T*. In the i n i t i a l  d isequilibrium position, production is at 
X and expenditure is at Y, re f le c t in g  the fac t tha t supply equals 
demand in the nontradables market but there is a tradables ( i .e .  
external) d e f ic i t  of OY. A po licy of reducing absorption from OA to 
OB (measured in nontradables) and exchange rate devaluation which 
sh if ts  the price line  from AA' to BB', w i l l  restore equilibrium with 
both production and expenditure s h if t in g  to 7. This means that a 
deprecation in the real exchange rate induces resource s h if ts  into 
the tradables sectors (exports and imports).
This analysis points to a key element in the switching 
strategy: namely, governments must be able to change the underlying
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Effect of Exchange Rate Devaluation. 
Figure 9.13
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structure of re la t iv e  prices, i . e . ,  change the real exchange rate. 
But, governments can only manipulate nominal instruments such as the 
money supply and the nominal exchange ra te , and whether the 
application of these instruments leads to the desired change in 
re la t ive  prices or not w i l l  depend on the accompanying macroeconomic 
po lic ies  and the s truc tu ra l characteris tics of the economy. I f ,  as 
Edwards (1988) points out, these lead to an increase in Pn, the 
depreciation in the real exchange rate w i l l  be e ithe r reduced or 
prevented altogether. Factors which lead to an increase in pn include 
a continued fiscal/monetary expansion; real wage expansion; and the 
use of imported intermediate inputs.
Figure (9.14) p lots Ghana's nominal exchange rates and 
Purchasing power p a r i ty  (PPP) fo r  the period 1963-1990 indexed at 
1963=100. 1963 was chosen as the index year because according to
data, from Pick (1972), on the "black market" exchange rate in 1963 
as compared to the o f f i c ia l  exchange rate fo r  tha t year, obtained 
from IMF's IFS (1983), the o f f i c ia l  exchange rate was not found to be 
s ig n if ic a n t ly  overvalued in 1963. Thus looking at Figure (9.14), a 
sharply f a l l in g  trend in both nominal exchange rates and PPP is 
observed fo r  the period 1963-1983, while a le ve ll in g  o f f  in both 
rates occurred in the 1984-1990 period. PPP was higher than nominal 
exchange rates from 1964 to 1971, and also fo r  the period 1973-1983. 
I t  can be seen from Figure (9.14a) (indexed at 1963=100) that both 
values converge closely in the 1984 to 1990 period.
Thus, while devaluation of nominal exchange rates pre-1983
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Nominal Exchange Rates and Purchasing 
Power Parity (PPP) in Ghana: 1963=100.
Figure 9.14.
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Nominal Exchange Rates and Purchasing 
Power Parity in Ghana: 1963=100. 
Figure 9.14a.
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has brought these rates in l ine  with PPP, and has meant that domestic 
prices re f le c t  true world prices, the po ten tia l benefits of a 
devaluation on competitiveness of local manufacturers (which was 
discussed above) s t i l l  remain. This is discussed in the section 
below.
9.7. S e n s it iv i ty  Analysis o f Cost
In th is  section, the e ffec t of various combinations of cost 
cu tt ing  measures on the se ll ing  price ( i .e .  price including p r o f i t  
margin and sales and excise taxes i f  any) of Real Wax pr in ts  and 
Im ita tion Java p r in ts  (African p r in ts )  is investigated using data 
obtained during the 1991 f ie ld t r ip .
The possible cost reductions are based on the findings of 
the above sections of th is  chapter, and they are as fo llows: In terms 
of fue l price, a 30 percent reduction in Ghana's 1991 price w i l l  
s t i l l  leave i t  higher than the price of fue l in India (1990), Canada, 
Germany, and the USA. A 30 percent cut in Ghana's 1991 e le c t r ic i t y  
charges w i l l  bring them roughly in l ine  with charges in India (1985), 
Canada, and the USA. The highest water rates in Ghana, charged fo r  
re la t iv e ly  high consumption, are 20 percent higher than B r it ish  
rates. Technical ine ff ic iency  in the period 1985-89 was in the range 
of 5% to 15%. Thus a 5% improvement in costs due to technical 
ine ff ic iency  reduction is used in the s e n s i t iv i ty  analysis.
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The income tax paid by a typ ica l worker was found to add up 
to 9 percent of his or her income. Thus, i f  an assumption of a 5 
percent reduction in income tax is made, and assuming, also, that 50
percent of the tax is borne by the employee, and 50 percent by the
employer (which is an assumption usually made when investigating 
company tax incidence and not income taxes) then the f irm  w i l l  
benefit by a 2.5% reduction in labour cost.
Other po licy  e ffects  investigated below include: an exchange 
rate devaluation of 30%; reduction of raw material tax to 5% or 0%; 
reduction of sales tax to 15% or 0%; elim inating excise duty.
The data used is fo r  plant (J) producing Im ita tion  Java 
Prints and plant (A) producing Real Wax p r in ts ,  both fo r  the period 
1985-1990, plant (H), fo r  1986, producing Im ita tion Wax p r in ts ,  and 
plant (H), fo r  1986, producing Real Wax p r in ts . The analysis involves 
investigating the e ffec t on the ex-factory price of various 
combinations of some or a l l  of the po lic ies discussed above. The raw
results  are given in Appendix (2). From th is ,  i t  can be seen that the
calculations were as fo llows:
Step ( i ) :  The do lla r per meter price of imported raw
materials was introduced. This was m u lt ip l ied  by the d o l la r  to cedi 
exchange rate to give the cedi per 12 yards (10.968 meters) price 
(see (1) in spreadsheet) of imported raw materia ls. Thus, when a 
devaluation is introduced, i t  increases the cedi price of the 
imported raw materia l. The e ffe c t of a devaluation on imported
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packing materials was ignored to reduce complexity as th e ir  cost was 
re la t iv e ly  small. The percentage duty on imported raw materials was 
m u lt ip l ied  by the cedi price of imported raw materials (the duty on 
imported packing materials being ignored fo r  s im p l ic i ty ) ,  to give the 
cedi value of the duty (see (2 )) .  Total cost of raw materials (9) was 
obtained by adding to ta l  cost of imported materials (5) to local 
costs (6), (7), (8).
Step ( i i ) :  Cost of labour (10) was calculated by m ult ip ly ing 
the percentage reduction in labour cost due to a reduction in income 
tax by the d irec t labour cost. Fuel o i l  (11a), power ( l i b ) ,  and water 
(11c), were calculated by m ult ip ly ing the actual cost of fu e l,  power, 
and water by th e ir  corresponding percentage cost reductions. Here, a 
devaluation is not assumed to have a e ffec t on the cost of spares and 
replacement. This is not e n t ire ly  so as some spares are imported and 
thus th e ir  cost would be affected by a devaluation, but th is  is 
ignored fo r  s im p lic i ty ,  since the imported to local manufactured 
spares ra t io  is unknown. Thus, materials and labour cost per 12 yards 
(12) was obtained by summing (9), (10), and sum (ll), and to ta l  cost 
(17a) was obtained by adding (12), (13), (14), (15) and (16). The 
to ta l cost including e ff ic ie ncy  improvement (17b) was calculated by 
m u lt ip ly ing  the percentage improvement in technical e f f ic iency  by 
to ta l cost. The grand to ta l  (19) was obtained by adding (17b) to bank 
charges and in te res t (18), and a f te r  adding a 10% p r o f i t  margin to 
the grand to ta l ,  the ex-factory price (21) was obtained.
Step ( i i i ) :  The excise duty (22) was obtained by m ult ip ly ing 
the percentage excise tax with the ex-factory price (21). The sales
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tax (23) was obtained by m ult ip ly ing the percentage sales tax with 
the sum of excise duty (22) and ex-factory price (21). F in a lly ,  the 
ex-factory price plus tax (24) was the sum of (21), (22), and (23).
A summary of the results  is given in Table (9.4) fo r  f irm
(C), Table (9.5) fo r  f irm  (H), Table (9.6) fo r  f irm  (A), and Table 
(9.7) fo r  f irm  (J). These tables show the e ffe c t of various 
scenarios on the $ per meter price, and on the cedi per meter price, 
and also the percentage change from the actual $ per meter price and 
cedi per meter price. The f i r s t  scenario, shows the actual, unchanged
values. Scenario (2), is a 30% devaluation only. The th i rd  scenario,
Scenario (3), imposes a 5% raw material tax, and a 15% sales tax. 
Scenario (4), has a 5% raw material tax, a 15% sales tax, a 30% 
reduction in fuel and power charges, a 20% in water rates, and a 5% 
improvement in technical e ff ic iency . Scenario (5), involves a l l  the 
po lic ies of the preceding case plus a 30% devaluation, and a 2.5% 
reduction in labour cost due to an income tax reduction. Scenario (6) 
involves only a 2.5% reduction due to income tax.
The e ffec t of a devaluation, seen by looking at Scenario 
(2), is to reduce the $/meter price (thus making goods more 
competitive, at least in foreign markets) but to increase the cedi/ 
meter price. For example, a 30% devaluation causes a 10.2% decrease 
in f irm  (J 's )  1987 $/meter price , but the cedi/meter price fo r  that 
year rises by 16.5%.
276
Pr
ice
 
of 
Firm
 
(C
) 
Pr
od
uc
ing
 
IM
I. 
JA
VA
 
Pr
in
ts
, a
nd
 
Re
su
lt 
of 
Co
st 
Cu
ttin
g 
M
ea
su
re
s.
Ta
ble
 
9.
4.
to
d
CO
LO
CO
a >
o
CO
o
■v_
(0
C
05
O
CO
CM
d
CO
o
CO
*in
s
S0)•s
in
T “
MVSa*
5?O
CO*o
5?
1*in
T"
VSa*£i
oin
O
CO
CD3
t>
a
a
CO
d '
O
in
s
m*£0)©
t
aeo
CO
a vs
aeoe
ae£
0)a?o
3*?o
CO
Q .a?o
S2
lO
in
c\i N -
CM
in
N -
in
in
a?
CM
in
CO
d-'
-M-
CD
CM
in
CO II a *
o tovs
o
II
I—
CO
c
a?in $
05
o
CO
ll
£
a?inl. T“
o>
3
TO
>
CO
CO
05CO
c\i
in
co
I
IV00
0 5
O'-
ID
in
d ''
N .
sO
d"
O
,£
«
I
w
o>
o >c
COJC
oa?
05inin
in
si
CO
to"
o0500
in
a>t>e
boo
''SO''<0
in
d'-
CO
+
o'-O
J
0
TO
1a
o>O)cTO
JZOa*
c  « £
0 % 0»* 1 ■§
1  II T3E nJ ©
■° & 1 ll S c  •o « c
jr  o  c  
55 © © 5  li 73 E© 05 ©
■ 8 5 = £*- 
l i t  
|  E n
8 I §
I I  |«  j  S.
277
de
cr
ea
se
 
in 
Inc
om
e 
Ta
x.
Pr
ice
 
of 
Firm
 
(H
) 
Pr
od
uc
ing
 
RE
AL
 
W
AX
 
Pr
in
ts
, a
nd
 
Re
su
lt 
of 
Co
st 
Cu
ttin
g 
M
ea
su
re
s.
Ta
ble
 
9.
5.
Sc
. 
(6
) a s
i n
Sla*
4.
50 0%
fr6£V
%
0
Sc
en
ar
io
 
(5
)
a ?
*  3  
9  1
a ?  a ?  
in
£  « Lw  ©
£  S
i^  Q
M
©  R r
S  a *  ■ o  S
0
3.
16
-2
9.
9%
4,
00
3 -vPO ''o>
° P
Sc
en
ar
io
 
(4
)
a *
*
5  a *
s P  O  
£  %  
5  *o
a *  ni n  Q .
1  *  o
S 2
3.
52
-2
2.
0%
3,
44
0
-2
2.
0%
Sc
en
ar
io
 
(3
)
rm
=5
%
,s
t=
15
%
,e
x=
0%
3.
81
i
-1
5.
6%
3,
72
1
-1
5.
6%
Sc
. 
(2
)
d=
30
% COo
-9
.7
%
5,
17
6
+ 
17
.3
%
■t—
d
CO ac
tu
al
va
lu
e
4.
52 0%
4,
41
1
0%
19
86
: 
$/
m
et
er
% 
ch
an
ge
 
ac
tu
al 
$/
m
ce
di
/m
et
er
% 
ch
an
ge
 
ac
tu
al 
c/
m
278
de
cr
ea
se
 
In 
In
co
m
e 
Ta
x.
Pri
ce
 
of 
Firm
 
(A)
 P
ro
du
cin
g 
RE
AL
 W
AX
 
Pr
int
s, 
and
 
Re
su
lt 
of 
Co
st 
Cu
ttin
g 
M
ea
su
re
s.
Ta
ble
 
9.
6.
CD^
d co
in
<0
c0)o
CO
COc0o
CO
co
CM
d
CO
o
CO
as
IO
s
1*>
as
10
%
as
LO
Ehmfrv
aso
asIO
Shw
in
as
£o>
I«%
aso
D.
►*
§£
as
1
as"
IO
as£0)
as"
i
ts £n f t
gR CO
in Q. 
E
*■ Q
S2
tl
ZW\sOP>
LOII
E
asoII
S
as"
LO
g
COII■o
re3
zre
CM
E
75
3
zra
o>D)c
CD
£o
as
re3
zra
0O)ca
£o
in
E5*
753
zm
oO)c(0
£o
as
ra3
zre
oO)cra£O
as
00
0)3
E
S
E
75
3T>re
a>o>cra
£O
as
o
re
3
zre
a>o>cre
£a
as
279
de
cr
ea
se
 
in 
In
co
m
e 
Ta
x.
Pri
ce
 
of 
Firm
 
(A)
 P
ro
du
cin
g 
RE
AL
 W
AX
 
Pr
int
s, 
and
 
Re
su
lt 
of 
Co
st 
Cu
ttin
g 
M
ea
su
re
s. 
Ta
ble
 
9.6
. 
(C
on
tin
ue
d)
.
Sc
. 
(6
)
ri
t2
.5
% N>
CO 0
%
8,
13
2
0% n.
a.
n.
a.
n.
a.
n.
a. inN-
CO 0
%
13
,9
78 0%
Sc
en
ar
io
 
(5
)
*
vO  tf}
s  g  s  =
5? gLO ffiT" fl)
v> §w* J";
in '
e  s?S. o  >P CO
o  *
8  *  10 o
S2
2.
54
-3
1.
5%
7,
23
4
-1
1.
0% n.
a.
n.
a.
n.
a.
n.
a.
2.
71
-2
7.
7%
13
,1
20 s
CDJ
Sc
en
ar
io
 
(4
)
as \Q  
§  *  
§  sS' ©  
V— "
%  g* O
*  8  in “ ■
E a*o
S2
CO
CO
-1
5.
7%
6,
85
7
-1
5.
7% n.
a.
n.
a.
n.
a.
n.
a. 00
CO
-1
5.
2%
11
,8
74
-1
5.
2%
Sc
en
ar
io
 
(3
) II 5? 
%  ©  
«" H
*  £  in «
ii a?
E m£  T“
3.
36
-9
.5
%
7,
36
1
-9
.5
%
n.
a.
n.
a. d
c n.
a.
CO
-9
.1
%
12
,7
08
-9
.1
%
Sc
. 
(2
) 6?o
CO
II
■o
COo
CO
CO
CD
1
8,
62
5
+ 
5.
9% n.
a.
n.
a.
n.
a.
n.
a.
3.
21
-1
4.
4%
15
,4
84
+ 
10
.8
%
i—
d
CO ac
tu
al
va
lu
e T -N
CO 0
% T "
T“
co
0% n.
a.
n.
a.
n.
a.
n.
a.
3.
75 0%
13
,9
81 0%
19
88
: $
/m
et
er
| % 
ch
an
ge
 
ac
tu
al 
$/m
ce
di
/m
et
er
% 
ch
an
ge
 
ac
tu
al 
c/
m
19
89
: 
S/
m
et
er
% 
ch
an
ge
 
ac
tu
al 
%
/m
ce
di
/m
et
er
% 
ch
an
ge
 
ac
tu
al 
c/m
19
90
: 
$/
m
et
er
% 
ch
an
ge
 
ac
tu
al 
$/
m
ce
di
/m
et
er
% 
ch
an
ge
 
ac
tu
al 
c/
m
280
de
cr
ea
se
 
in 
inc
om
e 
Ta
x.
Pr
ice
 
of 
Firm
 
(J)
 P
ro
du
cin
g 
IM
I J
AV
A 
Pr
in
ts
, a
nd
 
Re
su
lt 
of 
Co
st 
Cu
ttin
g 
M
ea
su
re
s.
Ta
ble
 
9.
7.
CD,
d
CO
U )
s
CO
CO
IO
SBo '
o
CM
N .
CO
'$?o '
O
CO
O
CO
s fl
O '
o
N -CO
CD
c\f
xo0 s
O
CVJCO
C\j
xO
O '
o
IO
CO
Is-;
'd -
xpO '
o
LO
CO
cCl)
O
to
CM
LO
CO
CO
t
Is-
o
I s-
04
x p5s
I s-
00
CD CM
LO
CO
'M -T “to
cvT
0 s
00
LO
00o
CM
O 'LO
CO
CM
oCO
LO
"d-"
0 s
CO
CO
c
CDo
CO
LO
T— O ''CO
si
CDIf)
'd '
CM
xPO '
0 0
CM
CM
CO
CO
CM
VOO '
CM
CO
CM
o
CO
CM"
CM
CO
CM
CO
CO
CM
LO
00
CD
co"
LO
c o
COc:
CD
oin
W O 0 0-d ;
xpO '
00
CO5?
1 0
CO
LO
CD
CM"
00
CO
00
LO
CM
\DO '
O
CO
CD
LO
(N
o '
O
CO
CM
LO
CM
o '
0 0
CD
CO
CM
o '
0 0
CM ,
dtn
n
I I
T 5
CO
CO
xpo '
CD
CO
CD
CO
LO
co"
xOO '
O
CM+
CM
CO
CM
o '
r - $CO
co"
xpo '
d
T“
+
s
CM
xpo '
CM
LO
CO
LO
LO"
xOO '
LO
CD
+
CJ>
CO
CO fl>
T> «
CO >
00
CO
LO
xOO 'o
Is-
00
CO
Is-
O
CO
CD
0 )
CD
CM"
CO
00
CM
O
LO
Is-
<d-"
o>
t >
E
so>
E
75a
t >co
Q>
O )
c
(0
n
E
1
o
E
t>
75a
7 3co
Q>
O )c
CO
JZ
o
§
E
CO
00
0 >
E£
75a
73co
0>
CDc
CO
JG
o
a ?
Q )
73
E
5
CD
O
COa
73co
0>
O )c
CO
JZ
o
§
E
K
00
CD
COa
t >
co
CD
O )c
CO
JZo
• g
E
5
G )
O
CO
0 )
o >c
CO
£
o
a ?
i
3  C  S
8  I  S.
281
de
cr
ea
se
 
in 
In
co
m
e 
Ta
x.
Pr
ice
 
of 
Firm
 
(J)
 P
ro
du
cin
g 
IM
I J
AV
A 
Pr
int
s, 
and
 
Re
su
lt 
of 
Co
st 
Cu
ttin
g 
M
ea
su
re
s. 
Ta
ble
 
9.7
. 
(C
on
tin
ue
d)
.
to ,
6
CO
IO
CO
c
CD
o
CO
CO
c
CD
o
CO
CO
CO
c
CD
O
CO
CM,
d
CO
o
CO
*
IO
S
aeS
ra
S?
IO
ir>
ae
a?o
CO
•o
a5: w to *
r
%
II%na*10ii
E
a?o
COII
■o
ra3
§
s
cvi
O 'o
S5
IO
a
k .
ma?¥0)
a?oa*o
52
a?£raa?o
COo
Cvl
\U
o '
I''.
t '-
CvJ
CM
CO
CMa*o3.3?©
52
a?oII3
IO
CO
CO
o
in
CM
in
in
CM
in
co
CM
co
CM
vP
O '
in
o
£
r a
E«£
oo
000>
O )
CD
CM
to"
r -
CO
CM
o
m
CO
vOO 'o
to
00
CM
a
CD
in
sPO 'o
CD
CO
CM
'vOO '
h -
in
CM
00
CD
00
O '
CO
00
o
00
in
CO
CO
CD
co
CM
vOO 'o
o
COo o
3
in
in
CO
00
CO
t"."
CM
00
to"
E
13
3
tsra
a>
O )c
n
£
o
I
E73s
'Po '
CO
CM
-pO '
CO
T—
+
sPO 'o
E
ts
75
Ira
raO)cra£
o
in
CM
CO
in
CM
oo
oo
CM
'pO '
CO
o
O '
d
CM
CO
00
CM
o>
o>
N .
CM
in
co"
'PO '
CO
o
'Po '
cd
+
'PO '
O COCO
c T
CD
cvi
'pO '
CO
CO
CM
in
in
co
o"
5
CM
O
in CD
co
co
cvi
CD
in
cvi
d-
oo
cvi
raISE
s0>
ES
753
tsra
ra
D )cra£
oa?
§
E
E
tS
73
3
ts
n
ra
CD
c
n
S |  oo  a?
'PO '
in
oo
'PO '
00
CD
O '
O
E
73
3
ts
n
ra
O )c
n
£
O
sP
o
CD
D -
o>"
in
co
in
cm"
o
T—
h -
I
E
'PO '
O
so
O '
CO
o
O 'o
in
'Po '
m
00
'po '
CO1^
+
O 'o
E
ts
733
tsra
ra
O )cra£
Oa?
</> u
282
po
w
er
,w
.=
w
at
er
,e
f.=
ef
fic
ie
nc
y,
rit
=r
ed
. 
du
e 
to
de
cr
ea
se
 
in 
In
co
m
e 
Ta
x.
Furthermore, a devaluation causes a larger decrease in the 
$/m price and a lower increase in the C/m price i f  the amount of 
foreign inputs as a percentage of to ta l  inputs is  re la t iv e ly  low. For 
example, a 30% devaluation causes f irm  (A's) 1985 $/m price, with 
16.1 percent of the cost of raw materials resu lt ing  from imported 
materia ls, to f a l l  by 21.1%, while the cedi/m price rises by only 
2.5%. On the other hand, the e ffec t of the devaluation on f irm  (A's) 
1990 $/m price , with 50 percent of raw material cost being 
a tt r ibu tab le  to imports, is a f a l l  of only 14.4%, while the cedi/m 
price rises by 10.8 percent. Thus, i f  the percentage of foreign 
inputs is re la t iv e ly  high, a devaluation causes a re la t iv e ly  higher 
increase in the cedi/meter price.
Domestic consumption of local manufactures may increase or 
decrease as a re su lt  of a devaluation depending on the price 
e la s t ic i t y  of demand, and the substitu tion  e ffec ts  between local 
manufactures and imports of competing fin ished goods. A devaluation 
has a greater percentage increase in the c/meter price of competing 
imported goods as compared to domestic manufactures. I f  loca lly  
manufactured goods and imported goods are perfect substitu tes, and 
the price e la s t ic i t y  of demand of local goods is re la t iv e ly  
in e la s t ic ,  then a devaluation w i l l  increase consumption of local 
manufactures even i f  the c/meter price r ises . In th is  case, a 
devaluation makes domestic manufactures more competitive with 
imports. Conversely, i f  the substitu tion  e ffe c t between domestic 
goods and imported goods is small, and the price e la s t ic i t y  of demand 
is high, then the increase in the c/meter price resu lt ing  from a
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devaluation w i l l  reduce local demand fo r  the good. In th is  case, the 
only pos it ive  e ffe c t of a devaluation is to reduce the $/meter price 
thus making the domestic good more competitive in foreign markets, 
i .e .  more exportable.
The least e ffec t ive  po licy was the 2.5% reduction in labour 
cost due to an income tax reduction, Scenario (6). This fa i le d  to
reg is te r any s ig n if ica n t change ( i .e .  greater than 0.1%) from the
actual value fo r  any of the cases looked at.
The scenarios which resu lt  in equal percentage changes in 
local and domestic prices are those which do not involve a 
devaluation, i .e .  Scenarios (3) and (4). For example Scenario (4) in 
the case of f irm  (H) in 1986 produces a 22% decrease in both $/meter 
price and C/meter price.
The scenario with the greatest decrease in $/meter price is 
Scenario (5), while the greatest decrease in the cedi/meter price is 
achieved in Scenario (4). For example, in the case of f i rm  (J) 1985,
the $/meter price is affected as fo llows: Scenario (2) -13.9%;
Scenario (3) -16.8%, Scenario (4) -22.8%; Scenario (5) -34.3%. Thus
Scenario (5) has the greatest $/meter price decrease. In terms of
cedi/meter price fo r  the same f irm  and year, the e ffects  are as 
fo llows: Scenario (2) +12%; Scenario (3) -16.8%; Scenario (4) -22.8%; 
Scenario (5) -14.7%. Thus the greatest decrease in cedi/meter price
occurs in Scenario (4).
284
9.7.1 Export P o ten tia l.
Sibald (1991) produced a report, fo r  the Commonwealth 
Secretaria t, on the market potentia l of Ghanaian te x t i le s  in North 
America. They f in d  that "a review of the ex is ting  prices is essential 
to penetrating the U.S. markets." The F.O.B. ( f re ig h t  on board) price 
of Ghanaian Real Wax they tested on the market was $3.35/yard 
($3.66/meter). This was found to be high as "some buyers quoted 
$2.85/yard F.O.B. Ghana ($3.12/meter) , . . 11. Thus, "the consultants 
concluded from the reaction to the prices that the manufacturers w i l l  
have to develop a new pric ing  structure, i f  they are to compete in 
the market."
Table (9.8) shows two scenarios, Scenario (7) and Scenario 
(8), fo r  firms (J) and (A) in 1990. These are s im ila r to Scenarios 
(4) and (5), but with both sales tax and raw material tax set at 0%, 
as is curren tly  the case under the Ghanaian export promotion 
programme. This means that firms do not pay these taxes i f  they 
export.
The in te resting  resu lt  shown in Table (9.8) is that f irm  
(A,s) 1990 price fo r  Real Wax, which stood at 3.75 $/meter was
decreased to 2.72 $/meter under Scenario (7), and to 2.31 $/meter 
under Scenario (8). Even though a small handling charge should be 
added to these prices to make them F.O.B., they are much lower than 
the 3.12 $/meter quoted by Sibald (1991) as being a t t ra c t ive  to the 
U.S. market. This indicates that the export po ten tia l of Ghanaian
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Real Wax pr in ts  (and possibly other te x t i le s )  is great, given the 
r ig h t  po lic ies  which re su lt  in the required reduction in price.
9.8. Summary.
The degree to which the Ghanaian te x t i le  sector w i l l  cope 
with competition from imports w i l l  f i r s t l y  depend on each individual 
f i rm 's  a b i l i t y  to adequately improve i ts  productive e ff ic ie ncy  and 
cut i t s  costs. The f irm s ' competitiveness w i l l  also be enhanced by 
government po licy  such as: (1) cutt ing the tax burden which these 
firms and th e ir  employees face; (2) macroeconomic po licy , such as 
devaluation and monetary/fiscal contraction, which is argued w i l l  
improve the competitiveness of tradables such as te x t i le s ;  (3) 
reviewing the cost of fue l/w a te r/ and e le c t r ic i t y  faced by firms.
i t  has been shown in th is  chapter tha t, given certain cost 
cutt ing measure, domestic price reductions, i .e .  reduction in cedis 
per meter price, of up to 23.2% was possible. The export potentia l of 
Ghanaian te x t i le s ,  i .e .  reduction in the do lla r per meter price, can 
also be greatly  improved with the adoption of certa in tax and cost 
cutt ing measures.
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10. POLICY.
10.1. Introduction.
This chapter begins by reviewing the trade po licy  debate in 
order to put the current l ibe ra lised  Ghanaian trade po licy  in a
proper theore tica l perspective. Then, having established, from the 
evidence given, that a l ibe ra lised  trade regime is in Ghana's best
in te rest, the discussion then focuses on why and how, given a free
trade regime, the te x t i le s  sector (and by implication manufacturing) 
might be assisted by government po licy. F ina lly , some po licy  options 
are explored.
A fte r the introduction in Section (10.1), a review of the 
trade po licy  debate is given in Section (10.2). Section (10.3) looks 
at reasons fo r  the review of macroeconomic po licy . Section (10.4) 
looks at the benefits of a production-enhancing programme, while
Section (10.5) makes po licy recommendations that can be incorporated 
in th is  programme. The summary is in Section (10.6).
10.2. Trade and Economic Growth.
The main proposition of neoclassical trade theory is tha t, 
given certa in assumptions, free trade is superior in economic 
e ff ic iency  terms to protection. The s ta t ic  case fo r  free trade is 
demonstrated by the fac t tha t the removal of ba rr ie rs  to foreign
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trade expands the feasib le  set of consumption p o s s ib i l i t ie s .  This is 
because i t  provides, in e f fe c t,  "an ind irec t technology fo r
transforming domestic resources into the goods and services that
y ie ld  current and fu ture u t i l i t y  fo r  consumers" (Lai and Rajapatirana 
(1987).
The law of comparative advantage underpins the gains from 
trade. This is demonstrated by the Heckscher-Ohlin theory (summarised 
in Jones and Neary, 1984, p .14-21) which develops a two-factor
(labour and c a p ita l) ,  two commodity model and demonstrates and
demonstrates how each country w i l l  have a comparative advantage in, 
and therefore should specialise in, the production of the commodity 
which is re la t iv e ly  intensive in the use of the re la t iv e ly  abundant 
fac to r. Suggested benefits from dynamic versions of the law of 
comparative advantage include increased domestic savings formation 
and foreign cap ita l inflows (Bhagwati, 1978, Ch. 6), improved qua lity  
of entrepreneurship resu lt ing  from the exposure to foreign 
competition (Keesing, 1967), access to new technology, and the 
elim ination of domestic market constraints and the benefits of 
economies of scale (Krueger, 1978).
Findlay (1984, p. 26) argued that the demonstration of the 
super io r ity  o f free trade is a comparative s ta t ic  analysis and " is  
s i le n t  about the rate of economic growth over t im e , . . . " .  But, as Lai 
and Rajapatirana (1987) argue, the resu lt  of moving towards free 
trade is a higher level of per capita income and not a permanently 
fas te r rate of growth.
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10.2.1. Empirical Studies on Exports and Growth.
Many s ta t is t ic a l  studies have looked at the links  between 
trade and growth. For example, Michalopoulos and Jay (1973) estimated 
an aggregate neoclassical production function fo r  t h i r t y  nine 
countries. Exports were found to be highly s ig n if ic a n t ,  and GNP 
growth was s ig n i f ic a n t ly  correlated to the growth rate of exports. 
Krueger (1978), in her study fo r  the National Bureau of Economic 
Research on foreign trade regimes and economic development, regressed 
GNP growth fo r  each of ten countries against the rate of export 
growth. She found a posit ive  and s ign if ica n t re la tionsh ip  between the 
two. S im ila r ly , Balassa (1978), estimated the equations in Michaely's 
(1977) study and incorporating the Michalopoulos-Jay fac tors , found a 
robust re la tionsh ip  between exports and GNP growth fo r  eleven 
countries. Feder (1983) not only found a pos it ive  re la tionsh ip  
between exports and GNP growth, but also provided evidence to support 
the hypothesis that export oriented po lic ies  led the economy to an 
optimal a lloca tion  of resources as well as generally enhancing 
p roductiv ity . The World Development Report (WDR) (1987) finds that 
when countries are grouped in four categories, tha t is ,  strongly 
outward-oriented, moderately outward-oriented, moderately inward- 
oriented and strongly inward oriented, th e ir  economic performance, 
including GNP growth, tends to decline as one moves along the scale 
from the strongly outward-oriented towards the strongly inward- 
oriented group.
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But, as in most s ta t is t ic a l  matters, there is an opposing 
point of view of Krueger, Balassa, Feder, and the others mentioned 
above. Singer (1988) in his c r i t ic is m  of the WDR's (1987) findings 
makes the point tha t the category of inward-oriented countries, 
and especially  the strongly inward-oriented countries, consist of 
poorer countries than the outward-oriented countries. As one moves 
along the scale, there is a regression in per capita income level 
which is even clearer and more s t r ik in g  than the regression in 
economic performance highlighted by the WDR (1987).
Thus, Singer argues, what the WDR (1987) analysis te l ls  
us is that poorer countries f in d  i t  more d i f f i c u l t  to progress than 
countries already fu r the r up the development ladder, such as the NICs 
and middle-income countries. This is none other than the old 
p r inc ip le  of vicious c irc les  of cumulative causation emphasised by 
Myrdal (1958), Nurkse (1961) and other 's t r u c tu ra l is ts ' .
The fac t that outward orien ta tion  does not work as well fo r  
the low-income developing countries, p a r t ic u la r ly  in Sub-Saharan 
A fr ica , as i t  does fo r  the middle-income countries, has been 
noted in a study by Ffelleiner (1986). Fie concludes that i f  there is 
a lesson in the experience of the African countries ' interactions 
with the global economy during the 1960s and 1970s, i t  would seem 
to have more to do with the d e s ira b i l i ty  of s ta b i l is in g  import volume 
than with that of increasing the degree of outward o r ien ta tion . He 
finds that fo r  the low-income countries, there is no evidence to 
support the proposition that the degree of export or ien ta tion  is
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associated with growth performance e ither in A fr ica  or in poor 
countries generally, and tha t there is support, especia lly powerful 
in A fr ica , fo r  the view that greater import volume in s ta b i l i t y  
is associated with slower growth.
Other evidence that high growth rates of export earnings 
occur only when external demand is strong thus suggesting that 
adverse changes in world demand carried greater weight in determining 
export performance than changes in trade po licy  is put forward by 
Kavoussi (1985). He claims that fo r  the f i r s t  period he looked at, 
1967-73, when world market conditions were generally favourable, 
there was a strong posit ive  corre la tion  between export o r ienta tion 
and growth performance. However, fo r  the second period, 1973-77, 
when world market conditions became more unfavourable, the 
corre la tion  was weaker and doubtfu lly  s ig n if ic a n t.  These results  
seem to imply that when external demand is weak, gains from 
openness are l ik e ly  to be o ffse t by i ts  negative e ffec ts . On the 
other hand, when world demand is strong, the benefits of 
openness c le a r ly  outweigh i ts  dangers. Singer et a l .  (1988) who 
extended Kavoussi's analysis to the period 1977-83 confirm his 
results  tha t countries achieve high growth rates of export 
earnings only when external demand is strong. During a period of 
slack demand, th is  no longer holds irrespective of trade po licy. In 
th e ir  regional analysis they f in d  that fo r  A fr ica , only a weak 
corre la t ion  between export o r ien ta tion  and growth in the period 
1967-73 existed, both when facing above and below average world 
demand. In the period 1977-83, there was v i r t u a l ly  no corre lation
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between trade or ien ta tion  and growth rate of GNP; the above average 
group went from a weak corre la t ion  to v i r tu a l ly  no corre la t ion  at 
a l l .  The below average group maintained a weak corre la tion  in 
both periods. These resu lts  are very much in l ine  with the findings 
of Michaely (1977), Mosley (1987) and Wheeler (1984). Michaely 
f inds : "the pos it ive  association of the economy's growth rate with
the growth of the export share appears to be p a r t ic u la r ly  strong 
among the more developed countries, and not to ex is t at a l l  among the 
least developed.. .This seems to indicate that growth is affected by 
export performance only once countries achieve some minimum level of 
development" (p .52).
10.2.2. Causality.
A l l  the studies reviewed above use conventional s ta t is t ic a l  
tests fo r  establishing an association between exports and growth. But 
corre la tion  does not indicate causality . The making of causal 
inferences requires an underlying theore tica l model, whose v a l id i ty  
can be tested by standard econometric techniques. Recently, however, 
a s ta t is t ic a l  technique, the Granger-Sims causality  te s t ,  has become 
widely used to f in d  the d irec tion  of causality . This technique seeks 
to establish whether, over time, a pa rt icu la r variable regu la rly  
precedes another.
Jung and Marshall (1985) have applied the Granger causality 
tes t to data fo r  t h i r t y  seven developing countries fo r  the period
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1950-81, in order to determine whether exports "Granger-cause" 
growth, or vise versa. They f in d  that only four countries provide 
evidence fo r  export promotion, and "more in te re s t in g ly , many of the 
countries most famous fo r  the miraculous growth rates tha t appeared 
to arise from export promotion po lic ies  (e.g. Korea, Taiwan, B raz il)  
provide no s ta t is t ic a l  support fo r  the export promotion hypothesis" 
(p .10). Darrat (1986) has also applied the Granger-causality tes t to 
time series data fo r  exports and growth fo r  Hong-Kong, Korea, 
Singapore, and Taiwan fo r  the period 1962-1982, and finds that 
"neither exports cause economic growth nor economic growth causes 
exports" fo r  the f i r s t  three countries. For Taiwan, he finds that 
"economic growth u n id ire c t io n a l ly  causes exports" (p .697). But as Lai 
and Rajapatirana (1987) argue, i f  the cases in which output growth 
causes export growth are included as supporting the outward 
orien ta tion  theory in the Jung and Marshall study, then the l i s t  of 
countries with growth rates ar is ing  from export promotion po lic ies 
rises to fourteen.
10.3. Reasons for Macroeconomic Policy Review.
10.3.1. Terms of Trade.
There is considerable debate in the l i te ra tu re  as to the 
v a l id i ty  of the various trade and in d u s tr ia l isa t io n  po lic ies . 
S tru c tu ra lis ts ,  have c r i t ic is e d  the neoclassical analysis of trade 
and in d u s tr ia l isa t io n  on a number of grounds. Singer (1950), and 
Prebisch (1950) argued that the long run trend in terms of trade
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moved against primary products as compared to manufactures which 
meant tha t Developing Countries needed to change from a re liance on 
trade and primary exports, and re ly  more heavily on domestic-market 
based in d u s tr ia l is a t io n .  Myrdal (1958) argued tha t the l ib e ra l 
in ternationa l trade system would u lt im a te ly  make the r ich  r icher and 
the poor poorer. But the theore tica l and factual basis of Singer's 
and Prebisch's thesis have been questioned by Lipsey (1963) and 
Spraos (1980) amongst others. Morawetz (1977), and Lai (1984), 
amongst others, have attempted to disprove Myrdal's predictions.
Morawetz, fo r  example, finds "  no clear re la t ion  between i n i t i a l
income level and subsequent growth ra tes".
Nurkse (1962) argued that in contrast to the nineteenth 
century, in ternationa l trade in the post war period could no longer 
act as an "engine of growth" fo r  Developing Countries, and that an 
a lte rna tive  "engine", in the form of import substitu ting  
in d u s tr ia l isa t io n ,  must be sought. But the view tha t in ternational 
trade was an engine of growth in the nineteenth century was 
questioned by Kravis (1970). He states that though a strong external 
demand fo r  a country's exports may be useful, i t  " is  neither a
necessary nor s u f f ic ie n t  condition fo r  growth " . He therefore
suggested that the term "handmaiden of growth" (p .869) might better 
convey the ro le  which can be played by trade.
With regards to Ghana's terms of trade (TOT), i t  was seen in 
Section (2.6.1) of Chapter (2) that while short term fluc tuations 
did occur in the period 1967-87, there was no d iscern ib le  decline in
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TOT during that period. What has also been discussed in Chapter (2) 
is that Ghana's export base is  p r im arily  re l ia n t  on primary products. 
I f  world commodity prices decline, then Ghana's TOT w i l l  deteriorate . 
Thus in order to reduce th is  re liance on commodity prices, Ghana has 
to encourage the export of manufactured goods as w e ll.  This 
combination of primary product exports and manufactures exports 
reduces the r is k  of f luc tua tions in her TOT.
10.3.2. Investment.
As mentioned in Chapter (5), Ghana is in urgent need of 
foreign d ire c t  investment. The te x t i le s  sector, with i t s  aging 
cap ita l stock needs investment in new plant and machinery. But with 
private sector investment languishing at a mere 4 to 5 percent of 
GDP, new po lic ies  to promote both foreign and domestic cap ita l 
spending are v i t a l .
10.3.3. Sunk Costs.
Given that machinery has a f i n i t e  l i f e  of say 20 years, 
and given tha t most of the investments in plant and machinery were 
made in the 1960s, most of the te x t i le  m il ls  in Ghana have now 
outlived th e ir  useful working lives and are ready fo r  replacement. 
A few m il ls  do however have substantial cap ita l assets in the 
form of modern machinery (see plant B below), and the industry as 
a whole has decades of accumulated know-how and a tangible
296
amount of s k i l le d  labour. This is re flected by CBS, Industr ia l 
S ta t is t ic s  (1990), which gives persons engaged by level of s k i l l  in 
te x t i le s ,  manufacturing, and industry as a whole, fo r  1987. We see 
from th is  that there were 451 managers, 1,632 technical or c le r ica l 
s ta f f  and 6,238 sk i l le d  workers in the woven te x t i le s  sector.
Given the d i f f i c u l t y  of recouping these investments in 
machinery and know-how, or transforming plant and equipment to 
other uses, cap ita l costs must be treated as a sunk rather than a 
variable cost of operating ex is ting  equipment. These costs, together 
with the accumulated know-how would be ir re tr ie va b le  i f  th is  industry 
perished. I f  th is  accumulated know-how is allowed to perish with the 
disappearing manufacturing sector, then a great opportunity fo r  
in d u s tr ia l isa t io n  under l ibe ra l ised  market conditions would have been 
passed-up. Thus government might wish to take the above into account 
when formulating po licy .
10.3.4. The Adjustment Process Argument.
As discussed in Chapter (2 ), with the introduction of the 
ERP in 1983, industry began to face problems due to competition from 
imports, a rundown and obsolete capita l stock, and t ig h t  l iq u id i t y .
Firms w i l l  obviously benefit i f  they succeed in cutting 
production costs. I t  w i l l  also be helpful i f  macroeconomic policy 
softens the impact of l ib e ra l is a t io n  as cap ita l market imperfection
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may make i t  impossible fo r  firms with long-term v ia b i l i t y  to survive 
through the adjustment process.
10.3.5. The Late Industrialisation Argument.
Amsden (1989), Westphal (1978), and others have looked at 
Korea's in d u s tr ia l isa t io n  strategy which Amsden called ' la te  
in d u s t r ia l is a t io n ' .  Amsden states that low wages in cotton-spinning 
and weaving firms were found to be in s u f f ic ie n t  as a basis on which 
to compete against Japan. She states that Korean firms "appear to 
have required subsidies to begin to compete in world markets." These 
took the form of indus tr ia l incentives that generally favour exports 
over import subs titu t ion . Westphal summarised these incentives as 
follows:
"unrestric ted access to and t a r i f f  exemptions on imported 
intermediate and cap ita l goods; exemption from payment of 
ind irec t taxes both on major intermediate inputs, whether 
imported or purchased domestically, and on export sales; 
generous wastage allowances in determining duty and ind irec t 
tax-free raw material imports, which permitted the use of some 
of these imports in production fo r  the domestic market; reduced 
prices fo r  several overhead inputs including e le c t r ic i t y  and 
ra ilroad  t r a n s p o r t , . . . ;  a 50 percent reduction in d irec t taxes 
on income earned in exporting, along with accelerated 
depreciation; and, immediate access to subsidised short- and 
medium-term c red it  to finance working cap ita l and fixed 
investment respective ly ."
Subsidised c red it in a capita l scarce country meant that i ts  
price diverged greatly  from i ts  true market value, and subsidised 
long-term c re d it  had a negative real price due to in f la t io n .  This
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meant that the price of c red it was not " r ig h t " .  Also, the foreign 
exchange ra te , even though not greatly  d is to rted , did succeed in 
stimulating exports when th is  d is to r t io n  was used in conjunction with 
other po lic ie s .
Coupled with these d if fe re n t incentives was a determination 
from government tha t performance standards which i t  set should be 
reached by industries. This according to Amsden:
"induced a level of p roductiv ity , and will ingness to invest on 
the part of the private sector, that made greater price 
'd is to r t io n s ' unnecessary, and the ample price 'd is to r t io n s ' 
that did ex is t more e ffec t ive .
Therefore i t  may be said that growth has been fas te r in 
Korea not because markets have been allowed to operate more 
fre e ly  but because the subsidisation process has been
q u a l i ta t iv e ly  s u p e r io r . . . " .
Thus the case of Korea is an example of when "wrong" prices 
are r ig h t ,  when operated with other incentives and an insistence on 
performance standards is adhered to by the government.
10.3.6. Level Playing Fie ld Argument.
As seen in Chapter (7), fu e l,  e le c t r ic i t y ,  and water charges 
are higher in Ghana than in some of the other countries shown. Thus 
in order to have a "leve l playing f ie ld " ,  there is a case fo r  these 
rates to be reviewed, and monopoly p r ic ing , wherever present, 
eliminated.
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10.4. Benefits o f P roduc tiv ity  Improvements.
In th is  section, the benefits of simultaneously introducing 
trade l ib e ra l is a t io n  po lic ies  and productivity-enhancing programmes 
(PEPs) are considered. Pack's (1987, p .158) approach is followed, in 
which he demonstrates these gains in terms of a diagram as shown in 
Figure (10.1).
Assume, i n i t i a l l y ,  tha t the sector is in equilibrium at 
point M. A made-to-measure t a r i f f  excludes imports of competing 
products by being set so that the least e f f ic ie n t  f i rm  can survive 
and the more e f f ic ie n t  ones co lle c t rents. Thus output is i n i t i a l l y  
Qj, domestic price Pj, world price P2=Pw, and the made-to measure 
t a r i f f  P^P2 .
I f  t a r i f f s  are removed without an accompanying PEP, then a 
gain of P2MZ would be accrued which equals the net cost imposed by 
the i n i t i a l  protective regime, namely, excess production cost plus 
the loss in consumer surplus minus the increase in producer surplus.
The introduction of a PEP leads to a downward s h i f t  in the 
supply curve to S2, and i f  th is  is undertaken simultaneously with the 
elim ination of t a r i f f s ,  two effects  re su lt :  (1) an increase in
consumer surplus of PjP2ZM, and (2) a change in producer surplus of 
P2ZR - PjP2M. The net gain is thus P2MZR which is  greater than P2MZ 
(the gain from l ib e ra l is a t io n  only). P2MZR can be decomposed into two
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Benefits and Costs of Productivity Improvements.
Figure 10.1.
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areas: P2MNR and MNZ. P2MNR represents a f a l l  in the (private)
marginal cost of producing i n i t i a l  output Qj, since a downward s h i f t  
in the industry 's  supply curve re f le c ts  the s h i f t  in the marginal 
cost curves of the component firm s. Thus P2MNR can be approximated by 
the decrease in the sum of the marginal costs of the firms making-up 
the sector. MNZ is the social gain from the expansion of output from 
Qj to Q2 and consists of the additional producer surplus, SNZ, and 
consumer surplus, MSZ.
Given tha t the area P2MZ could be obtained simply by 
e lim inating t a r i f f s  without a concurrent PEP, the "pure" e ffec t of 
the PEP would therefore be P2ZMR - P2MZ which equals the true benefit 
RP2Z. Some might argue that even th is  smaller measure represents an 
overstatement due to the p o s s ib i l i ty  that l ib e ra l is a t io n ,  even i f  not 
supplemented e x p l ic i t l y  by PEPs, would cause a downward s h i f t  in the 
industry supply curve as ind iv idual firms facing more intense 
competition would seek to reduce costs on th e ir  own. This was seen in 
the gradual reduction in technical ine ff ic iency  of the firms surveyed 
in the p o s t- l ib e ra l isa t io n  period in Ghana (given in Chapter 8). But, 
as also seen in Chapter (8), there is s t i l l  room fo r  more cost 
reductions as a re su lt  of PEPs. Thus, the implication of th is  is tha t 
the time required fo r  adjustment of the supply curve is l ik e ly  to be 
longer, and the ultimate height of the supply curve is l ik e ly  to be 
greater, i f  firms are le f t  to th e ir  own devices rather than i f  a PEP 
focusing d ire c t ly  on p roduc tiv ity  issues is implemented.
PEPs can be undertaken by both firms and the government.
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PEPs that can be undertaken by firms include: measures, such as
reviewing working conditions or perhaps be tter incentives or even 
better worker/management tra in in g , to improve labour p roductiv ity ; 
more e f f ic ie n t  use of fue l power and water. The PEPs which the 
government is envisaged to consider are as fo llows: bear some of the 
cost of worker/management tra in ing  programmes; provide favourable 
terms and conditions fo r  f irm  to renew th e ir  aged plant and 
machinery.
In the above discussion, the supply curve s h i f ts  not as a 
resu lt of passive-but-inevitable learning by doing, as in the infant 
industry argument, but in response to investment e x p l ic i t l y  designed 
to s h i f t  i t  qu ick ly . I f  the learning period in the in fant industry 
argument does lead to a s h i f t  in the supply curve from Sj to S2, then 
the producer surplus RP2Z accrues over time even i f  nothing is done 
to force the pace of learning. I f  th is  were the l ik e ly  evolution over 
time ( fo r  an evaluation of the realism of th is  view see Bell et a l. 
(1984)), the benefit from the PEP would be overstated, and the true 
benefit would consist of the discounted differences in producer 
surplus given by the two time paths of s h if t in g  supply curves, i .e .  
the difference between the benefits of a fas t s h i f t  in the supply 
curve and a slower s h i f t .  I t  must be highlighted at th is  point that 
the expected s h i f t  in the supply curve resu lt ing  from a PEP does not 
only occur more rap id ly , but i t  would also be expected to be greater. 
This is because the perceived PEP could produce a f a l l  in costs not 
only as a re su lt  of ind iv idual f i rm 's  e f fo r ts ,  but also as a resu lt 
of government po licy  designed to achieve th is .
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10.5. P o licy P rescrip tion .
From the evidence shown in Section (10.2), gains from trade 
argument and the benefits of comparative advantage highlighted by the 
Heckscher-Ohlin theory are accepted, even though i t  is  realised that 
th is  view has been debated in the l i te ra tu re  by Wheeler, Michaely, 
and others. Thus, assuming Ghana's trade po licy  remains export- 
oriented in nature, i t  can be seen from Sections (10.3) tha t te x t i le s  
in pa rt icu la r  and manufacturing in general have been greatly  
neglected. Section (10.4) shows that a production-enhancing programme 
or po licy  (PEP) can be devised, w ith in a l ibe ra lised  export oriented 
framework, tha t w i l l  produce benefits fo r  firms and society.
Chapter (9), uncovered many areas where te x t i le  firms faced 
re la t iv e ly  high exogenous costs. In what fo llows, po licy  suggestions 
are made, some of which have already been shown in Chapter (9) to 
reduce exogenous costs, which would be expected to produce a 
reduction in these exogenous costs and thus improve competitiveness. 
These exogenous cost reducing po licy recommendations are as follows:
(a) Taxes: Here a rb it ra ry  figures are chosen to demonstrate the 
possible reductions in taxation. Sales tax could be reduced from 
17.5 percent in 1991/2 to under 15% percent; company tax could 
be reduced from 35 percent to 20 percent; raw material tax of 10 
percent could be abolished ( i t  must be pointed out here that in
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terms of export promotion, exported te x t i le s  are already exempt 
from raw material tax and sales tax); income tax rates could be 
reviewed and d ra s t ic a l ly  reduced. The top rate of income tax , 
fo r  example could be reduced from 67 percent fo r  income exceeding 
a taxable income to  GDP per capita ra t io  of 13, to  say 45 percent 
fo r  incomes exceeding an income to GDP ra t io  of 60 percent. The 
exemption level could be increased from an income to GDP ra t io  of 
nearly 0 to an exemption level of income to GDP ra t io  of say 5. 
This w i l l  reduce the tax on low-paid employees. Even though th is  
was not shown to have any s ig n if ica n t cost reducing e ffe c t on ex­
factory price in Chapter (9), i t  is nevertheless f e l t  that
reducing the taxes paid by low income workers, which means a
higher take home pay is benefic ia l fo r  at least two reasons: 
F i r s t ly ,  i t  may re su lt  in higher p roductiv ity  since higher paid 
workers are more re luctant to loose th e ir  jobs than lower paid
workers. Secondly, th is  higher take home pay w i l l  reduce the
pressure on firms to increase wages by the amount they otherwise 
would have.
(b) Optimal p r ic ing  po licy does not support water charges that 
are m u lt i- t ie re d  progressive. Optimal charges are m u lt i- t ie re d  
regressive, with industries consuming large volumes getting 
discounts on rates. Rates could be comparable to the United 
Kingdom rate of $2.78/1000 gallons as compared to Ghana's highest 
rate of $3.33/1000 gallons.
(c) I f  fue l prices were reduced from $395/1000 l i t r e s  to a level
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comparable to Ind ia 's  or Canada's fuel price th is  would give a 
rate of $200/1000 l i t r e s .  This could be achieved by reducing the 
tax on fu e l,  and also by reducing fue l price i t s e l f .
(d) I f  e le c t r i c i t y  prices were reduced from $0.063/kwh 
(calculated fo r  f irm  J as an aggregate of charge per Kwh and 
charge per max. demand) to levels comparable with Canada 
($0.038/kwh), India ($0.040/kwh), and USA ($0.049/kwh), a big 
step would have been taken in producing a more " leve l playing 
f ie ld "  environment fo r  the Ghanaian te x t i le  industry. Again th is  
could be achieved by reducing the tax on e le c t r ic i t y  consumption, 
and by reducing the price i t s e l f .
(e) Devaluation: As was seen in Chapter (7 ), a devaluation of
the exchange rate can have a favourable e ffec t on competitiveness 
i f  i t  is introduced with a f is c a l  and/or monetary contraction. 
This is because i t  changes the re la t ive  prices of tradables and 
nontradables in favour of tradables. But a devaluation, by
reducing the re la t iv e  price of nontradables, causes unemployment, 
in the short to medium term, in the nontradables goods sector and
thus has a social cost which may be p o l i t i c a l l y  unacceptable.
( f )  While accelerated depreciation on new cap ita l is already 
practised, i t  is f e l t  that subsidised long-term c red it  fo r  
cap ita l investment would resu lt in priva te investment in
industry. This would therefore resu lt  in the greatly  needed 
in jec t ion  of new cap ita l in the industry.
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10.6. Summary.
With the gains from trade argument and the Heckscher-Ohlin 
theory of comparative advantage discussed in Section (2) above, i t  is 
argued in th is  chapter that an export-oriented trade po licy  is , on 
balance, preferable to im p o rt-su bs t itu t ing - indu s tr ia l isa t io n .
Given th is ,  the focus then turns to the reasons why a 
macroeconomic po licy  review might be advisable, and these are as 
fo llows: Ghana's terms of trade, while not observed to have declined 
over the 1967-87 period looked at, did show a lo t  of short term 
f luc tua tion  over that period and can thus be said to be 
unpredictable; aging cap ita l stock in the te x t i le s  sector requires an 
investment promotion e f fo r t ;  l i t t l e  of the sunk-costs in cap ita l and 
technical know-how would be re tr ievab le  i f  t e x t i le  firm s shut-down; 
cap ita l market imperfections make i t  d i f f i c u l t  fo r  firms with long 
term v ia b i l i t y  to survive through the adjustment process thus 
measures are required to ease the d i f f i c u l t i e s  faced during 
adjustment; there is the late in d u s tr ia l isa t io n  argument put forward 
by Amsden (1989), amongst others, in which i t  is argued that in an 
in d u s tr ia l is in g  country, a system of indus tr ia l subsidy coupled with 
po lic ies that maintain high levels of p roduc tiv ity  lead to high 
growth rates, as has been the case in Korea; and f i n a l l y  the "level 
playing f ie ld "  argument is discussed in which i t  is envisaged that 
fu e l,  power, and water charges could be reduced to levels found in
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other selected countries.
F in a lly ,  po licy  options are explored. These include: 
reviewing tax po lic ie s ; reducing fu e l,  water, and power charges 
devaluation o f the exchange ra te ; incentives fo r  cap ita l investment.
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11. SUMMARY.
This study has been concerned with assessing the e ff ic iency  
and cost structure of the Ghanaian te x t i le  sector. A summary of the 
main findings is made here together with a b r ie f  review of the 
discussion made in each chapter.
Chapter (2) reviewed the Ghanaian economy. This highlighted 
the import-substitu ting ind us tr ia l isa t ion  drive which led to the 
formation of the te x t i le s  sector (amongst others). The decline of the 
1970s and early 1980s is discussed, and so are the resu lting  
l ib e ra l is a t io n  po lic ies  of the ERP. The chapter then highlighted the 
fac t that while the ERP has been largely successful in "reviv ing" the
economy, i t  has le f t  Ghana with a high degree of aid-dependency, a
d e re l ic t  manufacturing sector, and very l i t t l e  private sector
investment and foreign capita l investment.
Chapter (3) discussed the Ghanaian cotton cu lt iva t io n  
industry in an attempt to examine i ts  v ia b i l i t y  as a competitively
priced a lte rna tive  to cotton importation. While th is  chapter 
highlighted the fac t that cotton cu lt iva t io n  has increased 
dramatically since being privatised in 1985, and accounts today fo r  
over 50 percent of Ghana's cotton consumption, and that both price 
and non-price factors were instrumental in increasing the production 
and price-competitveness of cotton, technical know-how in the ginning 
process is required to improve i ts  qua lity . I t  was pointed out that 
th is  was a l im it in g  fac to r in the future success of cotton both fo r
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the domestic and export markets.
Chapter (4) discussed the state of the world te x t i le  
industry. I ts  h is to ry  was reviewed, and the orig ins of the M u lt if ib re  
Arrangement (MFA), as well as i ts  e ffec t on developing countries were 
discussed. Most of the studies looked at found that the MFA caused a 
substantial decline in export opportunities and revenues of 
developing countries. The te x t i le  manufacturing process was also 
reviewed in Chapter (4), and so were the p roduc tiv ity  improvements 
due to technological advances. The discussion focused on the high 
degree of automation in the spinning and weaving processes, and on 
the fac t that new technology, in general, has been ra is ing 
p roductiv ity  while lowering labour content in the te x t i le  industry.
I t  was thus found in Chapter (4) tha t, in industr ia lised  
countries, enterprises adopting new technologies often enjoyed an 
edge over th e ir  competitors in the sense that the higher productiv ity  
achieved with these new technologies often offsets  higher wages of 
countries such as the US, thus enabling them to be competitive with 
developing countries.
The Ghanaian te x t i le  sector was reviewed in Chapter (5). 
While c loth production was found to have declined from over 100 
m il l io n  meters in 1976 to under 10 m il l io n  in 1982, i t  recovered only 
s l ig h t ly  to over 20 m il l io n  meters by 1988. In 1987, employment in 
th is  sector stood at 12,800 employees with a high proportion of to ta l 
employment being in the largest f iv e  establishments. Also included in
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this chapter is a plant by plant summary of 12 te x ti le  firms.
Chapter (6) reviewed the approaches to production f ro n t ie rs .  
These include no n -s ta t is t ica l parametric and n o n -s ta t is t ica l non- 
parametric approaches as well as determ in istic  s ta t is t ic a l  f ro n t ie r  
and stochastic s ta t is t ic a l  f ro n t ie r  approaches. The main f ind ing of 
th is  chapter is tha t the stochastic f ro n t ie r  approach, unlike the 
three other approaches, introduces a disturbance term representing 
noise or measurement e rro r, which can then be decomposed in to two 
components: ine ff ic iency  and noise. Also, using the Jondrow e t. a l.
(1982) measure, with the stochastic f ro n t ie r  approach, gives non- 
consistent estimates of f irm  and year spec if ic  technical 
ine ff ic iency .
Chapter (7) discussed the method of data co llec t ion . This 
took the form of implementing a to ta l  of three questionnaires on two 
f ie ld t r ip s .  One questionnaire was directed at selected te x t i le  m il ls ,  
and the resu lts  obtained provided the data fo r  the technical 
e ff ic iency  estimation of Chapter (8). A second questionnaire was 
intended to co l le c t  cotton growing data, and th is  provided the data 
fo r  the cotton c u lt iv a t io n  costs which were estimated in Chapter (3). 
The th ird  questionnaire collected data on fab r ic  manufacturing cost 
structure. This formed the basis of the fa b r ic  manufacturing cost 
comparison made in Chapter (9). Data was also obtained from the Price 
and Incomes Board, and th is  was used in the cost s e n s i t iv i ty  
analysis made in Chapter (9).
311
Chapter (8) estimated technical ine ff ic iency  in six selected 
te x t i le  m i l ls  using a stochastic Cobb-Douglas production function, 
and data collected from the f ie ld t r ip .  The main find ing  of th is  
chapter is tha t estimates of technical in e ff ic ie n cy , in 1980, 
averaged 13.8 percent, with the lowest and highest values of 6.2 
percent and 25.5 percent respectively. In 1983, the average of 
technical ine ff ic iency  rose to 27.5 in 1983, with lowest and highest 
values being 18.8 percent and 33.1 percent respective ly. By 1989, the 
average had fa l le n  to 7.7 percent with the lowest and highest values 
fo r  that year standing at 4.0 percent and 12.6 percent respectively.
Chapter (9) looked at the costs faced by te x t i le  firms 
c lass if ied  in to endogenous and exogenous costs. The endogenous costs 
which were id e n t i f ie d  included: labour cost; raw material cost; 
e ff ic iency  of raw material use; e ff ic iency  of fu e l,  water and power 
use; technical and a lloca tive  e ff ic iency . The exogenous costs 
discussed included: fu e l,  power and water prices; d ire c t  and ind irec t 
taxes; and cost reduction as a resu lt  of an exchange rate 
devaluation.
The main find ings of th is  chapter, in terms of e ff ic iency  
and cost cu tt ing  po ten tia l of the prescribed p o lic ie s , are as 
follows: f i r s t l y  the te x t i le  firms looked at in th is  study have
reacted to foreign competition by becoming more techn ica lly  
e f f ic ie n t ;  secondly, in terms of domestic competition with imports, 
the competitive s itua tion  of te x t i le  firms can be grea tly  enhanced by 
po lic ies which a ffec t the ex-factory price of th e ir  products ( i .e .
312
po lic ies  such as reduction of a l l  forms of taxes, and reduction in 
cost o f fu e l ,  power, and water inputs); and th i r d ly ,  in terms of 
export p o ten t ia l,  i t  can be concluded that some firms can become 
in te rna t iona lly  competitive given certain po lic ies  which lead to a 
reduction in the price of th e ir  product.
Policy recommendations were made in Chapter (10). A fter the 
gains from trade argument and the benefits of comparative advantage 
are discussed, i t  is argued that an export-oriented trade po licy is 
preferable to an im po rt-subs titu t ing - indus tr ia l isa tion  po licy . Given 
th is ,  the discussion then turns to ju s t i fy in g  a macroeconomic policy 
review on the grounds of the fo llowing arguments: terms of trade
f luc tua tions ; aging cap ita l stock; sunk costs; cap ita l market 
imperfections; late ind u s tr ia l isa t io n  argument; and f in a l ly ,  the 
" leve l playing f ie ld "  argument.
F in a lly ,  some po licy options are explored. These included: 
reviewing tax po lic ie s ; reducing fu e l,  power and water charges; 
devaluation of the exchange ra te ; and incentives fo r  capita l 
investment.
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APPENDIX 1.
TEXTILES QUESTIONNAIRE
Section (1) - Establishment Id e n t i f ic a t io n .
Date:......................................................................................................
Name of establishment:.....................................................................
Year established:........................................................ ......................
Type of ownership:.............................................................................
N a tiona lity  of Ownership:......................................... ......................
Location:........................................................................ ......................
Number of Ghanaian employees:................................. ......................
Number of Expatriate employees:............................. ......................
Products:........................................................................ .....................
Section (2) - Wages, Output, Value o f assets: (1979-1989).
(a) Wages of workers in Cedis 1979:..................... .....................
1980: .....................
1981: .....................
1982: .....................
1983: ......................
1984: .....................
1985: ......................
1986: ......................
1987: ......................
A 1
1988:
1989:
(b) Output (sales) in cedis 1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
(c) Value of assets in cedis:
I n i t i a l Value of factory bu ild ing:
I n i t i a l value of machinery:
In i t i a l value of motor vehicles:
I n i t i a l value of fu rn itu re  and equipment
IN 1979: (Disposals are -ve).
Value of factory  bu ild ing: 
Additions to bu ild ing:
A 2
Value of Machinery:
Additions to Machinery:
Value of motor vehicles:
Additions to motor vehicles:
Value of fu rn itu re  and equipment: 
Additions to fu rn itu re  and equipment: 
IN 1980: (Disposals are -ve).
Value of fac tory  bu ild ing:
Additions to bu ild ing:
Value of Machinery:
Additions to Machinery:
Value of motor vehicles:
Additions to motor vehicles:
Value of fu rn itu re  and equipment: 
Additions to fu rn itu re  and equipment:
IN 1981: (Disposals are -ve).
Value of factory  bu ild ing:
Additions to bu ild ing:
Value of Machinery:
Additions to Machinery:
Value of motor vehicles:
Additions to motor vehicles:
Value of fu rn itu re  and equipment: 
Additions to fu rn itu re  and equipment:
In 1982: (Disposals are -ve).
Value of fac tory  bu ild ing:
Additions to bu ild ing :
Value of Machinery:
Additions to Machinery:
Value of motor vehicles:
Additions to motor vehicles:
Value of fu rn itu re  and equipment: 
Additions to fu rn itu re  and equipment
In 1983: (Disposals are -ve).
Value of factory  bu ild ing:
Additions to bu ild ing:
Value of Machinery:
Additions to Machinery:
Value of motor vehicles:
Additions to motor vehicles:
Value of fu rn itu re  and equipment: 
Additions to fu rn itu re  and equipment
IN 1984: (Disposals are -ve).
Value of factory bu ild ing:
Additions to bu ild ing:
Value of Machinery:
Additions to Machinery:
Value of motor vehicles:
A 4
Additions to motor vehicles:
Value of fu rn itu re  and equipment: 
Additions to fu rn itu re  and equipment
IN 1985: (Disposals are -ve).
Value of factory  bu ild ing:
Additions to bu ild ing:
Value of Machinery:
Additions to Machinery:
Value of motor vehicles:
Additions to motor vehicles:
Value of fu rn itu re  and equipment: 
Additions to fu rn itu re  and equipment
IN 1986: (Disposals are -ve).
Value of factory  bu ild ing:
Additions to bu ild ing:
Value of Machinery:
Additions to Machinery:
Value of motor vehicles:
Additions to motor vehicles:
Value of fu rn itu re  and equipment: 
Additions to fu rn itu re  and equipment
IN 1987: (Disposals are -ve).
Value of factory bu ild ing:
A 5
Additions to building:
Value of Machinery:
Additions to Machinery:
Value of motor vehicles:
Additions to motor vehicles:
Value of fu rn itu re  and equipment: 
Additions to fu rn itu re  and equipment:
IN 1988: (Disposals are -ve).
Value of factory  bu ild ing:
Additions to bu ild ing:
Value of Machinery:
Additions to Machinery:
Value of motor vehicles:
Additions to motor vehicles:
Value of fu rn itu re  and equipment: 
Additions to fu rn itu re  and equipment
IN 1989: (Disposals are -ve).
Value of factory  bu ild ing:
Additions to bu ild ing:
Value of Machinery:
Additions to Machinery:
Value of motor vehicles:
Additions to motor vehicles:
Value of fu rn itu re  and equipment: 
Additions to fu rn itu re  and equipment
A 6
STATE DATE AND VALUE OF ANY REVALUATIONS:
Section (3) - E lec tric ity  consumption in 1989
Units consumed in KWh.:
Maximum Demand in KVA.:
COST STRUCTURE QUESTIONNAIRE
Section (1) - Yarn Manufacturing Cost.
Blend of yarn:
Yarn count:
Overheads in cedis per kg.:
Cotton cost in C/Kg.:
Polyester cost in C/Kg.:
Viscose cost in C/Kg.:
Waste cost in Cedis/Kg.:
Section (2) - Fabric Manufacturing Cost.
Type of fa b r ic :
Width of fab r ic  in inches.:
Labour cost in cedis per yard:
Power cost in C/yd.:
Supplies cost in C/yd.:
Depreciation + in te rest in C/yd.:
Yarn cost in C/yd.:
Raw material cost in C/yd.:
Waste in C/yd.:
A 8
GHANA COTTON COMPANY (GCC1 QUESTIONNAIRE
Section (1) - General Information.
Year Established:
Type of ownership:
Location:
Number of employees:
Section (2) - Performance of GCC for 1985-1989.
Area cu lt iva ted in Hectares 1985:
1986:
1987:
1988:
1989:
Volume seed cotton (tonnes) 1985:
1986:
1987:
1988:
1989:
L in t cotton price in Cedis 1985:
A 9
1986:
1987:
1988:
1989:
Volume l i n t  cotton (tonnes) 1985:
1986:
1987:
1988:
1989:
Section (3) - Cost Structure in 1991.
(a) Insectic ide.
How many times applied per year:
Quantity per hectare:
Cost per l i t r e :
(b) F e r t i l is e rs .
Quantity of compound f e r t i l i s e r  (bags/Ha)
Price of f e r t i l i s e r  per bag:
Quantity of ammonia f e r t i l i s e r  (bags/Ha):
Price of ammonia f e r t i l i s e r  per bag:
(c) Seed.
Quantity required in Kgs./Ha.:
Cost of Kg. of seed:
A 10
(d) Ploughing.
Cost per Ha.:
(e) Y ield.
Yield per Ha.:
Price payed to farmers per Ha.:
( f )  Ginning.
Cost per Kg. of l i n t  cotton:
Yield of l i n t  per Ha.:
(g) Transport.
Transport to + from gin in Kg of raw cotton
(h) S ta ff.
No. of senior s ta f f  per 1000 Ha:
Wages of senior s ta f f  per month:
No. of supervisors per 1000 Ha:
Wages of supervisor per month:
No. of workers per 1000 Ha:
Wages of workers per month:
Cost of 1 expatriate wages and accomodation
( i )  Vehicles.
Number of cars per lOOOHa:
Cost of 1 car:
Number of motorbikes per 1000 Ha:
A 11
Cost of 1 motorbike:
Number of tractors per 1000 Ha.:
Price per t rac to r :
( j )  Capital.
What operating capita l is given on credi t  
How long is c red i t :
What is in terest paid on cap i ta l :
A 12
APPENDIX 2.
FIRM (J) IMI JAVA, 1985.
dollar/cedi rate 54
CEDIS/10.968m $
imp. raw matl. $ 
imp. pack matl. $
imported raw mat (1) 689
imported pack mat(2) 22
duty imported mat(3) 228
other cost (local)(4) 222
tot cst imp l+2+3+4=(5) 1,161
percent duty on raw 3 3.00%
local r mat(6) 109
local pack (7) 0
transport handling(8) 0
tot C raw 5+6+7+8=(9) 1,270
direct labour(10) 413
cost fuel oil 97
cost power 3 9
cost water 57
percent red in fuel 0.00%
percent red in power 0.00%
percent red in water 0.00%
fuel oil(11a) 97
power(lib) 3 9
water(lie) 57
spares replacement(lid) 31
sum 11 224
mat+lab 9+10+lla.d=(12) 1,907
general admin (13) 170
other o'heads(14) 180
deliv sell exp (15,16) 10
efficiency improvement 0.00%
total cost 12...16=(17a) 2,267
efficiency saving 0
tot cost incl.eff.(17b) 2,267
bank charges/int (18) 2 3
grand total 17(b)+18=(19) 2,290
profit margin % 10.00%
profit margin (20) 229
ex-fac price 19+20=(21) 2,519
excise tax (percent) 15.00%
sales tax (percent) 10.00%
excise duty (22) 378
sales tax (23) 290
ex-fact pri+tax 21.23=(24) 3,187
per m
.16411
1.164 
0.037 
0.384 
0.375 
1.960
0.184
0.000
0.000
2.144
0.697
0.164
0.066
0.096
0.164 
0.066 
0.096 
0.052 
0. 378
3.220 
0.287 
0. 304
3.828 
0.000
3.828
0.039 
3 .866
0. 387 
4.253
0.638
0.489
5. 380
A 13
FIRM (J) IMI JAVA, 1985:d.30%
dollar/cedi rate 70.2
CEDIS/10.968m
imp. raw matl. $ 
imp. pack matl. $
imported raw mat (1) 896
imported pack mat(2) 22
duty imported mat(3) 296
other cost (local)(4) 222
tot cst imp l+2+3+4=(5) 1,436
percent duty on raw 3 3.00%
local r mat(6) 109
local pack (7) o
transport handling(8) 0
tot c raw 5+6+7+8=(9) 1,545
direct labour(10) 413
cost fuel oil 97
cost power 39
cost water 57
percent red in fuel 0.00%
percent red in power 0.00%
percent red in water 0.00%
fuel oil(lla) 97
power(lib) 39
water(11c) 57
spares replacement(lid) 31
sum 11 224
mat+lab 9+10+lla.d=(12) 2,182
general admin (13) 170
other o'heads(14) 180
deliv sell exp (15,16) 10
efficiency improvement 0.00%
total cost 12...16=(17a) 2,542
efficiency saving 0
tot cost incl.eff.(17b) 2,542
bank charges/int (18) 23
grand total 17(b)+18=(19) 2,565
profit margin % 10.00%
profit margin (20) 257
ex-fac price 19+20=(21) 2,822
excise tax (percent) 15.00%
sales tax (percent) 10.00%
excise duty (22) 423
sales tax (23) 324
ex-fact pri+tax 21.23=(24) 3,569
$ per m
1.16411
1.164 
0.029 
0. 384 
0.288 
1.865
0.142
0.000
0.000
2.007
0.536
0.126
0.051
0.074
0.126
0.051
0.074
0.040
0.291
2 . 834 
0.221 
0. 234
3.302 
0.000
3.302
0.030
3.331
0.333
3.665
0.550
0.421
4.636
A 14
Firm (J) IMI JAVA, 1985:r.i.t.2.5%
dollar/cedi rate 54
CEDIS/10.968m
imp. raw matl. $ 
imp. pack matl. $
imported raw mat (1) 689
imported pack mat(2) 22
duty imported mat(3) 228
other cost (local)(4) 222
tot cst imp l+2+3+4=(5) 1,161
percent duty on raw 3 3.00%
local r mat(6) 109
local pack (7) 0
transport handling(8) 0
tot c raw 5+6+7+8=(9) 1,270
direct labour 413
% red due to inc tax 2.50%
cost of labour (10) 402.675
cost fuel oil 97
cost power 3 9
cost water 57
percent red in fuel 0.00%
percent red in power 0.00%
percent red in water 0.00%
fuel oil(lla) 97
power(lib) 39
water(11c) 57
spares replacement(lid) 31
sum 11 224
mat+lab 9+10-Hla.d=( 12) 1,897
general admin (13) 170
other o/heads(14) 180
deliv sell exp (15,16) 10
efficiency improvement 0.00%
total cost 12...16=(17a) 2,257
efficiency saving 0
tot cost incl.eff.(17b) 2,257
bank charges/int (18) 23
grand total 17(b)+18=(19) 2,280
profit margin % 10.00%
profit margin (20) 228
ex-fac price 19+20=(21) 2,508
excise tax (percent) 15.00%
sales tax (percent) 10.00%
excise duty (22) 376
sales tax (23) 288
ex-fact pri+tax 21.23=(24) 3,172
$ per m
1.16411
1.164
0.037
0.384
0.375
1.960
0.184
0.000
0.000
2.144
0.697
0.680
0.164
0.066
0.096
0.164 
0.066 
0.096 
0.052 
0. 378
3.202 
0. 287 
0.304
3.810 
0.000
3.810
0.039
3.849
0.385
4.234
0.635
0.487
5.356
A 15
FIRM (J) IMI JAVA, 1985:r.m.5%,s.t.l5%,ex.0%,
dollar/cedi rate 54
CEDIS/10.968m
imp. raw matl. $ 
imp. pack matl. $
imported raw mat (1) 689
imported pack mat(2) 22
duty imported mat(3) 3 4
other cost (local)(4) 222
tot cst imp l+2+3+4=(5) 968
percent duty on raw 5.00%
local r mat(6) 109
local pack (7) 0
transport handling(8) 0
tot c raw 5+6+7+8=(9) 1,077
direct labour(10) 413
cost fuel oil 97
cost power 39
cost water 57
percent red in fuel 0.00%
percent red in power 0.00%
percent red in water 0.00%
fuel oil(lla) 97
power(lib) 39
water(llc) 57
spares replaceraent(lid) 31
sum 11 224
mat+lab 9+10+lla.d=(12) 1,714
general admin (13) 170
other o'heads(l4) 180
deliv sell exp (15,16) 10
efficiency improvement 0.00%
total cost 12...16=(17a) 2,074
efficiency saving 0
tot cost incl.eff.(17b) 2,074
bank charges/int (18) 23
grand total 17(b)+18=(19) 2,097
profit margin % 10.00%
profit margin (20) 210
ex-fac price 19+20=(21) 2,307
excise tax (percent) 0.00%
sales tax (percent) 15.00%
excise duty (22) 0
sales tax (23) 346
ex-fact pri+tax 21.23=(24) 2,653
$ per m
1.16411
1.164 
0.037 
0.058 
0.375 
1.634
0.184
0.000
0.000
1.818
0.697
0.164
0.066
0.096
0.164
0.066
0.096
0.052
0.378
2.894 
0. 287 
0. 304
3 .502 
0.000 
3.502
0.039
3.541
0.354 
3 .895
0.000
0.584
4.479
A 16
FIRM (J) IMI JAVA, 1985:r.m.5%,s.t.l5%,ex.0%, 
dollar/cedi rate 54 f.30%,p.30%,v
CEDIS/10.968m
imp. raw matl. $ 
imp. pack matl. $
imported raw mat (1) 689
imported pack mat(2) 22
duty imported mat(3) 34
other cost (local)(4) 22 2
tot cst imp l+2+3+4=(5) 968
percent duty on raw 5.00%
local r mat(6) 109
local pack (7) 0
transport handling(8) 0
tot c raw 5+6+7+8=(9) 1,077
direct labour(10) 413
cost fuel oil 97
cost power 3 9
cost water 57
percent red in fuel 30.00%
percent red in power 30.00%
percent red in water 20.00%
fuel oil(lla) 68
power(lib) 27
water(lie) 46
spares replacement(lid) 31
sum 11 171.8
mat+lab 9+10+lla.d=(12) 1,662
general admin (13) 170
other o/heads(14) 180
deliv sell exp (15,16) 10
efficiency improvement 5.00%
total cost 12...16=(17a) 2,022
efficiency saving 101
tot cost incl.eff.(17b) 1,921
bank charges/int (18) 23
grand total 17(b)+18=(19) 1,944
profit margin % 10.00%
profit margin (20) 194
ex-fac price 19+20=(21) 2,138
excise tax (percent) 0.00%
sales tax (percent) 15.00%
excise duty (22) 0
sales tax (23) 321
ex-fact pri+tax 21.23=(24) 2,459
.20%,ef.5% 
$ per m
1.16411
1.164 
0.037 
0.058 
0. 375 
1.634
0.184
0.000
0.000
1.818
0.697
0.164
0.066
0.096
0.115 
0.046 
0.077 
0.052 
0.290
2.806
0.287
0.304
3.414
0.171
3.243
0.039
3.282
0.328 
3 . 610
0.000
0.541
4.151
A 17
Firm (J) IMI JAVA, 1985:d.30%,r.m5%,s.tl5%,ex.0%,r.i.t .2.5%
dollar/cedi rate 70.2 f.30%,p.30%,w.20%,ef.5%
imp. raw matl. $ 
imp. pack matl. $ 
imported raw mat (1) 
imported pack mat(2) 
duty imported mat(3) 
other cost (local)(4) 
tot cst imp l+2+3+4=(5) 
percent duty on raw 
local r mat(6) 
local pack (7) 
transport handling(8)
tot c raw 5+6+7+8=(9)
direct labour 
% red due to inc tax 
cost of labour (10)
cost fuel oil 
cost power 
cost water 
percent red in fuel 
percent red in power 
percent red in water 
fuel oil(lla) 
power(lib) 
water(11c)
spares replacement(lid) 
sum 11
CEDIS/10.968m
896
22
45 
222
1,185
5.00%
109
0
0
1,294
413
2.50%
402.675
97
39
57
30.00%
30.00%
2 0 . 0 0 %
68
27
46 
31
171.8
$ per m
1.16411
164
029
058
288
539
142
000
000
1.681
0.536
0.523
0.126
0.051
0.074
0.088 
0.035 
0.059 
0.040 
0. 223
mat+lab 9+10+lla.d=(12) 
general admin (13) 
other o'heads(14) 
deliv sell exp (15,16) 
efficiency improvement 
total cost 12...16-(17a) 
efficiency saving 
tot cost incl.eff.(17b)
bank charges/int (18)
grand total 17(b)+18=(19)
profit margin % 
profit margin (20) 
ex-fac price 19+20=(21)
excise tax (percent) 
sales tax (percent) 
excise duty (22) 
sales tax (23)
1,869
170
180
10
5.00%
2,229
111
2,117
23
2,140
10 . 00%
214
2,354
0 . 0 0 %
15.00%
0
353
2.427
0.221
0.234
2.894
0.145
2.750
0.030
2.780
0.278
3.058
0.000
0.459
ex-fact pri+tax 21.23=(24) 2,707 3.516
A 18
FIRM (J) IMI JAVA, 1986.
dollar/cedi rate 89
CEDIS/10.968m
imp. raw matl. $ 
imp. pack matl. $
imported raw mat (1) 583
imported pack mat(2) 50
duty imported mat(3) 193
other cost (local)(4) 99
tot cst imp l+2+3+4=(5) 925
percent duty on raw 33.00%
local r mat(6) 121
local pack (7) 29
transport handling(8) 112
tot c raw 5+6+7+8=(9) 1,187
direct labour(10) 3 34
cost fuel oil 140
cost power 57
cost water 84
percent red in fuel 0.00%
percent red in power 0.00%
percent red in water 0.00%
fuel oil(11a) 140
power(lib) 57
water(lie) 84
spares replacement(lid) 45
sum 11 326
mat+lab 9+10+lla.d=(12) 1,847
general admin (13) 132
other o'heads(14) 140
deliv sell exp (15,16) 13
efficiency improvement 0.00%
total cost 12...16=(17a) 2,132
efficiency saving 0
tot cost incl.eff.(17b) 2,132
bank charges/int (18) 23
grand total 17(b)+18=(19) 2,155
profit margin % 10.00%
profit margin (20) 215
ex-fac price 19+20=(21) 2,370
excise tax (percent) 15.00%
sales tax (percent) 10.00%
excise duty (22) 356
sales tax (23) 273
ex-fact pri+tax 21.23=(24) 2,999
$ per m
0.59763
0.598
0.051
0.197
0.101
0.947
0.124
0.030
0.115
1.216
0.342
0.143
0.058
0.086
0.143
0.058
0.086
0.046
0.334
1.892
0.135
0.143
2.184 
0.000
2.184
0.024
2.208
0.221
2.428
0. 364 
0.279
3.072
A 19
FIRM (J) IMI JAVA, 1986:d.30%
dollar/cedi rate 115.7
CEDIS/10.968m
imp. raw matl. $ 
imp. pack matl. $
imported raw mat (1) 758
imported pack mat(2) 50
duty imported mat(3) 250
other cost (local)(4) 99
tot cst imp l+2+3+4=(5) 1,158
percent duty on raw 33.00%
local r mat(6) 121
local pack (7) 29
transport handling(8) 112
tot c raw 5+6+7+8=(9) 1,420
direct labour(10) 3 34
cost fuel oil 140
cost power 57
cost water 84
percent red in fuel 0.00%
percent red in power 0.00%
percent red in water 0.00%
fuel oil(11a) 140
power(lib) 57
water(11c) 84
spares replacement(lid) 45
sum 11 326
mat+lab 9+10+lla.d=(12) 2,080
general admin (13) 132
other o,heads(14) 140
deliv sell exp (15,16) 13
efficiency improvement 0.00%
total cost 12...16— (17a) 2,365
efficiency saving 0
tot cost incl.eff.(17b) 2,365
bank charges/int (18) 23
grand total 17(b)+18=(19) 2,388
profit margin % 10.00%
profit margin (20) 239
ex-fac price 19+20=(21) 2,626
excise tax (percent) 15.00%
sales tax (percent) 10.00%
excise duty (22) 394
sales tax (23) 302
ex-fact pri+tax 21.23=(24) 3 ,322
$ per m
0.59763
0.598
0.039
0.197
0.078
0.912
0.095
0.023
0.088
1.119
0.263
0.110
0.045
0.066
0.110
0.045
0.066
0.035
0.257
1.639
0.104
0 . 1 1 0
1.863 
0.000
1.863
0.018 
1. 882
0.188
2.070
0.310
0.238
2.618
A 20
Firm (J) IMI JAVA, 1986:r.i.t.2.5%
dollar/cedi rate 89
CEDIS/10.968m
imp. raw matl. $ 
imp. pack matl. $
imported raw mat (1) 583
imported pack mat(2) 50
duty imported mat(3) 193
other cost (local)(4) 99
tot CSt imp l+2+3+4=(5) 925
percent duty on raw 3 3.00%
local r mat{6) 121
local pack (7) 29
transport handling(8) 112
tot c raw 5+6+7+8=(9) 1,187
direct labour 334
% red due to inc tax 2.50%
cost of labour (10) 325.65
cost fuel oil 140
cost power 57
cost water 84
percent red in fuel 0.00%
percent red in power 0.00%
percent red in water 0.00%
fuel oil(lla) 140
power(lib) 57
water(11c) 84
spares replacement(lid) 45
sum 11 326
mat+lab 9+10+lla.d=(12) 1,839
general admin (13) 13 2
other o'heads(14) 140
deliv sell exp (15,16) 13
efficiency improvement 0.00%
total cost 12...16=(17a) 2,124
efficiency saving 0
tot cost incl.eff.(17b) 2,124
bank charges/int (18) 23
grand total 17(b)+18=(19) 2,147
profit margin % 10.00%
profit margin (20) 215
ex-fac price 19+20=(21) 2,361
excise tax (percent) 15.00%
sales tax (percent) 10.00%
excise duty (22) 354
sales tax (23) 272
ex-fact pri+tax 21.23=(24) 2,987
$ per m
0.59763
0
0.598
0.051
0.197
0.101
0.947
0.124
0.030
0.115
1.216
0. 342
0.334
0.143
0.058
0.086
0.143
0.058
0.086
0.046
0.334
1.883
0.135
0.143
2.175 
0.000
2.175
0.024
2.199
0 . 2 2 0  
2 .419
0.363
0.278
3.060
A 21
FIRM (J) IMI JAVA, 1986:r.m.5%,s.t.l5%,ex.0%,
dollar/cedi rate 89
CEDIS/10.968m
imp. raw matl. $ 
imp. pack matl. $
imported raw mat (1) 583
imported pack mat(2) 50
duty imported mat(3) 29
other cost (local)(4) 99
tot cst imp l+2+3+4=(5) 762
percent duty on raw 5.00%
local r mat(6) 121
local pack (7) 29
transport handling(8) 112
tot C raw 5+6+7+8=(9) 1,024
direct labour(10) 334
cost fuel oil 140
cost power 57
cost water 84
percent red in fuel 0.00%
percent red in power 0.00%
percent red in water 0.00%
fuel oil(lla) 140
power(lib) 57
water(11c) 84
spares replacement(lid) 45
sum 11 326
mat+lab 9+10+lla.d=(12) 1,684
general admin (13) 13 2
other o'heads(14) 140
deliv sell exp (15,16) 13
efficiency improvement 0.00%
total cost 12...16=(17a) 1,969
efficiency saving 0
tot cost incl.eff.(17b) 1,969
bank charges/int (18) 23
grand total 17(b)+18=(19) 1,992
profit margin % 10.00%
profit margin (20) 199
ex-fac price 19+20=(21) 2,191
excise tax (percent) 0.00%
sales tax (percent) 15.00%
excise duty (22) 0
sales tax (23) 329
ex-fact pri+tax 21.23=(24) 2,519
$ per m
0.59763
0.598
0.051
0.030
0.101
0.780
0.124
0.030
0.115
1.049
0.342
0.143
0.058
0.086
0.143
0.058
0.086
0.046
0.334
1.725
0.135
0.143
2.017 
0.000
2.017
0.024
2.040
0.204
2.244
0.000
0.337
2.581
A 22
FIRM (J) IMI JAVA, 1986:r.m.5%,s.t.l5%,ex.0%,
dollar/cedi rate 89 f.30%,p.30%,v
CEDIS/10.968m
imp. raw matl. $ 
imp. pack matl. $
imported raw mat (1) 583
imported pack mat(2) 50
duty imported mat(3) 29
other cost (local)(4) 99
tot cst imp l+2+3+4=(5) 762
percent duty on raw 5.00%
local r mat(6) 121
local pack (7) 29
transport handling(8) 112
tot c raw 5+6+7+8=(9) 1,024
direct labour(10) 334
cost fuel oil 140
cost power 57
cost water 84
percent red in fuel 30.00%
percent red in power 30.00%
percent red in water 20.00%
fuel oil(lla) 98
power(lib) 40
water(llc) 67
spares replacement(lid) 45
sum 11 250.1
mat+lab 9+10+lla.d=(12) 1,608
general admin (13) 13 2
other o'heads(14) 140
deliv sell exp (15,16) 13
efficiency improvement 5.00%
total cost 12...16=(17a) 1,893
efficiency saving 95
tot cost incl.eff.(17b) 1,798
bank charges/int (18) 23
grand total 17(b)+18=(19) 1,821
profit margin % 10.00%
profit margin (20) 182
ex-fac price 19+20=(21) 2,003
excise tax (percent) 0.00%
sales tax (percent) 15.00%
excise duty (22) 0
sales tax (23) 300
ex-fact pri+tax 21.23=(24) 2,304
.20%,ef.5% 
$ per m
0.59763
0.598
0.051
0.030
0.101
0.780
0.124
0.030
0.115
1.049
0.342
0.143
0.058
0.086
0.100 
0.041 
0 . 069 
0.046 
0.256
1.647
0.135
0.143
1.939
0.097
1.842
0.024
1.866
0.187
2.052
0.000
0.308
2. 360
A 23
Firm (J) IMI JAVA, 1986:d.30%,r.m5%,s.tl5%,ex.0%,r . 
dollar/cedi rate 115.7 f.30%,p.30%,%
CEDIS/10.968m
imp. raw matl. $ 
imp. pack matl. $
imported raw mat (1) 758
imported pack mat(2) 50
duty imported mat(3) 38
other cost (local)(4) 99
tot cst imp l+2+3+4=(5) 945
percent duty on raw 5.00%
local r mat(6) 121
local pack (7) 29
transport handling(8) 112
tot c raw 5+6+7+8=(9) 1,207
direct labour 3 34
% red due to inc tax 2.50%
cost of labour (10) 325.65
cost fuel oil 140
cost power 57
cost water 84
percent red in fuel 30.00%
percent red in power 30.00%
percent red in water 20.00%
fuel oil(lla) 98
power(lib) 40
water(11c) 67
spares replacement(lid) 45
sum 11 250.1
mat+lab 9+10+lla.d=(12) 1,783
general admin (13) 132
other o/heads(14) 140
deliv sell exp (15,16) 13
efficiency improvement 5.00%
total cost 12...16— (17a) 2,068
efficiency saving 103
tot cost incl.eff.(17b) 1,965
bank charges/int (18) 23
grand total 17(b)+18=(19) 1,988
profit margin % 10.00%
profit margin (20) 199
ex-fac price 19+20=(21) 2,186
excise tax (percent) 0.00%
sales tax (percent) 15.00%
excise duty (22) 0
sales tax (23) 328
ex-fact pri+tax 21.23=(24) 2,514
i.t.2.5% 
.20%,ef.5% 
$ per ra
0.59763
0
0.598
0.039
0.030
0.078
0.745
0.095
0.023
0.088
0.951
0.263
0.257
0.110
0.045
0.066
0.077
0.031
0.053
0.035
0.197
1.405
0.104
0.110
1.630
0.081
1.548
0.018
1.566
0.157
1.723
0.000
0.258
1.981
A 24
FIRM (J) IMI JAVA, 1987.
dollar/cedi rate 153
CEDIS/10.968m
imp. raw matl. $ 
imp. pack matl. $
imported raw mat (1) 1,649
imported pack mat(2) 0
duty imported mat(3) 3 30
other cost (local)(4) 130
tot cst imp l+2+3+4=(5) 2,109
percent duty on raw 20.00%
local r mat(6) 229
local pack (7) 6
transport handling(8) 0
tot c raw 5+6+7+8=(9) 2,344
direct labour(10) 458
cost fuel oil 169
cost power 69
cost water 100
percent red in fuel 0.00%
percent red in power 0.00%
percent red in water 0.00%
fuel oil(lla) 169
power(lib) 69
water(11c) 100
spares replacement(lid) 54
sum 11 392
mat+lab 9+10+lla.d=(12) 3,194
general admin (13) 229
other o'heads(14) 164
deliv sell exp (15,16) 0
efficiency improvement 0.00%
total cost 12...16=(17a) 3,587
efficiency saving 0
tot cost incl.eff.(17b) 3,587
bank charges/int (18) 12
grand total 17(b)+18=(19) 3,599
profit margin % 10.00%
profit margin (20) 360
ex-fac price 19+20=(21) 3,958
excise tax (percent) 0.00%
sales tax (percent) 20.00%
excise duty (22) 0
sales tax (23) 792
ex-fact pri+tax 21.23=(24) 4,750
$ per m
0.98257
0.983
0.000
0.197
0.077
1.257
0.136
0.004
0.000
1.397
0.273
0.101
0.041
0.060
0.101
0.041
0.060
0.032
0.234
1.903
0.136
0.098
2.137 
0.000
2.137
0.007
2.144
0.214
2.359
0.000
0.472
2.831
A 25
FIRM (J) IMI JAVA, 1987:d.30%
dollar/cedi rate 199
CEDIS/10.968m
imp. raw matl. $ 
imp. pack matl. $
imported raw mat (1) 2,145
imported pack mat(2) 0
duty imported mat(3) 429
other cost (local)(4) 130
tot cst imp l+2+3+4=(5) 2,704
percent duty on raw 20.00%
local r mat(6) 229
local pack (7) 6
transport handling(8) 0
tot c raw 5+6+7+8— (9) 2,939
direct labour(10) 458
cost fuel oil 169
cost power 69
cost water 100
percent red in fuel 0.00%
percent red in power 0.00%
percent red in water 0.00%
fuel oil(lla) 169
power(lib) 69
water(lie) 100
spares replacement(lid) 54
sum 11 392
mat+lab 9+10+lla.d=(12) 3,789
general admin (13) 229
other o'heads(14) 164
deliv sell exp (15,16) 0
efficiency improvement 0.00%
total cost 12...16=(17a) 4,182
efficiency saving 0
tot cost incl.eff.(17b) 4,182
bank charges/int (18) 12
grand total 17(b)+18=(19) 4,194
profit margin % 10.00%
profit margin (20) 419
ex-fac price 19+20=(21) 4,613
excise tax (percent) 0.00%
sales tax (percent) 20.00%
excise duty (22) 0
sales tax (23) 923
ex-fact pri+tax 21.23=(24) 5,535
$ per m
0.98257
0.983
0.000
0.197
0.060
1.239
0.105
0.003
0.000
1.346
0.210
0.077
0.032
0.046
0.077
0.032
0.046
0.025
0.180
1.736
0.105
0.075
1.916 
0.000
1.916
0.005
1.921
0.192
2.113
0.000
0.423
2.536
A 26
Firm (J) IMI JAVA, 1987:r.i.t.2.5%
dollar/cedi rate 153
CEDIS/10.968m
imp. raw matl. $ 
imp. pack matl. $
imported raw mat (1) 1,649
imported pack mat(2) 0
duty imported mat(3) 330
other cost (local)(4) 130
tot CSt imp l+2+3+4=(5) 2,109
percent duty on raw 20.00%
local r mat(6) 229
local pack (7) 6
transport handling(8) 0
tot c raw 5+6+7+8=(9) 2,344
direct labour 458
% red due to inc tax 2.50%
cost of labour (10) 446.55
cost fuel oil 169
cost power 69
cost water 100
percent red in fuel 0.00%
percent red in power 0.00%
percent red in water 0.00%
fuel oil(11a) 169
power(lib) 69
water(11c) 100
spares replacement(lid) 54
sum 11 392
mat+lab 9+10+lla.d=(12) 3,182
general admin (13) 229
other o,heads(14) 164
deliv sell exp (15,16) 0
efficiency improvement 0.00%
total cost 12...16=(17a) 3,575
efficiency saving 0
tot cost incl.eff.(17b) 3,575
bank charges/int (18) 12
grand total 17(b)+18=(19) 3,587
profit margin % 10.00%
profit margin (20) 359
ex-fac price 19+20=(21) 3,946
excise tax (percent) 0.00%
sales tax (percent) 20.00%
excise duty (22) 0
sales tax (23) 789
ex-fact pri+tax 21.23=(24) 4,735
$ per m
0.98257
0
0.983
0.000
0.197
0.077
1.257
0.136
0.004
0.000
1.397
0.273
0.266
0.101
0.041
0.060
0.101 
0.041 
0.060 
0.032 
0.234
1.896
0.136
0.098
2 .130 
0.000 
2.130
0.007
2.138
0.214
2.351
0.000
0.470
2.822
A 27
FIRM (J) IMI JAVA, 1987:r.m.5%,s.t.l5%,ex.0%,
dollar/cedi rate 153
CEDIS/10.968m
imp. raw matl. $ 
imp. pack matl. $
imported raw mat (1) 1,649
imported pack mat(2) 0
duty imported mat(3) 82
other cost (local)(4) 130
tot cst imp l+2+3+4=(5) 1,861
percent duty on raw 5.00%
local r mat(6) 229
local pack (7) 6
transport handling(8) 0
tot C raw 5+6+7+8=(9) 2,096
direct labour(10) 458
cost fuel oil 169
cost power 69
cost water 100
percent red in fuel 0.00%
percent red in power 0.00%
percent red in water 0.00%
fuel oil(lla) 169
power(lib) 69
water(11c) 100
spares replacement(lid) 54
sum 11 392
mat+lab 9+10+lla.d=(12) 2,946
general admin (13) 229
other o'heads(14) 164
deliv sell exp (15,16) 0
efficiency improvement 0.00%
total cost 12...16=(17a) 3,339
efficiency saving 0
tot cost incl.eff.(17b) 3,339
bank charges/int (18) 12
grand total 17(b)+18=(19) 3,351
profit margin % 10.00%
profit margin (20) 335
ex-fac price 19+20=(21) 3,686
excise tax (percent) 0.00%
sales tax (percent) 15.00%
excise duty (22) 0
sales tax (23) 553
ex-fact pri+tax 21.23=(24) 4,239
$ per ra
0.98257
0.983
0.000
0.049
0.077
1.109
0.136
0.004
0.000
1.249
0.273
0.101
0.041
0.060
0.101
0.041
0.060
0.032
0.234
1.756
0.136
0.098
1.990 
0.000
1.990
0.007
1.997
0 . 2 0 0
2.197
0.000
0.330
2.526
A 28
FIRM (J) IMI JAVA, 1987:r.m.5%,s.t.l5%,ex.0%,
dollar/cedi rate 153 f.30%,p.30%,w.20%,ef.5%
imp. raw matl. $ 
imp. pack matl. $ 
imported raw mat (1) 
imported pack mat(2) 
duty imported mat(3) 
other cost (local)(4) 
tot cst imp l+2+3+4=(5) 
percent duty on raw 
local r mat(6) 
local pack (7) 
transport handling(8)
tot c raw 5+6+7+8=(9)
direct labour(10)
cost fuel oil 
cost power 
cost water 
percent red in fuel 
percent red in power 
percent red in water 
fuel oil(lla) 
power(lib) 
water(11c)
spares replacement(lid) 
sum 11
CEDIS/10.968m
1,649
0
82
130
1,861
5.00%
229
6
0
2,096
458
169
69
100
30.00%
30.00%
2 0 . 0 0 %
118
48
80
54
300.6
$ per m
0.98257
0.983
0.000
0.049
0.077
1.109
0.136
0.004
0.000
1.249
0.273
0.101
0.041
0.060
0.070
0.029
0.048
0.032
0.179
mat+lab 9+10+lla.d=(12) 
general admin (13) 
other o'heads(14) 
deliv sell exp (15,16) 
efficiency improvement 
total cost 12...16=(17a) 
efficiency saving 
tot cost incl.eff.(17b)
bank charges/int (18)
grand total 17(b)+18=(19)
profit margin % 
profit margin (20) 
ex-fac price 19+20=(21)
excise tax (percent) 
sales tax (percent) 
excise duty (22) 
sales tax (23)
2,855
229
164
0
5.00% 
3,248 
162 
3 ,086
12
3 ,098
1 0 . 0 0 %
310
3,407
0 . 0 0 %
15.00%
0
511
1.701 
0.136 
0 .098
1.935
0.097
1.839
0.007
1. 846
0.185
2.030
0.000
0.305
ex-fact pri+tax 21.23-(24) 3 ,918 2.335
A 29
Firm (J) IMI JAVA, I987:d.30%,r.m5%,s.tl5%,ex.0%,r.i.t.2.5% 
dollar/cedi rate 199 f.30%,p.30%,w.20%,ef.5:
imp. raw matl. $ 
imp. pack matl. $ 
imported raw mat (1) 
imported pack mat(2) 
duty imported mat(3) 
other cost (local)(4) 
tot cst imp l+2+3+4=(5) 
percent duty on raw 
local r mat(6) 
local pack (7) 
transport handling(8)
tot c raw 5+6+7+8=(9)
direct labour 
% red due to inc tax 
cost of labour (10)
cost fuel oil 
cost power 
cost water 
percent red in fuel 
percent red in power 
percent red in water 
fuel oil(lla) 
power(lib) 
water(11c)
spares replacement(lid) 
sum 11
CEDIS/10.968m
2,145
0
107
130
2,382
5.00%
229
6
0
2,617
458
2.50%
446.55
169 
69 
100 
30.00% 
30.00% 
2 0 . 0 0 % 
118 
48 
80 
54 
300 . 6
$ per m
0.98257
0
0.983
0.000
0.049
0.060
1.091
0.105
0.003
0.000
1.199
0 . 210
0.205
0.077
0.032
0.046
0.054 
0 . 022 
0.037 
0.025 
0.138
mat+lab 9+10+lla.d=(12) 
general admin (13) 
other o'heads(l4) 
deliv sell exp (15,16) 
efficiency improvement 
total cost 12...16=(17a) 
efficiency saving 
tot cost incl.eff.(17b)
bank charges/int (18)
grand total 17(b)+18=(19)
profit margin % 
profit margin (20) 
ex-fac price 19+20=(21)
excise tax (percent) 
sales tax (percent) 
excise duty (22) 
sales tax (23)
3,364
229
164
0
5.00%
3,757
188
3,569
12
3 ,581
1 0 . 0 0 %
358
3,939
0 . 0 0 %
15.00%
0
591
1.541
0.105
0.075
1.721
0.086
1.635
0.005
1.641
0.164
1.805
0.000
0.271
ex-fact pri+tax 21.23=(24) 4,530 2.076
A 30
FIRM (J) IMI JAVA, 1988.
dollar/cedi rate 202
CEDIS/10.968m
imp. raw matl. $ 
imp. pack matl. $
imported raw mat (1) 2,144
imported pack mat(2) 0
duty imported mat(3) 322
other cost (local)(4) 162
tot cst imp l+2+3+4=(5) 2,627
percent duty on raw 15.00%
local r mat(6) 309
local pack (7) 9
transport handling(8) 0
tot C raw 5+6+7+8=(9) 2,945
direct labour(10) 651
cost fuel oil 212
cost power 86
cost water 126
percent red in fuel 0.00%
percent red in power 0.00%
percent red in water 0.00%
fuel oil(11a) 212
power(lib) 86
water(llc) 126
spares replacement(lid) 68
sum 11 492
mat+lab 9+10+lla.d=(12) 4,088
general admin (13) 287
other o'heads(14) 206
deliv sell exp (15,16) 0
efficiency improvement 0.00%
total cost 12...16=(17a) 4,581
efficiency saving 0
tot cost incl.eff.(17b) 4,581
bank charges/int (18) 16
grand total 17(b)+18=(19) 4,597
profit margin % 10.00%
profit margin (20) 460
ex-fac price 19+20=(21) 5,057
excise tax (percent) 0.00%
sales tax (percent) 25.00%
excise duty (22) 0
sales tax (23) 1,264
ex-fact pri+tax 21.23=(24) 6,321
$ per m
0.9675
0.968
0.000
0.145
0.073
1.186
0.139
0.004
0.000
1.329
0.294
0.096
0.039
0.057
0.096
0.039
0.057
0.031
0 . 2 2 2
1.845
0.130
0.093
2.068
0.000
2.068
0.007
2.075
0.207
2.282
0.000
0.571
2.853
A 31
FIRM (J) IMI JAVA, 1988:d.30%
dollar/cedi rate 262.6
CEDIS/10.968m
imp. raw matl. $ 
imp. pack matl. $
imported raw mat (1) 2,787
imported pack mat(2) 0
duty imported mat(3) 418
other cost (local)(4) 16 2
tot cst imp l+2+3+4=(5) 3,367
percent duty on raw 15.00%
local r mat(6) 3 09
local pack (7) 9
transport handling(8) 0
tot c raw 5+6+7+8=(9) 3,685
direct labour(10) 651
cost fuel oil 212
cost power 86
cost water 126
percent red in fuel 0.00%
percent red in power 0.00%
percent red in water 0.00%
fuel oil(11a) 212
power(lib) 86
water(11c) 126
spares replacement lid) 68
sum 11 49 2
mat+lab 9+10+lla.d=(12) 4,828
general admin (13) 287
other o'heads(14) 206
deliv sell exp (15,16) 0
efficiency improvement 0.00%
total cost 12...16=(17a) 5,321
efficiency saving 0
tot cost incl.eff.(17b) 5,321
bank charges/int (18) 16
grand total 17(b)+18»(19) 5,337
profit margin % 10.00%
profit margin (20) 534
ex-fac price 19+20=(21) 5,870
excise tax (percent) 0.00%
sales tax (percent) 25.00%
excise duty (22) 0
sales tax (23) 1,468
ex-fact pri+tax 21.23=(24) 7,338
$ per m
0.9675
0.968
0.000
0.145
0.056
1.169
0.107
0.003
0.000
1.279
0.226
0.074
0.030
0.044
0.074
0.030
0.044
0.024
0.171
1.676 
0 . 1 0 0  
0.072
1.847 
0.000
1.847
0.006
1.853
0.185
2.038
0.000
0.510
2.548
A 32
Firm (J) IMI JAVA, 1988:r.i.t.2.5%
dollar/cedi rate 202
CEDIS/10.968m
imp. raw matl. $ 
imp. pack matl. $
imported raw mat (1) 2,144
imported pack mat(2) 0
duty imported mat(3) 322
other cost (local)(4) 162
tot CSt imp l+2+3+4=(5) 2,627
percent duty on raw 15.00%
local r mat(6) 309
local pack (7) 9
transport handling(8) 0
tot C raw 5+6+7+8=(9) 2,945
direct labour 651
% red due to inc tax 2.50%
cost of labour (10) 634.725
cost fuel oil 212
cost power 86
cost water 126
percent red in fuel 0.00%
percent red in power 0.00%
percent red in water 0.00%
fuel oil(lla) 212
power(lib) 86
water(llc) 126
spares replacement(lid) 68
sum 11 492
mat+lab 9+10+lla.d=(12) 4,072
general admin (13) 287
other o'heads(14) 206
deliv sell exp (15,16) 0
efficiency improvement 0.00%
total cost 12...16=(17a) 4,565
efficiency saving 0
tot cost incl.eff.(17b) 4,565
bank charges/int (18) 16
grand total 17(b)+18=(19) 4,581
profit margin % 10.00%
profit margin (20) 458
ex-fac price 19+20=(21) 5,039
excise tax (percent) 0.00%
sales tax (percent) 25.00%
excise duty (22) 0
sales tax (23) 1,260
ex-fact pri+tax 21.23=(24) 6,299
$ per m
0.9675
0
0.968
0.000
0.145
0.073
1.186
0.139
0.004 
0.000
1. 329
0 . 294
0.286
0.096
0.039
0.057
0.096 
0.039 
0.057 
0.031 
0 . 222
1.838
0.130
0.093
2.060
0.000
2.060
0.007
2.068
0.207
2.274
0.000
0.569
2.843
A 33
FIRM (J) IMI JAVA, 1988:r.m.5%,s.t.l5%,ex.0%,
dollar/cedi rate 202
CEDIS/10.968m
imp. raw matl. $ 
imp. pack matl. $
imported raw mat (1) 2,144
imported pack mat(2) 0
duty imported mat(3) 107
other cost (local)(4) 162
tot cst imp l+2+3+4=(5) 2,413
percent duty on raw 5.00%
local r mat(6) 309
local pack (7) 9
transport handling(8) 0
tot c raw 5+6+7+8=(9) 2,731
direct labour(10) 651
cost fuel oil 212
cost power 86
cost water 126
percent red in fuel 0.00%
percent red in power 0.00%
percent red in water 0.00%
fuel oil(lla) 212
power(lib) 86
water(11c) 126
spares replacement(lid) 68
sum 11 492
mat+lab 9+10+lla.d=(12) 3,874
general admin (13) 287
other o'heads(14) 206
deliv sell exp (15,16) 0
efficiency improvement 0.00%
total cost 12...16=(17a) 4,367
efficiency saving 0
tot cost incl.eff.(17b) 4,367
bank charges/int (18) 16
grand total 17(b)+18=(19) 4,383
profit margin % 10.00%
profit margin (20) 438
ex-fac price 19+20=(21) 4,821
excise tax (percent) 0.00%
sales tax (percent) 15.00%
excise duty (22) 0
sales tax (23) 723
ex-fact pri+tax 21.23-(24) 5,544
$ per m
0.9675
0.968
0.000
0.048
0.073
1.089
0.139
0.004
0.000
1.233
0.294
0.096
0.039
0.057
0.096
0.039
0.057
0.031
0 . 2 2 2
1.748
0.130
0.093
1.971 
0.000
1.971
0.007
1.978
0.198
2.176
0.000
0.326
2.502
A 34
FIRM (J) IMI JAVA, 1988:r.m.5%,s.t.l5%,ex.0%, 
dollar/cedi rate 202 f.30%,p.30%,v
CEDIS/10.968m
imp. raw matl. $ 
imp. pack matl. $
imported raw mat (1) 2,144
imported pack mat(2) 0
duty imported mat(3) 107
other cost (local)(4) 162
tot cst imp l+2+3+4=(5) 2,413
percent duty on raw 5.00%
local r mat(6) 309
local pack (7) 9
transport handling(8) 0
tot c raw 5+6+7+8=(9) 2,731
direct labour(10) 651
cost fuel oil 212
cost power 86
cost water 126
percent red in fuel 30.00%
percent red in power 30.00%
percent red in water 20.00%
fuel oil(lla) 148
power(lib) 60
water(llc) 101
spares replacement(lid) 68
sum 11 377.4
mat+lab 9+10+lla.d=(12) 3,759
general admin (13) 287
other o'heads(14) 206
deliv sell exp (15,16) 0
efficiency improvement 5.00%
total cost 12...16=(17a) 4,252
efficiency saving 213
tot cost incl.eff.(17b) 4,040
bank charges/int (18) 16
grand total 17(b)+18=(19) 4,056
profit margin % 10.00%
profit margin (20) 406
ex-fac price 19+20=(21) 4,461
excise tax (percent) 0.00%
sales tax (percent) 15.00%
excise duty (22) 0
sales tax (23) 669
ex-fact pri+tax 21.23=(24) 5,130
.20%,ef.5% 
$ per m
0.9675
0.968
0.000
0.048
0.073
1.089
0.139
0.004
0.000
1.233
0.294
0.096
0.039
0.057
0.067
0.027
0.045
0.031
0.170
1.697
0.130
0.093
1.919
0.096
1.823
0.007
1.830
0.183
2.014
0.000
0.302
2.316
A 35
Firm (J) IMI JAVA, 1988:d.30%,r.m5%,s.tl5%,ex.0%,r.i.t .2.5% 
dollar/cedi rate 262.6 f.30%,p.30%,w.20%,ef.5%
imp. raw matl. $ 
imp. pack matl. $ 
imported raw mat (1) 
imported pack mat(2) 
duty imported mat(3) 
other cost (local)(4) 
tot cst imp l+2+3+4=(5) 
percent duty on raw 
local r mat(6) 
local pack (7) 
transport handling(8)
tot c raw 5+6+7+8=(9)
direct labour 
% red due to inc tax 
cost of labour (10)
cost fuel oil 
cost power 
cost water 
percent red in fuel 
percent red in power 
percent red in water 
fuel oil(lla) 
power(lib) 
water(11c)
spares replacement(lid) 
sum 11
CEDIS/10.968m
2,787
0
139
162
3,088
5.00%
309
9
0
3,406
651 
2. 50% 
634.725
212
86
126
30.00%
30.00%
2 0 . 0 0 %
148
60
101
68
377.4
$ per m
0.9675
0
968
000
048
056
072
0.107
0.003
0.000
1.183
0.226
0 . 2 2 0
0.074
0.030
0.044
0.052
0.021
0.035
0.024
0.131
mat+lab 9+10+lla.d=(12) 
general admin (13) 
other o/heads(14) 
deliv sell exp (15,16) 
efficiency improvement 
total cost 12...16-(17a) 
efficiency saving 
tot cost incl.eff.(17b)
bank charges/int (18)
grand total 17(b)+18=(19)
profit margin % 
profit margin (20) 
ex-fac price 19+20=(21)
excise tax (percent) 
sales tax (percent) 
excise duty (22) 
sales tax (23)
4,418
287
206
0
5.00%
4,911
246
4,665
16
4,681
1 0 . 0 0 %
468
5,150
0 . 0 0 %
15.00%
0
772
1.534
0.100
0.072
1.705
0.085
1.620
0.006
1.625
0.163
1.788
0.000
0.268
ex-fact pri+tax 21.23=(24) 5,922 2.056
A 36
FIRM (J) IMI JAVA, 1989.
dollar/cedi rate 270
CEDIS/10. 968ltl
imp. raw matl. $ 
imp. pack matl. $
imported raw mat (1) 3,014
imported pack mat(2) 0
duty imported mat(3) 452
other cost (local)(4) 195
tot CSt imp 1+2+34-4= (5) 3,661
percent duty on raw 15.00%
local r mat(6) 523
local pack (7) 14
transport handling(8) 0
tot C raw 5+6+7+8=(9) 4,198
direct labour(10) 770
cost fuel oil 252
cost power 103
cost water 149
percent red in fuel 0.00%
percent red in power 0.00%
percent red in water 0.00%
fuel oil(lla) 252
power(lib) 103
water(llc) 149
spares replacement lid) 81
sum 11 585
mat+lab 9+10+lla.d=(12) 5,553
general admin (13) 43 3
other o'heads(14) 319
deliv sell exp (15,16) 0
efficiency improvement 0.00%
total cost 12...16=(17a) 6,305
efficiency saving 0
tot cost incl.eff.(17b) 6,305
bank charges/int (18) 23
grand total 17(b)+18=(19) 6,328
profit margin % 10.00%
profit margin (20) 633
ex-fac price 19+20=(21) 6,961
excise tax (percent) 0.00%
sales tax (percent) 22.50%
excise duty (22) 0
sales tax (23) 1,566
ex-fact pri+tax 21.23=(24) 8,527
$ per m
1.01777
1.018 
0.000 
0.153 
0 . 066 
1.236
0.177
0.005
0.000
1.418
0.260
0.085
0.035
0.050
0.085
0.035
0.050
0.027
0.198
1.875
0.146
0.108
2.129 
0.000
2.129
0.008
2.137
0.214
2.351
0.000
0.529
2.879
A 37
FIRM (J) IMI JAVA, 1989:d.30%
dollar/cedi rate 351
CEDIS/10.968m
imp. raw matl. $ 
imp. pack matl. $
imported raw mat (1) 3,918
imported pack mat(2) 0
duty imported mat(3) 588
other cost (local)(4) 195
tot cst imp l+2+3+4=(5) 4,701
percent duty on raw 15.00%
local r mat(6) 523
local pack (7) 14
transport handling(8) 0
tot c raw 5+6+7+8=(9) 5,238
direct labour(10) 770
cost fuel oil 252
cost power 103
cost water 149
percent red in fuel 0.00%
percent red in power 0.00%
percent red in water 0.00%
fuel oil(lla) 252
power(lib) 103
water(11c) 149
spares replaceraent(lid) 81
sum 11 585
mat+lab 9+10+lla.d=(12) 6,593
general admin (13) 433
other o/heads(14) 319
deliv sell exp (15,16) 0
efficiency improvement 0.00%
total cost 12...16=(17a) 7,345
efficiency saving 0
tot cost incl.eff.(17b) 7,345
bank charges/int (18) 23
grand total 17(b)+18=(19) 7,368
profit margin % 10.00%
profit margin (20) 737
ex-fac price 19+20=(21) 8,105
excise tax (percent) 0.00%
sales tax (percent) 22.50%
excise duty (22) 0
sales tax (23) 1,824
ex-fact pri+tax 2l.23-(24) 9,928
$ per m
1.01777
1.018
0.000
0.153
0.051
1.221
0.136
0.004 
0.000
1. 361
0 . 2 0 0
0.065
0.027
0.039
0.065
0.027
0.039
0.021
0.152
1.713
0.112
0.083
1.908 
0.000
1.908
0.006
1.914
0.191
2.105
0.000
0.474
2.579
A 38
Firm (J) IMI JAVA, 1989:r.i.t.2.5%
dollar/cedi rate 270
CEDIS/10.968m
imp. raw matl. $ 
imp. pack matl. $
imported raw mat (1) 3,014
imported pack mat(2) 0
duty imported mat(3) 452
other cost (local)(4) 195
tot cst imp l+2+3+4=(5) 3,661
percent duty on raw 15.00%
local r mat(6) 523
local pack (7) 14
transport handling(8) 0
tot c raw 5+6+7+8=(9) 4,198
direct labour 770
% red due to inc tax 2.50%
cost of labour (10) 750.75
cost fuel oil 252
cost power 103
cost water 149
percent red in fuel 0.00%
percent red in power 0.00%
percent red in water 0.00%
fuel oil(11a) 252
power(lib) 103
water(llc) 149
spares replacement(lid) 81
sum 11 585
mat+lab 9+10+lla.d=(12) 5,534
general admin (13) 433
other o'heads(14) 319
deliv sell exp (15,16) 0
efficiency improvement 0.00%
total cost 12...16=(17a) 6,286
efficiency saving 0
tot cost incl.eff.(17b) 6,286
bank charges/int (18) 23
grand total 17(b)+18=(19) 6,309
profit margin % 10.00%
profit margin (20) 631
ex-fac price 19+20=(21) 6,940
excise tax (percent) 0.00%
sales tax (percent) 22.50%
excise duty (22) 0
sales tax (23) 1,561
ex-fact pri+tax 21.23=(24) 8,501
$ per m
1.01777
0
1.018
0.000
0.153
0.066
1.236
0.177
0.005
0.000
1.418
0.260
0.254
0.085
0.035
0.050
0.085
0.035
0.050
0.027
0.198
1.869
0.146
0.108
2.123 
0.000
2.123
0.008
2.130
0.213
2.343
0.000
0.527
2 .871
A 39
FIRM (J) IMI JAVA, 1989:r.m.5%,s.t.l5%,ex.0%,
dollar/cedi rate 270
CEDIS/10.968m
imp. raw matl. $ 
imp. pack matl. $
imported raw mat (1) 3,014
imported pack mat(2) 0
duty imported mat(3) 151
other cost (local)(4) 195
tot cst imp l+2+3+4=(5) 3,360
percent duty on raw 5.00%
local r mat(6) 523
local pack (7) 14
transport handling(8) 0
t o t  C raw 5+6+7+8=(9) 3,897
direct labour(10) 770
cost fuel oil 252
cost power 103
cost water 149
percent red in fuel 0.00%
percent red in power 0.00%
percent red in water 0.00%
fuel oil(lla) 252
power(lib) 103
water(llc) 149
spares replacement(lid) 81
sum 11 585
mat+lab 9+10+lla.d=(12) 5,252
general admin (13) 433
other o'heads(14) 319
deliv sell exp (15,16) 0
efficiency improvement 0.00%
total cost 12...16=(17a) 6,004
efficiency saving 0
tot cost incl.eff.(17b) 6,004
bank charges/int (18) 23
grand total 17(b)+18=(19) 6,027
profit margin % 10.00%
profit margin (20) 603
ex-fac price 19+20=(21) 6,629
excise tax (percent) 0.00%
sales tax (percent) 15.00%
excise duty (22) 0
sales tax (23) 994
ex-fact pri+tax 21.23=(24) 7,624
$ per m
1.01777
1.018
0.000
0.051
0.066
1.135
0.177
0.005 
0.000
1. 316
0.260
0.085
0.035
0.050
0.085
0.035
0.050
0.027
0.198
1.773
0.146
0.108
2.027 
0.000
2.027
0.008
2.035
0.204
2.239
0.000
0.336
2.574
A 40
FIRM (J) IMI JAVA, 1989:r.m.5%,s.t.l5%,ex.0%, 
dollar/cedi rate 270 f.30%,p.30%,v
CEDIS/10.968m
imp. raw matl. $ 
imp. pack matl. $
imported raw mat (1) 3,014
imported pack mat(2) 0
duty imported mat(3) 151
other cost (local)(4) 195
tot cst imp l+2+3+4=(5) 3,360
percent duty on raw 5.00%
local r mat(6) 523
local pack (7) 14
transport handling(8) 0
tot c raw 5+6+7+8=(9) 3,897
direct labour(10) 770
cost fuel oil 252
cost power 103
cost water 149
percent red in fuel 30.00%
percent red in power 30.00%
percent red in water 20.00%
fuel oil(11a) 176
power(llb) 72
water(11c) 119
spares replacement(lid) 81
sum 11 448.7
mat+lab 9+10+lla.d=(12) 5,115
general admin (13) 433
other o'heads(14) 319
deliv sell exp (15,16) o
efficiency improvement 5.00%
total cost 12...16=(17a) 5,867
efficiency saving 293
tot cost incl.eff.(17b) 5,574
bank charges/int (18) 23
grand total I7(b)+I8=(19) 5,597
profit margin % 10.00%
profit margin (20) 560
ex-fac price 19+20=(21) 6,157
excise tax (percent) 0.00%
sales tax (percent) 15.00%
excise duty (22) 0
sales tax (23) 924
ex-fact pri+tax 21.23=(24) 7,080
.20%,ef.5% 
$ per m
1.01777
1.018
0.000
0.051
0.066
1.135
0.177
0.005
0.000
1.316
0.260
0.085
0.035
0.050
0.060
0.024
0.040
0.027
0.152
1.727
0.146
0.108
1.981
0.099
1.882
0.008
1.890
0.189
2.079
0.000
0.312
2.391
A 41
Firm (J) IMI JAVA, 1989:d.30%,r.m5%,s.t!5%,ex.0%,r
dollar/cedi rate 351 f.30%,p.30%,
CEDIS/10.968m
imp. raw matl. $ 
imp. pack matl. $
imported raw mat (1) 3,918
imported pack mat(2) 0
duty imported mat(3) 196
other cost (local)(4) 195
tot cst imp l+2+3+4=(5) 4,309
percent duty on raw 5.00%
local r mat(6) 52 3
local pack (7) 14
transport handling(8) 0
tot c raw 5+6+7+8=(9) 4,846
direct labour 770
% red due to inc tax 2.50%
cost of labour (10) 750.75
cost fuel oil 252
cost power 103
cost water 149
percent red in fuel 30.00%
percent red in power 3 0.00%
percent red in water 20.00%
fuel oil(lla) 176
power(lib) 72
water(llc) 119
spares replacement(lid) 81
sum 11 448.7
mat+lab 9+10+lla.d=(12) 6,046
general admin (13) 433
other o'heads(14) 319
deliv sell exp (15,16) 0
efficiency improvement 5.00%
total cost 12...16=(17a) 6,798
efficiency saving 340
tot cost incl.eff.(17b) 6,458
bank charges/int (18) 23
grand total 17(b)+18=(19) 6,481
profit margin % 10.00%
profit margin (20) 648
ex-fac price 19+20=(2l) 7,129
excise tax (percent) 0.00%
sales tax (percent) 15.00%
excise duty (22) 0
sales tax (23) 1,069
ex-fact pri+tax 21.23=(24) 8,198
i . t . 2.5% 
.20%,ef.5% 
$ per m
1.01777
0
1.018
0.000
0.051
0.051
1.119
0.136
0.004
0.000
1.259
0 . 2 0 0
0.195
0.065
0.027
0.039
0.046
0.019
0.031
0.021
0.117
1.570
0 . 1 1 2
0.083
1.766
0.088
1.677
0.006
1.683
0.168
1.852
0.000
0.278
2.129
A 42
FIRM (J) IMI JAVA, 1990.
dollar/cedi rate 340
CEDIS/10.968m
imp. raw matl. $ 
imp. pack matl. $
imported raw mat (1) 4,173
imported pack mat(2) 0
duty imported mat(3) 417
other cost (local)(4) 226
tot cst imp l+2+3+4=(5) 4,816
percent duty on raw 10.00%
local r mat(6) 664
local pack (7) 17
transport handling(8) 0
tot c raw 5+6+7+8=(9) 5,497
direct labour(10) 863
cost fuel oil 309
cost power 126
cost water 184
percent red in fuel 0.00%
percent red in power 0.00%
percent red in water 0.00%
fuel oil(lla) 309
power(lib) 126
water(11c) 184
spares replacement(lid) 99
sura 11 718
mat+lab 9+10+lla.d=(12) 7,078
general admin (13) 462
other o'heads(14) 380
deliv sell exp (15,16) 0
efficiency improvement 0.00%
total cost 12...16-(17a) 7,920
efficiency saving 0
tot cost incl.eff.(17b) 7,920
bank charges/int (18) 28
grand total 17(b)+18=(19) 7,948
profit margin % 10.00%
profit margin (20) 795
ex-fac price 19+20=(21) 8,743
excise tax (percent) 0.00%
sales tax (percent) 22.50%
excise duty (22) 0
sales tax (23) 1,967
ex-fact pri+tax 21.23=(24) 10,710
$ per m
1.11892
1.119 
0.000 
0.112 
0.061 
1.291
0.178
0.005
0.000
1.474
0.231
0.083
0.034
0.049
0.083
0.034
0.049
0.027
0.193
1.898
0.124
0.102
2.124 
0.000
2.124
0.008
2.131
0.213
2.344
0.000
0.527
2.872
A 43
FIRM (J) IMI JAVA, 1990:d.30%
dollar/cedi rate 442
CEDIS/10.968m
imp. raw matl. $ 
imp. pack matl. $
imported raw mat (1) 5,424
imported pack mat(2) 0
duty imported mat(3) 542
other cost (local)(4) 226
tot CSt imp l+2+3+4=(5) 6,193
percent duty on raw 10.00%
local r mat(6) 664
local pack (7) 17
transport handling(8) 0
tot C raw 5+6+7+8=(9) 6,874
direct labour(10) 863
cost fuel oil 309
cost power 126
cost water 184
percent red in fuel 0.00%
percent red in power 0.00%
percent red in water 0.00%
fuel oil(lla) 309
power(llb) 126
water(llc) 184
spares replacement(lid) 99
sum 11 718
mat+lab 9+10+lla.d=(12) 8,455
general admin (13) 462
other o'heads(14) 380
deliv sell exp (15,16) 0
efficiency improvement 0.00%
total cost 12...16=(17a) 9,297
efficiency saving 0
tot cost incl.eff.(17b) 9,297
bank charges/int (18) 28
grand total 17(b)+18=(19) 9,325
profit margin % 10.00%
profit margin (20) 932
ex-fac price 19+20=(21) 10,257
excise tax (percent) 0.00%
sales tax (percent) 22.50%
excise duty (22) 0
sales tax (23) 2,308
ex-fact pri+tax 21.23=(24) 12,565
$ per m
1.11892
1.119
0.000
0 . 1 1 2
0.047
1.277
0.137
0.004
0.000
1.418
0.178
0.064
0.026
0.038
0.064
0.026
0.038
0 . 0 2 0
0.148
1.744
0.095
0.078
1.918 
0.000
1.918
0.006
1.923
0.192 
2.116
0.000
0.476
2.592
A 44
Firm (J) IMI JAVA, 1990:r.i.t .2.5%
dollar/cedi rate 340
CEDIS/10.968m
imp. raw matl. $ 
imp. pack matl. $
imported raw mat (1) 4,173
imported pack mat(2) 0
duty imported mat(3) 417
other cost (local)(4) 226
tot cst imp l+2+3+4=(5) 4,816
percent duty on raw 10.00%
local r mat(6) 664
local pack (7) 17
transport handling(8) 0
tot C raw 5+6+7+8=(9) 5,497
direct labour 863
% red due to inc tax 2.50%
cost of labour (10) 841.425
cost fuel oil 309
cost power 126
cost water 184
percent red in fuel 0.00%
percent red in power 0.00%
percent red in water 0.00%
fuel oil(11a) 309
power(lib) 126
water(llc) 184
spares replacement(lid) 99
sura 11 718
mat+lab 9+10+lla.d=(12) 7,056
general admin (13) 462
other o/heads(14) 380
deliv sell exp (15,16) 0
efficiency improvement 0.00%
total cost 12...16=(17a) 7,898
efficiency saving 0
tot cost incl.eff.(17b) 7,898
bank charges/int (18) 28
grand total 17(b)+18=(19) 7,926
profit margin % 10.00%
profit margin (20) 793
ex-fac price 19+20-(21) 8,719
excise tax (percent) 0.00%
sales tax (percent) 22.50%
excise duty (22) 0
sales tax (23) 1,962
ex-fact pri+tax 21.23=(24) 10,681
$ per m
1.11892
0
1.119
0.000
0 . 1 1 2
0.061
1.291
0.178
0.005
0.000
1.474
0,231
0.226
0.083
0.034
0.049
0.083
0.034
0.049
0.027
0.193
1.892
0.124
0.102
2.118
0.000
2.118
0.008
2.126
0.213
2.338
0.000 
0. 526
2.864
A 45
FIRM (J) IMI JAVA, 1990:r.m.5%,s.t.l5%,ex.0%,
dollar/cedi rate 340
CEDIS/10.968m
imp. raw matl. $ 
imp. pack matl. $
imported raw mat (1) 4,173
imported pack mat(2) 0
duty imported mat(3) 209
other cost (local)(4) 226
tot cst imp l+2+3+4=(5) 4,607
percent duty on raw 5.00%
local r mat(6) 664
local pack (7) 17
transport handling(8) 0
tot c raw 5+64-7+8= (9) 5,288
direct labour(10) 86 3
cost fuel oil 309
cost power 126
cost water 184
percent red in fuel 0.00%
percent red in power 0.00%
percent red in water 0.00%
fuel oil(lla) 309
power(lib) 126
water(llc) 184
spares replacement(lid) 99
sum 11 718
mat+lab 9+10+lla.d=(12) 6,869
general admin (13) 462
other o'heads(14) 380
deliv sell exp (15,16) 0
efficiency improvement 0.00%
total cost 12...16=(17a) 7,711
efficiency saving 0
tot cost incl.eff.(17b) 7,711
bank charges/int (18) 28
grand total 17(b)+18=(19) 7,739
profit margin % 10.00%
profit margin (20) 774
ex-fac price 19+20=(21) 8,513
excise tax (percent) 0.00%
sales tax (percent) 15.00%
excise duty (22) 0
sales tax (23) 1,277
ex-fact pri+tax 21.23=(24) 9,790
$ per m
1.11892
1.119
0.000
0.056
0.061
1.235
0.178
0.005
0.000
1.418
0.231
0.083
0.034
0.049
0.083
0.034
0.049
0.027
0.193
1.842
0.124
0.102
2.068
0.000
2.068
0.008
2.075
0.208
2.283
0.000
0.342
2.625
A 46
FIRM (J) IMI JAVA, 1990:r.m.5%,S.t.l5%,ex.0%,
dollar/cedi rate 340 f.30%,p.30%,v
CEDIS/10.968m
imp. raw matl. $ 
imp. pack matl. $
imported raw mat (1) 4,173
imported pack mat(2) 0
duty imported mat(3) 209
other cost (local)(4) 226
tot cst imp l+2+3+4=(5) 4,607
percent duty on raw 5.00%
local r mat(6) 664
local pack (7) 17
transport handling(8) 0
tot c raw 5+6+7+8=(9) 5,288
direct labour(10) 86 3
cost fuel oil 309
cost power 126
cost water 184
percent red in fuel 30.00%
percent red in power 30.00%
percent red in water 20.00%
fuel oil(lla) 216
power(lib) 88
water(lie) 147
spares replacement(lid) 99
sum 11 550.7
mat+lab 9+10+lla.d=(12) 6,702
general admin (13) 462
other o'heads(14) 380
deliv sell exp (15,16) 0
efficiency improvement 5.00%
total cost 12...16=(17a) 7,544
efficiency saving 377
tot cost incl.eff.(17b) 7,167
bank charges/int (18) 28
grand total 17(b)+18=(19) 7,195
profit margin % 10.00%
profit margin (20) 719
ex-fac price 19+20=(21) 7,914
excise tax (percent) 0.00%
sales tax (percent) 15.00%
excise duty (22) 0
sales tax (23) 1,187
ex-fact pri+tax 21.23=(24) 9,101
.20%,ef.5%
$ per m
1.11892
1.119
0.000
0.056
0.061
1.235
0.178
0.005
0.000
1.418
0.231
0. 083 
0.034 
0.049
0.058
0.024
0.039
0.027
0.148
1.797
0.124
0.102
2.023
0.101
1.922
0.008
1.929
0.193
2.122
0.000
0.318
2.441
A 47
Firm (J) IMI JAVA, I990:d.30%,r.m5%,s.tl5%,ex.0%,r.i.t.2.5%
dollar/cedi rate 442 f.30%,p.30%,w.20%,ef.5%
imp. raw matl. $ 
imp. pack matl. $ 
imported raw mat (1) 
imported pack mat(2) 
duty imported mat(3) 
other cost (local)(4) 
tot cst imp l+2+3+4=(5) 
percent duty on raw 
local r mat(6) 
local pack (7) 
transport handling(8)
tot c raw 5+6+7+8=(9)
direct labour 
% red due to inc tax 
cost of labour (10)
cost fuel oil 
cost power 
cost water 
percent red in fuel 
percent red in power 
percent red in water 
fuel oil(11a) 
power(lib) 
water(11c)
spares replacement(lid) 
sum 11
mat+lab 9+10+lla.d=(12) 
general admin (13) 
other o'heads(14) 
deliv sell exp (15,16) 
efficiency improvement 
total cost 12...16=(17a) 
efficiency saving 
tot cost incl.eff.(17b)
bank charges/int (18)
grand total 17(b)+18=(19)
profit margin % 
profit margin (20) 
ex-fac price 19+20=(21)
excise tax (percent) 
sales tax (percent) 
excise duty (22) 
sales tax (23)
CEDIS/10.968m
5,424
0
271
226
5,922
5.00%
664
17
0
6,603
863
2.50%
841.425
309
126
184
30.00%
30.00%
20.00%
216
88
147
99
550.7
7,995
462
380
0
5.00%
8,837
442
8,395
28
8,423
10.00%
842
9,265
0.00%
15.00%
0
1,390
$ per m
1.11892
0
1.119
0.000
0.056
0.047
1.221
0.137
0.004 
0.000
1. 362
0.178
0.174
0.064
0.026
0.038
0.045
0.018
0.030
0 . 0 2 0
0.114
1.649
0.095
0.078
1.823
0.091
1.732
0.006
1.737
0.174
1.911
0.000
0.287
ex-fact pri+tax 21.23=(24) 10,655 2.198
A 48
FIRM (J) IMI JAVA, 1990:r.m.0%,s.t.0%,ex.0%,
dollar/cedi rate 340 f.30%,p.30%,v
CEDIS/10.968m
imp. raw matl. $ 
imp. pack matl. $
imported raw mat (1) 4,173
imported pack mat(2) 0
duty imported mat(3) 0
other cost (local)(4) 226
tot CSt imp l+2+3+4=(5) 4,399
percent duty on raw 0.00%
local r mat(6) 664
local pack (7) 17
transport handling(8) 0
tot c raw 5+6+7+8=(9) 5,080
direct labour(10) 863
cost fuel oil 309
cost power 126
cost water 184
percent red in fuel 30.00%
percent red in power 30.00%
percent red in water 20.00%
fuel oil(lla) 216
power(llb) 88
water(11c) 147
spares replacement(lid) 99
sum 11 550.7
mat+lab 9+10+lla.d=(12) 6,493
general admin (13) 462
other o'heads(14) 380
deliv sell exp (15,16) 0
efficiency improvement 5.00%
total cost 12...16»(17a) 7,335
efficiency saving 367
tot cost incl.eff.(17b) 6,969
bank charges/int (18) 28
grand total 17(b)+18=(19) 6,997
profit margin % 10.00%
profit margin (20) 700
ex-fac price 19+20=(21) 7,696
excise tax (percent) 0.00%
sales tax (percent) 0.00%
excise duty (22) 0
sales tax (23) 0
ex-fact pri+tax 21.23=(24) 7,696
.20%,ef.5%
$ per m
1.11892
0
1.119
0.000
0.000
0.061
1.180
0.178 
0.005 
0 . 000
1.362
0.231
0.083
0.034
0.049
0.058
0.024
0.039
0.027
0.148
1.741
0.124
0.102
1.967
0.098
1.869
0.008
1.876
0.188
2.064
0.000
0.000
2.064
A 49
FIRM (J) IMI JAVA, 1990:d.30%,r.m.0%,s.t.0%,ex.0%,
dollar/cedi rate 442 f.30%,p.30%,w.20%,ef.5%
imp. raw matl. $ 
imp. pack matl. $ 
imported raw mat (1) 
imported pack mat(2) 
duty imported mat(3) 
other cost (local)(4) 
tot cst imp l+2+3+4=(5) 
percent duty on raw 
local r mat(6) 
local pack (7) 
transport handling(8)
tot c raw 5+6+7+8=(9)
direct labour(10)
cost fuel oil 
cost power 
cost water 
percent red in fuel 
percent red in power 
percent red in water 
fuel oil(lla) 
power(lib) 
water(11c)
spares replacement(lid) 
sum 11
CEDIS/10.968m
5,424
0
0
226
5,650
0.00%
664
17
0
6,331
863
309
126
184
30.00%
30.00%
20.00%
216
88
147
99
550.7
$ per m
11892
0
119 
000 
000 
047 
166
0.137
0.004 
0.000
1. 306
0.178
0.064
0.026
0.038
0.045
0.018
0.030
0 . 0 2 0
0.114
mat+lab 9+10+lla.d=(12) 
general admin (13) 
other o'heads(14) 
deliv sell exp (15,16) 
efficiency improvement 
total cost 12...16=(17a) 
efficiency saving 
tot cost incl.eff.(17b)
bank charges/int (18)
grand total 17(b)+18=(19)
profit margin % 
profit margin (20) 
ex-fac price 19+20=(21)
excise tax (percent) 
sales tax (percent) 
excise duty (22) 
sales tax (23)
7,745
462
380
0
5.00%
8,587
429
8,158
28
8,186
10.00%
819
9,004
0.00%
0.00%
0
0
1.598
0.095
0.078
1.771
0.089
1.683
0.006
1.689
0.169
1.857
0.000
0.000
ex-fact pri+tax 21.23=(24) 9,004 1.857
A 50
FIRM (A), REAL WAX , 1985.
dollar/cedi rate 54
CEDIS/10.968m
imp. raw matl. $ 
imp. pack matl. $
imported raw mat (1) 154
imported pack mat(2) 0
duty imported mat(3) 46
other cost (local)(4) 0
tot cst imp l+2+3+4=(5) 200
percent duty on raw 30.00%
local r mat(6) 1,614
local pack (7) 0
transport handling(8) 0
tot c raw 5+6+7+8=(9) 1,814
direct labour(10) 203
cost fuel oil 118
cost power 6
cost water 15
percent red in fuel 0.00%
percent red in power 0.00%
percent red in water 0.00%
fuel oil(lla) 118
power(lib) 6
water(11c) 15
spares replacement(lid) 17
sum 11 156
mat+lab 9+10+lla.d=(l2) 2,173
general admin (13) 120
other o'heads(14) 109
deliv sell exp (15,16) 0
efficiency improvement 0.00%
total cost 12...16=(17a) 2,402
efficiency saving 0
tot cost incl.eff.(17b) 2,402
bank charges/int (18) 0
grand total 17(b)+18=(19) 2,402
profit margin % 10.00%
profit margin (20) 240
ex-fac price 19+20=(21) 2,642
excise tax (percent) 15.00%
sales tax (percent) 10.00%
excise duty (22) 396
sales tax (23) 304
ex-fact pri+tax 21.23=(24) 3,342
$ per m
0.25971
0.260
0.000
0.078
0.000
0.338
2.725
0.000
0.000
3 .063
0.343
0.199
0.010
0.025
0.199
0.010
0.025
0.029
0.263
3.669
0.203
0.184
4.056 
0.000
4.056
0.000 
4 .056
0.406
4.461
0.669
0.513
5.643
A 51
FIRM (A), REAL WAX , 1985:d.30%
dollar/cedi rate 70.2
imp. raw matl. $ 
imp. pack matl. $ 
imported raw mat (1) 
imported pack mat(2) 
duty imported mat(3) 
other cost (local)(4) 
tot cst imp l+2+3+4=(5) 
percent duty on raw 
local r mat(6) 
local pack (7) 
transport handling(8)
tot c raw 5+6+7+8=(9)
direct labour(10)
cost fuel oil 
cost power 
cost water 
percent red in fuel 
percent red in power 
percent red in water 
fuel oil(lla) 
power(lib) 
water(11c)
spares replacement(lid) 
sum 11
mat+lab 9+io+lla.d=(l2) 
general admin (13) 
other o'heads(14) 
deliv sell exp (15,16) 
efficiency improvement 
total cost 12...16=(17a) 
efficiency saving 
tot cost incl.eff.(17b)
bank charges/int (18)
grand total 17(b)+18=(19)
profit margin % 
profit margin (20) 
ex-fac price 19+20=(21)
excise tax (percent) 
sales tax (percent) 
excise duty (22) 
sales tax (23)
ex-fact pri+tax 21.23=(24)
CEDIS/10.968m $ per m
0.25971
200 0.260
0 0.000
60 0.078
0 0.000
260 0.338
30.00%
1,614 2.096
0 0.000
0 0.000
1,874 2.434
203 0.264
118 0.153
6 0.008
15 0.019
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
118 0.153
6 0.008
15 0.019
17 0.022
156 0.203
2,233 2.900
120 0.156
109 0.142
0
0.00%
2.462 3.198
0 0.000
2.462 3.198
0 0.000
2.462 3.198
10.00%
246 0.320
2,708 3.517
15.00%
10.00%
406 0.528
311 0.404
3,426 4.449
A 52
Firm (A), REAL WAX, 1985:r.i.t.2.5%
dollar/cedi rate 54
imp. raw matl. $ 
imp. pack matl. $ 
imported raw mat (1) 
imported pack mat(2) 
duty imported mat(3) 
other cost (local)(4) 
tot cst imp l+2+3+4=(5) 
percent duty on raw 
local r mat(6) 
local pack (7) 
transport handling(8)
tot c raw 5+6+7+8=(9)
direct labour 
% red due to inc tax 
cost of labour (10)
cost fuel oil 
cost power 
cost water 
percent red in fuel 
percent red in power 
percent red in water 
fuel oil(lla) 
power(lib) 
water(11c)
spares replacement(lid) 
sum 11
mat+lab 9+10+lla.d=(12) 
general admin (13) 
other o'heads(14) 
deliv sell exp (15,16) 
efficiency improvement 
total cost 12...16=(17a) 
efficiency saving 
tot cost incl.eff.(17b)
bank charges/int (18)
grand total 17(b)+18=(19)
profit margin % 
profit margin (20) 
ex-fac price 19+20=(21)
excise tax (percent) 
sales tax (percent) 
excise duty (22) 
sales tax (23)
CEDIS/10.968m
154
0
46
0
200
30.00%
1,614
0
0
1,814
203 
2.50% 
197.925
118
6
15
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
118
6
15
17
156
2,168
120
109
0
0.00% 
2, 397 
0
2.397 
0
2.397
10.00% 
240 
2 ,637
15.00%
10.00%
395
303
$ per m
0.25971 
0
260
000
078
000
338
2.725
0.000
0.000
3.063
0.343
0.334
0.199
0.010
0.025
199
010
025
029
0 . 263
3.660
0.203
0.184
4.047 
0.000
4.047
0.000 
4 .047
0.405
4.452
0 . 6 6 8
0.512
ex-fact pri+tax 21.23=(24) 3,335 5.631
A 53
FIRM (A), REAL WAX , 1985:r.m.5%, S.t.15%,ex.0%,
dollar/cedi rate 54
CEDIS/10.968m
imp. raw matl. $ 
imp. pack matl. $ 
imported raw mat (1) 
imported pack mat(2) 
duty imported mat(3) 
other cost (local)(4) 
tot cst imp l+2+3+4=(5) 
percent duty on raw 
local r mat(6) 
local pack (7) 
transport handling(8)
tot c raw 5+6+7+8=(9)
direct labour(10)
cost fuel oil 
cost power 
cost water 
percent red in fuel 
percent red in power 
percent red in water 
fuel oil(lla) 
power(lib) 
water(11c)
spares replacement(lid) 
sum 11
mat+lab 9+10+lla.d=(12) 
general admin (13) 
other o'heads(14) 
deliv sell exp (15,16) 
efficiency improvement 
total cost 12...16=(17a) 
efficiency saving 
tot cost incl.eff.(17b)
bank charges/int (18)
grand total 17(b)+18=(19)
profit margin % 
profit margin (20) 
ex-fac price 19+20=(21)
excise tax (percent) 
sales tax (percent) 
excise duty (22) 
sales tax (23)
154
0
8
0
162
5.00%
1,614
0
0
1,776
203
118
6
15
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
118
6
15
17
156
2,135
120
109
0
0.00%
2.364 
0
2.364 
0
2.364
10.00%
236
2,600
0.00%
15.00%
0
390
$ per m
0.25971
0.260
0.000
0.013
0.000
0.273
725
000
0.000
2.998
0.343
0.199
0 . 0 1 0
0.025
199
010
025
029
263
604
203
184
3.991 
0.000 
3 .991
0.000
3.991
0.399
4.390
0.000
0.658
ex-fact pri+tax 21.23=(24) 2,990 5.048
A 54
FIRM (A), REAL WAX
dollar/cedi rate
1985:r.m.5%, s.t .15%,ex.0%,
54 f.30%,p.30%,W.20%,ef.5%
imp. raw matl. $ 
imp. pack matl. $ 
imported raw mat (1) 
imported pack mat(2) 
duty imported mat(3) 
other cost (local)(4) 
tot cst imp l+2+3+4=(5) 
percent duty on raw 
local r mat(6) 
local pack (7) 
transport handling(8)
tot c raw 5+6+7+8=(9)
direct labour(10)
cost fuel oil 
cost power 
cost water 
percent red in fuel 
percent red in power 
percent red in water 
fuel oil(lla) 
power(lib) 
water(11c)
spares replacement(lid) 
sum 11
mat+lab 9+10+lla.d=(12) 
general admin (13) 
other o'heads(14) 
deliv sell exp (15,16) 
efficiency improvement 
total cost 12...16=(17a) 
efficiency saving 
tot cost incl.eff.(17b)
bank charges/int (18)
grand total 17(b)+18-(19)
profit margin % 
profit margin (20) 
ex-fac price 19+20=(21)
excise tax (percent) 
sales tax (percent) 
excise duty (22) 
sales tax (23)
CEDIS/10.968m
154
0
8
0
162
5.00%
1,614
0
0
1,776
203
118
6
15
30.00%
30.00%
20.00%
83
4
12
17
115.8
2,094
120
109
0
5.00%
2,323
116
2.207
0
2.207
10.00%
221
2,428
0.00%
15.00%
0
364
$ per m
0.25971
0.260
0.000
0.013
0.000
0.273
2.725
0.000
0.000
2.998
0. 343
0.199
0 . 0 1 0
0.025
0.139
0.007
0 . 0 2 0
0.029
0.196
3.536 
0. 203 
0.184
3.923
0.196
3.727
0.000
3 .727
0. 373 
4.099
0.000
0.615
ex-fact pri+tax 21.23=(24) 2,792 4.714
A 55
Firm (A), REAL WAX, 1985:d.30%,r.m5%,s.tl5%,ex.0%,r.i.t.2.5*
dollar/cedi rate 70.2 f.30%, p .30%,w.20%,ef.5%
imp. raw matl. $ 
imp. pack matl. $ 
imported raw mat (1) 
imported pack mat(2) 
duty imported mat(3) 
other cost (local)(4) 
tot cst imp l+2+3+4=(5) 
percent duty on raw 
local r mat(6) 
local pack (7) 
transport handling(8)
tot c raw 5+6+7+8=(9)
direct labour 
% red due to inc tax 
cost of labour (10)
cost fuel oil 
cost power 
cost water 
percent red in fuel 
percent red in power 
percent red in water 
fuel oil(lla) 
power(lib) 
water(11c)
spares replacement(lid) 
sum 11
mat+lab 9+10+lla.d=(12) 
general admin (13) 
other o'heads(14) 
deliv sell exp (15,16) 
efficiency improvement 
total cost 12...16=(17a) 
efficiency saving 
tot cost incl.eff.(17b)
bank charges/int (18)
grand total 17(b)+18=(19)
profit margin % 
profit margin (20) 
ex-fac price 19+20=(21)
excise tax (percent) 
sales tax (percent) 
excise duty (22) 
sales tax (23)
CEDIS/10.968m
200
0
10
0
210
5.00%
1,614
0
0
1,824
203
2.50%
197.925
118
6
15
30.00%
30.00%
20.00%
83
4
12
17
115.8
2,138
120
109
0
5.00%
2,367
118
2,248
0
2 , 248
10.00%
225
2,473
0.00%
15.00%
0
371
$ per m
25971 
0
0.260 
0.000 
0.013 
0.000 
0.273
2.096 
0.000 
0.000
2.369
0. 264
0.257
0.153 
0.008 
0.019
0.107 
0.005 
0 . 016 
0 . 0 2 2  
0.150
2.776
0.156
0.142
3.074
0.154
2.920
0.000
2.920
0.292
3.212
0.000
0.482
ex-fact pri+tax 21.23=(24) 2,844 3.694
A 56
FIRM (A), REAL WAX , 1986.
dollar/cedi rate 89
CEDIS/10.968m
imp. raw matl. $ 
imp. pack matl. $
imported raw mat (1) 284
imported pack mat(2) 0
duty imported mat(3) 57
other cost (local)(4) 8
tot C S t  imp l+2+3+4=(5) 349
percent duty on raw 20.00%
local r mat(6) 1,614
local pack (7) 12
transport handling(8) 6
tot c raw 5+6+7+8=(9) 1,981
direct labour(10) 298
cost fuel oil 235
cost power 13
cost water 31
percent red in fuel 0.00%
percent red in power 0.00%
percent red in water 0.00%
fuel oil(11a) 235
power(lib) 13
water(11c) 31
spares replacement(lid) 34
sum 11 313
mat+lab 9+10+lla.d=(12) 2,592
general admin (13) 158
other o'heads(14) 85
deliv sell exp (15,16) 23
efficiency improvement 0.00%
total cost 12...16=(17a) 2,858
efficiency saving 0
tot cost incl.eff.(17b) 2,858
bank charges/int (18) 17
grand total 17(b)+18=(19) 2,875
profit margin % 10.00%
profit margin (20) 287
ex-fac price 19+20=(21) 3,162
excise tax (percent) 15.00%
sales tax (percent) 10.00%
excise duty (22) 474
sales tax (23) 364
ex-fact pri+tax 2l.23=(24) 4,000
$ per m
0.29079
0.291
0.000
0.058
0.008
0.357
1.653
0.012
0.006
2 .029
0.305
0.241
0.013
0.032
0.241
0.013
0.032
0.035
0.321
2.655
0.162
0.087
2.927 
0.000
2.927
0.017
2.945
0.294
3.239
0.486
0.373
4.098
A 57
FIRM (A), REAL WAX , 1986:d.30%
dollar/cedi rate 115.7
CEDIS/10.968m
imp. raw matl. $ 
imp. pack matl. $
imported raw mat (1) 369
imported pack mat(2) 0
duty imported mat(3) 74
other cost (local)(4) 8
tot cst imp l+2+3+4=(5) 451
percent duty on raw 20.00%
local r mat(6) 1,614
local pack (7) 12
transport handling(8) 6
tot C raw 5+6+7+8=(9) 2,083
direct labour(10) 298
cost fuel oil 235
cost power 13
cost water 31
percent red in fuel 0.00%
percent red in power 0.00%
percent red in water 0.00%
fuel oil(lla) 235
power(lib) 13
water(llc) 31
spares replacement(lid) 3 4
sum 11 313
mat+lab 9+10+lla.d=(12) 2,694
general admin (13) 158
other o'heads(14) 85
deliv sell exp (15,16) 23
efficiency improvement 0.00%
total cost 12...16=(17a) 2,960
efficiency saving 0
tot cost incl.eff.(17b) 2,960
bank charges/int (18) 17
grand total 17(b)+18=(19) 2,977
profit margin % 10.00%
profit margin (20) 298
ex-fac price 19+20=(21) 3,274
excise tax (percent) 15.00%
sales tax (percent) 10.00%
excise duty (22) 491
sales tax (23) 377
ex-fact pri+tax 2l.23=(24) 4,142
$ per m
0.29079
0.291
0.000
0.058
0.006
0.355
1.272
0.009
0.005
1.641
0.235
0.185
0 . 0 1 0
0.024
0.185
0 . 0 1 0
0.024
0.027
0.247
2.123
0.125
0.067
2.332 
0.000
2.332
0.013
2.346
0.235
2.580
0.387
0.297
3.264
A 58
Firm (A), REAL WAX, 1986:r.i.t.2.5
dollar/cedi rate 89
CEDIS/10.968m
imp. raw matl. $ 
imp. pack matl. $
imported raw mat (1) 284
imported pack mat(2) 0
duty imported mat(3) 57
other cost (local)(4) 8
tot cst imp l+2+3+4=(5) 349
percent duty on raw 20.00%
local r mat(6) 1,614
local pack (7) 12
transport handling(8) 6
tot c raw 5+6+7+8=(9) 1,981
direct labour 298
% red due to inc tax 2.50%
cost of labour (10) 290.55
cost fuel oil 235
cost power 13
cost water 31
percent red in fuel 0.00%
percent red in power 0.00%
percent red in water 0.00%
fuel oil(11a) 235
power(lib) 13
water(11c) 31
spares replacement(lid) 34
sum 11 313
mat+lab 9+10+lla.d=(12) 2,584
general admin (13) 158
other o'heads(14) 85
deliv sell exp (15,16) 23
efficiency improvement 0.00%
total cost 12...16=(17a) 2,850
efficiency saving 0
tot cost incl.eff.(17b) 2,850
bank charges/int (18) 17
grand total 17(b)+18=(19) 2,867
profit margin % 10.00%
profit margin (20) 287
ex-fac price 19+20=(21) 3,154
excise tax (percent) 15.00%
sales tax (percent) 10.00%
excise duty (22) 473
sales tax (23) 363
ex-fact pri+tax 21.23=(24) 3,990
$ per m
0.29079
0
0.291
0.000
0.058
0.008
0.357
1.653
0.012
0.006
2.029
0.305
0.298
0.241
0.013
0.032
0.241
0.013
0.032
0.035
0.321
2.647
0.162
0.087
2.920 
0.000
2.920
0.017 
2 .937
0.294
3.231
0.485
0.372
4.087
A 59
FIRM (A), REAL WAX , 1986:r.m.5%,s.t.15%,ex.0%,
dollar/cedi rate 89
CEDIS/10.968m
imp. raw matl. $ 
imp. pack matl. $
imported raw mat (1) 284
imported pack mat(2) 0
duty imported mat(3) 14
other cost (local)(4) 8
tot cst imp l+2+3+4=(5) 306
percent duty on raw 5.00%
local r mat(6) 1,614
local pack (7) 12
transport handling(8) 6
tot c raw 5+6+7+8=(9) 1,938
direct labour(lO) 298
cost fuel oil 235
cost power 13
cost water 31
percent red in fuel 0.00%
percent red in power 0.00%
percent red in water 0.00%
fuel oil(lla) 235
power(lib) 13
water(11c) 31
spares replacement(lid) 34
sum 11 313
mat+lab 9+10+lla.d=(12) 2,549
general admin (13) 158
other o'heads(14) 85
deliv sell exp (15,16) 23
efficiency improvement 0.00%
total cost 12...16=(17a) 2,815
efficiency saving 0
tot cost incl.eff.(17b) 2,815
bank charges/int (18) 17
grand total 17(b)+18=(19) 2,832
profit margin % 10.00%
profit margin (20) 283
ex-fac price 19+20=(21) 3,115
excise tax (percent) 0.00%
sales tax (percent) 15.00%
excise duty (22) 0
sales tax (23) 467
ex-fact pri+tax 21.23=(24) 3,583
$ per m
0.29079
0. 291 
0.000 
0.015 
0.008 
0.314
1.653
0.012
0.006
1.985
0.305
0.241
0.013
0.032
0.241 
0.013 
0.032 
0.035 
0. 321
2.611 
0.162 
0.087
2.884 
0.000
2.884
0.017
2.901
0.290
3.191
0.000
0.479
3.670
A 60
FIRM (A), REAL WAX , 1986:r.m.5%,s.t.15%,ex.0%,
dollar/cedi rate 89 f.30%,p.30%,w.20%,
CEDIS/10.968m $
imp. raw matl. $ (
imp. pack matl. $
imported raw mat (1) 284
imported pack mat(2) 0
duty imported mat(3) 14
other cost (local)(4) 8
tot cst imp l+2+3+4=(5) 306
percent duty on raw 5.00%
local r mat(6) 1,614
local pack (7) 12
transport handling(8) 6
tot c raw 5+6+7+8=(9) 1,938
direct labour(10) 298
cost fuel oil 235
cost power 13
cost water 31
percent red in fuel 3 0.00%
percent red in power 30.00%
percent red in water 20.00%
fuel oil(lla) 165
power(lib) 9
water(11c) 25
spares replacement(lid) 34
sum 11 232.4
mat+lab 9+10+lla.d=(12) 2,468
general admin (13) 158
other o'heads(14) 85
deliv sell exp (15,16) 23
efficiency improvement 5.00%
total cost 12...16=(17a) 2,734
efficiency saving 137
tot cost incl.eff.(17b) 2,598
bank charges/int (18) 17
grand total 17(b)+18=(19) 2,615
profit margin % 10.00%
profit margin (20) 261
ex-fac price 19+20=(21) 2,876
excise tax (percent) 0.00%
sales tax (percent) 15.00%
excise duty (22) 0
sales tax (23) 431
ex-fact pri+tax 21.23=(24) 3,308
ef .5%
per m
.29079
0.291
0.000
0.015
0.008
0.314
1.653
0.012
0.006
1.985
0.305
0.241
0.013
0.032
0.169
0.009
0.025
0.035
0.238
2.529
0.162
0.087
2.801
0.140
2.661
0.017
2.679
0.268
2.946
0.000
0.442
3.388
A 61
Firm (A), REAL WAX, 1986:d.30%,r.m5%,s.tl5%,ex.0%,r.i.t.2.5%
dollar/cedi rate 115.7 f.30%,p.30%,w.20%,ef.5%
imp. raw matl. $ 
imp. pack matl. $ 
imported raw mat (1) 
imported pack mat(2) 
duty imported mat(3) 
other cost (local)(4) 
tot cst imp l+2+3+4=(5) 
percent duty on raw 
local r mat(6) 
local pack (7) 
transport handling(8)
tot c raw 5+6+7+8=(9)
direct labour 
% red due to inc tax 
cost of labour (10)
cost fuel oil 
cost power 
cost water 
percent red in fuel 
percent red in power 
percent red in water 
fuel oil(lla) 
power(11b) 
water(11c)
spares replacement(lid) 
sum 11
CEDIS/10.968m
369
0
18
8
395
5.00%
1,614
12
6
2,027
298
2.50%
290.55
235
13
31
30.00%
30.00%
20.00%
165
9
25
34
232.4
$ per m
0.29079
0
0. 291 
0.000 
0.015 
0.006 
0.312
1.272
0.009
0.005
1.598
0.235
0. 229
0.185
0.010
0.024
0.130 
0.007 
0.020 
0.027 
0.183
mat+lab 9+10+lla.d=(12) 
general admin (13) 
other o'heads(14) 
deliv sell exp (15,16) 
efficiency improvement 
total cost 12...16=(17a) 
efficiency saving 
tot cost incl.eff.(17b)
bank charges/int (18)
grand total 17(b)+18=(19)
profit margin % 
profit margin (20) 
ex-fac price 19+20=(21)
excise tax (percent) 
sales tax (percent) 
excise duty (22) 
sales tax (23)
2 ,550 
158 
85 
23 
5.00% 
2,816 
141 
2,676
17
2,693
10.00%
269
2,962
0.00%
15.00%
0
444
2.010
0.125
0.067
2.219
0.111
2.108
0.013
2.122
0.212
2.334
0.000
0.350
ex-fact pri+tax 21.23=(24) 3 ,406 2.684
A 62
FIRM (A), REAL WAX , 1987.
dollar/cedi rate 153
CEDIS/10.968m
imp. raw matl. $ 
imp. pack matl. $
imported raw mat (1) 696
imported pack mat(2) 0
duty imported mat(3) 139
other cost (local)(4) 0
tot cst imp l+2+3+4=(5) 836
percent duty on raw 20.00%
local r mat(6) 2,424
local pack (7) 0
transport handling(8) 0
tot C raw 5+6+7+8=(9) 3,260
direct labour(10) 298
cost fuel oil 322
cost power 17
cost water 43
percent red in fuel 0.00%
percent red in power 0.00%
percent red in water 0.00%
fuel oil(lla) 322
power(lib) 17
water(llc) 43
spares replacement(lid) 47
sum 11 429
mat+lab 9+10+lla.d=(12) 3,987
general admin (13) 392
other o'heads(14) 114
deliv sell exp (15,16) 30
efficiency improvement 0.00%
total cost 12...16=(17a) 4,523
efficiency saving 0
tot cost incl.eff.(17b) 4,523
bank charges/int (18) 33
grand total 17(b)+18=(19) 4,556
profit margin % 10.00%
profit margin (20) 456
ex-fac price 19+20=(21) 5,011
excise tax (percent) 0.00%
sales tax (percent) 20.00%
excise duty (22) 0
sales tax (23) 1,002
ex-fact pri+tax 2l.23=(24) 6,013
$ per m
0.41498
0.415
0.000
0.083
0.000
0.498
1.444
0.000
0.000
1.942
0.178
0.192
0.010
0.026
0.192
0.010
0.026
0.028
0.256
2.376
0.234
0.068
2.695 
0.000
2.695
0 . 0 2 0
2.715
0.271
2.986
0.000
0.597
3.583
A 63
FIRM (A), REAL WAX , 1987:d.30%
dollar/cedi rate 199
CEDIS/10.968m
imp. raw matl. $ 
imp. pack matl. $
imported raw mat (1) 906
imported pack mat(2) 0
duty imported mat(3) 181
other cost (local)(4) 0
tot CSt imp l+2+3+4=(5) 1,087
percent duty on raw 20.00%
local r mat(6) 2,424
local pack (7) 0
transport handling(8) 0
tot c raw 5+6+7+8=(9) 3,511
direct labour(10) 298
cost fuel oil 322
cost power 17
cost water 43
percent red in fuel 0.00%
percent red in power 0.00%
percent red in water 0.00%
fuel oil(lla) 322
power(lib) 17
water(11c) 4 3
spares replacement(lid) 47
sum 11 429
mat+lab 9+10+lla.d=(12) 4,238
general admin (13) 392
other o'heads(14) 114
deliv sell exp (15,16) 30
efficiency improvement 0.00%
total cost 12...16=(17a) 4,774
efficiency saving 0
tot cost incl.eff.(17b) 4,774
bank charges/int (18) 3 3
grand total 17(b)+18=(19) 4,807
profit margin % 10.00%
profit margin (20) 481
ex-fac price 19+20=:(21) 5,288
excise tax (percent) 0.00%
sales tax (percent) 20.00%
excise duty (22) 0
sales tax (23) 1,058
ex-fact pri+tax 21.23=(24) 6,345
$ per m
0.41498
0.415
0.000
0.083
0.000
0.498
1.111
0.000
0.000
1.609
0.137
0.148 
0. 008 
0 . 0 2 0
0.148
0.008
0 . 0 2 0
0 . 0 2 2
0.197
1.942
0.180
0.052
2.187 
0.000
2.187
0.015
2 . 2 0 2
0 . 2 2 0
2.423
0.000
0.485
2.907
A 64
Firm (A), REAL WAX, 1987:r.i.t.2.5%
dollar/cedi rate 153
CEDIS/10.968m
imp. raw matl. $ 
imp. pack matl. $
imported raw mat (1) 696
imported pack mat(2) 0
duty imported mat(3) 139
other cost (local)(4) 0
tot CSt imp l+2+3+4=(5) 836
percent duty on raw 20.00%
local r mat(6) 2,424
local pack (7) 0
transport handling(8) 0
tot C raw 5+6+7+8=(9) 3,260
direct labour 298
% red due to inc tax 2.50%
cost of labour (10) 290.55
cost fuel oil 322
cost power 17
cost water 43
percent red in fuel 0.00%
percent red in power 0.00%
percent red in water 0.00%
fuel oil(lla) 322
power(11b) 17
water(11c) 43
spares replacement(lid) 47
sum 11 429
mat+lab 9+10+lla.d=(12) 3,979
general admin (13) 392
other o'heads(14) 114
deliv sell exp (15,16) 30
efficiency improvement 0.00%
total cost 12...16=(17a) 4,515
efficiency saving 0
tot cost incl.eff.(17b) 4,515
bank charges/int (18) 3 3
grand total 17(b)+18=(19) 4,548
profit margin % 10.00%
profit margin (20) 455
ex-fac price 19+20=(21) 5,003
excise tax (percent) 0.00%
sales tax (percent) 20.00%
excise duty (22) 0
sales tax (23) 1,001
ex-fact pri+tax 21.23=(24) 6,004
$ per m
0.41498
0
0.415
0.000
0.083
0.000
0.498
1.444
0.000
0.000
1.942
0.178
0.173
0.192
0 . 0 1 0
0.026
0.192 
0.010 
0.026 
0.028 
0.256
2.371
0.234
0.068
2.691 
0.000
2.691
0 . 0 2 0
2.710
0.271
2.981
0.000
0.596
3 .578
A 65
FIRM (A) REAL WAX, 1987: 
dollar/cedi rate
imp. raw matl. $ 
imp. pack matl. $ 
imported raw mat (1) 
imported pack mat(2) 
duty imported mat(3) 
other cost (local)(4) 
tot cst imp l+2+3+4=(5) 
percent duty on raw 
local r mat(6) 
local pack (7) 
transport handling(8)
tot C raw 5+6+7+8=(9)
direct labour(10)
cost fuel oil 
cost power 
cost water 
percent red in fuel 
percent red in power 
percent red in water 
fuel oil(lla) 
power(lib) 
water(11c)
spares replacement lid) 
sum 11
mat+lab 9+10+lla.d=(12) 
general admin (13) 
other o'heads(14) 
deliv sell exp (15,16) 
efficiency improvement 
total cost 12...16=(17a) 
efficiency saving 
tot cost incl.eff.(17b)
bank charges/int (18)
grand total 17(b)+18=(19)
profit margin % 
profit margin (20) 
ex-fac price 19+20=(21)
excise tax (percent) 
sales tax (percent) 
excise duty (22) 
sales tax (23)
,r.m.5%,s.t .15%,ex.0%, 
153
CEDIS/10.968m
696
0
35
0
731
5.00%
2,424
0
0
3,155
298
322
17
43
.00%
.00%
.00%
322
17
43
47
429
3,882
392
114
30
0.00%
4.418 
0
4.418 
33
4,451
10.00%
445
4,896
0.00%
15.00%
0
734
ex-fact pri+tax 21.23-(24) 5,631
$ per m
0.41498
0
0.415
0.000
0.021
0.000
0.436
1.444
0.000
0.000
1.880
0.178
0.192 
0.010 
0.026
0.192
0 . 0 1 0
0.026
0.028
0.256
2.313
0.234
0.068
2.633 
0.000
2.633
0 . 0 2 0
2.653
0.265
2.918
0.000
0.438
3.355
A 66
FIRM (A), REAL WAX , 1987:r.m.5%,s.t.15%,ex.0%,
dollar/cedi rate 153 f.30%,p.30%,
CEDIS/10.968m
imp. raw matl. $ 
imp. pack matl. $
imported raw mat (1) 696
imported pack mat(2) 0
duty imported mat(3) 35
other cost (local)(4) 0
tot cst imp l+2+3+4=(5) 731
percent duty on raw 5.00%
local r mat(6) 2,424
local pack (7) 0
transport handling(8) 0
tot c raw 5+6+7+8=(9) 3,155
direct labour(10) 298
cost fuel oil 322
cost power 17
cost water 43
percent red in fuel 30.00%
percent red in power 30.00%
percent red in water 20.00%
fuel oil(lla) 225
power(lib) 12
water(11c) 34
spares replacement(lid) 47
sum 11 318.7
mat+lab 9+10+lla.d=(12) 3,772
general admin (13) 392
other o'heads(14) 114
deliv sell exp (15,16) 30
efficiency improvement 5.00%
total cost 12...16=(17a) 4,308
efficiency saving 215
tot cost incl.eff.(17b) 4,093
bank charges/int (18) 3 3
grand total 17(b)+18=(19) 4,126
profit margin % 10.00%
profit margin (20) 413
ex-fac price 19+20=(21) 4,538
excise tax (percent) 0.00%
sales tax (percent) 15.00%
excise duty (22) 0
sales tax (23) 681
ex-fact pri+tax 21.23=(24) 5,219
.20%,ef.5%
$ per m
0.41498
0.415
0.000
0.021
0.000
0.436
1.444
0.000
0.000
1.880
0.178
0.192
0 . 0 1 0
0.026
0.134
0.007
0 . 0 2 0
0.028
0.190
2. 248 
0.234 
0.068
2.567
0.128
2.439
0 . 0 2 0
2.458
0.246
2.704
0.000
0.406
3.110
A 67
Firm (A), REAL WAX, 1987:d.30%,r.m5%,s.tl5%,ex.0%,r .i.t.2.5%
dollar/cedi rate 199 f.30%,p.30%,w.20%,ef.5%
imp. raw matl. $ 
imp. pack matl. $ 
imported raw mat (1) 
imported pack mat(2) 
duty imported mat(3) 
other cost (local)(4) 
tot cst imp l+2+3+4=(5) 
percent duty on raw 
local r mat(6) 
local pack (7) 
transport handling(8)
tot c raw 5+6+7+8=(9)
direct labour 
% red due to inc tax 
cost of labour (10)
cost fuel oil 
cost power 
cost water 
percent red in fuel 
percent red in power 
percent red in water 
fuel oil(lla) 
power(lib) 
water(11c)
spares replacement(lid) 
sum 11
CEDIS/10.968m
906
0
45
0
951
5.00%
2,424
0
0
3 ,375
298
2.50%
290.55
322 
17 
43 
30.00% 
30.00% 
2 0 . 0 0 %
225
12
34
47
318.7
$ per m
41498
0
415 
000 
021 
000 
436
1.111
0.000
0.000
1.546
0.137
0.133
0.148
0.008
0 . 0 2 0
0.103
0.005
0.016
0 . 0 2 2
0.146
mat+lab 9+10+lla.d=(12) 
general admin (13) 
other o'heads(14) 
deliv sell exp (15,16) 
efficiency improvement 
total cost 12...16=(17a) 
efficiency saving 
tot cost incl.eff.(17b)
bank charges/int (18)
grand total 17(b)+18=(19)
profit margin % 
profit margin (20) 
ex-fac price 19+20=(21)
excise tax (percent) 
sales tax (percent) 
excise duty (22) 
sales tax (23)
3 ,984 
392 
114 
30 
5.00% 
4,520 
226 
4,294
33
4,327
1 0 . 0 0 %
433
4,760
0.00%
15.00%
0
714
1.825
0.180
0.052
2.071
0.104
1.967
0.015
1.983
0.198
2.181
0.000
0.327
ex-fact pri+tax 21.23=(24) 5,474 2.508
A 68
FIRM (A) REAL WAX, 1988.
dollar/cedi rate 200
CEDIS/10.968m $ per m
imp. raw matl. $ 
imp. pack matl. $
imported raw mat (1) 1,020
imported pack mat(2) 0
duty imported mat(3) 153
other cost (local)(4) 0
tot cst imp l+2+3+4=(5) 1,173
percent duty on raw 15.00%
local r mat(6) 3,520
local pack (7) 0
transport handling(8) 0
tot c raw 5+6+7+8=(9) 4,693
direct labour(10) 287
cost fuel oil 253
cost power 21
cost water 160
percent red in fuel 0.00%
percent red in power 0.00%
percent red in water 0.00%
fuel oil(lla) 253
power(lib) 21
water(11c) 160
spares replacement(lid) 22
sum 11 456
mat+lab 9+10+lla.d=(12) 5,436
general admin (13) 370
other o'heads(14) 71
deliv sell exp (15,16) 30
efficiency improvement 0.00%
total cost 12...16=(17a) 5,907
efficiency saving 0
tot cost incl.eff.(17b) 5,907
bank charges/int (18) 14
grand total 17(b)+18=(19) 5,921
profit margin % 10.00%
profit margin (20) 592
ex-fac price 19+20=(21) 6,513
excise tax (percent) 0.00%
sales tax (percent) 25.00%
excise duty (22) 0
sales tax (23) 1,628
ex-fact pri+tax 21.23=(24) 8,141
0.465003
0.465
0.000
0.070
0.000
0.535
1.605
0.000
0.000
2.139
0.131
0.115
0.010
0.073
0.115
0 . 0 1 0
0.073
0 . 0 1 0
0.208
2.478
0.169
0.032
2.693 
0.000
2.693
0.006
2.699
0.270
2.969
0.000
0.742
3.711
A 69
FIRM (A) REAL WAX, 1988:dev.30%
dollar/cedi rate 260
CEDIS/10.968m $ per ra
imp. raw matl. $ 
imp. pack matl. $
imported raw mat (1) 1,326
imported pack mat(2) 0
duty imported raat(3) 199
other cost (local)(4) 0
tot cst imp l+2+3+4=(5) 1,525
percent duty on raw 15.00%
local r mat(6) 3,520
local pack (7) 0
transport handling(8) 0
tot c raw 5+6+7+8=(9) 5,045
direct labour(10) 287
cost fuel oil 253
cost power 21
cost water 160
percent red in fuel 0.00%
percent red in power 0.00%
percent red in water 0.00%
fuel oil(lla) 253
power(lib) 21
water(llc) 160
spares replacement(lid) 22
sum 11 456
mat+lab 9+10+lla.d=(12) 5,788
general admin (13) 370
other o'heads(14) 71
deliv sell exp (15,16) 30
efficiency improvement 0.00%
total cost 12...16=(17a) 6,259
efficiency saving 0
tot cost incl.eff.(17b) 6,259
bank charges/int (18) 14
grand total 17(b)+18=(19) 6,273
profit margin % 10.00%
profit margin (20) 627
ex-fac price 19+20=(21) 6,900
excise tax (percent) 0.00%
sales tax (percent) 25.00%
excise duty (22) 0
sales tax (23) 1,725
ex-fact pri+tax 21.23=(24) 8,625
0.465003
0.465
0.000
0.070
0.000
0.535
1.234
0.000
0.000
1.769
0.101
0.089
0.007
0.056
0.089
0.007
0.056
0.008
0.160
2.030
0.130
0.025
2.195 
0.000
2.195
0.005
2 . 2 0 0
0 . 2 2 0
2.420
0.000
0.605
3.025
A 70
Firm (A), REAL WAX, 1988:r.i.t.2.5%
dollar/cedi rate 200
CEDIS/10.968m
imp. raw matl. $ 
imp. pack matl. $
imported raw mat (1) 1,020
imported pack mat(2) 0
duty imported mat(3) 153
other cost (local)(4) 0
tot cst imp l+2+3+4=(5) 1,173
percent duty on raw 15.00%
local r mat(6) 3,520
local pack (7) 0
transport handling(8) 0
tot c raw 5+6+7+8=(9) 4,693
direct labour 287
% red due to inc tax 2.50%
cost of labour (10) 279.825
cost fuel oil 253
cost power 21
cost water 160
percent red in fuel 0.00%
percent red in power 0.00%
percent red in water 0.00%
fuel oil(11a) 253
power(lib) 21
water(11c) 160
spares replacement(lid) 22
sum 11 456
mat+lab 9+10+lla.d=(12) 5,429
general admin (13) 3 70
other o'heads(14) 71
deliv sell exp (15,16) 30
efficiency improvement 0.00%
total cost 12...16=(17a) 5,900
efficiency saving 0
tot cost incl.eff.(17b) 5,900
bank charges/int (18) 14
grand total I7(b)+18=(19) 5,914
profit margin % 10.00%
profit margin (20) 591
ex-fac price 19+20=(21) 6,505
excise tax (percent) 0.00%
sales tax (percent) 25.00%
excise duty (22) 0
sales tax (23) 1,626
ex-fact pri+tax 21.23=(24) 8,132
$ per m
0.465003
0
0.465
0.000
0.070
0.000
0.535
1.605
0.000
0.000
2.139
0.131
0.128
0.115
0.010
0.073
0.115
0 . 0 1 0
0.073
0 . 0 1 0
0.208
2.475
0.169
0.032
2.690 
0.000
2.690
0.006
2.696
0. 270 
2.966
0.000
0.741
3 . 707
A 71
FIRM (A) REAL WAX, 1988:r.m.5%,s.t.15%, ex.0%
dollar/cedi rate 200
CEDIS/10.968m $ per m
imp. raw matl. $ 
imp. pack matl. $
imported raw mat (1) 1,020
imported pack mat(2) 0
duty imported mat(3) 51
other cost (local)(4) 0
tot cst imp l+2+3+4=(5) 1,071
percent duty on raw 5.00%
local r mat(6) 3,520
local pack (7) 0
transport handling(8) 0
tot c raw 5+6+7+8=(9) 4,591
direct labour(10) 287
cost fuel oil 253
cost power 21
cost water 160
percent red in fuel 0.00%
percent red in power 0.00%
percent red in water 0.00%
fuel oil(lla) 253
power(lib) 21
water(11c) 160
spares replacement(lid) 22
sum 11 456
mat+lab 9+10+lla.d=(12) 5,334
general admin (13) 370
other o'heads(14) 71
deliv sell exp (15,16) 30
efficiency improvement 0.00%
total cost 12...16=(17a) 5,805
efficiency saving 0
tot cost incl.eff.(17b) 5,805
bank charges/int (18) 14
grand total 17(b)+18=(19) 5,819
profit margin % 10.00%
profit margin (20) 582
ex-fac price 19+20=(21) 6,401
excise tax (percent) 0.00%
sales tax (percent) 15.00%
excise duty (22) 0
sales tax (23) 960
ex-fact pri+tax 21.23=(24) 7,361
0.465003
0.465
0.000
0.023
0.000
0.488
1.605
0.000
0.000
2.093
0.131
0.115
0.010
0.073
0.115
0.010
0.073
0 . 0 1 0
0.208
2.432
0.169
0.032
2.646 
0.000
2.646
0.006
2.653
0.265
2.918
0.000
0.438
3.356
A 72
FIRM (A) REAL WAX, 1988:r.m.5%,s.t.15%, ex.0%,
dollar/cedi rate 200 f.30%,p.30%,w.20%, ef.5%
CEDIS/10.968m $ per m
imp. raw matl. $ 
imp. pack matl. $
imported raw mat (1) 1,020
imported pack mat(2) 0
duty imported mat(3) 51
other cost (local) (4) 0
tot cst imp l+2+3+4=(5) 1,071
percent duty on raw 5.00%
local r mat(6) 3,520
local pack (7) 0
transport handling(8) 0
tot C raw 5+6+7+8=(9) 4,591
direct labour(10) 287
cost fuel oil 253
cost power 21
cost water 160
percent red in fuel 30.00%
percent red in power 30.00%
percent red in water 20.00%
fuel oil(lla) 177
power(lib) 15
water(llc) 128
spares replacement(lid) 22
sum 11 341.8
mat+lab 9+10+lla.d=(12) 5,220
general admin (13) 370
other o'heads(14) 71
deliv sell exp (15,16) 30
efficiency improvement 5.00%
total cost 12...16=(17a) 5,691
efficiency saving 285
tot cost incl.eff.(17b) 5,406
bank charges/int (18) 14
grand total 17(b)+18=(19) 5,420
profit margin % 10.00%
profit margin (20) 542
ex-fac price 19+20=(21) 5,962
excise tax (percent) 0.00%
sales tax (percent) 15.00%
excise duty (22) 0
sales tax (23) 894
ex-fact pri+tax 21.23=(24) 6,857
0.465003
0.465
0.000
0.023
0.000
0.488
1.605
0.000
0.000
2.093
0.131
0.115
0 . 0 1 0
0.073
0.081
0.007
0.058
0 . 0 1 0
0.156
2.380
0.169
0.032
2.594
0.130
2.465
0.006
2.471
0.247
2.718
0.000
0.408
3.126
A 73
Firm (A), REAL WAX, 1988:d.30%,r,m5%,s.tl5%,ex.0%,r .i.t.2.5%
dollar/cedi rate 260 f.30%,p.30%,w.20%,ef.5%
CEDIS/10.968m $ per m
imp. raw matl. $ 
imp. pack matl. $
imported raw mat (1) 1,326
imported pack mat(2) 0
duty imported mat(3) 66
other cost (local)(4) 0
tot CSt imp l+2+3+4=(5) 1,392
percent duty on raw 5.00%
local r mat(6) 3,520
local pack (7) 0
transport handling(8) 0
tot C raw 5+6+7+8=(9) 4,912
direct labour 287
% red due to inc tax 2.50%
cost of labour (10) 279.825
cost fuel oil 253
cost power 21
cost water 160
percent red in fuel 30.00%
percent red in power 30.00%
percent red in water 20.00%
fuel oil(11a) 177
power(lib) 15
water(llc) 128
spares replacement(lid) 22
sum 11 341.8
mat+lab 9+10+lla.d={12) 5,534
general admin (13) 370
other o'heads(14) 71
deliv sell exp (15,16) 30
efficiency improvement 5.00%
total cost 12...16=(17a) 6,005
efficiency saving 300
tot cost incl.eff.(17b) 5,705
bank charges/int (18) 14
grand total 17(b)+18=(19) 5,719
profit margin % 10.00%
profit margin (20) 572
ex-fac price 19+20=(21) 6,291
excise tax (percent) 0.00%
sales tax (percent) 15.00%
excise duty (22) 0
sales tax (23) 944
ex-fact pri+tax 21.23=(24) 7,234
0.465003
0
0.465
0.000
0.023
0.000
0.488
1.234
0.000
0.000
1.723
0.101
0.098
0.089
0.007
0.056
0.062
0.005
0.045
0.008
0.120
1.941
0.130
0.025
2.106
0.105
2 . 0 0 0
0.005
2.005
0.201 
2. 206
0.000
0.331
2.537
A 74
FIRM (a), REAL WAX (2 colour way), 1990.
dollar/cedi rate 340
CEDIS/10.968m
imp. raw matl. $ 
imp. pack matl. $
imported raw mat (1) 3,300
imported pack mat(2) 0
duty imported mat(3) 495
other cost (local)(4) 9
tot cst imp l+2+3+4-(5) 3,803
percent duty on raw 15.00%
local r mat(6) 4,817
local pack (7) 11
transport handling(8) 94
tot c raw 5+6+7+8=(9) 8,725
direct labour(10) 99
cost fuel oil 392
cost power 48
cost water 214
percent red in fuel 0.00%
percent red in power 0.00%
percent red in water 0.00%
fuel oil(lla) 392
power(lib) 48
water(llc) 214
spares replacement(lid) 79
sum 11 733
mat+lab 9+l0+lla.d=(12) 9,557
general admin (13) 399
other o'heads(14) 232
deliv sell exp (15,16) 4
efficiency improvement 0.00%
total cost 12...16=(17a) 10,192
efficiency saving 0
tot cost incl.eff.(17b) 10,192
bank charges/int (18) 183
grand total 17(b)+18=(19) 10,375
profit margin % 10.00%
profit margin (20) 1,038
ex-fac price 19+20=(21) 11,413
excise tax (percent) 0.00%
sales tax (percent) 22.50%
excise duty (22) 0
sales tax (23) 2,568
ex-fact pri+tax 21.23=(24) 13,981
$ per m
0.8848
0.885
0.000
0.133
0 . 0 0 2
1.020
1.292
0.003
0.025
2.340
0.027
0.105
0.013
0.057
0.105
0.013
0.057
0.021
0.197
2.563
0.107
0.062
2.733 
0.000
2.733
0.049
2.782
0. 278 
3.061
0.000
0.689
3.749
A 75
FIRM (a), REAL WAX (2 colour way), 1990:d.30%
dollar/cedi rate 440
CEDIS/10.968m
imp. raw matl. $ 
imp. pack matl. $
imported raw mat (1) 4,270
imported pack mat(2) 0
duty imported mat(3) 640
other cost (local)(4) 9
tot cst imp l+2+3+4=(5) 4,919
percent duty on raw 15.00%
local r mat(6) 4,817
local pack (7) 11
transport handling(8) 94
tot c raw 5+6+7+8=(9) 9,841
direct labour(10) 99
cost fuel oil 392
cost power 48
cost water 214
percent red in fuel 0.00%
percent red in power 0.00%
percent red in water 0.00%
fuel oil(lla) 392
power(llb) 48
water(11c) 214
spares replacement(lid) 79
sum 11 733
mat+lab 9+10+lla.d=(12) 10,673
general admin (13) 399
other o,heads(14) 232
deliv sell exp (15,16) 4
efficiency improvement 0.00%
total cost 12...16=(17a) 11,308
efficiency saving 0
tot cost incl.eff.(17b) 11,308
bank charges/int (18) 183
grand total 17(b)+18=(19) 11,491
profit margin % 10.00%
profit margin (20) 1,149
ex-fac price 19+20=(21) 12,641
excise tax (percent) 0.00%
sales tax (percent) 22.50%
excise duty (22) 0
sales tax (23) 2,844
ex-fact pri+tax 21.23=(24) 15,485
$ per m
0.8848
0. 885 
0.000 
0.133 
0 . 0 0 2  
1.019
0.998
0 . 0 0 2
0.019
2.039
0.021
0.081
0.010
0.044
0.081
0 . 0 1 0
0.044
0.016
0.152
2.212
0.083
0.048
2.343 
0.000
2.343
0.038
2.381
0.238
2.619
0.000
0.589
3.209
A 76
FIRM (A) REAL WAX (2cw), 1990:r.i.t.2.5%
dollar/cedi rate 340
CEDIS/10.968m
imp. raw matl. $ 
imp. pack matl. $
imported raw mat (1) 3,300
imported pack mat(2) 0
duty imported mat(3) 495
other cost (local)(4) 9
tot cst imp l+2+3+4=(5) 3,803
percent duty on raw 15.00%
local r mat(6) 4,817
local pack (7) 11
transport handling(8) 94
tot c raw 5+6+7+8=(9) 8,725
direct labour 99
% red due to inc tax 2.50%
cost of labour (10) 96.525
cost fuel oil 392
cost power 48
cost water 214
percent red in fuel 0.00%
percent red in power 0.00%
percent red in water 0.00%
fuel oil(11a) 392
power(lib) 48
water(llc) 214
spares replacement(lid) 79
sum 11 733
mat+lab 9+10+lla.d=(12) 9,555
general admin (13) 399
other o/heads(14) 232
deliv sell exp (15,16) 4
efficiency improvement 0.00%
total cost 12...16=(17a) 10,190
efficiency saving 0
tot cost incl.eff.(17b) 10,190
bank charges/int (18) 183
grand total 17(b)+18=(19) 10,373
profit margin % 10.00%
profit margin (20) 1,037
ex-fac price 19+20=(21) 11,410
excise tax (percent) 0.00%
sales tax (percent) 22.50%
excise duty (22) 0
sales tax (23) 2,567
ex-fact pri+tax 21.23=(24) 13,978
$ per m
0.8848
0
0.885
0.000
0.133
0 . 0 0 2
1.020
1.292
0.003
0.025
2.340
0.027
0.026
0.105
0.013
0.057
0.105
0.013
0.057
0.021
0.197
2.562
0.107
0.062
2.733 
0.000
2.733
0.049
2.782
0.278 
3 .060
0.000
0 . 6 8 8
3 .748
A 77
FIRM (a), REAL WAX (2 cw) , 1990:r.m .5%,s.t.15%,ex.0%,
dollar/cedi rate 340
CEDIS/10.968m
imp. raw matl. $ 
imp. pack matl. $
imported raw mat (1) 3,300
imported pack mat(2) 0
duty imported mat(3) 165
other cost (local)(4) 9
tot cst imp l+2+3+4=(5) 3,474
percent duty on raw 5.00%
local r mat(6) 4,817
local pack (7) 11
transport handling(8) 94
tot C raw 5+6+7+8=(9) 8,396
direct labour(10) 99
cost fuel oil 392
cost power 48
cost water 214
percent red in fuel 0.00%
percent red in power 0.00%
percent red in water 0.00%
fuel oil(lla) 392
power(lib) 48
water(llc) 214
spares replacement(lid) 79
sum 11 733
mat+lab 9+10+lla.d=(12) 9,228
general admin (13) 399
other o'heads(14) 23 2
deliv sell exp (15,16) 4
efficiency improvement 0.00%
total cost 12...16~(17a) 9,863
efficiency saving 0
tot cost incl.eff.(17b) 9,863
bank charges/int (18) 183
grand total 17(b)+18=(19) 10,046
profit margin % 10.00%
profit margin (20) 1,005
ex-fac price 19+20=(21) 11,050
excise tax (percent) 0.00%
sales tax (percent) 15.00%
excise duty (22) 0
sales tax (23) 1,658
ex-fact pri+tax 21.23=(24) 12,708
per m
0.8848
0.885
0.000
0.044
0 . 0 0 2
0.931
1.292
0.003
0.025
2.251
0.027
0.105
0.013
0.057
0.105
0.013
0.057
0.021
0.197
2.474
0.107
0.062
2.645 
0.000
2.645
0.049
2.694
0.269
2.963
0.000
0.444
3.408
A 78
FIRM (A) REAL WAX (2cw), 1990:r.m.5%,s.t.15%,ex.0%,
dollar/cedi rate 340 f.30%,p.30%,w
CEDIS/10.968m
imp. raw matl. $ 
imp. pack matl. $
imported raw mat (1) 3,300
imported pack mat(2) 0
duty imported mat(3) 165
other cost (local)(4) 9
tot cst imp l+2+3+4=(5) 3,474
percent duty on raw 5.00%
local r mat(6) 4,817
local pack (7) 11
transport handling(8) 94
tot c raw 5+6+7+8=(9) 8,396
direct labour(10) 99
cost fuel oil 392
cost power 48
cost water 214
percent red in fuel 30.00%
percent red in power 30.00%
percent red in water 20.00%
fuel oil(lla) 274
power(lib) 34
water(11c) 171
spares replacement(lid) 79
sum 11 558.2
mat+lab 9+l0+lla.d=(12) 9,053
general admin (13) 3 99
other o'heads(14) 232
deliv sell exp (15,16) 4
efficiency improvement 5.00%
total cost 12...16=(17a) 9,688
efficiency saving 484
tot cost incl.eff.(17b) 9,203
bank charges/int (18) 183
grand total I7(b)+18=(19) 9,386
profit margin % 10.00%
profit margin (20) 939
ex-fac price 19+20=(21) 10,325
excise tax (percent) 0.00%
sales tax (percent) 15.00%
excise duty (22) 0
sales tax (23) 1,549
ex-fact pri+tax 21.23=(24) 11,874
.20%,ef.5%
$ per m
0.8848
0
0.885
0.000
0.044
0 . 0 0 2
0.931
1.292
0.003
0.025
2.251
0.027
0.105
0.013
0.057
0.074
0.009
0.046
0.021
0.150
2.428
0.107
0.062
2.598
0.130
2.468
0.049
2.517
0.252
2.769
0.000
0.415
3.184
A 79
FIRM (A) REAL WAX (2cw), 1990:d.30%,r.m.5%,s.t.15%,ex.0%,r.i.t
dollar/cedi rate 442 f.30%,p.30%,w.20%,ef.5%
imp. raw matl. $ 
imp. pack matl. $ 
imported raw mat (1) 
imported pack mat(2) 
duty imported mat(3) 
other cost (local)(4) 
tot cst imp l+2+3+4=(5) 
percent duty on raw 
local r mat(6) 
local pack (7) 
transport handling(8)
tot c raw 5+6+7+8=(9)
direct labour 
% red due to inc tax 
cost of labour (10)
cost fuel oil 
cost power 
cost water 
percent red in fuel 
percent red in power 
percent red in water 
fuel oil(lla) 
power(lib) 
water(11c)
spares replacement(lid) 
sum 11
CEDIS/10.968m
4,289
0
214
9
4,513 
5.00% 
4 ,817 
11 
94
9,435
99
2.50%
96.525
392
48
214
30.00%
30.00%
2 0 . 0 0 %
274
34
171
79
558.2
$ per m
0.8848 
0
885 
000 
044 
002  
931
0.994
0 . 0 0 2
0.019
1.946
0 . 0 2 0
0 . 0 2 0
0.081
0 . 0 1 0
0.044
0.057
0.007
0.035
0.016
0.115
mat+lab 9+10+lla.d=(12) 
general admin (13) 
other o'heads(14) 
deliv sell exp (15,16) 
efficiency improvement 
total cost 12...16-(17a) 
efficiency saving 
tot cost incl.eff.(17b)
bank charges/int (18)
grand total 17(b)+18=(19)
profit margin % 
profit margin (20) 
ex-fac price 19+20=(21)
excise tax (percent) 
sales tax (percent) 
excise duty (22) 
sales tax (23)
10,090
399
232
4
5.00%
10,725
536
10,188
183
10,371
1 0 . 0 0 %
1,037
11,408
0 . 0 0 %
15.00%
0
1,711
2.081
0.082
0.048
2.212
0.111
2.102
0.038
2.139
0.214
2.353
0.000
0.353
ex-fact pri+tax 21.23=(24) 13 ,120 2 .706
.2-5
A 80
FIRM (A) REAL WAX (2cw), 1990:r.m.0%,s.t.0%,ex.0%,
dollar/cedi rate 340 f.30%,p.30%,w.20%,ef.5%
imp. raw matl. $ 
imp. pack matl. $ 
imported raw mat (1) 
imported pack mat(2) 
duty imported mat(3) 
other cost (local)(4) 
tot cst imp l+2+3+4=(5) 
percent duty on raw 
local r mat(6) 
local pack (7) 
transport handling(8)
tot c raw 5+6+7+8=(9)
direct labour(10)
cost fuel oil 
cost power 
cost water 
percent red in fuel 
percent red in power 
percent red in water 
fuel oil(lla) 
power(lib) 
water(11c)
spares replacement(lid) 
sum 11
CEDIS/10.968m
3,300
0
0
9
3,309
0 . 0 0 %
4,817
11
94
8,231
99
392
48
214
30.00%
30.00%
2 0 . 0 0 %
274
34
171
79
558.2
$ per m
0.8848
0
885
000
000
002
887
1.292
0.003
0.025
2.207
0.027
0.105
0.013
0.057
0.074
0.009
0.046
0.021
0.150
mat+lab 9+10+lla.d=(12) 
general admin (13) 
other o'heads(14) 
deliv sell exp (15,16) 
efficiency improvement 
total cost 12...16=(17a) 
efficiency saving 
tot cost incl.eff.(17b)
bank charges/int (18)
grand total 17(b)+18=(19)
profit margin % 
profit margin (20) 
ex-fac price 19+20-(21)
excise tax (percent) 
sales tax (percent) 
excise duty (22) 
sales tax (23)
8 , 8 8 8
399
232
4
5.00%
9,523
476
9,047
183
9,230
1 0 . 0 0 %
923
10,153
0 . 0 0 %
0.00%
0
0
2.383
0.107
0.062
2.554
0.128
2.426
0.049
2.475
0.248
2.723
0.000
0.000
ex-fact pri+tax 21.23=(24) 10,153 2.723
A 81
FIRM (A) REAL WAX (2cw), 1990:d.30%,r.m.0%,s.t.0%,ex.0%,
dollar/cedi rate 442 f.30%,p.30%,w.20%,ef.5%
imp. raw matl. $ 
imp. pack matl. $ 
imported raw mat (1) 
imported pack mat(2) 
duty imported mat(3) 
other cost (local)(4) 
tot cst imp l+2+3+4=(5) 
percent duty on raw 
local r mat(6) 
local pack (7) 
transport handling(8)
tot c raw 5+6+7+8=(9)
direct labour(10)
cost fuel oil 
cost power 
cost water 
percent red in fuel 
percent red in power 
percent red in water 
fuel oil(lla) 
power(lib) 
water(lie)
spares replacement(lid) 
sum 11
roat+lab 9+l0+lla.d=(12) 
general admin (13) 
other o'heads(14) 
deliv sell exp (15,16) 
efficiency improvement 
total cost 12...16=(17a) 
efficiency saving 
tot cost incl.eff.(17b)
bank charges/int (18)
grand total 17(b)+18=(19)
profit margin % 
profit margin (20) 
ex-fac price 19+20=(21)
excise tax (percent) 
sales tax (percent) 
excise duty (22) 
sales tax (23)
CEDIS/10.968m
4,289
0
0
9
4,298
0.00%
4,817
11
94
9,220
99
392
48
214
30.00%
30.00%
2 0 . 0 0 %
274
34
171
79
558.2
9,878
399
232 
4
5.00' 
10,513 
526 
9,987
183
10,170
1 0 . 0 0 %
1,017
11,187
0.00%
0.00%
0
0
$ per m
0.8848 
0
0.885 
0.000 
0.000 
0 . 0 0 2  
0.887
0.994 
0 . 0 0 2  
0.019
1.902
0 . 0 2 0
0.081 
0.010 
0.044
0.057
0.007
0.035
0.016
0.115
2.038
0.082
0.048
2.169
0.108
2.060
0.038
2.098
0.210
2.308
0.000
0.000
ex-fact pri+tax 21.23=(24) 11,187 2. 308
A 82
FIRM (H), REAL WAX , 1986.
dollar/cedi rate 89
CEDIS/10.968m
imp. raw matl. $ 
imp. pack matl. $
imported raw mat (1) 1,527
imported pack mat(2) 0
duty imported mat(3) 305
other cost (local)(4) 150
tot cst imp l+2+3+4=(5) 1,982
percent duty on raw 20.00%
local r mat(6) 140
local pack (7) 58
transport handling(8) 22
tot C raw 5+6+7+8=(9) 2,202
direct labour(10) 499
cost fuel oil 145
cost power 60
cost water 87
percent red in fuel 0.00%
percent red in power 0.00%
percent red in water 0.00%
fuel oil(lla) 145
power(lib) 60
water(lie) 87
spares replacement(lid) 46
sum 11 338
mat+lab 9+10+lla.d=(12) 3,039
general admin (13) 50
other o'heads(14) 52
deliv sell exp (15,16) 21
efficiency improvement 0.00%
total cost 12...16=(17a) 3,162
efficiency saving 0
tot cost incl.eff.(17b) 3,162
bank charges/int (18) 8
grand total 17(b)+18=(19) 3,170
profit margin % 10.00%
profit margin (20) 317
ex-fac price 19+20=(21) 3,487
excise tax (percent) 15.00%
sales tax (percent) 10.00%
excise duty (22) 523
sales tax (23) 401
ex-fact pri+tax 2l.23=(24) 4,411
$ per m
1.56408
1.564
0.000
0.313
0.154
2.031
0.143
0.059
0.023
2.256
0.511
0.149
0.061
0.089
0.149 
0.061 
0.089 
0.047 
0. 346
3 .113 
0.051 
0.053
3.239 
0.000
3.239
0.008
3.248
0.325
3.572
0.536
0.411
4.519
A 83
FIRM (H), REAL WAX , 1986:d.30%
dollar/cedi rate 115.7
CEDIS/10.968ra
imp. raw matl. $ 
imp. pack matl. $
imported raw mat (1) 1,985
imported pack mat(2) 0
duty imported mat(3) 397
other cost (local)(4) 150
tot cst imp l+2+3+4=(5) 2,532
percent duty on raw 20.00%
local r mat(6) 140
local pack (7) 58
transport handling(8) 22
tot C raw 5+6+7+8=(9) 2,752
direct labour(10) 499
cost fuel oil 145
cost power 60
cost water 87
percent red in fuel 0.00%
percent red in power 0.00%
percent red in water 0.00%
fuel oil(lla) 145
power(llb) 60
water(11c) 87
spares replacement(lid) 46
sum 11 3 38
mat+lab 9+10+lla.d=(12) 3,589
general admin (13) 50
other o'heads(14) 52
deliv sell exp (15,16) 21
efficiency improvement 0.00%
total cost 12...16=(17a) 3,712
efficiency saving 0
tot cost incl.eff.(17b) 3,712
bank charges/int (18) 8
grand total 17(b)+18=(19) 3,720
profit margin % 10.00%
profit margin (20) 372
ex-fac price 19+20=(21) 4,092
excise tax (percent) 15.00%
sales tax (percent) 10.00%
excise duty (22) 614
sales tax (23) 471
ex-fact pri+tax 21.23=(24) 5,176
$ per m
1.56408
1.564
0.000
0.313
0.118
1.995
0.110
0.046
0.017
2.168
0.393
0.114
0.047
0.069
0.114
0.047
0.069
0.036
0.266
2.828
0.039
0.041
2.925 
0.000
2.925
0.006
2.931
0.293
3.224
0.484 
0. 371
4.079
A 84
Firm (H) REAl wax 1986:r.i.t.2.5%
dollar/cedi rate 89
CEDIS/10.968m
imp. raw matl. $ 
imp. pack matl. $
imported raw mat (1) 1,527
imported pack mat(2) 0
duty imported mat(3) 305
other cost (local)(4) 150
tot cst imp l+2+3+4=(5) 1,982
percent duty on raw 20.00%
local r mat(6) 140
local pack (7) 58
transport handling(8) 22
tot c raw 5+6+7+8=(9) 2,202
direct labour 499
% red due to inc tax 2.50%
cost of labour (10) 486.525
cost fuel oil 145
cost power 60
cost water 87
percent red in fuel 0.00%
percent red in power 0.00%
percent red in water 0.00%
fuel oil(lla) 145
power(lib) 60
water(11c) 87
spares replacement(lid) 46
sum 11 338
mat+lab 9+10+lla.d=(12) 3,027
general admin (13) 50
other o'heads(14) 52
deliv sell exp (15,16) 21
efficiency improvement 0.00%
total cost 12...16=(17a) 3,150
efficiency saving 0
tot cost incl.eff.(17b) 3 ,150
bank charges/int (18) 8
grand total 17(b)+18=(19) 3,158
profit margin % 10.00%
profit margin (20) 316
ex-fac price 19+20=(21) 3 ,473
excise tax (percent) 15.00%
sales tax (percent) 10.00%
excise duty (22) 521
sales tax (23) 399
ex-fact pri+tax 2l.23=(24) 4,394
$ per ra
1.56408
0
1.564
0.000
0.313
0.154
2.031
0.143
0.059
0.023
2.256
0.511
0.498
0.149
0.061
0.089
0.149
0.061
0.089
0.047
0.346
3.101
0.051
0.053
3.227 
0.000
3.227
0.008
3.235
0.323
3.558
0.534
0.409
4.501
A 85
FIRM (H), REAL WAX , 1986:r.m.5%,s.t!5%#ex.0%,
dollar/cedi rate 89
CEDIS/10.968m
imp. raw matl. $ 
imp. pack matl. $
imported raw mat (1) 1,527
imported pack mat(2) 0
duty imported mat(3) 76
other cost (local)(4) 150
tot cst imp l+2+3+4=(5) 1,753
percent duty on raw 5.00%
local r mat(6) 140
local pack (7) 58
transport handling(8) 22
tot c raw 5+6+7+8=(9) 1,97 3
direct labour(10) 499
cost fuel oil 145
cost power 60
cost water 87
percent red in fuel 0.00%
percent red in power 0.00%
percent red in water 0.00%
fuel oil(lla) 145
power(lib) 60
water(lie) 87
spares replacement(lid) 46
sum 11 3 38
mat+lab 9+10+lla.d=(12) 2,810
general admin (13) 50
other o'heads(14) 52
deliv sell exp (15,16) 21
efficiency improvement 0.00%
total cost 12...16=(17a) 2,933
efficiency saving 0
tot cost incl.eff.(17b) 2,933
bank charges/int (18) 8
grand total 17(b)+18=(19) 2,941
profit margin % 10.00%
profit margin (20) 294
ex-fac price 19+20=(21) 3,235
excise tax (percent) 0.00%
sales tax (percent) 15.00%
excise duty (22) 0
sales tax (23) 485
""ex-fact pri+tax 21.23=(24) 3,721
$ per m
1.56408
1.564
0.000
0.078
0.154
1.796
0.143
0.059
0.023
2.021
0.511
0.149
0.061
0.089
0.149
0.061
0.089
0.047
0.346
2.879
0.051
0.053
3 .005 
0.000 
3.005
0.008
3.013
0.301
3.314
0.000
0.497
3.811
A 86
FIRM (H), REAL WAX , 1986:r.m.5%,s.tl5%;ex.0%,
dollar/cedi rate 89 f.30%,p.30%,w.20%,
CEDIS/10.968m
imp. raw matl. $ 
imp. pack matl. $
imported raw mat (1) 1,527
imported pack mat(2) 0
duty imported mat(3) 76
other cost (local)(4) 150
tot CSt imp l+2+3+4=(5) 1,753
percent duty on raw 5.00%
local r mat(6) 140
local pack (7) 58
transport handling(8) 22
tot c raw 5+6+7+8=(9) 1,973
direct labour(10) 499
cost fuel oil 145
cost power 60
cost water 87
percent red in fuel 30.00%
percent red in power 30.00%
percent red in water 20.00%
fuel oil(lla) 101
power(lib) 42
water(lie) 70
spares replacement(lid) 46
sum 11 259.1
mat+lab 9+10+lla.d=(12) 2,731
general admin (13) 50
other o'heads(14) 52
deliv sell exp (15,16) 21
efficiency improvement 5.00%
total cost 12...16=(17a) 2,854
efficiency saving 143
tot cost incl.eff.(17b) 2,712
bank charges/int (18) 8
grand total 17(b)+18=(19) 2,720
profit margin % 10.00%
profit margin (20) 272
ex-fac price 19+20=(21) 2,991
excise tax (percent) 0.00%
sales tax (percent) 15.00%
excise duty (22) 0
sales tax (23) 449
ex-fact pri+tax 21.23=(24) 3,440
ef .5%
$ per m
1.56408
1.564
0.000
0.078
0.154
1.796
0.143
0.059
0.023
2.021
0.511
0.149
0.061
0.089
0.104
0.043
0.071
0.047
0.265
2.798
0.051
0.053
2.924
0.146
2.778
0.008
2.786
0.279
3.065
0.000
0.460
3.524
A 87
Firm (H) REA1 wax 1986:d.30%,r.m5%,s.tl5%,ex.0%,r. i
dollar/cedi rate 115.7 f.30%,p.30%,v
CEDIS/10.968m
imp. raw matl. $ 
imp. pack matl. $
imported raw mat (1) 1,985
imported pack mat(2) 0
duty imported mat(3) 99
other cost (local)(4) 150
tot cst imp l+2+3+4=(5) 2,234
percent duty on raw 5.00%
local r mat(6) 140
local pack (7) 58
transport handling(8) 2 2
tot c raw 5+6+7+8=(9) 2,454
direct labour 499
% red due to inc tax 2.50%
cost of labour (10) 486.525
cost fuel oil 145
cost power 60
cost water 87
percent red in fuel 30.00%
percent red in power 30.00%
percent red in water 20.00%
fuel oil(lla) 101
power(lib) 42
water(11c) 70
spares replacement(lid) 46
sum 11 259.1
mat+lab 9+10+lla.d=(12) 3,200
general admin (13) 50
other o'heads(14) 52
deliv sell exp (15,16) 21
efficiency improvement 5.00%
total cost 12...16=(17a) 3,323
efficiency saving 166
tot cost incl.eff.(17b) 3,157
bank charges/int (18) 8
grand total 17(b)+18=(19) 3,165
profit margin % 10.00%
profit margin (20) 316
ex-fac price 19+20=(2l) 3,481
excise tax (percent) 0.00%
sales tax (percent) 15.00%
excise duty (22) 0
sales tax (23) 522
ex-fact pri+tax 21.23=(24) 4,003
.t.2.5%
.20%,ef.5%
$ per m
1.56408
0
1.564
0.000
0.078
0.118
1.760
0.110
0.046
0.017
1.934
0.393
0.383
0.114
0.047
0.069
0 .080 
0.033 
0.055 
0.036 
0. 204
2.521
0.039
0.041
2.618
0.131
2.487
0.006
2. 494
0.249
2.743
0.000
0.411
3.155
A 88
FIRM (C), JAVA, 1987.
dollar/cedi rate 153
CEDIS/10.968m
imp. raw matl. $ 
imp. pack matl. $
imported raw mat (1) 971
imported pack mat(2) 0
duty imported mat(3) 117
other cost (local)(4) 25
tot cst imp l+2+3+4=(5) 1,112
percent duty on raw 12.00%
local r mat(6) 2,3 59
local pack (7) 18
transport handling(8) 10
tot c raw 5+6+7+8=(9) 3,499
direct labour(10) 306
cost fuel oil 100
cost power 41
cost water 60
percent red in fuel 0.00%
percent red in power 0.00%
percent red in water 0.00%
fuel oil(ila) 100
power(lib) 41
water(11c) 60
spares replacement(lid) 32
sum 11 233
mat+lab 9+l0+lla.d=(12) 4,038
general admin (13) 109
other o'heads(14) 278
deliv sell exp (15,16) 37
efficiency improvement 0.00%
total cost 12...16=(17a) 4,462
efficiency saving 0
tot cost incl.eff.(17b) 4,462
bank charges/int (18) 0
grand total 17(b)+18=(l9) 4,462
profit margin % 10.00%
profit margin (20) 446
ex-fac price 19+20=(2l) 4,909
excise tax (percent) 0.00%
sales tax (percent) 20.00%
excise duty (22) 0
sales tax (23) 982
ex-fact pri+tax 21.23=(24) 5,890
$ per m
0.5786
0.579
0.000
0.069
0.015
0.663
1.406
0.011
0.006
2.085
0.182
0.060
0.024
0.036
0.060
0.024
0.036
0.019
0.139
2.407
0.065
0.166
2.659 
0.000
2.659
0.000
2.659
0.266
2.925
0.000
0.585
3.510
A 89
FIRM (C), JAVA, 1987:d.30%
dollar/cedi rate 199
CEDIS/10.968m
imp. raw matl. $ 
imp. pack matl. $
imported raw mat (1) 1,263
imported pack mat(2) 0
duty imported mat(3) 152
other cost (local)(4) 25
tot cst imp l+2+3+4-(5) 1,439
percent duty on raw 12.00%
local r mat(6) 2,359
local pack (7) 18
transport handling(8) 10
tot c raw 5+6+7+8=(9) 3,826
direct labour(10) 3 06
cost fuel oil 100
cost power 41
cost water 60
percent red in fuel 0.00%
percent red in power 0.00%
percent red in water 0.00%
fuel oil(lla) 100
power(lib) 41
water(llc) 60
spares replacement(lid) 32
sum 11 233
mat+lab 9+10+lla.d=(12) 4,365
general admin (13) 109
other o'heads(14) 278
deliv sell exp (15,16) 37
efficiency improvement 0.00%
total cost 12...16=(17a) 4,789
efficiency saving 0
tot cost incl.eff.(17b) 4,789
bank charges/int (18) 0
grand total 17(b)+18=(19) 4,789
profit margin % 10.00%
profit margin (20) 479
ex-fac price 19+20=(21) 5,268
excise tax (percent) 0.00%
sales tax (percent) 20.00%
excise duty (22) 0
sales tax (23) 1,054
ex-fact pri+tax 21.23=(24) 6,322
$ per m
0.5786
0.579
0.000
0.069
0.011
0.659
1.081
0.008
0.005
1.753
0.140
0.046
0.019
0.027
0.046
0.019
0.027
0.015
0.107
2 . 0 0 0
0.050
0.127
2.194 
0.000
2.194
0.000
2.194
0.219
2.414
0.000
0.483
2.897
A 90
Firm (C) JAVA, 1987:r.i.t.2.5%
dollar/cedi rate 153
CEDIS/10.968m
imp. raw matl. $ 
imp. pack matl. $
imported raw mat (1) 971
imported pack mat(2) 0
duty imported mat(3) 117
other cost (local)(4) 25
tot cst imp l+2+3+4=(5) 1,112
percent duty on raw 12.00%
local r mat(6) 2,359
local pack (7) 18
transport handling(8) 10
tot C raw 5+6+7+8=(9) 3,499
direct labour 306
% red due to inc tax 2.50%
cost of labour (10) 298.35
cost fuel oil 100
cost power 41
cost water 60
percent red in fuel 0.00%
percent red in power 0.00%
percent red in water 0.00%
fuel oil(11a) 100
power(lib) 41
water(11c) 60
spares replacement(lid) 3 2
sum 11 233
mat+lab 9+10+lla.d=(12) 4,031
general admin (13) 109
other o,heads{14) 278
deliv sell exp (15,16) 37
efficiency improvement 0.00%
total cost 12 . . . 16=s( 17a) 4,455
efficiency saving 0
tot cost incl.eff.(17b) 4,455
bank charges/int (18) 0
grand total I7(b)+18=(19) 4,455
profit margin % 10.00%
profit margin (20) 445
ex-fac price 19+20=(21) 4,900
excise tax (percent) 0.00%
sales tax (percent) 20.00%
excise duty (22) 0
sales tax (23) 980
ex-fact pri+tax 21.23=(24) 5,880
$ per m
0.5786
0
0.579 
0 . 000 
0.069 
0.015 
0.663
1.406
0.011
0.006
2.085
0.182
0.178
0.060
0.024
0.036
0.060
0.024
0.036
0.019
0.139
2.402
0.065
0.166
2.655 
0.000
2.655
0.000
2.655
0.265
2.920
0.000
0.584
3.504
A 91
FIRM (C), JAVA, 1987:r.m.5%,s.t.l5%,ex.o%
dollar/cedi rate 153
CEDIS/10.968m
imp. raw matl. $ 
imp. pack matl. $
imported raw mat (1) 971
imported pack mat(2) 0
duty imported mat(3) 49
other cost (local)(4) 25
tot cst imp l+2+3+4=(5) 1,044
percent duty on raw 5.00%
local r mat(6) 2,359
local pack (7) 18
transport handling(8) 10
tot c raw 5+6+7+8=(9) 3,431
direct labour(10) 306
cost fuel oil 100
cost power 41
cost water 60
percent red in fuel 0.00%
percent red in power 0.00%
percent red in water 0.00%
fuel oil(11a) 100
power(llb) 41
water(llc) 60
spares replacement(lid) 32
sum 11 2 33
mat+lab 9+10+lla.d=(12) 3,970
general admin (13) 109
other o'heads(14) 278
deliv sell exp (15,16) 37
efficiency improvement 0.00%
total cost 12...16=(17a) 4,394
efficiency saving 0
tot cost incl.eff.(17b) 4,394
bank charges/int (18) 0
grand total 17(b)+18=(19) 4,394
profit margin % 10.00%
profit margin (20) 439
ex-fac price 19+20=(21) 4,834
excise tax (percent) 0.00%
sales tax (percent) 15.00%
excise duty (22) 0
sales tax (23) 725
ex-fact pri+tax 2l.23=(24) 5,559
$ per m
0.5786
0.579
0.000
0.029
0.015
0.622
1.406
0.011
0.006
2.045
0.182
0.060
0.024
0.036
0.060
0.024
0.036
0.019
0.139
2.366
0.065
0.166
2.619 
0.000
2.619
0.000
2.619
0.262
2.881
0.000
0.432
3.313
A 92
FIRM (C), JAVA, 1987:r.m.5%,s.t.l5%,ex.o%
dollar/cedi rate 153 f.30%,p.30%,w.20%,
CEDIS/10.968m
imp. raw matl. $ 
imp. pack matl. $
imported raw mat (1) 971
imported pack mat(2) 0
duty imported mat(3) 49
other cost (local)(4) 25
tot cst imp l+2+3+4=(5) 1,044
percent duty on raw 5.00%
local r mat(6) 2,359
local pack (7) 18
transport handling(8) 10
tot c raw 5+6+7+8=(9) 3,431
direct labour(10) 306
cost fuel oil 100
cost power 41
cost water 60
percent red in fuel 30.00%
percent red in power 30.00%
percent red in water 20.00%
fuel oil(11a) 70
power(lib) 29
water(llc) 48
spares replacement(lid) 32
sum 11 178.7
mat+lab 9+10+lla.d=(12) 3,916
general admin (13) 109
other o'heads(14) 278
deliv sell exp (15,16) 37
efficiency improvement 5.00%
total cost 12...16=(17a) 4,340
efficiency saving 217
tot cost incl.eff.(17b) 4,123
bank charges/int (18) 0
grand total 17(b)+18=(19) 4,123
profit margin % 10.00%
profit margin (20) 412
ex-fac price 19+20=(21) 4,536
excise tax (percent) 0.00%
sales tax (percent) 15.00%
excise duty (22) 0
sales tax (23) 680
ex-fact pri+tax 21.23=(24) 5,216
ef. 5%
$ per m
0.5786
0.579
0.000
0.029
0.015
0.622
1.406
0.011
0.006
2.045
0.182
0.060
0.024
0.036
0.042
0.017
0.029
0.019
0.106
2.334
0.065
0.166
2.586
0.129
2.457
0.000
2.457
0.246
2.703
0.000
0.405
3.108
A 93
Firm (C) JAVA, I987:d.30%,r.m5%,s.tl5%,ex.0%,r.i.t.2.5%
dollar/cedi rate 199 f.30%,p.30%,w.20%,ef.5%
CEDIS/10.968m $ per m
imp. raw matl. $ 
imp. pack matl. $ 
imported raw mat (1) 
imported pack mat(2) 
duty imported mat(3) 
other cost (local)(4) 
tot cst imp l+2+3+4=(5) 
percent duty on raw 
local r mat(6) 
local pack (7) 
transport handling(8)
tot c raw 5+6+7+8=(9)
direct labour
'% red due to inc tax
cost of labour (10)
cost fuel oil 
cost power 
cost water 
percent red in fuel 
percent red in power 
percent red in water 
fuel oil(lla) 
power(lib) 
water(11c)
spares replacement(lid) 
sum 11
0.5786
0
1,263
0
63
25
1,351
5.00%
2,359
18
10
3,738
306
2.50%
298.35
100
41
60
30.00%
30.00%
2 0 . 00 %
70
29
48
32
178.7
579
000
029
011
0.619
1.081
0.008
0.005
1.713
0.140
0.137
0.046
0.019
0.027
0.032
0.013
0 . 0 2 2
0.015
0.082
mat+lab 9+10+lla.d=(12) 
general admin (13) 
other o'heads(14) 
deliv sell exp (15,16) 
efficiency improvement 
total cost 12...16=(17a) 
efficiency saving 
tot cost incl.eff.(17b)
bank charges/int (18)
grand total 17(b)+18=(19)
4,215
109
278
37
5.00?
4,639
232
4,407
4,407
1.931
0.050
0.127
2.125
0.106
2.019
0.000
2.019
profit margin % 10.00%
profit margin (20) 441
ex-fac price 19+20=(21) 4,848
excise tax (percent) 0.00%
sales tax (percent) 15.00%
excise duty (22) 0
sales tax (23) 727
ex-fact pri+tax 21.23-(24) 5,575
0 . 2 0 2
2.221
0.000
0.333
2.554
A 94
